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About the British Association for Korean Studies

The British Association for Korean Studies (BAKS) was founded in 1987 as a forum to host conferences and workshops on Korean Studies around the UK. At such events, papers have been presented on a wide range of subjects including archaeology, art, economics, literature, politics, and society. BAKS continues to hold annual conferences, sometimes in partnership with her sister organisations, The British Association for Chinese Studies (BACS) and The British Association for Japanese Studies (BAJS).

Papers of the British Association for Korean Studies (BAKS Papers) was founded in 1991 to publish the editorially approved transactions of the then annual conferences of the Association. The journal for several years actively solicited submissions from outside the conferences as well. Fifteen volumes were published, the final two issues digitally.

Initially the quality of *BAKS Papers* was maintained by an internal editorial board and the editor. Since Volume 14 (2012), *BAKS Papers* became a fully peer-reviewed journal. There was established an external editorial board of 20 international scholars covering a range of areas within the humanities and the social sciences. The Editorial Board is under the leadership of the Editor. There are prescribed rules for the examination of submissions and regulations for writers making a submission. Just under half of the submissions (including external submissions) were rejected for publication in Volume 15 (2013).

Since its inception in the late 1980s, the *Papers of the British Association for Korean Studies* has focussed on modern and contemporary Korea but has not neglected traditional culture and history. For example, Volume 5 (1994) was a special issue devoted to archaeology and material culture. The journal has published other special issues, such as Volume 6, which focused on 'Nationality and Nationalism in East Asia', reflecting the Association's broader interests in contemporary East Asia, and Volume 14 (2012), which focussed on British witnesses to the social, cultural, political and economic changes in late twentieth-century Korea.

About the *European Journal of Korean Studies*

At the General Meeting for The British Association for Korean Studies in London on 9 September 2016, the Association decided to re-launch *Papers of the British Association for Korean Studies* (BAKS Papers) as the *European Journal of Korean Studies*.

The new name better reflects the existing breadth of the editorial board as well as the extensive range of submissions that result from expanded offerings on Korean Studies across the European continent, including Great Britain. Using our experience gained in publishing the *BAKS Papers* over the last 25 years, we are delighted to relaunch the publication as a Europe-wide journal dedicated to Korean Studies.

BAKS Papers has been blind, peer-reviewed since volume 15, and the *European Journal of Korean Studies* will carry on being blind, peer-reviewed. The new *Journal* will be published twice a year, rather than just annually. It is the only English-language journal in Europe devoted to the broad field of Korean Studies, and we hope that it will become the show-case journal for the outstanding work on Korea being done in Europe.

First published in 1991 and originally available in printed format, *Papers of the British Association for Korean Studies* (informally known as *BAKS Papers*) is now available on-line through the Association's website. Articles are indexed with SCOPUS and SSCI. Volumes 1–16 are available for download, as future issues of the *European Journal of Korean Studies* will be as well. Since Volume 17 (1) the *European Journal of Korean Studies* is available again in print. The *Journal* is free to BAKS members and those who want copies can access them on www.ejks.org.uk or contact Robert Winstanley-Chesters: treasurer@baks.org.uk

Editors

Adam Cathcart, Editor in Chief
Robert Winstanley-Chesters, Managing Editor

Editor's Note

In April 2018 the leaders of North and South Korea met at the truce village of Panmunjom to rededicate a small pine tree which had been planted in 1953 to mark the signing of the famous armistice. As cameras clicked and whirred, the two heads of state placed soil on the tree's roots from Paektusan and Hallasan, mountains at the extreme north and south of the peninsula and fed the tree with water sourced from Han and Taedong Rivers.[1] The powerful geomantic energies from these quintessentially Korean topographies, it was hoped, would reinforce and revitalise connections between the two estranged nations. This issue of the *European Journal of Korean Studies* can hardly be compared to such an intricate act of diplomatic coordination, although both have required an extensive level of communication and negotiation behind the scenes. However, the publication of this issue of the journal does mark a similar moment of transplantation, and an acknowledgment of the importance of rootedness, as we complete a period of five years and seven issues during which the journal has been housed administratively at the University of Leeds.

2020 marks a change for the journal in that it from the next issue, Volume 20.1, will be housed at the Wolfson College, University of Oxford, where Professor James Lewis will take up the position of Chief Editor of the journal. Robert Winstanley-Chesters will provide continuity and stay on as Managing Editor of the journal, providing a steady hand over all the many bureaucratic and intellectual gears—including the peer review process—that keep the engine of the journal humming and active. Adam Cathcart concludes his five-year term as Editor in Chief of the journal having been 'present at the creation' of its transformation from the *Papers of the British Association for Korean Studies* (BAKS Papers), into the *European Journal of Korean Studies* and having supported its transition into a new era. The Academy of Korean Studies has generously elected to continue funding the journal as it moves from Leeds to Oxford, and this support has been vital to the expansion of our work.

In the six months since our previous issue was published, the *European Journal of Korean Studies* has achieved a number of new milestones, in addition to the renewed Academy of Korean Studies funding. In October 2019, we were informed that our application for listing on SCOPUS had been successful. In February 2020, we were also informed that the journal in future would be listed by Clarivate

1 This introduction has been adapted from Robert Winstanley-Chesters, 'Spatializing Imagined Moments of Korean Unification: Arboreal and Topographic Charisma on April 27, 2018' in *SN Korean Humanities*, vol. 5 (2), September, 2019, pp. 38–58.

Analytics on SSCI and Web of Science. These are very helpful not just for the journal's visibility and an indicator of our regular production of quality content, but also because for staff at Korean and other universities, these are markers of importance and rigor and should increase further the attractiveness of the *European Journal of Korean Studies* for academics as a target for the publication of peer-reviewed outputs. We are also members of Crossref and all our articles have doi numbers to support integration in other citation and indexing systems such as Google Scholar. Subscribing institutions to the journal can now also access our web platform and archive through our reliable and table IP authentication service, compatible with EZ Proxy and other authentication providers.

And now to the outputs for this issue:

As a previous editor of BAKS Papers, the predecessor journal to the European Journal of Korean Studies, Keith Howard continues to produce voluminous and stimulating work on music on both Koreas. As this volume went to press, he was celebrating the completion and publication of his ground-breaking history of North Korean music, *Songs for Great Leaders*, for Oxford University Press. This issue of the journal is privileged to have a special section edited by Professor Howard, who has prepared a diverse yet unified set of papers on the subject of North Korean popular culture. What may strike the reader upon encountering this matrix of articles is less the difficulty of gathering data from North Korea than the wide range and application of social science approaches to the extensive amount of data produced by the state, its institutions, and North Korean interactions with neighboring states. Pekka Korhonen and Toomori Mori's paper on the Samjiyon Orchestra lays out a web of institutional linkages and functions served by a key ensemble used in inter-Korean diplomacy in 2018, contributing to diplomatic history, cultural studies and North Korean studies thereby. While the 'soft power' elements of North Korean music have played a role in the global spread of North Korean tunes in karaoke as well as the draw of foreign tourists, argues Alexandra Leonzini, the state also seeks to control and harness the potentially problematic aspects of reproducing music in the karaoke spaces (including private homes) in Pyongyang and around the DPRK. Peter Moody looks back at North Korea's history in the Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il periods of leadership, innovatively braiding together a broader history of socialist consumerism along with song analysis. Rowan Pease carves a portrait of a bicultural Korean and Chinese patriotic composer for whom a type of celebration has emerged in recent years, grown out of a wide-ranging research project which included interviewing the composer's family members. Additional papers in the special section include conceptual treatments of North Korea's film industry from Hwy-Chang Moon and Wenyan Yin, all handsomely prefaced by a piece by Keith Howard on the very

notion of a 'popular culture' in a North Korean media landscape in which nearly all cultural production is mediated by the state and its shifting goals.

Additional papers in the issue include a fascinating consideration from Konkuk University's Farrah Sheikh of the online construction and shaping of Korean Muslim identity. There are also two detailed and intriguing papers addressing female experience at different moments in Korean history, one exploring the experience of Korean Picture Brides in Hawaii during the colonial period from Hwang Yuh Jyung and the other examining the processes of 'Housewifization' during the reign of Park Chung-hee. Professor Phillip Shon of Ontario Tech offers a fascinating and rare comparative consideration of the crime of Parricide between Korean and American contexts. Finally, we are very pleased to offer a Research Note by Ernest Leung of the Chinese University of Hong Kong, a young scholar of colonial Korean history whom we believe will be adding richly to future scholarly debates on the history of Northeast Asia; he provides readers with a rich and detailed interrogation of Japanese influences on Korean Socialist roots and legacies. The Editors of the *European Journal of Korean Studies* feel that the format and venue of the Research Note provides an extra and alternative option for authors and graduate students which has really contributed empirical value over the last few issues and which we will continue to use and experiment with in future.

In addition to these valuable articles we also feature in this issue a phalanx of book reviews of current work, some of which we feel has been underrated or is not widely accessible. In particular we want to flag up a review by Professor Mark Caprio of a Festschrift dedicated to the late Hilary Conroy, a double review by AhRan Ellie Bae of two books by Kinoshita Takao and Hatano Setsuko focused on Korean literary figures with complicated Japanese pasts, and a review from Professor Kevin Gray of a new edited volume from Yonsei University Press whose editors are Professor John Delury and Chung-in Moon. Our bibliophile tendencies are always rewarded with the contribution of book reviews to the journal, and we value suggestions from readers for reviews of neglected or unexpected works.

Finally as we begin to raise up our roots and move across the landscape once more, just as Tolkien did to Oxford and his Ents did in *The Lord of the Rings*, we would like to thank once more the School of History at the University of Leeds, and in particular Michelle Ridge and Simon Ball in the Office of Research, and the successive two Heads of School Andrea Major and Simon Hall, for having hosted the journal's budget and for interfacing extensively not just but with our generous funder, the Academy of Korean Studies. It is a *bon voyage* of sorts, but the proverbial tree of scholarly debate and production continues to grow and, dear readers, we will look forward to your ongoing interaction with and support of the journal.

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1 The digital version of *European Journal of Korean Studies*, Volume 19.2 will also feature a review by Balazs Szalontai of Korea University. It has not been possible due to production and timescale issues for this review to be included in the printed version of Volume 19.2, but it will appear in the printed version of Volume 20.1 in October 2020. Please visit our website at www.ejks.org.uk to read this review.

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Bill Skillend Prize 2019

The British Association of Korean Studies (BAKS) is delighted to announce that the 2019 prize for best undergraduate dissertation in Korean studies in a UK higher education institution (HEI) was awarded to **Corliss Luong at the University of Sheffield** for the thesis entitled **The Origins and Adoption of the Concept of *Han* in Korean Traditional Music**. The thesis is well-researched displaying a sophisticated, conceptual and analytical structure that was impressively persuasive in the force and quality of the argumentation.

Similarly to last year, the submissions covered a wide range of disciplines, once again suggesting the breadth and vitality of Korean studies in UK higher education. Topics included Korean nationalism and Japanese colonialism, contemporary Korean fashion in the global fashion market, the sexual health of North Korean women living in South Korea and soft power and the Korean wave.

The diversity and quality of submissions represents a serious commitment to research throughout the Korean studies community in the UK. We as always use this opportunity to request all academic colleagues to advertise widely the prize this year in your departments.

The prize is named for the late Professor Bill Skillend, who was a pioneer in the study of Korean language and literature and responsible for the introduction of its instruction in Britain. BAKS would also like to acknowledge Dr. James Hoare, whose generous donation made the award possible.

Hazel Smith PhD FRSA
BAKS Committee member
Professorial Research Associate, School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London
Professor Emeritus, Cranfield University, UK
Visiting Fellow, The Wilson Center for International Scholars, Washington DC

Special Section: North Korean Popular Culture

KEITH HOWARD Professor Emeritus, SOAS University of London

Exploring the popular culture of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) is no easy task and, in terms of the available literature, the field appears to be in its infancy. One reason for this may be because definitions of 'popular culture' tend to employ notions of consumption based on the contemporary West. In reality, though, wherever it is used, 'popular culture', no less than 'classical' or 'folk', is discursive in character. It marks, in a broad sense, products created by or reflecting historical, social, political and cultural forces, but beyond that things get murky. Some argue it characterizes products that are ever-changing and which champion novelty, but others identify in it formulaic cultural production that has inherited industrial techniques of mass production—little different to 'any colour provided it's black' Model T Fords. Popular culture can oppose and challenge the mainstream and dominant power structures, reflecting sub-cultural allegiances and affiliations. But, it has also been embraced and used by many totalitarian regimes, both fascist or communist. In its variety, it can be said to comprise an unruly collection of moments and eruptions, but also to reflect the sensibilities of a given—typically youthful—generation. Many are critical about the role industry plays in its creation, and some, following Marx, reject its capitalist identity along with the consumerism involved in its dissemination. Others follow Walter Benjamin, accepting it as belonging to an age of mass reproduction but considering that it offers spaces in which those willing to adhere to its strictures are given opportunities to prosper.

John Lent, in his introduction to *Asian Popular Culture*, takes a familiar approach. He allies the popular to high-tech information and entertainment, sharing the appeal of Western cultural artefacts or embraced through tourism and

EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF KOREAN STUDIES, VOLUME 19, NO. 2 (2020), pp. 1–6.

consumption (1995, 1–4). He follows commentators who link popular culture to the emergence of market economies—which arguably takes us back to Montaigne and Pascal in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (Lowenthal 1950) even if, more recently, this characterizes discourse on the mass media. Many who follow this approach consider popular culture to be trivial, undemanding, bland and repetitive. This was how the English poet and critic Matthew Arnold characterized new cultural forms emanating from America back in 1869, and during the twentieth century much the same was said about the rise of Hollywood and, to paraphrase Richard Hoggart (1958), the proliferation of sex and violence novels, spicy magazines, candy floss, and juke box favourites. In this approach, popular culture is considered a threat to both local but populist 'folk' and widely disseminated but elitist 'classical' traditions. Indeed, in its levelling-down, its exponents are held to have little regard for regional distinctiveness: 'bad stuff drives out the good, since it is more easily understood and enjoyed' (MacDonald 1953, 14; see also Hebdige 1988, chapter 3).

A more promising approach for us here considers popular culture to have local particularity. Fabian Holt writes that '[c]ategories of popular [culture] are particularly messy because they are rooted in vernacular discourse, in diverse social groups … and because they are destabilized by shifting fashions and the logic of modern capitalism' (2007, 14). This contrasting approach has at its roots the rise of eighteenth-century nationalism and national consciousness, and shows awareness of how folk culture was harnessed as national culture (as discussed by, for example, Burke 1978). Raymond Williams sets out how over time national culture moved from being produced by the people to something controlled by those in power (1976, 199). The overlap between national culture and mass culture became more apparent during the twentieth century as those who ruled sought to use it, through ever-greater circulation, to broadcast propaganda as well as morality. On the other side, though, censorship was employed to limit the undesirable. Popular music has often been positioned in the cross-hairs. The Soviet writer and political activist Maxim Gorky, writing in *Pravda* on 18 April 1928, remarked: 'Having listened to the caterwauling for a minute or two, one comes, willy-nilly, to the conclusion that this must be an orchestra of mental cases, driven mad by a carnal fixation' (cited in MacFadyen 2002, 1). And, later, Khrushchev: 'We are against cacophonic music … there is music that makes one feel like vomiting, and causes colic in one's stomach' (cited in Slominsky 1971, 1377–8). Still, the attraction of wide circulation led the Soviet Union to promote *estrada* as an acceptable form of popular music (Stites 1992, MacFadyen 2001), and from the 1990s onwards post-Soviet states such as Uzbekistan continued to promote *estrada*, albeit adding updated versions of local traditions (Klenke 2019).

In my recent book (Howard 2020, 243–4), I offer a few examples of how, from the mid twentieth-century onwards, authoritarian states such as Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Albania and China embraced popular music, and cite an East German minister who remarked in 1955 that popular music should not be left to people to develop as they wish, but that state intervention should ensure its ideological purity and appropriateness (attempts to control popular music are, of course, not confined to communist and totalitarian states). In 1985, the American Parents Music Resource Center succeeded in limiting sales of 'extreme' metal, mandating labels on records that carried the warning 'Parental Advisory: Explicit Lyrics'; there is also a famous example in *The Times* from 16 July 1816 where the waltz came in for criticism: 'So long as this obscene display was confined to prostitutes and adulteresses, we did not think it deserving of notice; but now it is attempted to be forced on the respectable classes of society … we feel it is a duty to warn every parent against exposing his daughter to so fatal a contagion.'[1] It is perhaps pertinent as we approach North Korea that some literature has argued that control from above, wherever encountered, imposes a fantasy, an escape from reality, and that control, because it maintains and reproduces a prevailing power structure, leads to an impoverishment of production (see, for example, Maltby 1989).

Holt's mention of vernacular discourse is a reaction against the view that, because popular culture is considered to have initially developed in the West, so its global dissemination is associated with a deterritorialization of production—mapping Deleuze and Guattari's *Thousand Plateaus* (1987) to Arjun Appadurai (1990)—in which the local is subject to a levelling down as it is subsumed by Western hegemonic forms. The last three decades has seen a reassessment of this, arguing for the reterritorialization of cultural production. Closely associated with the writings of the cultural studies' theorist John Tomlinson (e.g., 1991), this has particular resonance in East Asia. Partly, there has been a recognition of the success of Japan's *kaizen* philosophy: during its reconstruction after the end of World War II, Japan absorbed Western products, improved them, and then successfully re-exported them back to the West in culturally odourless (*mukokuseki*) forms. South Korea has proved itself adept at adapting this philosophy to popular culture in, for example, TV dramas, films, and pop music (Jung 2011), and most recently in webtoons (Oh and Koo 2019). Partly, though, the reassessment reflected an increase in Geertzian thick description, as observations of consumption revealed vernacular interpretations that refracted the popular culture imported from the West: the TV soap *Dallas*, thus, resonated with audiences distant from any experience of Texas (Ien Ang 1982). And, the phenomenon of glocalization—how East Asian cultural products mix local elements with overtly Western forms—has begun to be discussed (starting with Iwabuchi [2002] and Parks and Kumar [2003]).

In investigating North Korean popular culture, we must surely look to the vernacular, in so far as this reflects local interpretations that are politically, culturally, or socially determined. It is always a remote possibility that one will find something 'authentic' or 'pure', based on supposedly universal or objective aesthetic judgements, but to attempt to do so in North Korea surely misses the point: control of all production by North Korea's state organs does not allow space for dissent, for novelty, or for sub-cultural associations and affiliations among either or both producers or consumers. This follows classic Marxism, which has it that the people do not see themselves as exploited by the mechanics of control and the top-down production. Rather, they have entered into definite and necessary relationships with that production, since it corresponds both to the development of the state and what they experience in their daily lives. Hence, because North Korea adopts and adapts on its own terms, imposing criteria and understandings of popular culture generated by and from Western experience will reveal little. I do not deny that the standardized account which comes out of Pyongyang is monolithic and puritanical; it is controlled by ranks of censors and ideologues to ensure consistency and block any hint of dissent from within, and to tell only what it has been decided can be known to those of us in the world outside what Suk-Young Kim (2010) has argued is a 'theatrical state'. The account neglects to mention what has been adopted and adapted, and while we have to get beyond what the state tells us, we face, in Sandra Fahy's words, a 'phenomena of access without access, telling without telling, truth without truth, information without information' (2019, 15).

Since we are not allowed unfettered access to creators and consumers, creating ethnographies, or, indeed, conducting fieldwork, is problematic, and the result is that we must read tea-leaves as we seek to document our subject. Still, and despite the many journalists who argue to the contrary, North Korea is not unknown. So, the articles assembled here use many and varied way to interpret the tea-leaves, from video imaging and contemporary news reports, through historical records, through discussions with pertinent individuals—whether the wife and daughter of a composer in China or consumers of *karaoke* in Pyongyang and beyond—to analyses of music and film production. Taken together, this small set of articles can only create tiny ripples on the still surface of the water, but they do illustrate that there is a breadth of materials now available for study. They also reveal that many diverse academic approaches may be employed, from critical/cultural studies, through ethnomusicology and anthropology, to area studies and history. Simply stated, our hope is that these small contributions will create ripples, encouraging others to look more closely at North Korean popular culture, in any and all of its manifestations.

Peter Moody opens the proceedings, expanding the understanding of consumption within socialist states by looking at the relationship between

consumption and North Korea's cult of personality surrounding Kim Il Sung. He uses popular songs through to the 1960s as his lens, and asks how lyrics and form, and dissemination, reinforced exhortations about the leadership and promoted state policies. Rowan Pease interrogates issues of identity, taking as her subject films produced both in North Korea and China that celebrate a single composer: Zheng Lücheng/Chŏng Ryulsŏng. Born in Kwangju in the southwest of the Korean peninsula, active in the 1930s among the anti-Japanese forces in China and then at the centre of Maoist cultural policy in Yan'an, he composed key marches for both the communist Chinese and North Korean regimes. Zheng/Chŏng became a national icon, but took on multiple identities. He is celebrated in both South Korea and China, but differently, and in North Korea elements of his life were appropriated and recast to serve Kim's leadership cult. Third, Pekka Korhonen and Tomoomi Mori explore a recent North Korean phenomenon, the Samjiyon Orchestra. This orchestra's members became cultural diplomats at the Pyeongchang Winter Olympic Games in 2018, and the authors delve into its history and its records—in print literature, and in audio and video materials promoted through social media channels—to explore the changing function and status of music and musical groups within recent and contemporary North Korea.

The fourth essay, by Hwy-Chang Moon and Wenyan Yin, adopts the global value chain model to analyse North Korea's international film co-productions. The authors delineate patterns of internationalization, the use of locations and human resources, and the boundaries imposed on foreign partners working in Pyongyang. They divide their consideration into three chronological periods, and ask what North Korea might learn from the experiences of Chinese filmmakers. Finally, Alexandra Leonzini offers an ethnographic account of a cultural phenomenon—*karaoke*—and the North Korean state's tolerance and suppression of it. Informed by participant observation, and working with named foreigners and anonymous Koreans, Leonzini assesses how a global form has gained a vernacular identity, one that is made more than fun and more than a site of cultural production as it is rendered constructive rather than reflective of the social reality of life for North Koreans and foreigners in Pyongyang and among North Koreans working or residing outside the northern part of the Korean peninsula.

Note

1. The Danish organization Freemuse, who some years ago asked me to write a report on censorship in North Korea, devotes itself to campaigning for artistic freedom. See freemuse.org.

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From Production to Consumption: The Socialist Realism/Personality Cult Divide in North Korean Popular Music

PETER MOODY PhD student, Columbia University[1,2]

Abstract

While several historical works have explored the notion of 'communist consumption' especially in regards to Eastern European countries, few have looked at the relationship between consumption and the personality cult in a place like North Korea where the state has tended to respond to material shortages with ideological campaigns. This paper uses the lens of popular music to re-conceptualize the notion of consumption as not simply about "how much one consumes" but instead "what kind of things one consumes" and the consequent relation to state objectives for the national economy and political control.

From around the time of the state founding in 1948 to the mid-1960s, North Korean music was largely in line with transnational principles of socialist realism, stressing the utilization of local folk forms and the tying of them lyrically to messages of industriousness and socialist construction. However, from the late 1960s when the leadership personality cult kicked into high gear, music simultaneously embraced more outside forms of music while at the same time exhibiting lyrical themes that associated particular items and experiences with a new national heritage centered on exhortations to revere Kim Il Sung and members of his family. The result was a shift in emphasis from exhibiting virtue through production to promoting loyalty through practices of consumption, and this gave impetus to the light music genre in popular music.

Keywords: consumption, distribution, light music, personality cult, popular culture, socialist realism

Introduction

> Yoho! Potato, Potato, King Potato!
> I really, really love it,
> I can't eat all of it,
> Delicious like white rice, the Taehongdan potato!

The above lyrics are from the song "Taehongdan Potato" ("*Taehongdan Kamja*"), which can be heard in a widely circulated YouTube video[3] featuring a young girl singing about a 'king potato.' The song came out of the so-called potato revolution which began in 1998 at the height of the North Korean famine. To respond to the famine, the state had launched an initiative to bring men who had just completed their military service (as well as women to join them) to Taehongdan Country, an inhospitable northern part of the country, for the purpose of growing potatoes.[4] Notable about the song is that it places much more emphasis on the consumption of potatoes than the production of them.[5] This may have to do with the fact that there were already material incentives (including new homes and colour televisions) for people to move north to the county and engage in potato agricultural production.[6] Rather than a work song to encourage production, then, this song appears to incentivize something else: consuming potatoes, which the North Korean regime had some success in cultivating but were not universally liked.

The "Taehongdan Potato" song's emphasis on consumption is not an isolated phenomenon. There have also been songs about receiving one's ration of potatoes ("Potato Pride")[7] and national staple foods such as Pyongyang *naengmyŏn* cold noodles ("Pyongyang Raengmyŏn is the Best").[8] The prominence of consumption in these songs raises questions about the objectives and tactics of ideological campaigns in state socialist regimes when it comes to matters of production and consumption. While initiatives to stimulate production are an indispensable part of any analysis of agriculture and industry in state socialism, consumption has not received the same treatment.

Tatiana Gabroussenko has looked at the theme of consumption in North Korea, seeing the food imagery from the Potato Revolution as a renovation of "the official discourse of socialist prosperity" that mobilized "earthly, materialist symbols" to maintain loyalty in the midst of the food crisis of the late 1990s.[9] In an earlier work, Gabroussenko further notes the prevalence of images of feasts in early North Korean literature, a feature she says was rare in the Soviet Union during the Stalinist period.[10] Yet as Karen Petrone reveals, in the 1930s, the Soviet government made sure there were lavish display of food and consumer goods during holiday periods in years of limited resources in order to convey a sense of prosperity and a bright future. Petrone uses the term "discourse of plenty" to

refer to this phenomenon. With limited knowledge about the conditions of the rest of the world at the time, this practice led to many Soviet citizens believing that they were better off than the rest of Europe.[11]

In one sense then, the 'discourse of plenty' can serve to veil and/or distract from a reality of under-consumption. Journalist Barbara Demick appears to take this position in her book *Nothing to Envy*. In a moving account from her text, a North Korean defector recalls the worst period of the famine in South Hamgyong province in 1998, when he saw a young boy who was facing starvation yet was singing the song "Nothing to Envy" ("*Saesang e burŏm ŏpsŏra*") with its lyrics "Our house is within the embrace of the Workers Party / We are all brothers and sisters … / We have nothing to envy in the world."[12] While the song is not directly about consuming things, implicit within its title, "We envy nothing in the world," is the notion of at least material sufficiency. The music video for the song, after all, features scenes of multi-colored amusement park rides and young children in line to receive wrapped presents, which paints a picture of material goods and prosperity.[13]

The recurrence of consumption as a point of emphasis in state discourse can also be explained in relation to what many scholars call 'late socialism'[14]—when the socialist states in Eastern Europe responded to the challenge of increasing exposure to capitalist societies and illicit, informal practices of exchange by investing in and highlighting domestic consumer items. The contributors to the volume *Communism Unwrapped: Consumption in Cold War Eastern Europe* provide numerous examples of communist countries engaging in consumer endeavor as a kind of "flexibility, even creativity, in [systems] … generally seen as stagnant and stultified."[15]

In this complex engagement with capitalist technologies, methods, and aesthetics, Western capitalist technologies were deployed and "woven tightly into local innovations/techniques and visions of communist futures."[16] While North Korean society today may or may not be at a stage that earns the label of "late socialism," the bottom-up markets that resulted from the collapse of the Public Distribution System (PDS) during the 1994–1998 famine have indeed led to the phenomenon where the state aims to domesticate consumption practices.[17] One can see this today in practices such as the establishment and supervision of retail-sales outlets.[18]

But communist states have highlighted practices of consumption for some time, and production and consumption have long been thematically linked. For every planting season there is, after all, a harvest, and the incentive of the harvest is inseparable from the ideological exhortations to engage in production as an experience in itself. As Suzy Kim points out, the emphasis on consumption in

state socialist societies dates back at least as far as the 1930s in the Soviet Union when the state's emphasis on cultural life, "stressed private life and individual consumption as the path to a modern, rational, cultured Soviet everyday life."[19] In the North Korean context, Kim sees repeated references to *saenghwal*, or "the act of living," in the early years of the North Korean state as part of a move to bring about a "total revolution in life" that would involve all aspects of the everyday including production at the workplace and consumption at home.[20] Examining how much emphasis is placed on labor and how much is placed on the fruit of that labor in state propaganda can reveal shifting priorities and tactics by the state to ensure compliance with its objectives and sustain itself over time.

This essay re-conceptualizes the notion of consumption as not simply about how much one consumes but instead what kind of things one consumes and the relation of this to state objectives for the national economy and political control. While not explicitly making the case that North Korea had a consumer society in its early period, it argues that from the 1960s, there was a marked shift from themes of production to themes of consumption in song lyrics, and that this was part of a state objective to homogenize peasants and industrial workers into a single working class. The drive to homogenize the population was a response to a perceived crisis in agricultural production that was blamed on peasants for not having the vigor and collective consciousness of industrial workers. By featuring and glorifying particular experiences of consumption, the state could bring its political objectives into the realm of everyday experience and in the process carve out a new North Korean identity that all could attain regardless of occupation. This identity began with members of the industrial working class who could utilize technology for the sake of producing for the entire community, but evolved into more of soldiers who modeled their experiences around the Manchurian guerrilla experiences of Kim Il Sung and his family members in their resistance against Japanese imperialism.

This transition involved a gradual move away from a cultural climate of trans-national socialist realism towards that of a popular culture that was an integral part of the personality cult of Kim Il Sung. What this means in the context of music is that the utilization of local folk forms of music and the tying of them lyrically to messages of industriousness and socialist construction gave way to the embrace of updated popular forms of music and lyrical themes that associated particular items and experiences with devotion to members of the Kim family. The result was a shift in emphasis from exhibiting virtue through production to exhibiting loyalty through practices of consumption, and this gave rise to popular music and popular culture more broadly on a separate trajectory from the kinds of popular culture found in capitalist societies.

Setting the Stage: A Brief Economic History of North Korea Until the 1970s

Right from the time of liberation from Japanese colonialism in 1945 and subsequent Soviet military occupation, the priorities of North Korean economic planners were harnessing the productive potential of the industrial landscape left behind by the Japanese (made up of factories and hydroelectric power facilities) and increasing food production. For the former aspiration, the still embryonic North Korean government, in the form of the North Korean Provisional People's Committee, moved towards nationalization of industry in August 1946, which resulted in the confiscation of 90% of factories and enterprises, most of which were previously held by the Japanese.[21] In contrast, the Provisional People's Committee did not seek to nationalize or collectivize agricultural at first. Instead, it enacted the Agrarian Reform Law which created an owner-cultivation system that involved confiscating land from landowners of more than 12 acres and distributing it to the farmers working on that land, most of whom did not own any themselves. Although there was a 25% tax-in-kind on crops, this was much lower than the tenancy rent that farmers had previously been paying.[22] This Land Reform policy therefore brought legitimacy to the government among the peasant population and at the same time had its intended effect of expanding agriculture with a 40% growth in grain production by the end of the decade.[23] As for people's daily consumptive needs, in January of 1948, the People's Committee established a graded system of grain rationing based on the type of work people did.[24]

As one might imagine, the Korean War (1950–1953) brought challenges in terms of food and industrial production as well as distribution of food. This was in no small part due to the bombing campaign by the UN side, which resulted in a gutting of North Korean hydroelectric power facilities and a number of other industrial sites as well. Also, to pay for weaponry, North Korea had to export a number of its key industrial products as well as large amounts of grains and rice to the Soviet Union.[25] And as Balázs Szalontai has brought to light, foreign diplomats to North Korea learned in 1952 certain parts of the country were experiencing famine, which was compounded by US bombings on irrigation facilities in April 1953 only a few months before the signing of the armistice.[26]

At the same time, the dislocation and chaos the war brought about also presented a window of opportunity for the state to initiate a gradual process of agricultural collectivization (i.e. state-enforced consolidation of private farms into communally run enterprises). As Cheehyung Harrison Kim has pointed out, war assistance to damaged farmland was the "roadway to the state's appropriation of the private means of production owned by the farmers."[27] Additionally,

the state was able to increase its own holdings of farms and orchards from 16 to 213 after the owners of them fled to the South and was also able to use the war as pretext to confiscate land from those deemed subversive.[28] The purpose of the agricultural collectivization was to put agriculture and heavy industry into a symbiotic relationship, in which agriculture would provide foodstuffs and raw materials to the heavy industries which would in turn provide tools and machinery to the agricultural areas to make their work more efficient and less labor-intensive.

Instead of adopting an equal emphasis on light and heavy industrial development as followers of the Soviet Union were advocating for at the time, the North Korea regime prioritized heavy industry for it was seen as the means to ensure an independent economy over the long term.[29] Accordingly in the seven-year period following the Korean War (1954–1961), North Korean launched the Three Year and Five Year Plans during which propaganda focused heavily on glorifying industrial work and the labor heroes who fulfilled production targets in extraordinary circumstances. Cheehyung Harrison Kim calls this the time of North Korea's "production regime," when there was a "coming together of the ruling-party, policy-and law-making organs, trade unions and cultural and artistic organizations all with the single aim of increasing production."[30] The Three Year Plan (1953–1956) focused largely on reconstruction from the devastation of the Korean War, while the subsequent Five Year Plan, which began in 1957, prioritized rapid heavy industrial development. To bring the Five Year Plan into fruition, the North Korean regime launched the Chollima (Thousand Li Horse) workteam movement, a socialist competition model, using the symbol of a horse that could speedily travel a long distance to encourage workers to produce much in a short period of time.[31]

By 1960, North Korea had transitioned from a predominantly agricultural economy to a predominantly industrial one. We can see this in the fact that "[t]he ratio of industry and agriculture in society's total output was reversed from 59.1% in agriculture and 23.2% in industry in 1946 to 23.6% in agriculture and 57.1% in industry in 1960."[32] This was largely due to the heavy industrial focus of the 1957 Five Year Plan, which despite its harsh implementation, saw impressive gains in industrial production.[33] Following the Five Year Plan (which was declared complete a year ahead of schedule), the perception of a lag in agriculture vis-à-vis industry motivated the North Korean state to initiate the Seven Year Plan, which began in 1961 and involved moving beyond an obsession with heavy industry to putting equivalent weight on light industrial[34] and agricultural production. However, in the first few years of this plan, there were problems: first, the limited domestic market was not driving economic growth sufficiently and, secondly, the

goal of improving people's economic lives by means of developing light industry and agricultural production was not reached.[35]

The *Theses on the Socialist Rural Question in Our Country* (hereafter referred as the *Rural Theses*) authored by Kim Il Sung and adopted by the Workers' Party of Korea in 1964 was the proposed remedy for responding to this two-sided problem of lagging agricultural production and lagging peasant demand for industrial goods.[36] This remedy was the three-pronged technical, cultural, and ideological revolutions. The technical revolution aimed to increase agricultural yields and relieve peasants of the burdens of previous forms of labor by enhancing agricultural practices related to irrigation, mechanization, chemicalization and agricultural science. The cultural revolution aimed to "liquidate all backward ways of living and customs" and provide peasants with the technical knowledge needed to effectively utilize transformed agricultural practices. The means for doing this were constructing new schools, sending engineer advisors to work teams, and implementing mass cultural work. Finally, the ideological revolution aimed to root out the last vestiges of the old exploitation system by elevating enthusiasm for the principles of collectivism, patriotism for the socialist fatherland, proletarian internationalism, love of labor, and revolutionary optimism.[37]

It is within the discussion of the cultural revolution that the text walks a fine line between upholding the principle of a worker-peasant alliance and disparaging the lifestyle and mindset of the peasants. We can see from the goal to "liquidate all backward ways of living and customs and building a hygienic and cultured way of life" that Kim Il Sung and others in support of the *Socialist Rural Theses* were as interested in transforming daily life and consumption practices as they were in transforming production practices.[38] One very poignant example of what the cultural revolution was to look like in practice was the move to make the age-old "practice of carrying a water jar on the head … that had been a big burden for village women" completely disappear as a result of bringing running water to the countryside.[39]

Accompanying the *Socialist Rural Theses* with their emphasis on invigorating the productive capacity of the countryside was a growing signaling of material as well as ideological incentives. As Andrei Lankov notes, North Korea's practices of distribution have not only involved rationing but by the 1960s and 1970s had taken the form of leaders granting presents on special days to special individuals for their loyalty to the leader and/or state. Presents have ranged from the commonplace (fresh fruit and sweets) to the luxurious (television sets and wristwatches).[40] Additionally, beginning in the 1960s, there was at least a rhetorical move toward consumption. To build support for the Seven Year Plan, Kim promised that people would "lead a life of plenty … live in tile-roofed houses, eat rice and meat, and

wear silk clothes."[41] Finally in 1962, the North Korean government convened the highly publicized Changsong Conference, which laid out a vision for local consumer goods industries to thrive under the operation of a centrally-based Light Industrial Commission.[42]

Should we interpret these new developments as a move from a production regime to a 'consumption regime'? Such a notion would contradict North Korea's history of repeated periods of shortages in industrial and agricultural goods. In actual material terms, the reality for many North Koreans may not have been much different from the Korean War period—which Cheehyung Harrison Kim sees involving a "rhetoric of anti-consumption," where people were exhorted to reduce food consumption and limit the acquisition of new material goods.[43] Another way to approach the consumption question is to move beyond a production/consumption binary and look at the features and practices of everyday life that involved both. One area in which to do this is to look at housing: although housing was a place of leisure and rest from the workplace, and therefore an act of consumption, it "helped people find harmony with industrial demands and spatial efficiency" as Cheehyung Harrison Kim puts it, and therefore "played an indispensable role in the process of reproducing the means of production."[44] While Cheehyung Harrison Kim sees the consumption of housing in the 1950s as an extension of the production regime, it may be helpful to envision North Korea in the 1960s as more of a "distribution regime." After all, the professed goal of the *Socialist Rural Theses* was to direct and mobilize particular practices of consumption as well as production in a process of homogenizing the population. And because practices of consumption such as eating were universal (in contrast to the production procedures of different forms of employment), the act of consumption (at the receiving end of distribution) become more prominent in cultural material than it had previously been.

By the mid-1960s, North Korea had branched out from prioritizing heavy industry to a focus on other sectors with the Seven Year Plan prioritizing agriculture along with the production of light industrial consumer goods such as plastic, nylon, and Vinalon (a synthetic fiber and cotton substitute that was invented by a Korean during the Japanese colonial period).[45] In terms of how successful the plan was for agricultural production, interpretations by present-day scholars of North Korea are mixed. Chong-Ae Yu points to the constantly increasing grain production from the mid-1960s to the 1980s to argue that the industrialization of agriculture was largely achieved.[46] Hy-sang Lee, on the other hand, concludes that the implementation of the plan was "stillborn," because the much-proposed investment was not carried out and was diverted to a military buildup in response to the Cuban Missile Crisis and political upheavals in South Korea.[47] As far as consumer goods

are concerned, the fact that the Seven Year Plan had to be extended three years suggests that its targets were not met.

The concept of the three revolutions however endured and was the impetus behind the Three Revolutions Team Movement which was launched in 1974. This campaign involved dispatching students and other reliable members to the countryside as well as the factories to instill in workers, many of them older, new technological approaches for enhancing efficiency in production and a new revolutionary consciousness.[48] Immanuel Kim, who has written about North Korean literature in the 1970s, considers the Three Revolutions Team Movement the “intellectualization of the people” because of its goals in transforming manual laborers into skilled laborers and its approach of not glamorizing manual laborers, but instead criticizing them for being stuck in the past.[49] It was also the political legacy of the North Korean economic strategy of early 1970s: to import capital goods on credit from Western European countries and Japan (typically one plant and its corresponding machinery per industry) and then imitate the technology for the purpose of constructing more plants. Unfortunately for the North Koreans, the 1973 global oil crisis shrunk demand for its main export item, nonferrous metals, which led to them not being able to pay back the debt they incurred from this technological importation strategy.[50] As a result, the drive to import technology from abroad ended for the most part in 1975.[51]

The mobilization of the general population to engage in countryside labor, however, continued and became one of the major components of the Second Seven Year Plan (1978–1984). As we shall see, in the midst of this attempt to elevate peasant consciousness upward to the working class and send members of the working and revolutionary classes (such as technicians and the children of war victims) downward to assist in countryside labor, there was a gradual shift in propaganda themes from exhorting hard work to lauding the benefits of the North Korean socialist system and exhorting loyalty to it. It is that transition in cultural production which we turn to in the following two sections.

Socialist Realist Music in North Korea’s Production Regime

To give impetus to the economic stagecraft discussed in the previous section, the early North Korean state relied on cultural production that was largely based on the transnational ideascape of Socialist Realism. The official, formalized definition of this art and ideological movement that came out of the First Socialist Writers Conference in the Soviet Union in 1934 was: “a truthful, historically concrete representation of reality in its revolutionary development … that must be combined with the task of ideologically remaking and training the laboring people

in the spirit of socialism."[52] Andrei Zhdanov, who was the first to introduce the concept at the conference, portrayed it as a kind of revolutionary romanticism that would highlight the heroic deeds of the working class while at the same time truthfully depicting their everyday struggle.[53] For literature, there were specific requirements for what this was to entail, including that of a positive hero who throughout the course of a novel was supposed to move from a state of spontaneity and self-centeredness to one of discipline and consciousness that reflected the directives of the party.[54] For other forms of art such as music, the parameters for what was acceptable were more ambiguous but included certain overarching principles like optimism, party spirit (in support of what the party's objectives were at any given time),[55] and popular spirit (resonating with the local people in a simple way they could digest and relate to).[56]

Socialist realism is a contentious topic in the field of North Korean Studies, with Brian Myers, in particular, arguing that North Korean cultural production, under the legacy of writer and cultural administrator Han Sŏrya, abandoned its tenets for the most part by the early 1960s (when Han was purged). Myers justifies this position by highlighting tendencies he finds prevalent, such as patrimonial ethnocentrism as opposed to working-class Marxist-Leninist ideology, pastoralism as opposed to industrialization, and the prevalence of protagonists characterized by their simple, spontaneous nature (*sobakham* in Korean) as opposed to positive heroes who move from spontaneity to disciplined consciousness.[57] Myers makes a number of salient points regarding Han's literary work and exposes a level of ambiguity regarding the role socialist realism played in literature, but he barely takes into account the transnational process that Hilary Chung refers to as "the continual redefinition of socialist realism to accommodate national identity and local conditions," which makes it "impossible to provide a single formula which can be applied across domains and decades."[58] A look at North Korean sources from its early period lends credence to this assessment. While there is a certain amount of deference to proponents of socialist realism like Maxim Gorky (whose novel *Mother* was declared a model work to be emulated), and key Soviet phrases of principles such as "describing reality within its revolutionary development,"[59] there is also an acknowledgement and insistence that socialist realism can manifest itself in different ways depending on time and location. As one article from September 1956 in the journal *Chosŏn Yesul* (North Korean Arts) puts it, "because socialist realism is a historical phenomenon that arose from a stage of socialist development, it develops and is applied to suit the circumstances and particular qualities of each nation and nationality."[60]

In addition to the dimension of party spirit, in which invigorating a working spirit is involved, there was also the popular spirit imperative regarding the

creative process of a writer or artist. One article from the *Rodong Sinmun* party newspaper in 1957 makes this clear by calling out doctrinaire Marxist-Leninists for not realizing that true theory is not the unity of formality but the unity of action, warning that "one can take the tenets of socialist realism too literally but that ends up as formalism." The article later states that "researching life and describing it in its revolutionary development are the important principles of socialist realism which involves experiencing life with the people and reflecting on this relationship."[61] The priority placed on process over product reflects what Keith Howard describes as the "filtering [of] Andrei Zhdanov's Soviet Socialist Realism through Mao Zedong's Talks at the [1942] Yan'an Forum [for Literature and Art]."[62] It was at this historic forum that Mao articulated Soviet principles of socialist realism (which was called Proletarian Realism in China at the time), yet deviated somewhat from them by downgrading the superior position of professional writers, compelling them to go out and learn directly from workers, peasants and soldiers.[63] As part of this principle, Mao instructed music specialists to "pay attention to the songs of the masses," so they could maintain a close connection with them and guide them.[64]

From 1946 to at least the early 1960s, Kim Il Sung called on musicians, composers and performers to implement both party spirit and popular spirit by making use of national traditions but at the same time avoiding entertaining for entertainment's sake in a way that was not revolutionary. For instance, in 1954, he called for "correctly distinguish[ing] what is progressive and popular in our national culture legacy from what is backward and reactionary and carry[ing] the former forward critically [while] discard[ing] the latter."[65] Corresponding to such calls was an initiative to collect folk songs (*minyo*) and divide them into categories according to their lyrical content rather than their musical features. Of the categories which were defined, the kind of folk songs that attracted the most interest were work songs, because of how closely tied they were to people's daily lives.[66] We get some indication of this by looking at the second volume of a 1963 song book, *Kujŏn Minyo-jip* (Orally Transmitted Folk Songs), in which work songs are listed first and with the exception of a subsequent section ("songs of livelihood and social conditions") make up the largest number of songs.[67] Moreover, in the same year, the association between songs celebrating labor and socialist realism was clearly recognized, since an article in the popular journal *Kŭlloja* (The Laborer) claims that "wonderful socialist realist music based on folk songs has caught the hearts of people in all places of life and has stimulated the vigor of laborers." Such songs are reported to be based on the tunes of folk songs passed down from ancestors who had an inherent love of work. While the writer acknowledges a number of songs express the sorrow of hard labor rooted in

exploitation, he argues that this exploitation had been liquidated and that labor had now become a "song and truly a joy of laborers."[68]

The advantage of retaining socialist realism as an analytical lens for looking at North Korea is that it shines light on the transnational socialist currents that resonated in the North Korean cultural sphere. Nevertheless, while the socialist realism label is useful for understanding music during the 1950s and early 1960s (when the priority was for rapid heavy industrial production), it becomes insufficient for accounting for new lyrical content that began to appear in the latter part of the 1960s in accordance with a push for more emphasis on agricultural production and consumer goods. As we shall see, this corresponded with a rise in the personality cult of the North Korean leader and ultimately a diversification in musical forms as the regime sought new ways to motivate more people.

The Evolution of Song Lyrics in an Emerging Distribution Regime

In cultural production from late 1950s to the early 1960s, when references to socialist realism were very (if not the most) prevalent, the most prevalent party spirit aspect of socialist realism (i.e. the agenda of the party) was the need to maximize productive capacity. If we look at a North Korean songbook from 1959—*Korean Songs vol. 2*—we can see some evidence of this for the song lyrics are inexorably tied up by the production regime described in the previous section. References to production dominate at least 15 of the 25 total songs, with the rest mostly about victory in the Korean War and the natural beauty of non-agricultural landscapes such as mountains and rivers. The production song references include surpassing production targets for both industry and agriculture,[69] "weaving with embroideries of victory,"[70] conquering the forest by felling timber,[71] and caring for a baby while working at the same time.[72] Of the 25 songs, only one, "Song of Cow-bells" ("*Sobangul Sori*"), touches on the fruit of labor as well as its process, including the line "over the fields … roll waves of rich crops." Nevertheless, this comes only after lines alluding to the labor process: "Tinkling, tinkling, carrying bundles of rice," and "Tinkling, tinkling, how many trips did we make?"[73]

Ten years later, we can find an updated take on the process of production in the abundant references to the *Rural Theses* (*Nongchon T'eje*). In 1969, the popular magazine *Chŏllima* featured a song called "Song of the Socialist Rural Theses."[74] The lyrics of this song are featured in a songbook of 600 famous songs first published in 1977[75] and include verses about all three revolutions (technological, cultural and ideological) from the previously mentioned text *Rural Theses* with a chorus about Kim Il Sung leading the bright path to Communism. There

is also a fourth verse about the task of the industrial working class to help the peasants out to remove all distinctions between country and city and a fifth verse about the task of making the cooperative accounting system akin to that of the industrial enterprise to achieve the dream of whole people's ownership. Here the emphasis is not so much on fulfilling production targets in a quantitative sense (as in the production regime) but instead in a qualitative sense of incorporating more technology into farm labor and in the process actually liberating peasants from intensive labor.

Rather than production and love of labor then, the overarching emphasis of lyrical content from the late 1960s to the 1970s is on the delight in the act of distribution. A glaring example of this tendency can be found in one song from this period called "Where to Use All of These Distributed Goods!" ("*I Manŭn Pubae rŭl Ŏdi e Ta SSŭlgga*") in which references to distribution make up nearly every part of nearly every line:

> Year of good farming, embracing the joy of the distribution,
> The old grandfather from the pear tree house doesn't know what to do!
> Plain rice, glutinous rice, 13.7 tons of it together, with a bundle of money distributed to him,
> Carrying it and coming home, where will he use all of these distributed goods?[76]

The lyrical changes of songs tracing back to the Japanese colonial period also signified this turn in content from production to consumption. As discussed in the previous section, songs of local communities were collected and reworked in the 1950s to correlate with increased production campaigns. Many songs originally included onomatopoeia for the sounds of work. For example, the "Ballad of New Gosan" ("Sin'gosan T'aryŏng") in the 1910s was about the appearance of a village around a new train station and featured "U-rooo-roo-roo" to depict the train passing by,[77] but by 1957, according to an article in the women's magazine *Chosŏn Nyŏsŏng* (North Korean Women), it used the same onomatopoeia ("U-rooo-roo-roo") for the sound of cars and wagons, and had become about the new post-liberation road of working together. It was now a song for people to sing while planting rice.[78] However, its lyrics following the *Rural Theses* depict very little work—if any—taking place. Instead, there is a jubilant reaction to both the "U-rooo-roo-roo" sound of the tractor bringing fertilizer to the farm and the distribution of the bountiful harvest that fills rice jugs to the brim.[79] Another song, "Barley Thrashing" ("Onghaeya"), included the call "Ong!" to exert physical energy and "Heya" as a response to this call,[80] but with the "Ong! Heya!" retained, the rest of the lyrics changed in 1957 to meet the needs of maximizing production: "Even though it's just you and I, we work like 10 hands."[81] It was then reworked a second time to juxtapose the golden wave of a barley harvest with the blooming of Kim

Il Sung's *Rural Theses*, removing distinctions between country and city thanks to mechanization and scientific agriculture.[82]

Ultimately, the production and consumption aims of the *Rural Theses* were linked with the love and blessing of Kim Il Sung. In one song written in 1968, "That Love That Has Overfilled the Heart" ("Kŭ Sarang Kasŭmsok e Nŏmch'yŏomnida), the force that has brought mechanized agriculture and chemical fertilizer to make the *Rural Theses* bloom is not the energy and efforts of the working class but, instead, is the love of Kim Il Sung that brings the technical revolution and his hands that cultivate the harvest. The song ends on a dramatic note:

> Every year when the heap of rice overflows,
> I am choked by the blessing of the *Suryŏng* (Kim Il Sung),
> With the *Rural Theses* blooming in the socialist cooperative field,
> I will honor the *Suryŏng* for 1000 to 10,000 years.[83]

The act of Kim Il Sung bestowing on the land the means of production for accumulating rice is not exactly distribution but can be considered a metaphor for the state's distribution system for food. Moreover, by attributing the success of the harvest solely to the foresight and generosity of Kim, the song masks the real labor power that went into production, portraying the agricultural producer as little more than a consumer of rice and receiver of the leader's affection.

The use of the term "*Suryŏng*" in the aforementioned song signifies another shift of the 1960s: the upsurge in the personality cult. While *suryŏng* simply means leader, as Fyodor Tertitskiy points out, its widespread use as a title for Kim started around 1967, as opposed to an institutional title like Party Chairman or Premier, as part of a process of erasure and deification.[84] On one level, there was a tightening of internal control and a removal of laudatory references to outside communist figures such as Marx, Lenin and Stalin. On the other hand, there was the construction of vast structures like the Kim Il Sung statue and distribution of items like badges with Kim Il Sung's portrait, all to honor the leader.[85] The last line in the song just cited "I will honor the Suryŏng for 1000 to 10,000 years" is another manifestation of this, closely coordinating with the second commandment of the 1974 "Ten Principles for the Establishment of the Monolithic Ideology System," namely: "We must honor Great Leader comrade Kim Il Sung with all of our loyalty."[86] By this time, the new North Korean was not merely an advanced industrial worker, but he or she was also someone with unquestionable loyalty and devotion to the leader.

The Gentle Breeze of Light Music: Soldier is the New Industrial Worker

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Kim Il Sung's son Kim Jong Il became involved in glorifying his father in the Propaganda and Agitation Department. This was a way to exhibit his filial piety and in the process to demonstrate that he was a worthy successor. One way he did this was commissioning a series of revolutionary operas, three of which took place in Manchuria during Kim Il Sung's anti-Japanese guerilla campaigns. One of the most popular, if not the most popular, was *The Flower Girl* (1972) about a girl whose family was victimized by a tyrannical landlord and by Japanese imperialists. At the end of the opera, Kim Il Sung's guerrilla army, which the girl's brother has become a part of, rescues her and overthrows the landlord. With its fusion of anti-colonial and socialist themes as well as its collective authorship, we might say that *The Flower Girl* marked the completion of indigenizing socialist realism in North Korea. The North Korean media heralded it as a monumental work and a model of socialist realism (much like the work of Gorky and other Soviet writers had been lauded) for the reason expressed through a student interviewee: "It gave bravery to the people while revealing the truth of revolution."[87] Might we also consider *The Flower Girl* an example of popular culture in a non-capitalist context? Not only did it further contribute to class convergence by linking peasant identity to the Manchurian guerrilla experience, it was also a popular success on both the stage and as a film, which fared well internationally—particularly in China.[88] Moreover, its performance did not simply end on the theatre stage or cinema screen. As Bradley Martin points out, the regime organized a Flower Girl Guard campaign that brought the leading characters to life in factories and other worksites.[89] In a report of the success of the *Socialist Rural Theses* in 1974, Premier Kim Il (not to be confused with Kim Il Sung) credited the Flower Girl Guards with being pioneers who played a leading role in the ideological revolution of the countryside.[90]

In addition to opera taking on a popular dimension, the late 1970s (and especially the 1980s) witnessed a new emphasis on so-called 'light music,' a category which, as Keith Howard points out, traces back to the Japanese colonial period. Songs of this type have tended to use 'fox-trot rhythms' and instrumentally include anything from marching band ensembles to synthesizers.[91] Light music was hardly new at the time it appeared in increasing frequency in the 1980s. In the decades following Korean liberation from Japan in 1945, it had come to stand for music (sometimes with lyrics, sometimes without)[92] with a greater variety of instruments (in comparison to mass songs) and more varied rhythmic structures (in comparison to revolutionary songs and marches). Light music also came to

mean adding these two elements to embellish existing songs regardless of their original form.

The fact that North Korea now with increasing frequency embraced popular and diversified forms of music outside of what were the typical socialist realist musical forms of "monumental symphonies, symphonic poems, cantatas, operas and mass songs as a medium as mass agitation" indicates the insufficiency of the label 'socialist realism' for understanding the rise of light music.[93] Although light music existed earlier, as Longyear (2011) points out, corresponding to Andrei Zhdanov's Anti-Formalism campaign of 1946–1948, Stalin sought to mobilize nationalism against cosmopolitan Western forms of music like jazz, and to empower local folk music (starting with Russian national music) at a time of growing Cold War tensions.[94] The ideological climate combined with a lack of resources during successive periods of war, reconstruction, and labor campaigns do provide some context for why North Koreans did not invest so much in popular forms of entertainment until the 1980s. Moreover, even after tolerance increased for cosmopolitan genres like jazz in the Soviet Union following Stalin's death and Khrushchev's subsequent rise to power, Kim Il Sung did not share approval for such music. As late as November 1962, he expressed distaste for jazz to international diplomats and wondered why other countries across the socialist bloc were not doing more to contain it. He also professed his love for Russian folk music which he believed inspired confidence in victory and represented the valor of Soviet people.[95]

Nevertheless, as early as 1966, there were signs that the reliance on folk songs, mass songs, solos and choruses was breaking down. An article titled "Issues that must be resolved in the popular song" in the journal *Chosŏn Ŭmak* (*North Korean Music*) outlines problems with a lack of variety in terms of emotion and subject material, unnatural sounding melodies, and composers who wrote for professionals instead of for people to sing.[96] To remedy these shortcomings, the author recommends composers going beyond arias and art songs by having singers use microphones and introducing songs that are smoother for people to listen to and easier to sing. The article outlines a series of steps relating to spreading music content more actively through mass media such as advertisements, fliers, newspapers, magazines, radio dramas, and film.[97]

By the 1980s, the state had put many of these recommendations into practice in light music. The personality cult was an integral part of this process. In accordance with the drive to extol Kim Il Sung for his anti-Japanese guerrilla campaigns, the two most prominent light music acts were named after sites of revolution.[98] The first, Wangjaesan Light Music Band, named after a mountain where Kim Il Sung held a guerrilla meeting, was launched in 1983 and featured

horn, percussion and string sections occasionally with keyboard and synthesizer mixed in. The second, Pochonbo Electronic Ensemble, named after a revolutionary battle site in Manchuria, had several keyboards/synthesizers as its base with Korean instruments, pianos and other Western instruments mixed in. Pochonbo Electronic Ensemble in particular was very popular with the younger generation. Their performances were broadcast, typically on Friday evenings and Sunday afternoons on Mansudae TV, a channel that featured art performances, movies and sports, and which was primarily designed for residents of Pyongyang.[99] In addition to entertainment, the two acts conveyed ideological messages of the past to a new generation by performing new, light music versions of older songs about rural life. Such songs included Wangjaesan's upbeat female solo version of "Ballad of New Gosan" ("*Sin'gosan T'aryŏng*")[100] (released on cassette in 1993) and Pochonbo's largely instrumental version of "Barley Slashing" ("*Ongheya*")[101] (released on cassette in 1989) with an electric guitar and drum solo.

Another light music adaptation of a song from the past was Pochonbo's hit "The Leader's Benevolence" ("*Suryŏng nim Ŭndŏkilse*"),[102] which was performed in Japan and released on VHS in 1991. As a disco remake of a song from 1974 with the same melody, it exhibits the theme of realizing the goodwill of the leader by means of the distribution system.[103] It has varying rhythms and instrumentally is a festive meeting of keyboard, synthesizer, piano, bass guitar, drums and the Korean *kkwaenggwari* small gong. Vocally, the song has a resemblance to the Mamas and the Papas' "California Dreaming," but with a much brighter lyrical content. It begins:

> A happy occasion, a happy occasion! A happy occasion in the farm field!
> In the golden fields of a thousand li, an abundant harvest has come!

It features a call and response first singing about the blessings and shouting exclamations like "That's good!" and then between a keyboard and synthesizer in a way that resembles two dancing partners in a folk dance. Finally, the upbeat and peppy song closes with a hymn signifying reverence to Kim Il Sung and the party:

> Who gave us this happiness? Our party brought it.
> Who gave us this happiness? It's the benevolence of the *Suryŏng*!
> In the farm village distribution hall, what a happy occasion!

While the song celebrates the fruit of agricultural labor, it is completely divorced from the production process.

Kim Jong Il rationalized the push for adopting outside styles of music as "subordinat[ing] foreign music to the development of our own music."[104] Nevertheless, it was not meant to be a full embrace. As Jeon Young-seon and Han Seung-ho reveal, at the same time the popular magazine *Chollima* lambasted the toxic effects

of capitalist countries' rock, disco, and jazz that paralyzed wholesome ideology, North Korea introduced Pochonbo's electronic music as "our style electronic music," making use of a variety of national and modern rhythms.[105]

One of the primary signs that North Korean music had evolved beyond a reliance on transnational socialist realism is that much of the lyrical content of light music songs lost any revolutionary fervor. This is especially the case for a new kind of song around this time, the *saenghwal kayo*, or daily life song. As Jeon Young-seon points out, in the 1980s, with the economy stabilized to a degree and the political system on track for the leadership succession from Kim Il Sung to Kim Jong Il, there was a push to create an atmosphere of excitement to win acceptance for the succession. Songs thus became merrier and upbeat while at the same time popularizing daily life habits that instilled a collective spirit.[106] Songs that highlighted daily life experiences went hand-in-hand with the Hidden Heroes campaign, a late 1970s and early 1980s series of calls to emulate heroes carried in the media and in short stories without seeking any kind of reward or recognition for effort. Immanuel Kim identifies this campaign as the moment when glorifying Kim Il Sung became the sole component of the vision for a socialist country.[107] For women, it involved taking on the characteristics of Kim Jong Il's mother Kim Jong Suk, who was revered for assisting Kim Il Sung on the battlefield as a warrior woman.[108] In continuity with her assumption that North Korean everyday life practices mirror theatrical performances, Kim Suk-young reveals how stage and film performance that stressed the Manchurian guerrilla experience and featured soldiers as central characters (as opposed to peasants and industrial workers) meant military-style dress became a fashion trend, particularly with feminized uniforms for women.[109] She also emphasizes that consumption practices such as dress codes became "an entry point to materializing ideology in bodily practices."[110]

Just as North Korean cultural administrators had indigenized socialist realism to suit the anti-colonial guerrilla narrative and hagiography around Kim Il Sung, a similar process occurred with popular culture to make the regime more meaningful to more people and enhance its connection to more spheres of daily life. Nevertheless, this did not mean the outright abandonment of socialist realism, even if the term appeared less regularly in print and was ultimately rearticulated as "juche realism."[111] After all, for music, more traditional forms based on socialist realism like marches, choruses and folk songs continued, even if in altered forms. Rather. the transition suggests a continual expansion of the dimension of popular spirit into new territory and the stabilization of the dimension of party spirit into supporting and defending the dynastic succession.

Conclusion

In a 1959 meeting with representatives of the fishing industry, Kim Il Sung called for fishing songs to stimulate the accumulation of resources from the ocean. In accordance with practices in other sectors to meet production targets, a song book, "Let's Wave the Flag of the Big Catch" ("*P'ungŏgi Hwinallija*"), was printed in 1962 that mainly featured modified folk songs, including "Sea is the Workplace of Youth" ("*Pada nŭn Chŏngchun Uri ŭi Iltŏ*") which associated youthful vigor with fishery work. Its songs made frequent references to the workday—casting out the net, raising the anchor, and of course exceeding the targets for catches.[112] A half century later, a new song, "Song of a High Haul in the Sea" ("*Pada Manp'ung ka*"),[113] was released. On the surface, it looks to be in the same mold: it has a folksy melody, uses onomatopoeia for the ship's sounds and even includes as its first line the words "Let's Fly the Flag of the Big Catch"—almost identical to the title of the 1960s' song. A closer look, however, shows there is something more. With the exception of two lines about travelling to find fish, the song doesn't refer to work but instead merely reacts to the catch with lines like "The dock is full of fish and laughter," "The fish are swarming through the sea as fluttering treasure," "Mountain of fish, pile it up!" and, finally, "What is this joy? It's the benevolence of the Marshal [Kim Jong Un]!" Clearly the song does not simply encourage fishermen to work harder, but, instead, it utilizes a discourse of plenty to enhance the legitimacy of the new leader, Kim Jong Un, who presumably provided the spark to make the catch possible.

While scholars have traditionally viewed consumption as inherently linked to the behavior of purchasing goods and services in the context of a market (or a black market) economy, recent research, particularly in the field of history, has opened up new ways for the topic to be explored. Nancy Reynolds observes that there has been a "spatial turn" away from private commercial enterprise to the public sphere, and to topics such as "quotidian consumption practices" that link "consumption to wider national identities of place in locally specific ways."[114] In colonial India, for instance, locally produced homemade cloth became a national symbol in the anticolonial struggle, as part of a visual vocabulary that provided "an especially important supplement to print capitalism to create community."[115] For postcolonial North Korea between the 1960s and the 1980s, when anticolonial discourse was still very much alive, there was an auditory as well as a "visual vocabulary" component to the promotion of domestic products (including Vinalon as an alternative to cotton). When mobilization movements, including songs that glorified collective labor, came up short, especially in agricultural areas, the state turned to more lyrical themes about consumption and, increasingly, to light music

as a form of mass popular entertainment. At first, the stakes in this revised mobilization strategy were to make agricultural workers see themselves as part of the industrial working class, but ultimately they were to make the entire population envision themselves as soldiers and defenders of the Kim family.

Even with content supporting the personality cult, however, the mix of cosmopolitan and national forms assured that North Koreans would not live in complete isolation when it came to the new electronic elements of the 1980s popular music soundscape. Moreover, the increasingly material aspect of lyrics over time demonstrates that a mix of materialist and ideological incentives in propaganda was intended, because implicit within references to the distribution system and to the Kim family bestowing favors was the message that loyalty to the leadership could be equated with material abundance. Finally, the turn towards showcasing popular music groups, dressed to embody conspicuous consumption, served as a means to attract interest from and to form bonds with people in the world beyond North Korea, in capitalist countries that included Japan, the former colonial occupier.

Notes

1. Peter Moody is a PhD candidate at Columbia University where he specializes in Modern Korean History. His research interests include North Korean cultural history, the agricultural and industrial history of the Korean peninsula, and the intellectual and cultural history of East Asia during the Japanese colonial period. His proposed dissertation title is *Mobilizing Music and the Making of North Korea* which encompasses not only a history of North Korean music but also elements of its history of industrialization, agriculture and international relations. His work on North Korea has been published in the *Sungkyun Journal of East Asian Studies*.
2. The people I would like to express my gratitude to (with regards to this article) are too numerous to name in the scope of a footnote. Two deserve special mention though. One is Seongmin Lee who sparked my interest in the production and consumption angle by sharing with me the Taehongdan County potato farming episode mentioned early on in this article. The other is Kumhee Cho who let me know about some important resource materials related to my topic and thought it was significant enough to mention that North Korean song lyrics have changed over time. I am also grateful to the guest editor Professor Keith Howard, the editors of this journal Professors Adam Cathcart and Robert Winstanley-Chesters as well as and the two blind reviewers for their feedback and for making the publication of this article and special issue possible.
3. "NORTH KOREA MUSIC Taehongdan Kamja (Potato)." *YouTube*, December 17, 2017. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-jAKd6bZM9g, accessed January 3, 2019.
4. Tatiana Gabroussenko. "The Potato Revolution in the DPRK: A Novel Type of Political Campaign." *Korea Journal* 56.1 (2016): 119.
5. 14 lines refer to the size, the delectableness of the potato and/or harvest of it as opposed to 2 lines that refer to the process of growing it.
6. Seongmin Lee. Interview by Peter G. Moody. January 9, 2019.

7. “DPRK Music A-11 “Kamja Charang Potato Pride.” *YouTube*, December 22, 2008. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UbjoJjO-FEs, accessed December 30, 2018.
8. “DPRK Music 5–10 Pyŏngyang Reengmyŏn Chaeiliya.” *YouTube*, August 27, 2008. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HFGpMNOOtfM, accessed January 15, 2019.
9. Gabroussenko 2016: 117–118.
10. Tatiana Gabroussenko. *Soldiers on the Cultural Front: Developments in the Early History of North Korean Literature and Literary Policy* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2010), 33.
11. Karen Petrone. *Life Has Become More Joyous, Comrades: Celebrations in the Time of Stalin* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000), 16–18.
12. Barbara Demick. *Nothing to Envy: Ordinary Lives in North Korea* (New York: Spiegel and Grau, 2015) 119.
13. “We envy nothing in the world [Subtitles].” *YouTube*, April 2, 2013. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6mVjTODPyUU, accessed December 30, 2018.
14. Roughly the 1960s–1980s for Eastern Europe although this may be different for other parts of the world. See for instance: Alexei Yurchak. “The Cynical Reason of Late Socialism: Power, Pretense, and the Anekdot.” *Public Culture* 9.2 (1997): 161–162, which highlights this phenomenon in the Soviet Union as well as Eastern Europe.
15. Paulina Bren and Mary Neuberger. “Introduction” In *Communism Unwrapped: Consumption in Cold War Eastern Europe*, edited by Bren, Paulina and Mary Neuberger. 1–25 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 5–6.
16. Ibid.
17. This state drive to influence and profit from marketization below rather than stamp it out was largely a decision resulting from a series of failed attempts in the first decade of the 2000s to reintroduce the Public Distribution System and severely restrict private forms of exchange. See: Andrei Lankov. *The Real North Korea: Life and Politics in the Failed Stalinist Utopia* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 121–133 and Hazel Smith. *Markets and Military Rule* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 211–222.
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20. S. Kim 2009, 14–15.
21. Cheehyung Harrison Kim. *Heroes and Toilers: Work as Life in Postwar North Korea, 1953–1961* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018), 24.
22. See: C. Kim, *Heroes and Toilers*, 92–97 and Hy-sang Lee. *North Korea: A Strange Socialist Fortress* (Westport: Praeger, 2000), 16–18.
23. H. Lee *North Korea: A Strange Socialist Fortress*, 16–17.
24. H. Lee *North Korea: A Strange Socialist Fortress*, 21.
25. Cheehyung Harrison Kim. Heroes and Toilers: Work as Life in Postwar North Korea, 1953–1961 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018), 73–76.
26. Balázs Szalontai. *Kim Il Sung in the Khrushchev Era: Soviet–DPRK Relations and the Roots of North Korean Despotism 1953–1964* (Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2005), 44.
27. Cheehyung Harrison Kim. *Heroes and Toilers: Work as Life in Postwar North Korea, 1953–1961* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018), 82.
28. Paul Stephen Ello, “The Commissar and the Peasant: A Comparative Analysis of Land Reform and Collectivization in North Korea and North Vietnam.” (PhD Diss., University of Iowa), 316–323.
29. Balázs Szalontai. *Kim Il Sung in the Khrushchev Era: Soviet–DPRK Relations and the Roots of North Korean Despotism 1953–1964* (Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2005), 51–52.

30. Cheehyung Harrison Kim. *Heroes and Toilers: Work as Life in Postwar North Korea, 1953–1961* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018), 2.
31. For more on the *Chollima* movement, see Peter G. Moody, "Chollima, the Thousand Li Flying Horse: Neotraditionalism at Work in North Korea." *Sungkyun Journal of East Asian Studies* 13.2 (2013): 211–233.
32. Jin-A Chung. 정진아, "Puk'an Sahoejuŭi Nongchont'eje ŭi Tŭngjang Paegyŏng." (북한 사회주의 농촌테제의 등장 배경 The Backgrounds of Theses on the Socialist Rural Question in North Korea) *Sahak Yonku* 사학연구 123 (2016): 217–218.
33. Yong-Pyo Hong. "North Korea in the 1950s: The Post Korean War Policies and Their Implications." *The Korean Journal of International Relations* 44.5 (2004): 223.
34. Light industry was not completely disregarded during the previous decade; it just was not prioritized in central planning initiatives. Instead, the North Korean government relied on local industries with their own raw materials to fulfill people's needs for consumer goods like socks, furniture, and soft drinks. See: Szalontai, *Kim Il Sung in the Khrushchev Era*, 123 and H. Lee, *North Korea: A Strange Socialist Fortress*, 30–34. There were also consumer goods that came from abroad in the form of foreign aid and imports particularly during the 1953–1956 Three Year Plan. See: C. Kim, *Heroes and Toilers*, 84.
35. Jin-a Chung, "Puk'an Sahoejuŭi Nongchont'eje ŭi," 232–233.
36. Jin-a Chung, "Puk'an Sahoejuŭi Nongchont'eje ŭi," 232–233.
37. Kim Il Sung. *Theses on the Socialist Rural Question in Our Country* (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1968), 21–34.
38. Kim Il Sung, *Theses on the Socialist Rural Question*, 28.
39. Although Kim Il Sung does not mention this specifically, Premier Kim Il talks about it in the context of liquidating backward ways of living, and claims in 1974 that it had virtually been achieved. See: Kim Il *On the Summing up of the Implementation of the "Theses on the Socialist Rural Question in Our Country" Set Forth by the Respected and Beloved Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung and the Future Tasks* (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1974), 51.
40. See: Andrei Lankov. *The Real North Korea: Life and Politics in the Failed Stalinist Utopia* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 35–36 and Andrei Lankov. "A dynastic polity in economic stagnation and decline." In *Routledge Handbook of Modern Korean History*, edited by Seth, Michael. 221–233 (Abington: Routledge, 2016), 228).
41. Quoted in: Hy-sang Lee. *North Korea: A Strange Socialist Fortress* (Westport: Praeger, 2000), 51.
42. Hy-sang Lee, *North Korea: A Strange Socialist Fortress*, 121.
43. Cheehyung Harrison Kim. *Heroes and Toilers: Work as Life in Postwar North Korea, 1953–1961* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018), 29.
44. C. Kim, *Heroes and Toilers*, 113–114.
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72. *Korean Songs vol. 2*, 49.
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A Cross-Border Life and Legacy: Zheng Lücheng

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Abstract

Zheng Lücheng (1914–1976) is famed in China as the composer of "March of the People's Liberation Army" (C. *Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun jinxingqu*). Less well known, but of more interest to readers of this paper, is his "March of the [North Korean] People's Army" (K. *Inmin'gun haengjin kok*), the official army march of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea until the late 1950s. Zheng was a transnational musician, crossing the shifting borders of Korea, Manchuria and China during turbulent years of war. Zheng's is a fascinating story of revolution, migration, music, romance and diplomacy at a crux in East Asian history. In the 1930s, Zheng left southern Korea to join anti-Japanese forces in China; he studied and then worked in the Lu Xun Arts School in Yan'an—the crucible of Maoist cultural policy; he married a Han Chinese cadre; returned to North Korea to compose for the army, establish orchestras and conservatoires; was repatriated to China and almost immediately returned to Pyongyang with the Chinese forces. Finally, he returned for good to China as an army composer. A literate and well-connected musician, he was adept at negotiating the power of nation states. Since Zheng's death in 1976, his legacy has continued to cross borders. He is celebrated in a North Korean biographical film, *The Musician Zheng Lücheng* (K. *Ŭmakka Chŏng Ryulsŏng*; 1992) and in a Chinese film *Going towards the Sun* (C. *Zouxiang taiyang*; 2005). He is commemorated in exhibition halls, memorials and festivals in both China and in his birthplace in Kwangju, South Korea. Zheng's story and music evoke nationalist sentiment, and at the same time are used in cultural diplomacy between these states. Drawing on interviews, archival documents and

more recent materials, this examination of Zheng, who played such a central part in the creation of East Asian musical modernity in the mid-twentieth century, illustrates a fascinating interaction of nationalism, internationalism and, now, soft power.

Keywords: North Korea; music; cultural exchange; film; Zheng Lücheng; Chinese-Korean diaspora

Introduction

Zheng Lücheng[1] (K. Chŏng Ryulsŏng; 1914–1976) is well known as a composer in China. There are few who cannot sing his "March of the People's Liberation Army" (C. *Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun jinxingqu*)." What is less well known, but of more significance to readers of the journal in which this article is published, is that he was also the composer of the "March of the People's Army (K. *Inmin'gun haeng-jin'gok*)," with lyrics by Pak Seyŏng, the official army march of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea People's Army until the late 1950s. For Zheng Lücheng was a cross-border musician, a transnational revolutionary, taking part in both the Chinese and Korean communist struggle.

In English-language scholarship on China's communist music, Zheng Lücheng gets overshadowed by more famous composers—his comrades such as Ma Ke, Nie Er and Lü Ji.[2] He is not mentioned in the current writings on North Korean music that I have found; however, since the resumption of diplomatic relations between China and the Republic of Korea, he has attracted attention in the south of the peninsula—where he spent his early years. Zheng's music, nearly all of it vocal, owes much to the work of his mentor, Xian Xinghai: there are rousing declamatory marches, lyrical songs based on collected folk tunes, cantatas setting the words of Mao Zedong and others, even an opera. It is still popular among older generations in China, and has been much analysed by Chinese musicologists.[3] His life story, likewise, continues to attract attention; it is the subject of books, films, documentaries in China and in both parts of the divided Korean peninsula. He is celebrated in an opera in China and most recently has been depicted in a comic book by South Korean illustrator Park Geon-un (2019).

Zheng's is a fascinating story of war, migration, music, romance and cultural diplomacy at a crux in East Asian history, the years from 1930 to 1953. During this period, Zheng left southern Korea to join anti-Japanese forces in China; he studied and then worked in the Lu Xun Arts School in Yan'an—the crucible of Maoist cultural policy; he married a Han Chinese cadre; he returned to North

Korea to compose for the army, establish orchestras and music schools; he was repatriated to China and almost immediately returned to Pyongyang with the Chinese forces during the Korean war. Finally, he returned to China where he remained for the rest of his life.

The period Zheng spent in North Korea, and how he fits with the emerging cultural history of the northern state from 1945 to 1953, has been little known in the West. Materials published in North Korea in the 1950s can be found abroad, and the enormous archives of China, Moscow and other former Soviet bloc countries have been extensively explored by cold war historians to flesh out our understanding of this period.[4] In the case of this more narrowly focussed article, the 1950s documents I use were found since 1992 in libraries, shops and personal collections in the Yŏnbyŏn Korean Autonomous Prefecture and other Korean communities in China, and at the Chinese Music Research Institute in Beijing. Such extant documents can help us reconstruct cultural conditions during this period, particularly the influence of returning Soviet- and Chinese-educated cadres. They suggest a more internationalist cultural outlook, as has been portrayed by Adam Cathcart and Charles Kraus (2008) and a greater open-ness to outside influence, as Korean artists and intellectuals returned from their exiles in neighbouring countries to rebuild the country. Keith Howard (2020 chapter 8) describes the shift from Japanese to USSR influence during this period, which saw performances and publications of Russian music within the DPRK, as well as Korean composers such as Shin Tosŏn (1924–1975), Cho Kilsŏk (1926–1996) and Hong Sup'yo (1926–1976)[5] studying in Moscow and Leningrad. This article adds one part of China's influence into the picture—there is a rich history of cultural exchange between the two countries to be further explored through Chinese sources. As for North Korean sources, already by the mid-1950s, histories of collaboration and foreign influence were being erased from accounts of Korean musical development, and replaced with those more fitting the emerging ideology of Juche self-reliance.

Sources for information on Zheng Lücheng outside this North Korean period are plentiful. The subject of my research may be long dead, yet much has been written about him. Therefore, this paper constitutes the "ethnography of a literate tradition."[6] Oral mythology—gossip and anecdotes—is abundant amongst those who remember him directly or indirectly, relating his love of fishing, his beautiful wife, and the daughter, Zheng Xiaoti, who was named after her father's violin. Zheng's family still live, and are devoted to preserving his memory. They are sophisticated enough to do so, promoting the memory of Zheng at home and abroad for different audiences, whether these be local, regional or international. Indeed, few could do it better, since Zheng's wife, Ding Xuesong, was China's first female ambassador, serving in Holland, Denmark, and Iceland in the 1970s and

80s following Zheng's death. The published accounts of his friends and family, unsurprisingly, verge on hagiography. Nevertheless, such histories can enrich our understanding of formal cultural collaborations and exchanges with intimations of informal, person-to-person contacts.

This article was prompted by the rather simple question of Zheng Lücheng's survival and success in what at times seems a fairly hostile environment. Despite rhetoric that China and North Korea are close as lips and teeth, and despite the rhetoric of communist internationalism, both countries' leaders developed highly nationalistic ideologies to bolster their legitimacy.[7] Whatever the rhetoric of friendship, few powerful figures managed to survive the conflicts involved in being international communists. In this, we might consider and parallel the purges in Pyongyang during 1956–1958, and during China's Cultural Revolution a decade later (1966–1976). Not only did Zheng survive such purges, but he later became an icon of patriotic musicianship for both countries. Two films have been made that depict episodes from this period in Zheng's life: *The Musician Zheng Lücheng* (K. *Ŭmakka Chŏng Ryulsŏng*; 2.8 Studio, Pyongyang 1992) and *Going towards the Sun*[8] (C. *Zouxiang taiyang*; Changchun Film Studio, 2005 directed by Song Jiangbo and Piao Junxi). Both portray a romantic and musical hero, struggling to compose music that expresses the revolutionary determination of the people.

This article will outline some key activities of Zheng during this period, and then contrast them with the portrayal in the North Korean biopic, where Kim Il Sung is seen to play a key role in his musical development. I finally reflect briefly on how his transnational career is celebrated now in both China and in South Korea, enabling each to simultaneously portray their nationalist and internationalist power.

Zheng Lücheng's Life

Zheng was born Zheng Fu'en in 1914[9] in Kwangju, South Chŏlla province, to a *yangban* family; there were 10 children, five of whom survived, and he was the youngest. His aunt was an elder and a musician in a missionary-run protestant church and he attended a Christian school, so from his early youth he was exposed to Western church music, and he played the mandolin.[10] The family had a wind-up record player that played records of Western classical music and Korean folksong, including those of singer An Kiyŏng.[11] When I met his daughter Zheng Xiaoti, in Beijing in 2011, she played me a recording from 1976 of her father singing an Irish song that he had learnt as a child. She spoke of him as having grown up with multiple musical languages, as a musical internationalist who kept a bust of Chopin on his piano and collected scores and sheet music on his later trips to

Russia and Eastern Europe. Indeed, throughout his career he adapted the musical styles not only of Korea and Yan'an, but of various Chinese regional and ethnic minority cultures, as expected of a composer "going deeply among the people" (C. *shenru shenghuo*).

The Zheng family had lost their land under the colonial occupation of Japan, and many of them were involved in anti-Japanese activities in both Korea and China. Two brothers participated in the March 1st (K. *Sam-il*) movement in 1919. One was imprisoned for eight years. One went to the military academy in Yunnan in 1927, met Zhu De and joined the National Revolutionary Army (C. *Guomin geming jun*). Another joined the Korean communist party in China, and Zheng's sister married a Korean graduate of the Whampoa academy, Pak Kŏn'ung.

After his father's death in 1932, Zheng followed his siblings[12] into exile in China in 1933, and entered a revolutionary military training class run by the League of Revolutionary Martyrs (K. *Ŭiyŏltan*; C. *yilietuan*,) in Nanjing.[13] There, he mixed with activist groups allied to both the nationalists (Kuomintang, KMT) and the communists, in Chongqing, Nanjing and Shanghai.[14] He joined the May Cultural Group, where he got to know progressive Chinese poets, artists and musicians. In Shanghai, Zheng took his first formal music lessons with a singing teacher called Krilova,[15] and in August 1937 he first met Xian Xinghai, a leading composer of Western-style art music who had recently returned from study in Paris. Xian suggest they work together in Shanghai, although by the time Zheng arrived to join him Xian had left, so Zheng, fleeing chaos in Shanghai, instead travelled to Yan'an.

Zheng was not the only Korean musician active in China, or indeed among anti-Japanese activists.[16] For example, the violinist and composer Ch'oe Ŭmpa was with the Chinese Communists at their first base in Jinggangshan in Jiangxi province, and wrote the Assembly Song for the First National Workers' and Peasants' Representative Assembly in 1931. There is, however, no further mention of Ch'oe after the communists embarked on the Long March in 1934, and no evidence that he contacted other Korean musicians. Another Korean, Han Yuhan (1910–1996), who had grown up in Beijing, was active as a composer and teacher in China, mainly with nationalist forces and the Korean Restoration Army, but he returned to South Korea after 1945.[17] Again, Kim Ch'ŏllam, a pianist and violinist who came to China after the Japanese annexation of Korea, was vice-director of communications for the Korean Provisional Government in Shanghai; after liberation he remained in China, and his children had leading musical careers. It is clear that there were a great many more activists in Manchuria who, like Zheng, moved back and forth between China and North Korea in the first decades of communist rule.[18]

Arriving in Yan'an in September 1937, Zheng studied at the Resist Japan University (C. *Kangri daxue*) and the Luxun Arts Academy. After one year he joined the staff of the latter as a conductor, teacher and composer. Several of his works became well known there, including "In praise of Yan'an" (C. *Yan'an song*; 1938) and "Ballad of Yan River" (C. *Yanshui Yao*; 1938), which was based on a local folk song style. Most ambitious was his "Eighth Route Army Cantata" (C. *Balu jun da hechang*; 1939) which included the "March of the Eighth Route Army" (C. *Balu jun jinxingqu*), later adopted as the "March of the People's Liberation Army." It was as conductor of the Anti-Japanese Army University Choir and its female troupe that he met his future wife, Ding Xuesong.

In *Red Star over China*, the American journalist Edgar Snow reported complaints that the communists were forever singing.[19] Zheng's own memories support this:

> The Resist Japan University had nearly 10,000 students, divided into a great many companies, each one of which had a conductor. Whenever major reports were made, from 5,000 to 6,000 up to 10,000 people were gathered on the field. We learned songs for half an hour or an hour before we began: this group would sing, then that group would sing, all very enthusiastically. … Yan'an is a small place, between the mountains and the river. When 10,000 people sang at once, the earth seemed to move and the mountain to shake …[20]

There was a sizable Korean community at Yan'an—the Korean communist party had been subsumed to the Chinese communist party—but there was some suspicion of the Koreans. The Korean communist Kim San, for instance, whose life story was reported by Snow's wife, was executed as a Trotskyite. It is not surprising then that Zheng was reported as a spy, according to gossip by a love rival. This led to Zheng being held, and Ding herself was warned to avoid him for over two years. According to Ding's memoirs, Zheng was questioned for his earlier association with Rightists, and for his work intercepting Japanese telephone calls for nationalist exiles in Chongqing. Eventually, Ding enlisted the support of the highest-ranking Korean in the Chinese communist movement, Mu Chŏng, to vouch for Zheng to Commander-in-Chief Zhu De. Zheng was cleared of espionage, and the couple were given permission to marry, in December 1941. A few months later, Zheng was present at Mao's famous "Yan'an talks," where he set out the artistic policy that was to form the foundation for China's post-1949 cultural development, preaching the necessity for art to reflect the life of the working people and to speak to them, and that it should serve socialism.

Zheng and Ding could not live together for long, as the latter was often travelling in the area to set up village administrations. Zheng, on the other hand, was in August 1942 sent with Yan'an Koreans under the command of Mu Chŏng

to a nearby base in Taihangshan, where they were joined by the Ŭiyongjun and other Korean forces in China. Nevertheless, in April 1943 they had a child, the aforementioned Xiaoti. Her name means "violin," to recall the violin that Zheng gave to a peasant in exchange for a goat that could provide milk for the baby.

Immediately before the surrender of the Japanese in August 1945, the Koreans received an order from Commander Zhu De that they were to go to China's northeastern provinces (formerly Manchuria), to link up and mobilise Koreans living there, and from there to assist the Russians in the liberation of Korea.[21] Zheng and his wife were among the forces that made their way on foot and horseback through to North Korea, arriving in Pyŏngyang in December. He recorded the journey back to Korea in the songs "Returning to the motherland" (K. *Choguk hyanghae nagaja*) and the March 1st March (K. *Sam-il haengjin'gok*; commemorating the independence movement of 1919).

We know less of Zheng's activities in Korea. For much of the time the couple were separated, and we only have Ding's account, or his daughter's childhood memories.[22] Once there, the couple transferred out of the CCP and into the Korean Workers' Party, and were assigned to Haeju. Ding advised on communist village administration, land reform and women's rights, while Zheng took a job as head of the Hwanghae province propaganda department. By the end of 1946, Ding was transferred to Pyongyang, and Zheng followed in spring 1947, as head of the entertainment and leisure department of the Korean People's Army (initially known as the Korean Defence Force [K. *Chosŏn po'andae*]). It was there that he wrote the official army march, setting words by the well-known poet Pak Seyŏng.[23] Several awards were granted to Zheng at this time for his contributions to Korean culture, and his career was flourishing.

Cultural and political histories shape each other, and Ding and Zheng's personal histories were in turn inevitably shaped by the conflicting forces of nationalism and internationalism in Pyongyang. Histories of North Korea at this time reveal deep divisions between four factions of communists within the Korean Workers Party, depending on whether they had been active in China, the Soviet Union, Manchuria, or within Korea itself. The Yan'an (China) faction, which Zheng would have been associated with, was led by the linguist Kim Tubong and was numerically stronger, but ultimately power rested in Kim Il Sung, one of the Manchuria guerrilla faction, who had also served in the Soviet Red Army. Ding's memoirs tell us that the family were close friends with Kim Tubong,[24] who rose to become Chairman of the Korean Communist Party and of the Supreme People's Assembly.[25] Their descriptions of his elegance, scholarship (he researched Korean linguistics), and how he introduced them to champagne, hardly mesh with the expected life of communist privation. They also mixed with other prominent

members of the Yan'an faction, such as Pak Ilu, and were close with the Chinese communist plenipotentiary in Korea, Zhu Lizhi.[26] The purges of this Yan'an faction in the mid-1950s, after they allegedly tried to arrange a coup d'etat at the Korean Worker's Party conference, are well documented. In fact, as early as 1950, Mu Chŏng and later Pak Ilu were removed from their posts.[27]

As a high-ranking Chinese communist, Ding initially acted as an emissary between the beleaguered Chinese communist forces in Manchuria and the Korean communists, who were providing supplies. Her contacts included Kim Il Sung, who presented her with parachute silk as a gift of thanks. After the Northeast was won by the communists, Ding was increasingly important as a representative of the CCP in Korea, organising the Chinese community there, and after 1949 setting up the New China News Agency. She chose to retain her Chinese nationality, transferred out of the Korean Workers' Party back into the Chinese Communist Party, and helped establish the Chinese Embassy in July 1950, working with the trade section.

Just as Ding had been warned that marriage to Zheng would affect her future in Yan'an, Zheng Lücheng's career was now affected by the status of his wife.[28] In her memoirs Ding explains that their situation was awkward: not only because of her nationality and his roots in Yan'an, but also because of their many Chinese friends and his close relationship with Mu Chŏng, who had been demoted. Despite his successes as conductor and composer, Zheng was told directly by the Army Political Commissar, Kim Il, that as he had a Chinese wife it was unsuitable for him to work in the Korean People's Army.[29] And so he was transferred from his job as head of the entertainment section of the army to the Korean State University of Music, as head of its composition department. This was an indication that he was no longer trusted in a key department in the military. Zheng continued to compose marches and songs there, but also the cantatas *East Sea Fisherman* (K. *Tonghae ŏbu*; lyrics by Kim Hakch'ŏl), *Tumen River* (K. *Tuman'gang*; lyrics by Cho Kich'ŏn), and an opera that remained incomplete at the outbreak of the Korean War, *Her voice still goes on* (C. *Ta de gesheng wei duan*).[30] Indicative of North Korea's enduring international links, and using music as "a means of cementing friendship with international socialist friends,"[31] Zheng also wrote a "Song of Korean–Sino Friendship" (K. *Cho-Chung ch'insŏn ŭi norae*; 1950), and even a song "In Praise of Mao Zedong" (C. *Mao Zedong zan ge*).[32] On the outbreak of war, he resumed his more military output, composing marches and songs such as "The Flag of the Republic Flutters in the Wind" (C. *Gongheguo qizhi yingfeng piaoyang*), which was published in July 1950 in the People's Army Paper (K. *Inmin'gun po*).[33]

Nevertheless, Ding writes, Zheng's situation became increasingly difficult as he was side-lined from the DPRK cultural leadership. In September 1950, after

much discussion with each other and with the Chinese plenipotentiary, the couple decided to return to settle in China, where his proven success as a composer with the Eighth Route Army should ease his path. "As a Communist Party member and an internationalist," he would be building "socialism whether in Korea or China," he apparently declared.[34] Zheng and Ding's return was arranged at the highest levels, by an exchange of letters between Premier Zhou Enlai and Kim Il Sung, just as the Korean War was starting. Ding describes Zheng's dramatic night drive to Sinŭiju at the beginning of October, as Pyongyang came under US attack. Zheng's mother, who had joined them in Pyongyang, was with him, and he also took a piano he had bought there.[35]

Zheng returned almost immediately to Korea in a cultural team attached to the Chinese People's Volunteers that were supporting the North in the war.[36] He was no longer a suspected traitor, but a valued guest of the Korean Workers Party, and Ding's memoirs say that his team initially stayed with the Korean communist command in Pyongyang bunkers.[37] Kim Il Sung is reported by Ding to have enjoyed singing with Zheng, and a photograph survives of them together. In January 1951, the cultural team headed south together with the Chinese Volunteer Army to Seoul, where Zheng picked up a set of historical scores of Korean court music that he found in the rubble. Later, Ding describes him composing, in the heat of battle, the "Song of White Cloud Hill" (C. *Gechang Baiyunshan*), a "March of the Chinese People's Volunteer Forces" (C. *Zhongguo renmin zhiyuanjun jinxingqu*) and other similar military works.

At the end of the Korean War, Zheng returned to China where he had a successful career as a military composer, creating a large corpus of vocal music, including children's songs, a cantata of Mao poems, and an opera based on Bai nationality melodies. He died peacefully, while fishing, in 1976, shortly after the end of the Cultural Revolution. Ding, his wife, had an enormously successful career in China's diplomatic service, and only passed away in 2012. After Zheng died, she organised concerts, forums, anthologies and book publications. Zheng's music is still celebrated, for instance, in a concert version of excerpts from his opera, *Wang fu yun*, held in Beijing in 2007, and most recently Zheng himself was the subject of the opera *Musician Zheng Lücheng's Long March Journey* (C. *Yinyuejia Zheng Lücheng de changzheng lu*).[38]

Image in North Korea

The post-1953 career of Zheng Lücheng and his subsequent music is well documented in Chinese literature. This article departs from this "reality" and into the realms of cultural flows and transnational imaginations of Zheng Lücheng.

Zheng had survived accusations of spying in Yan'an, and left Korea before the purge of his friends. This in itself can be considered as a feat. Nonetheless, his name disappeared during the 1950s from North Korean histories and song collections. His "March of the People's Army" (K. *Inmin'gun haengjingok*) appears in the 1958 anthology, *Resplendent Motherland* (K. *Pitnanŭn choguk*) and an army publication, *101 Song Anthology: 10th Anniversary of the Korean People's Army* (*101 Kokchip: Chosŏn inmin'gun ship nyŏn kinyŏm*). Apart from this one army song, I have found no other music by Zheng in North Korean compilations. Neither a 1952 *Newly Composed Song Collection* (K. *Shin chak kagok chip*) nor a 1954 *Selection of Korean People's Songs* (K. *Chosŏn inmin kayo kok sŏnchip*) have any of his songs. Even the 1956 (first) version of the history *Korean Music since Liberation* (K. *Haebanghu Chosŏn ŭmak*) by Ri Hirim *et al*,[39] has no mention of his name. After 1958, the Korean People's Army replaced his army song with one written by a Korean composer who had not served the Chinese army, Kim Oksŏng (1916–1965).[40] The 1987 volume *Music of the Korean Liberation War Period* (K. *Choguk haebang chŏnchaeng sigi ŭmak yesul*), which covers a period when he was active in Korea, does not mention him or his army march, even though a whole section is devoted to the composing of the later army march by Zheng's colleague, Kim Oksŏng. Such a disappearance is not entirely surprising, given the removal of Yan'an figures from the founding histories of North Korea. Nevertheless, and while I have no way to verify this, ethnic Korean composers from China who had contact with North Korean musicians told me that his *Song of the East Sea Fisherman* was performed long after his departure, and that the army continued to play (and prefer) his march.

More surprisingly, 40 years after he left North Korea, a biographical film about Zheng was released in Pyongyang in 1992: *The Musician Zheng Lücheng*. This reappearance is striking. The film depicts him as a model worker—a fervently nationalist musician. Although not explicitly part of the series, it fits into the massive set of films on Korea's revolutionary history, *Nation and Destiny* (K. *Minjokkwa ummyŏng*) that also included four films on the avant-garde composer Yun Isang (1917–1995), who was based in Berlin.[41] It was produced by the 2.8 Film Studio, an army-run studio that also made the *Nation and Destiny* series. Its director, Cho Kyŏngsun, was a Kim Il Sung prize-winning filmmaker, who had directed *Bellflower* (*Toraji*), one of the key films of the period, as well as others in the *Nation and Destiny* series. Playing Ding Xuesong was O Miran, the female star who had taken the lead role in *Bellflower*, while Zheng himself was played by Ri Wŏnbok, who had played military heroes in earlier films.[42]

The film irons out many inconveniences, such as Zheng's Yan'an wedding and daughter. In it, Zheng is shown striving to create Korean revolutionary music,

and only occasionally thinking back to his beautiful Chinese lover, (supposedly) left behind in Yan'an. And rather than Zheng moving to China, the film ends with Ding joining him in Korea. There is no suggestion that they ever leave Korea, as the film shows them embracing in the warm glow of gratitude to Kim Il Sung.

The Musician Zheng Lücheng: Nation and Duty

In *The Musician Zheng Lücheng*, Yan'an is shown as a place entirely populated by young women, resembling a military girls' boarding school rather than a communist army base. In one scene, Zheng sings the Korean folksong "*Arirang*" to the female soldiers of Yan'an, who look on adoringly in the way Chinese teenagers today look at their *Hallyu* idols (Figure 1). Kim Il Sung's is the only other male presence felt in Yan'an; despite being thousands of miles away in Manchuria, his

Figure 1 Zheng, singing at Yan'an. From *The Musician Zheng Lücheng* (Pyongyang, 2.8 Studio 1992)

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influence is depicted as profound. For instance, Zheng is seen to be inspired to write the *Song of the Eighth Route Army* after reading a newspaper report of the General's latest victory against the Japanese. Later, at the end of the war he is excited to hear of the General's plans for building the new Korea, and is eager to join him. He is only heartbroken that Ding cannot come with him. The two must put their love aside to build revolution.

Once the film moves to North Korea, Zheng's colleagues and his audience are largely male, be it factory workers or soldiers (Figure 2). His principal guide in North Korea is Kang Rim, a cadre who had fought alongside Kim Il Sung in Manchuria, and who appears occasionally as a conduit for Kim Il Sung's thoughts and plans. He tasks Zheng with building a school of music, forming an army band, and eventually with writing a song for the army. In his attempts to recruit the best musicians, Zheng encounters some, such as his former friend U Jin, who are

Figure 2 Zheng, singing at the rebuilding of a ironworks. From *The Musician Zheng Lücheng* (Pyongyang, 2.8 Studio, 1992)

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irredeemably bourgeois. Japanese-educated, and loving only Western classical music, U disparages Korean folk song. He rejects any responsibility to the country and its people, ranting instead about the essential freedom of artists. Zheng, on the other hand, longs to fulfil his duty, but struggles to write the kind of music that might stir the masses, or, in terms of revolutionary socialism, to inspire soldiers in battle.

Performing for the workers, Zheng is told by one listener that his music sounds like Chinese folksong, particularly in its high pitch. Zheng laments that he has lost his national voice and that his music lacks deep Korean emotion: "I've breathed foreign air, drunk foreign water. I've forgotten the things of my birthplace." Kang Rim, on the other hand, sings a hometown song that is truly moving. Zheng asks Kang Rim who had written this song, "Yearning for Home" (K. *Sahyangga*), and learns that it was Kim Il Sung's own composition.[43] Singing it had deeply inspired soldiers in times of difficulty: "When we were in battle, the General got us to sing it, to fill us with warm love of country, hatred of the Japanese, and to lift our morale. Only because the country was in his heart could the General write such a good song." The two men look up as the clouds part to reveal the sun, marvelling at Kim's musical talent. ("Yearning for Home," though attributed here and elsewhere to Kim Il Sung, was in fact an early *changga* [simple Western-style song], composed in 1916 by Chŏng Sa'in.)[44]

Under Kang's encouragement, Zheng gradually regains his Korean heart and voice. He travels far and wide—"deeply among the people"—to collect songs and instruments. He encourages a singer to take pride in the folksongs that she had been told were unworthy, and to perform them to spread the news and aims of General Kim. He himself sings "Yearning for Home" at concerts, and writes a hometown song that is more Korean. Despite this, when receiving orders through Kang to compose the "Song for the Korean People's Army," he doubts his own ability to connect with the masses satisfactorily. Kang passes on another song from Kim Il Sung's anti-Japanese forces: "March of the Guerrillas" (K. *Yugyŏktae haengjin'gok*), which he notes has both national and mass character.[45] Kang advises him to get out and join the soldiers in battle in order to experience their fighting spirit. And thus, struggling through the rain and mud with the troops, Zheng is again transformed. He returns to his piano (a gift to the ensemble from Kim), and, working through the night, imagining the battlefields of Manchuria, he composes the "Song of the Korean People's Army." This is a masterpiece of romantic piano virtuosity that segues into a full choral and orchestral version, accompanied by a filmed montage of modern military might. As a reward for Zheng's revolutionary contribution, Kim Il Sung writes to Zhou Enlai to arrange for Ding Xuesong to be sent to join Zheng in Korea as his wife. The film ends as they embrace on the train platform.

The same symbolism, linking Kim Il Sung with the sun at key moments in the protagonist Zheng's transformation, is familiar from other North Korean films, notably the much earlier *Sea of Blood* (*P'i pada*). Lee Hyangjin describes films of the early 1990s as being characterised by the "re-examination of the issues of working class, and nationalism," returning to core issues and national building.[46] Like films in the *Nation and Destiny* series, then, the film about Zheng depicts such issues through individuals, protagonists whose exemplary activities serve as a model for others. Several protagonists of the series were overseas Koreans, like Isang Yun. However, unlike the four films on Yun, which feature none of Yun's music, *Musician Zheng Lücheng* illustrates Zheng's musical development with several of his own compositions, such as the "Eighth Route Army Song" which he sings cheerily to Ding Xuesong at Yan'an, accompanying himself on the mandolin. In the film, this song is taken up by chorus and orchestra, as the trainee female soldiers practice on the Alpine meadows of China. Later, touring villages and towns while developing his voice, we hear his songs "Autumn Harvest" (K. *Ch'o so*), "Mt Paektu's Heavenly Lake" (K. *Paektusan ŭi chŏnji*), and eventually his army song. While much is made of their Korean spirit in the film, there is no trace of traditional Korean music in these songs; rather they are popular mass songs (K. *taejung kayo*) that resemble the more sentimental popular songs of the colonial era, or straightforward Soviet military music. The incidental music for the film is credited to Ri Kyŏnghun and Chang Cho'il, and follows a typically romantic musical style.[47]

It is interesting to compare the North Korean film with a biographical film made 13 years later in China, *Going towards the Sun* (2005)—the Chinese title *Zouxiang taiyang* takes words from the "March of the People's Liberation Army." It fills a similar story arc: the main story (the attempt to write an inspiring song for the army) and a romantic subplot, focussed on his romance with Ding. The Chinese film opens with the Japanese bombing a small group of children on the beach, including Zheng who is playing his violin. We then see a trail of destruction as the Japanese finish off Zheng's family and friends, first in Korea and then China, until he arrives in Yan'an. Like the Korean film, Zheng's Yan'an seems a bit like a scout camp, but much more masculine and with more violence. The inconvenient fact of Zheng's imprisonment as a suspected spy, and the fact that he left China for North Korea in 1945, merit no mention. Both films end with the successful completion of their respective army songs, and a montage of military clips. In both films it is during the heat of battle that inspiration finally arrives. In North Korea's film the guidance comes from Kim Il Sung; in China's, from the Chinese woman he loves, Ding Xuesong. Ding critiques his Army Song for being insufficiently vigorous and hateful. Following her guidance he adds some more march-like dotted quaver patterns, and larger melodic intervals. In many ways, *Going towards the Sun* was

a curiously dated film when it was released, and it was not a commercial success in China.

The North Korean film was released in 1992, the year that China resumed diplomatic relations with South Korea. Possibly, it was a cinematic reminder of Korea's ties to China: within the film, Zheng makes a speech to Ding in Yan'an about the shared aims of the two countries. It was precisely those diplomatic moves of 1992 that widened the transnational flow of Zheng Lücheng-ology, spreading it to South Korea. In October 1996, Ding Xuesong, Zheng Xiaoti and the prominent Chinese musicologist, Liang Maochun, visited Zheng's hometown of Kwangju in South Chŏlla province, meeting with surviving relatives and friends. Liang reflected on his journey to Korea in a series of articles for the journal *Renmin yinyue* (People's Music). In 2006 they held a music festival in Kwangju in Zheng's name, and news reports said that future festivals would involve the North Korean Mansudae Ensemble, though this appearance has never materialised.[48] And, also in 2006, in an extraordinary act of twisted cultural diplomacy, Zheng's widow Ding Xuesong presented South Korea's National Gugak Center (Kungnip kugagwŏn) with the scores of court music—banquet pieces—that he had rescued from the rubble of Seoul when the city was retaken by the Chinese and North Korean forces in January 1951.

Today, in Kwangju there is a small memorial hall devoted to Zheng, and his music features in concerts and festivals. Television documentaries have featured him and there are large family reunions; notably, the South Korean broadcaster MBC ran a full-length documentary on his life story, *Chŏng Yulsŏng ŭi insaeng kŭkchang* (Zheng Lücheng's Life Drama), and a comic book account of his life has recently been published (Park 2019). In all, there is local and national pride in his achievements as a Korean composer in China.

This article began by asking how, in the dangerous space between two highly nationalistic countries, Zheng had not only survived, but become an icon of revolutionary patriotism. As a transnational, Zheng slipped between the two countries, and as a musician, perhaps he was unthreatening. Perhaps it was in a liminal space that Zheng Lücheng became a suitable figure for both Chinese and North Korean model worker films. Like Isang Yun, the other composer with his own North Korean biopic, he did not live in North Korea and his music is never heard there, but he is, nonetheless, a national music hero. He can be memorialised in a country were no living figure can be idolised outside the Kim family dynasty. Zheng's life of migration, between South Korea, China and North Korea, ended over 40 years ago, but as an icon, his stories continue to circulate across borders. In so doing, his liminality gives us some indication of the complex tensions between nationalism and internationalism in the region, and how we may start to explore them.

Notes

1. To be consistent with most other English-language literature on Zheng, hereafter I use the Mandarin Chinese reading of his name 郑律成, Romanised according to pinyin conventions. Zheng's birth name was Fu'en (K. Pu-ŭn), and in the course of his anti-Japanese activities he took on a variety of aliases, including Liu Dazhen (刘大振, K. Ryu Taejin), Huang Qinghai (黄青海, K. Hwang Chŏnghae) and Jin Zhongmin (金中民, K. Kim Chungmin). His chosen name has musical connotations, as 律 means, among other things, "tone" or "pitch."
2. See for instance, Kraus 1989, Liu 2010, Mittler 1999.
3. See for instance, essays in Zhang *et al.* 1987, Ding 2009.
4. Readers of this journal will be familiar with such literature, such as recent publications by Person (2008), Shen and Li (2011), Shen and Xia (2018). Cathcart and Kraus (2008) focus more specifically on the cultural history of this period.
5. For whom, see Howard (2020, 217–218), and entries in Kim and Kim (1998; 319–320, 358–9, 432.
6. Stock 1996, 9.
7. Consider publications by Zhihua Shen and Danhui Li (2011, 2018).
8. The title words are taken from Gong Mu's lyrics to the "March of the PLA."
9. There is some debate about the exact year of his birth; see Liang Maochun 2016, Liang Maochun and Zheng Xiaoti 1997, and Jin Chungjun 2008. Addresses in Liangnim village 杨林町 and Pullodong 不老洞 are variously given.
10. In this, his musical upbringing does not sound very different to that of Kim Il Sung, as described in his biographies (Cathcart 2008, 94).
11. Zheng Zhi 2009, 231. For An, see fn. 43.
12. The three older brothers were Chŏng Hyoryŏng, Chŏng In'gi and Chŏng Ŭi'ŭn (see Wang 2016, chapter 2. Also Ding 2009, 9).
13. The standard Chinese-language biographies call this the "*Chaoxian geming ganbu xuexiao*" (Korean revolutionary cadre academy). I have found no further reference to this specific school, but Wakeman (2003, 79–80) describes a Korean revolutionary training class (*Chaoxian geming xunlianban*) which took in groups of about 100 students at a time each for about six months training.
14. Liang Maochun 2009, 285.
15. Her name in given in Chinese texts as "Kelinuowa." Probably M. Krilova, who appears on the programmes of the Shanghai Municipal Orchestra, for instance as a "Valkyrie" in May 1933, and then in 1936 as alto soloist in Beethoven's Choral Symphony (see http://exhibits.stanford.edu/paci/feature/expanding-the-orchestra-s-repertoire, 6 December 2019). "Kelinuowa" is said to have encouraged Zheng to study singing in Italy. This name appears in a Czech catalogue as a soprano who performed in 1952, and on gramophone recordings in 1961 with the Prague Symphony Orchestra, so she may have been Czech in origin.
16. Pease 2001, chapter 3, details Korean musical activities in the first half of the 20th century. See also Zhongguo Chaoxianzu yinyue yanjiuhui 2010, chapter 2.
17. Birth name Han Hyŏngsŏk. Like other exiles, Han used various aliases moved often, working, for instance, for the Korean Provisional Government in Shanghai, the Shanghai New China Art University (C. *Xinhua yishu daxue*), the Korean Youth Battlefield Cultural Troupe (K. *Han'guk ch'ŏngnyŏn chŏnji kongjak tae*), the Restoration Army and Kuomintang. Besides songs he also composed ballets and operas. After 1945 he returned to South Korea (Kim 1999; Pease 2001, 110).
18. The composer Chŏng Seryŏng (1930–1975) is one example (Kim and Kim 1998, 351). Another notable border-crosser was Chŏng Chinok (1926–1981), composer and director of the Yŏnbyŏn Song and Dance Troupe, who escaped back to North Korea in 1966, after

becoming a target of criticism during China's Cultural Revolution. Unlike Zheng, his music continues to be published and performed in both countries (Kim and Kim 1998, 355).

19. The title of Snow's Chapter 3 is "They sing too much."
20. Quoted in Kraus 1989, 55.
21. Shen and Li (2011, 52–55) describe the return of ethnic Koreans to Korea from both Yan'an and North East China and their role in establishing communist rule in North Korea.
22. Unless otherwise indicated, most of the material in this section comes from Ding Xuesong's account of her days in Korea in Ding and Yang 2009.
23. Pak was also the lyricist for many of Kim Wŏn'gyun's (1917–2002) songs, including the national anthem, "*Aegukka*," literally, "Patriotic Song."
24. Ding and Yang, 2009, 38. Zheng also set some of Kim's poetry as a choral piece (Zhang *et al.* 1987, 162).
25. Hoare 2012, 223–224.
26. Zhu was well known for his hospitality towards both the Yan'an and Manchurian factions (Shen and Li 2011, 55).
27. Blamed for the fall of Pyongyang in September 1950, Mu Chŏng was removed from his post by the end of that year (Shen and Xia 2018, 88), although Ding's account here suggests that he had already been demoted before that. He returned to China. Pak was eventually jailed in 1956 (Person 2008). Kim Tubong was purged in 1957, accused by Kim Il Sung of "undermining our party and leading people astray," although Andrei Lankov characterises him as a sympathiser rather than a maneuverer (2007, 95). He was sent to a labour camp (Shen and Li 2011, 213).
28. Shen and Li 2011, 199–218 outlines that despite such aid arrangements between China and North Korea, relations were always volatile and tainted with suspicion.
29. Ding and Yang 2009, 57.
30. The catalogue of works in Zhang *et al.* (1987, 158–176) is in Chinese, and I have not found the original Korean titles for all songs listed as being composed during this period.
31. Cathcart 2008, 102.
32. "*Mao Zedong zan ge*," with lyrics by the Chinese writer Gu Zhi, was published in the 1951 Chinese collection *Korean People's Songs* (C. *Chaoxian renmin gequji*). Ding and Liang's catalogue lists this song as being written and published during the Korean period, but it is possible that it was written during or after the transfer. However, song collections of this period did allow the praise of other leaders. In an indication of Korea's international indebtedness, the 1952 anthology *Newly Composed Songs* (K. *Shin chak kagok chip*) starts with "In Praise of Stalin" (K. *Ssŭttarin ch'an'ga*), followed by Kim Wŏn'gyun's "Song of General Kim Il Sung," and then China's de facto anthem "The East is Red" (C. *Dongfang hong*). In the 1954 *Selection of Korean People's Songs*, Stalin has slipped to third place, after Kim Wŏn'gyun's anthem "*Aegukka*" and his "Song for General Kim Il Sung."
33. Zhang *et al.* 1987, 162.
34. Ding and Yang 2009, 57. Likewise, according to Jin Changhao Zheng was not motivated by the desire for a leadership position, but because he wanted to write a greater variety of artistic works (C. *xiangyang de yishu zuopin*) to give spiritual nourishment to the revolutionary cause (1993, 449).
35. Zheng 2009, 250.
36. The team included writer Liu Baiyi (1916–2005), dramatist Ouyang Shanzun (1914–2009), film director Ling Zifeng (1917–1999), and the female poet Li Ying (1926–2019) (Ding and Yang 2009, 60).
37. Ding and Yang 2009, 60.
38. *Yinyuejia Zheng Lücheng de changzheng lu* was produced by the Eighth Route Army historical research unit, Baoding academy and Zheng Xiaoti cultural production company, and performed in Beijing in October 2016.

39. A second version of this, published in 1979, is more commonly cited, but represents a complete revision of the first version.
40. It appears in the same year in the anthology, *101 Kokchip: Chosŏn inmin'gun ship nyŏn kinyŏm*. For more on Kim Oksŏng, see Kim and Kim, 1998, 139.
41. Yun Isang's life was no less dramatic than Zheng's, and both took part in anti-Japanese activities. Yun was one of a group of Western avant-garde composers in West Germany, from where he was abducted by the Park Chun-hee regime in 1967, charged with espionage and imprisoned for two years. He returned to Berlin in 1971. The North Korean films of his life, *Yun Sangmin* (*Commoner Yun*; 1992–1993), like that of Zheng's, omit inconveniences such as the avant-garde nature of his music. For more, see Howard (2010; 2020, chapter 8) and Schonherr 2012, 119.
42. Schonherr 2012, 19.
43. Cathcart (2008, 94) gives other examples of Kim Il Sung's exemplary musical guidance, suggesting that notwithstanding the usual exaggerations "Kim's musical childhood indicates that he may indeed have had a role in the composition of songs and folk opera in the 1930s, roaming the Manchurian border spinning out song tunes and spitting anti-Japanese lyrics" (96).
44. "*Sahyangga*" was published in Korea as "*Nae kohyang-ŭl ribyŏl hago*" [Leaving my hometown]" in 1925 on the Nipponophone label, sung by An Kiyŏng (reissued on the 1992 CD set *Yusŏnggiro tŭddŏn kayosa* 1925–1945 Seoul: Sinnara). An Kiyŏng (1900–1980), the singer on that recording, had himself spent some time in the Yanbian (then Kando) region with anti-Japanese activists from 1919–1923. He later studied singing in the US, but became better known as a composer on his return. After 1945, An lived and worked in North Korea, where he was a prolific composer and from 1953 a vocal teacher at the Pyongyang School of Music. He never achieved a high position, though some of his songs are found in anthologies there (Kim and Kim 1998, 444–445). *Sahyangga* remains popular in North Korea, but generally without attribution. I have heard it in karaoke versions and arranged as a double piano concerto (at the Ŭnhasu Sun Festival concert of 2010), amongst others.
45. Yŏnbyŏn scholars such as Kim Tŏkkyun (1995, 99) suggest that this melody is European, given new words in the 1930s by Manchurian Korean forces. Although I do not know it as a European tune, it is very similar to the 1908 Japanese satirical hit "Chic Song" (J. *Haikara bushi*, literally "High Collar Song"), which makes fun of young Westernised Japanese. "High Collar Song" itself is said to be based on an earlier *shōka* (Pease 2001, 105).
46. Lee 2000, 39–40.
47. For whom, see Kim and Kim 1998, 328–9.
48. *DailyNK*, 14 November 2005. "Chŏng Yulsŏng ŭmakche kukchehwa kanŭngsŏng" (Possible internationalisation of Zheng Lücheng Music Festival). https://www.dailynk.com/%EC%A0%95%EC%9C%A8%EC%84%B1-%EC%9D%8C%EC%95%85%EC%A0%9C-%EA%B5%AD%EC%A0%9C%ED%99%94-%EA%B0%80%EB%8A%A5EC%84%B1/.

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The Samjiyon Orchestra as a North Korean Means for Gender Based Cultural Diplomacy

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Abstract

In 2018 it appeared that a peace process on the Korean Peninsula had got underway. Lots of publicity was produced on inter-Korean relations and many types of messages and diplomatic actors started to move across the border with South Korea. One important element in this process was cultural diplomacy, conducted partly by athletes and cheering squads during the Pyeongchang Winter Olympic Games, and partly by musical ensembles. Selection of the Samjiyon Orchestra for the Pyeongchang events sheds light on the kind of image the North Korean leadership wanted to display of the country on the international stage. This article analyses the characteristics of the orchestra, where it came from, and why was it suitable for cultural diplomacy. Our wider goal is to understand music as an element in North Korean foreign policy. Evidently, music is considered an important tool for specific occasions, though its use is intermittent rather than regular.

Keywords: North Korea, Samjiyon Orchestra, cultural diplomacy, women, musical politics

What is the Samjiyon Orchestra?

Spring 2018 witnessed considerable high-level diplomatic activity aimed at reviving the peace process on the Korean Peninsula. State leaders as well as high ranking politicians and diplomats met in front of the gaze of global watchers. One part of this was cultural diplomacy, conducted partly by athletes and cheering squads of supporters during the Pyeongchang Winter Olympic Games, and partly by musical ensembles. In this, a particular North Korean orchestra stands out: Pyongyang sent an ensemble, the Samjiyon Orchestra 삼지연관현악단, to perform in Gangneung on February 8, 2018[3] and in Seoul on February 11, 2018.[4] South Korea's president, Moon Jae-in, attended their performance. After returning to Pyongyang, the orchestra was warmly received by Chairman Kim Jong Un. They had a photo session with him on February 12,[5] and held a concert in honour of his father, Kim Jong Il's birthday on February 16.[6] South Korea sent its own musicians to perform in Pyongyang. They gave one concert on April 1, attended by Kim Jong Un,[7] and another one on April 3 that included also a short performance where the Samjiyon Orchestra joined southern artists.[8] A video of the performance exists.[9] A further cultural diplomacy performance by the orchestra was directed at China, in honour of a visiting Chinese opera troupe in April.[10] The summit meeting between the South's President Moon Jae-in and the North's Chairman Kim Jong Un at Panmunjom on April 27 further included a small performance by some Samjiyon musicians in the relaxed atmosphere of the evening retreat. Thus, between February and April there were six separate occasions where the Samjiyon Orchestra performed, five of them in important functions relating to cultural diplomacy.

During the summit, a dinner was organized for diplomatic officials. In the list of North Korean representatives, Hyon Song Wol was introduced as the leader of the orchestra, listing her past achievements as "leader of the Moranbong Band and singer of Pochonbo Electronic Ensemble." The guest list included a number of other musicians, namely the conductor Jang Ryong Sik (also representing Samjiyon), violinist Cha Yong Mi (Moranbong Band), and mezzo-soprano Hwang Un Mi (Mansudae Art Troupe). We also know from the news media that when Kim Jong Un visited China on January 7–10, 2019, he took Hyon Song Wol and Jang Ryong Sik with him, although their names were not mentioned by the official KCNA report on January 10.[11]

Visits of musicians and musical administrators do not necessarily lead to concerts, but the presence of such people attests to the fact that cultural diplomacy in the form of musical ensembles is an essential element in the North Korean diplomatic tool-kit. Certainly, the Samjiyon Orchestra was the main organ for

this in 2018. The selection of the Samjiyon Orchestra for the Pyeongchang events in spring 2018 represented an interesting phenomenon which shed light on the kind of image the North Korean leadership wanted to display on the international stage. This article attempts to shed light on what the orchestra is, and where it came from. Our wider goal is to understand music as an element in North Korean foreign policy, since, apparently, it is considered an important tool for specific occasions, though its use is intermittent rather than regular.

The grand beginning notwithstanding, the diplomatic peace process started to ground to a halt later in 2018, and the year 2019 was a period of waiting for a new breakthrough, which never materialized. Consequently, there was scant need for cultural diplomacy. Only two Samjiyon concerts were announced, both of them domestic ones. One was for the Day of the Sun celebrations for Kim Il Sung's birthday on April 15, without any specifics revealed.[12] The other one took place on 31 December for celebrating the New Year. Year 2019 was a lean one also in other cultural aspects. Big state orchestras gave relatively few concerts. To some extent the responsibility for public performances appeared to be delegated to work units, military bands, and educational institutions. The Moranbong Band and the Chongbong Band, famous only a couple of years ago, practically disappeared from visibility. Production of new songs and films ground to almost nothing. All this seems to imply that state funding had become tight because of international sanctions and consequently resources were withdrawn from the cultural sector. In this generally lacklustre situation, it is remarkable that the Samjiyon Orchestra not only continued to exist but was employed during main national events. It is an ensemble worth studying.

On Interpreting North Korean Phenomena

Doing research on North Korea is notoriously difficult, because the state systematically attempts to control the spread of all information, both essential and apparently non-essential, outside of the country. This hampers even well-meaning and mutually beneficial cooperative ventures.[13] At the same time North Korea is a member of international society, which necessitates constant communication with the world outside its borders. A researcher thus faces a narrow stream of information emanating from the country, administered by a cluster of propaganda workers who try to make specific arguments without revealing any inside information. This necessarily leads to conducting research using small, disparate pieces of information. During the Cold War, "Kremlinology" developed into a distinct brand of studies on the Soviet Union, specializing on interpreting small hints in the order of names, the placing of photographs, and similar items. What is

sometimes referred to as 'Pyongyangology' continues this same tradition. The situation, of course, does not make research actually difficult, but it is a specific condition which is not abnormal in many disciplines. For instance, historians and philosophers are able to write sensible books about various aspects of human history based on scant evidence, such as J. O. Urmson's interpretations of classical Greek ethics. Interpretative studies are naturally open to criticism, and counter-interpretations can always be made, but opposing comments notwithstanding Max Weber's study on protestant ethics, or Quentin Skinner's major work on the Mediaeval foundations of modern European political thought, are regarded as modern classics. As Skinner argues, historians do this not only by thoroughly interpreting the various bits of information that they have, but by relying strongly on what can be identified as historical contexts and plausible understandings of the intentions of the actors.[14] The results can of course be considered as speculative guesswork, but this is what has to be the case when information is scarce.

Our small elucidation of the role of Samjiyon in North Korean cultural diplomacy may not rise to the same level of historical importance with the above-mentioned classics, but we nevertheless take from Skinner the idea that our research object is to develop arguments in relation to specific political contexts that have specific political intentions. What we understand here as arguments can be specific verbal utterances on domestic or international issues, but also can be ordinary North Korean news about events and topics that take verbal and pictorial forms, the repertoires presented in concerts, and the costumes worn by performers. The ostensible purpose of these news items is to present North Korea as a functioning, "ordinary" country despite the hardships it faces, and to enhance its prestige—especially that of its leadership. Items relating to music fall in a special category: because North Korean ensembles produce polished popular music that is easy but intriguing to listen to, there is an international audience for them. Music performed by highly trained artists in thoroughly rehearsed concerts is plainly considered to enhance national prestige, in addition to its possible propaganda value. Prestige is a constantly accented element in North Korean discourse.[15] We judge the importance of music from the fact that North Korea chooses to give a fair amount of information about its ensembles in the form of publications of concerts, discussions in literature, and regular items in news outputs. Taking orchestras as part of political discourse becomes utilizable research material because, in a situation of general scarcity, a moderate array of information emanates about them.

Little has been written previously in English about the Samjiyon Band or the Samjiyon Orchestra, and there is little information about the Mansudae Art Troupe from which its members came, despite the latter's long history and importance

among the various North Korean ensembles and arts organizations. General analyses of music have been published, mostly in Korean and Japanese. Bak Yeong-jeong has written about the system of cultural administration during the Kim Jong Il era, analysing various art education institutions, the ideological ethos of training, cultural facilities in the country, as well as the different ensembles and their repertoires. Lee Shu-an is not an academic researcher, but he has published a book containing important first-hand information. He is a second-generation Korean resident in Japan, and has been involved for a long time in music exchange between Koreans in Japan and North Korea. He has written about developments in the musical sector from the beginnings of anti-Japanese partisan music—which was created between 1926–1945—the Korean War and reconstruction period, the ascent of Kim Jong Il as the major influence on the art scene from 1965 onwards, the military-first period under Kim Jong Il, inter-Korean reconciliation, and the "light music" of Pochonbo Electronic Ensemble, Wangjaesan Light Music Group, and Moranbong Band. There is also a recent South Korean PhD dissertation by Ha Seung-Hee that deals with the history and development of North Korean orchestras.[16] Keith Howard has for a long time observed the North Korean musical scene from various angles, creating the English language basis on which further studies can be built (2004, 2005, 2011).[17] Adam Cathcart has systematically followed North Korean musical diplomacy (2009, 2013).[18] Recently, as North Korean activity on the internet has increased, especially on YouTube, Youku and Bilibili, analyses on specific ensembles have appeared, especially on the Unhasu Orchestra[19] and the Moranbong Band.[20] Our analysis of Samjiyon Orchestra aims to add to such studies on specific ensembles and their role in North Korean musical politics. Specific discographies of the Unhasu Orchestra, the Moranbong Band, the Chongbong Band, and the Samjiyon Band/Orchestra are available that analyse individual concerts of specific ensembles. These are useful tools for research when the content available on YouTube and similar sites tend to be rather volatile, and VCDs and DVDs are available only to a limited extent.

Our research material consists of four main types. The most important is videos of the Samjiyon Band and Samjiyon Orchestra, which allow us to make empirical observations of behaviour, outlook, material, and repertoire; this is our only direct form of material. The second category consists of mentions of the orchestra and its predecessors in North Korean media; this gives historical information on dates, persons, and so on. The third type is books, articles, and comments written by international researchers, which is available mainly in Korean, Japanese, and English, although, as already mentioned, there is little on Samjiyon. The fourth type is news, videos, photos, and other material published by the international media. This last is necessarily miscellaneous, comes in various languages, and

may not satisfy the standards of strict scientific research, although, in a situation where data sources are scarce, its use can be defended. We have strived to use systematic source criticism on all the material we utilize. We locate our research on the field of political history; that is, we are not looking for immutable general laws covering North Korean cultural diplomatic behaviour, but humbly attempt to portray the specific characteristics of one actor in it.

What is There in an Orchestra?

The diplomatic usefulness of the Samjiyon Orchestra lies in the specific characteristics of its predecessor, the Samjiyon Band of the Mansudae Art Troupe 만수대예술단 삼지연악단. The names, the visual outlook, and the style of music of these ensembles are very similar. In practice, the orchestra adds musicians from other ensembles, as well as new conductors and a new leader. Hyon Song Wol served during 2012–2017 as leader of the Moranbong Band, which until 2017 was the top North Korean ensemble—when measured in terms of performances at important anniversaries, appearances together with the supreme leader, and flattering commentary in the North Korean media. Its chief conductor, Jang Ryong Sik, earlier worked as chief conductor of the National Symphony Orchestra and the State Merited Chorus. These had both been top musical groups, hence prestige and experience moved from pre-existing ensembles to the new Samjiyon Orchestra in early 2018, when it was chosen to be the national cultural representative of the state.

In North Korean thinking, the difference between a band (*aktan* = "music group") and an orchestra (*gwanhyeon aktan* = "symphony music group") seems to be twofold. On one hand, it denotes size. Bands are smaller, usually featuring about 10–13 musicians and 8–12 singers for a concert. On the other hand, it seems to denote organizational independence. The Chongbong Band of the Wangjaesan Art Group used to have 13 musicians and about 10 singers, but in terms of organization it was only a section of a larger group. The Samjiyon Band was bigger, but was part of the much larger Mansudae Art Troupe, containing over 50 musicians, so roughly the same size as the Unhasu Orchestra, both of which had been established in 2009 by Kim Jong Il. Size notwithstanding, the Samjiyon Band remained in the "band" category because it was only a section of a larger troupe, while the Unhasu Orchestra was an independent organization.[21] Thus, it appears that at the beginning of 2018, the Samjiyon Band was organizationally separated from its mother organization and given a new administrative and artistic leadership, which was then reflected in the change of name. This then facilitated a rise in prestige and foreign usefulness.

A major organizational overhaul, a specific photo session with Kim Jong Un, and a number of musical instruments donated by Kim Jong Un to the ensemble on April 6 2018, coupled to documentation in accompanying speeches about developing it as a world class orchestra, seem to point to a planned longevity.[22] The Samjiyon Orchestra is, therefore, likely to remain a central diplomatic tool for some time, provided there is room for cultural diplomacy in North Korea's foreign relations.

The Mansudae Art Troupe

The history of the Samjiyon Band is deeply embedded in the development of the Mansudae Art Troupe. The latter is one of the oldest, most important and most celebrated North Korean organizations for staged performance. Its origin was the Pyongyang Song and Dance Troupe, established in 1946, whose task was to entertain and spread socialist propaganda in collective farms, factories and military units.[23] On September 27, 1969, Kim Jong Il enlarged it into the Mansudae Art Troupe.[24] Organizationally, it was placed directly under the Worker's Party of Korea (hereafter, WPK). Understanding the organizational structures in North Korea is notoriously difficult, and musical ensembles can be found within different organizations. In principle, all art and propaganda work falls under the Department of Propaganda and Agitation within the Executive Bureau of the Central Committee of the WPK, but day-to-day supervision of ensembles is handled by additional organizations. Military orchestras fall under military units, but when one reads North Korean materials one gets the impression that most are directly under the Ministry of Culture, including the opera troupe established by Kim Jong Il, the Sea of Blood Opera Troupe.[25] The organizational affiliation of some ensembles has so far proved impossible to decipher; one of the current authors has asked several North Korean art experts where the Moranbong Band is organizationally placed, but nobody seems to know. However, it is clear that the organizational location of the Mansudae Art Troupe was directly under the Party, and thus also the Department of Propaganda and Agitation, which attests to the important role given to it. This location is also logical because Kim Jong Il, its creator and personal mentor, was in the late 1960s working in that department. Its present organizational location is not known.

The Mansudae Art Troupe specialized in producing revolutionary operas, music and dance, and by way of these activities in spreading national ideology.[26] This naturally included building up the personality cult of Kim Il Sung. The most famous of North Korean revolutionary operas, "The Flower Girl", was produced by the troupe in 1972. The play on which it was based had allegedly been written

by Kim Il Sung, but the opera was a collective undertaking supervised by Kim Jong Il. Ko Yong Hui, the mother of the current leader, Kim Jong Un, was a dancer in the Mansudae Art Troupe, and this indicates a close relation between the troupe and Kim Jong Il. We do not know its current size, but we have information from 1973, when the troupe contained 304 artists, including 54 dancers, 80 singers, and 120 musicians, with composers, music arrangers, conductors, choreographers, and scenery artists.[27] We do not believe that the troupe is drastically smaller nowadays, since it is still one of the major musical organizations, both in respect to stage performances and education, where young artists who have graduated from colleges gain further training and experience.

The Mansudae Art Troupe has a long history of cultural diplomatic activity. In the 1970s, after North Korea had been widening its trading and diplomatic networks well outside of the Socialist countries,[28] the troupe travelled and performed widely in Europe (France, Switzerland, Britain and Italy), Africa, South America,[29] China[30] and Japan.[31] In 2002, at the time of South Korea's Sunshine Policy and when relations between the North and South were relatively amicable, it even performed in Seoul. What the Samjiyon Orchestra started doing in 2018 therefore has a long, if rather sporadic, pedigree.

The personnel of the troupe are picked from Pyongyang-based and regional music ensembles and institutions on the basis of skill and ideological purity—the latter relates to a good family pedigree and therefore confines its members to élite families. North Koreans are divided into different strata according to their class status in 1945, and the closeness of members to Kim Il Sung's guerrilla group at that time. The system is known as *chulsin-seongbun*, and only those with a high status are considered ideologically reliable. They have easier access to good education and to important jobs in the administrative structure. The troupe is divided into a creative group, which composes and arranges music, a symphony orchestra that also includes players of modified Korean instruments, a dancing section, a male choir, a female choir, and a specific section for female musicians.[32] Kim Jong Il relates in his *On the Art of Music* that he established an all-female instrumental group within the troupe, whose skills he systematically developed over the years.[33] His work started in the 1960s, and in 1979 the group was reorganized as a special section, the Merited Female Instrumental Ensemble.[34] The long-time female conductor of the Samjiyon Band, Ri Sune gave an interview in 2015 for the party newspaper, *Rodong Sinmun*, where she identified herself as a former member of this section, emphasizing its central importance in the development of female musicians; she thanked Kim Jong Il for his personal guidance through the years.[35]

In the first decade of the current century, Kim Jong Il wanted to raise the level of North Korean ensembles, to make them international in standard. One means to do this was for artists to acquire education in highly regarded foreign institutions, hence several young musicians, singers, and conductors were sent to countries like Italy, Austria, Russia, and China.[36] Another method was to concentrate on the best artists in North Korea. For this reason, a special group of young musicians was selected within the troupe in June 2007 on an experimental basis, with the Merited Female Instrumental Ensemble forming the core.[37] Kim Jong Il guided their rehearsals in November and December 2007 as well as in April and November 2008, emphasizing that in addition to technical skills, they were to develop a style which would be pleasing to the North Korean population in general, and that they must also perform foreign melodies with skill and artistic touch.[38] These were the years when North Korea discovered the usefulness of the Internet and started uploading music to the Chinese Youku and American YouTube. A systematic cultural offensive directed at foreign audiences was planned, and on January 16, 2009, the year of the fortieth anniversary of the troupe itself, this special training section formally became the Samjiyon Band, taking a name given by Kim Jong Il himself.[39]

The Samjiyon Band

Samjiyon translates as “Three Ponds.” These are real ponds, situated in Samjiyon County in Ryanggang Province near the Chinese border in the foothills of Paektusan (White Peak Mountain). As with many names of North Korean ensembles, this connects with Kim Il Sung, as it is one of the locations where he is supposed to have conducted guerrilla warfare against the Japanese. This history makes the ponds an ideologically highly symbolic area.

The home base of the troupe is the Mansudae Art Theatre, but because it is a very large ensemble, from 2007 it started using the East Pyongyang Grand Theatre as its performance and rehearsal location.[40] The latter was built in 1989 and renovated in 2007. The theatre houses a major music library, as ordered by Kim Jong Il (*Choguk*). This is where the Samjiyon Band gave its first public concert on April 15, 2009 during celebrations for the Day of the Sun—the birthday of the Eternal President of the North Korean nation, Kim Il Sung.[41] No published video exists of this concert, so not much is known of it. This is also where the New York Philharmonic Orchestra performed with the State Symphony Orchestra on February 26, 2008, because it was a venue large enough and with good acoustics.[42] A few months after its debut, Samjiyon’s second concert took place on September 9, 2009, resulting in a DVD that features selected songs. From this DVD we know

that the repertoire consisted of the usual North Korean songs, mainly eulogies for the nation and the leaders, but also foreign popular classics such as Rimsky-Korsakov's "Flight of the Bumblebee," Bizet's "Carmen Suite," and Johann Strauss's "Radetzky Marsch."[43] These are common pieces in the foreign repertoires of North Korean ensembles. The concept of the band was as Kim Jong Il instructed: popular, and featuring a mixture of domestic and foreign compositions. As the Band did not have any singers, much of its presentation was purely instrumental, but a few Mansudae Art Troupe singers performed some songs.

The first director of the Samjiyon Band was Kim Il Jin,[44] and the violinist Ri Sune acted as concert master. However, Kim was soon elevated to the position of director of the whole Mansudae Art Troupe, so his name did not appear in any of the available published programs. Ri Sune became director and conductor of the band, while continuing to play violin and giving the most important solos. She had the rank of merit artist; North Korea has two ranks of distinction for its artists, of which merit artist is the lower, while people's artist is usually given for older artists with a long and distinguished record of serving the state. Ri studied at the Pyongyang University of Music and Dance, and after graduation joined the female instrumental section of the Mansudae troupe.[45] She was obviously talented and capable as leader, as she was able to get her young musicians to perform very well. An important aspect was the amicable atmosphere of early concerts, which is clearly discernible when observing Samjiyon videos and comparing them with concerts of other ensembles, or the same ensemble nowadays. North Korean orchestras do not necessarily display stern military discipline, but they tend to perform in a well-rehearsed and matter-of-fact style, with no informal behaviour or displays of emotion visible. Ri's musicians seemed happy and one can fairly often see them smiling to each other, as well as mutually communicating with their eyes or gestures during numbers. In addition to the typical repertoire choices for North Korean musicians, namely songs for the leaders and the party that the artists had been rehearsing throughout their educational period, Ri made them perform also interesting music; sometimes beautiful, sometimes difficult, usually foreign. This appeared to spark the interest of the artists. The cordial atmosphere was not exceptional during the late Kim Jong Il period, and one can sometimes observe it in other ensembles. Trust and approval was apparently being bestowed on ensembles, and their productions were appreciated; artists were important members of society and they knew it.[46] However, this appears to have been more so with Ri's Samjiyon Band than in other groups.

The third Samjiyon Band concert took place together with the Unhasu Orchestra. Both had been established in 2009, but the second later than the first, on May 30.[47] Their joint concert took place on October 10, during celebrations for the 64th

anniversary of the Worker's Party of Korea, in front of Kim Jong Il. This, we consider, to have been an important event as it allows us to make empirical comparisons. Both orchestras represented Kim Jong Il's international ambition, and the personnel of both were largely picked from the Mansudae troupe, or directly from the tertiary training institution, which by then was called the Kim Won Gyun Pyongyang University of Music.[48] Notwithstanding this, the Unhasu Orchestra was clearly more prestigious. When both ensembles played together, they were conducted by the Unhasu conductor, Ri Myong Il. Ri Sune conducted only her ensemble. The internationally educated members were all placed in the Unhasu Orchestra, and although both ensembles were composed of relatively young artists, the average age of Unhasu artists appeared to be a bit older. Most Samjiyon musicians appeared to be in their early twenties, not long graduated, although the band still had a few veterans from the Merited Female Instrumental Ensemble. Unhasu was slightly bigger, with 68 personnel, mostly male, while Samjiyon had only 54 members, mostly female. Unhasu played more forcefully and with greater technical skill, while Samjiyon featured softer and lighter melodies, although there were of course exceptions. When it was time to prove their skill in performing foreign music, Samjiyon played Aram Khachaturian's "Sabre Dance" while Unhasu played Pablo de Sarasate's "Zigeunerweisen." Both are virtuosic, high-skill numbers, but the former is more boisterous. Visually, the clearest difference was in clothing. Unhasu members wore designer clothing made of expensive-looking cloth, but Samjiyon members wore dresses of cheap-looking cloth with simple, traditional cuts. Unhasu looked a richer, and Samjiyon a poorer ensemble.[49] And one was an independent orchestra while the other one was only a band.

Whatever the original plans for elevating North Korean music to world standards, the result was two different ensembles, one of which ostensibly received the bulk of investment, remaining at the pinnacle of the North Korean art scene for four years. However, a peak is a windy place, and Unhasu exists nowadays only in memory.[50] Samjiyon remained in its shadow while Unhasu existed, and from 2012 onwards it remained in the shadow of the Moranbong Band, until its turn came to ascend the national central stage in 2018 under a different name, as an orchestra. There were reasons for this, which we can now contemplate.

The Samjiyon Concept

The Samjiyon Orchestra is a separate organization from the Samjiyon Band, which in turn is part of the Mansudae Art Troupe. However, if seen in a Platonic way—namely that ideas are eternal but their physical forms vary and change—both

can be interpreted as incarnations of the same concept. Within this, Samjiyon may not be eternal, but has at least already lasted for 10 years. There is a clear ideational continuation from 2009 to 2019, coupled to a continuation in personnel. About 10 musicians (violinists, wind instrumentalists, one percussionist) have remained in the orchestra without any apparent interruption form the start. On the other hand, 80 percent of the original 2009 personnel had changed by 2019, which suggests there has been a high turnover of musicians during the ensemble's existence. Nevertheless, the concept has remained, and the most important way in which this is the case is the high number and visibility of female musicians. To understand the importance of this, we have to go back to the 2008 visit of the New York Philharmonic Orchestra to Pyongyang. Members interacted with their North Korean counterparts before the evening concert, giving both individual and group lessons, as well as rehearsing together. One of their reported concerns was the number of male musicians they met, especially at more senior levels. Concert master Glenn Dicterow commented:

> They were all men in the State Orchestra. So I asked my minder, my interpreter: "So, why is this so?" He says: "We use the model of the old orchestras of the last two centuries, like Vienna." I said: "Well you know that even in Vienna they even have some women now and in New York Philharmonic we have 50 per cent women." And he says: "Well, that's very interesting, but we don't do that yet."[51]

This exchange of views was certainly carefully thought about afterwards by the northern administrators. The comment implied that North Korea was behind the times, and not at a high international level. A year later, when both the Samjiyon Band and the Unhasu Orchestra began, both had a high percentage of women among their musicians, and on the basis of the temporal sequence we suspect that the visit of the American symphony orchestra influenced the decision on gender balance. The Samjiyon Band had a greater proportion of female musicians between the two, and in its first published concert from October 2009 it featured 53 musicians, of whom 29 were female and 24 male. In addition, its leader and conductor was female. It was more than 50 percent female: North Korea had beaten the Americans! Later, the proportion of female musicians increased further, thereby surpassing the representation of women in a typical European or US symphony orchestra.[52] The male members were, of necessity, still present, because this allowed the Samjiyon Band to be placed in the centre of orchestral music, rather than occupying a separate category for women's music. But, its front rows were always reserved for women in colourful clothing, men in grey tuxedos being placed in the background. Occasionally, though rarely, a male musician would also appear in the front row.

A second essential characteristic of the Samjiyon concept is that it is civilian. Its musicians have never been observed wearing military dress in any published video or photo. Perhaps even more important is that it has almost never performed military songs. During 2017, when tensions were especially high, there were two instances when military songs appeared: the KCNA reported that in its concert in Hamhung during July 2017 its repertoire included "serial songs of guerrillas,"[53] but this concert has never been published. Also, for its March 2017 International Women's Day concert, it performed "*Nyeoseong haeanpo byeongui norae*" (Song of Coastal Artillery Women), which is certainly associated with the Korean People's Army but which can also be considered a historical feminist song, fit for presentation under the theme "*Seongunsidae nyeoseong changa*"—women in the military-first era.[54] Apart from these two cases, military songs have been conspicuously absent. For some reason, the Band has also never been observed performing the national anthem, even though other ensembles such as Unhasu, the State Merited Chorus, the Moranbong Band and the Chongbong Band have regularly performed it. This is curious, because the anthem is not a military song. The band has, though, played and sung paeans praising the leaders, the Party, and the nation, just like any other ensemble does, but a large part of its repertoire has always consisted of songs for or about women, families, and children. There have been occasional songs about the seasons, and a lot of foreign songs. All in all, the Samjiyon concept has, throughout the history of the band, remained as civilian as it is possible for an ensemble to be in North Korea.

A third conceptual element is the inclusion of foreign songs. Perhaps no other North Korean ensemble has performed as many foreign songs as has Samjiyon. They have been a regular ingredient in nearly all of its concerts over the eight years to 2017. Only rarely have national instruments been used, although the *jangsaenap* shawm was observed once in 2015 and once in 2017, and the *kayagum* zither appeared once in 2017. These were "improved" (*kaeryang*) versions, upgraded from traditional instruments to fit performances with modern orchestras using Western instruments. North Korea's juche ideology basically demands that Korean elements are held as superior against foreign ones in all aspects of life, although in practice foreign ingredients can be fused with national ones when deemed more efficient. In case of instruments this has meant retaining traditional timbres but developing instruments so that they are tuned to the diatonic scale. Western orchestras were found to be simply more efficient in propaganda work because of their wider sound range.[55] The Unhasu Orchestra often used improved traditional instruments in its performances, to enhance the nationalistic aura of its sound, but Samjiyon Band did not attempt to do the same. In effect, this candidly downplayed

a juche element; again, the band has offered mainly a Western outlook in terms of its instrumentation, much as in its repertoire.

Foreign melodies have proved a special problem for North Korean musicians, because the official state ideology requires domestic production to be pre-eminent. Kim Jong Il recommended adopting good elements from the foreign, but he forbid "mechanical copying" without being specific about what he meant.[56] The usual and safe solution has been to use medleys, which can be seen in many concerts by many ensembles. A piece from "Tico-tico" is attached to a piece such as the "Radetsky March", followed by "La Paloma", and so on for about 10 minutes. Cutting and reassembling in this way involves artistic reinterpretation of the foreign material, but after one hears a medley, though in a slightly different order, for the tenth time, the practice starts to appear mechanical. Samjiyon Band, especially under Ri Sune's leadership, often performed foreign melodies in their entirety, without slicing them into segments. Her approach was brave, but within the bounds of what Kim Jong Il taught. She chose interesting foreign compositions, and because she herself was a highly skilled professional musician, the result was a North Korean interpretation with originality. Logically, it could not be otherwise, so although this may sound tautological, the point is ideologically important. Ri Sune was a creative artist, whose repertoire was wide, and she produced enjoyable work whether the original composition she used was Korean or foreign. Ri was followed by Kim Ho Yun, a male conductor, in 2016. Although he had appeared briefly back in 2011 and was a good conductor, the band under him became more "normal" according to North Korean standards. For instance, although a high proportion of foreign songs continued to be performed, the predictable medley format became standardized. We do not know what Ri Sune is doing nowadays and where, as she has not been seen in public after 2015, but quite often established virtuosos move into education after quitting the stage.

A fourth element of the concept was that prior to 2018 Samjiyon had been considered a second-class ensemble. We touched on this above when comparing it with the Unhasu Orchestra. In spite of its level of artistry, it had not been among the most important national ensembles, either during Kim Jong Il's life nor after Kim Jong Un took over as leader. The Unhasu Orchestra, the State Merited Chorus, the Moranbong Band and the Chongbong Band all performed at important national events, while the Samjiyon Band seldom did so, and if it appeared it was not the main orchestra. Samjiyon usually performed at solar and lunar New Year celebrations, but even then not during the main night but, typically, one, two or more days after the main event. Again, their audience tended to be ordinary people rather than high party and state officials. Other typical dates for their performances were the International Women's Day (March 8) and Mother's Day

(November 16). Their second-class status prior to 2018 can also be seen in the fact that, with the exception of the one concert with Unhasu in December 2009, Kim Jong Il and Kim Jong Un never attended their concerts. There may of course have been private concerts, and guidance sessions, but the participation of the supreme leader in public concerts would certainly, had it occurred, have been announced by the North Korean media.

Higher level bureaucrats such as Kim Ki Nam have occasionally been seen in their audience from 2016 onwards—as the band's star began to rise under the tutelage of Kim Ho Yun, and as that of the Moranbong Band started to wane. An indication of this is that Samjiyon did not have any of its own special hits or signature songs until 2016. Composers and lyricists are attached to specific ensembles, creating songs for them, but apparently none were specifically assigned to Samjiyon, which as a result merely recirculated songs first given by other ensembles. In 2016, however, a song appeared that can be called a signature song in their Mother's Day concert on November 16. The song was "*Urineun mallimakisu*" (We are mallima riders!), composed by Hyon Gyong Il. *Mallima* in the title literally means "10,000-*ri* horse"; as a Korean *li*/–*ri* is roughly 400m, the expression suggests a horse that can run the hefty distance of 4000km in a day. This winged horse comes from classical Chinese literature, although the original can run only 400km a day, being thus appropriately called *Chollima* or the "thousand-*ri* horse." When Kim Il Sung launched the Chollima Movement to speed up reconstruction efforts after the Korean War in the 1950s, the *Chollima* speed became a standard reference to rapid collective construction efforts, until in 2017, the leadership made a rhetorical renovation and increased the speed to ten times more. The Mallima Campaign simply meant that under tightening international sanctions the people must intensify its efforts in all sectors to maintain and increase production. A person who participates in doing so, at least metaphorically, is a *mallima* rider. The Samjiyon Band performed its song with a special spirit, and continued to do so in later performances. The arrangement was complex, and included references to older songs. This was the first time an important propaganda song had been premiered by Samjiyon, and only later was it performed by the Moranbong Band.

The Samjiyon Band never gave many concerts. Based on mentions in news archives, between one to three concerts a year that were large enough to merit a notice was quite usual, though we cannot know anything about private concerts or smaller activities such as factory visits. The Unhasu Orchestra, during its active years, used to give between four and 13 concerts a year, and the Moranbong Band four to eight, though 2017 was exceptional, when the number of concerts given during a lengthy provincial tour rose to about 200. The Samjiyon Band was utilized by the state much less frequently. During 2009–2011, there was

considerable publishing activity, with DVDs printed and some concerts uploaded to YouTube and Youku. The years 2012–2015 were lean in this sense, with almost nothing uploaded to the internet, and the media seldom mentioned the band. This roughly corresponded to when the Moranbong Band was at its height, pushing aside other ensembles. In 2016, the Samjiyon Band became more heavy-duty, with a new director, new pink dresses made of expensive looking cloth for both female and male members, and a concert video uploaded to YouTube in November.[57] In 2017, the ensemble performed two full concerts in Pyongyang and made three trips to regional cities and factories in Wonsan, Ryanggang province and Hamhung. The band took on its share of propaganda work for the Mallima Campaign, although the State Merited Chorus and the Moranbong Band made more extensive provincial tours for the same purpose.[58]

A Clean Ensemble

According to our interpretation, the Samjiyon concept is a combination of civilian femininity, an international atmosphere created by a relative abundance of foreign music, and a relative peripheral role within the musical establishment prior to 2018. The State Merited Orchestra, the Moranbong Band, and the Chongbong Band, which were all used extensively in national and international propaganda throughout the years leading up to 2018, wore military uniforms, sang military songs, and behaved on stage with strict military discipline. They were in a sense too contaminated for diplomatic promotion. Perhaps most foreigners would not have noticed, because most do not understand what songs are about or what an outfit signifies, but South Koreans understand such nuances. The Samjiyon Band was, in this sense, as clean as possible for its transformation into an orchestra. There was also the National Symphony Orchestra, which these days also employs a number of female artists, but this was not very marketable in the sense of popular music. The decades-old history of the Mansudae Art Troupe as an envoy for cultural diplomacy may also have played a role in the transformation that occurred for the Pyeongchang Winter Olympic Games.

Fusing the Samjiyon Band's clean concept with elements taken from other orchestras, such as adding the beautiful and diplomatically savvy leader from the Moranbong Band, and two male conductors in white civilian dresses from the State Merited Chorus, did not prove to be difficult. The second conductor, Yun Bom Ju, had worked with Unhasu, and since that orchestra's demise he had worked with the State Merited Choir. A female singing squad came from the Chongbong Band, and lots of musicians were added from these and other ensembles. But the essential concept did not change: the new Samjiyon Orchestra still appeared very

feminine with its pink clothing, retained its civilian image, and easily adapted foreign songs, both whole and as parts of medleys, including South Korean songs. The only significant change was that Samjiyon moved from being a second-class ensemble to a first-class one, and suddenly became a major part of North Korea's cultural diplomacy.

Conclusion: Music and Females in North Korean Cultural Diplomacy

Spring 2018 offered one in a row of more peaceful attempts at inter-Korean and international reconciliation. Years of the South's Sunshine Policy (between 1998–2008) had been a previous, relatively long period, though full of tense moments and setbacks. Rüdiger Frank comments on northern policy making, especially regarding the economy, but in a way that works well for international diplomacy, that it is a matter of "one step forward and two steps back."[59] The metaphor is a bit rough, but policy making appears rather tempestuous. One reason for the dynamic stalemate in tension over the Korean peninsula lies in the policies of the USA, South Korea and Japan, with their changing governments;[60] another reason is undeniably the rather inelegant tool kit North Korea uses to deal with different situations. Positive approaches are quickly followed by very negative acts if something irritates the leadership, but sometimes without any obvious reason.

This has been the case in recent times. In 2013, Adam Cathcart and Steven Denney offered an interesting analysis of North Korean cultural diplomacy.[61] Spring and summer 2012 had seen a period of exceptionally heavy activity on that field. The Unhasu Orchestra had given a concert in Paris, and the Sea of Blood Opera Troupe toured China. The Moranbong Band had been established, and although it did not journey abroad at that time, its concert videos and its short-lived Facebook account created a sensation abroad. The same happened when fashionable photographs circulated in international media of Ri Sol Ju, the wife of Kim Jong Un and a former singer of the Unhasu Orchestra. In addition to music-related events and people, there was a photo exhibition in New York, and joint film projects were planned with Chinese counterparts. This all contributed to a rapid change in international impressions of North Korea, replacing the image of Kim Jong Il's dangerous military state with images of an internationalizing nation that was opening up under a new, reforming leader. North Korea appeared to acquire considerable soft power capability. At the same time, North Korea tested missiles, made rather bellicose pronouncements in its media, and, in a final blow that shattered its short-lived new image, in December 2012 successfully

launched the Kwangmyongsong 3–2 satellite using the Unha-3 carrier rocket. Cathcart and Denney call this the "strange 'hammer and *hanbok*' public relations strategy," where the hammer refers to bellicose behaviour and the *hanbok* is traditional Korean female dress (actually, this is a misnomer, because *hanbok* is a South Korean expression, while North Koreans call the costume *choson ot*).[62] Anyway, the expression neatly describes the rather obtuse duality of the North's diplomacy, in which emphatically hostile acts and words contrast warm overtures for peaceful contacts with foreign states.

Sometimes the two styles overlap, as happened in 2012, and sometimes they alternate over time. In 2017, much that came out of North Korea was about nuclear developments and missile testing, military drills, and aggressive pronouncements. Spring 2018 then presented an exceptionally strong flow of actions that suggested the possibility of progress towards alleviating tension and the peaceful coexistence of the North with its neighbours. At the core of this soft power strategy was music and female musicians, with the arts in general forming a field from which additional elements could be picked. The diplomatic offensive contained not only the mostly female and civilian Samjiyon Orchestra, strengthened by a female singing squad. Also, the visit of Hyon Song-wol to Seoul on January 21–22, created what was called the "Hyon Song-wol syndrome," as the South Korean and international media intensely ran her pictures, especially close-ups of her face.[63] The North Korean delegation to the Winter Olympic Games was formally led by Kim Yong Nam, the nominal head of state, but the centre of the delegation was Kim Jong Un's sister Kim Yo Jong, who personally invited the southern president Moon Jae-in to visit Pyongyang. Also her photos were taken profusely by South Korean and international media. The delegation included a 230-member, all-female cheer squad, which also gave its own performances and dances during its visit. The only combined sports team with South Korea was the female ice-hockey team.[64] There was lots of feminine aspects in this diplomatic effort, with South Korea to some extent answering in kind.[65]

So, what is there in a North Korean woman that makes her the ideal actor for the softer type of international public relations? The status of women has fluctuated over time. Officially, after the establishment of North Korea, as in all socialist countries, women's legal status became equal to that of men—in all fields, including politics, economy, culture, and suffrage. As all citizens became workers, the share of women in the workforce increased rapidly, especially when the state assumed responsibility for day care and education. The large number of women in professional roles dates from this time, and also includes professional artists. During the 1980s, when the northern economy started to stagnate and less workers were needed, women found themselves treated in a

more traditional style, and large numbers returned to being housewives. This was partially heightened during the 1990s, as many state sectors collapsed, but at the same time famine provided opportunities for women to become breadwinners of families in markets.[66] The female roles are described well in memoirs of North Korean defectors (e.g., Lee Hyeonseo). The record is thus mixed, but in cultural terms both Koreas have been found in numerous studies to maintain strong elements of patriarchy, with preference for male children, who get higher social, economic and educational support, leading to easier access to promotion in life. Irrespective of the legal situation, this practice creates a clearly gendered society.[67] In addition, the military field is particularly highly male-dominated, even though many women participate.

In a patriarchal society, women are not powerless; they merely have less power than men, and their social and cultural value is different. They represent the domestic and reproductive elements, of care and maintenance. When we add to this the element of beauty among younger women, the ingredient of sexual charm is brought into play. When we finally add orchestral music as a form of high culture, we also add advanced civilization to the image. The Samjiyon Orchestra embodied all this in its 2018 concerts. Female musicians were shown to be a potent tool of soft power for North Korea. They gathered lots of media attention and made a strong impression that the nation was ready for diplomatic breakthroughs. The only problem was that North Korea never uses its soft diplomacy elegantly, continuously, and congruently. Employing it tends to be part of short-lived operations, and if not accompanied by hammers and banging, invariably tends to be followed by hostile action. This may point to a unified leadership style in which personal mood plays a big role, or to a fragmented bureaucratic system where different branches of the state act without consideration for others, or both. Or it may simply point to an understanding in North Korea that presenting a confrontational image abroad is safer and more efficient than offering an image of peace, especially when very few concrete results have followed from the initiatives started in spring 2018.

In this sense the New Year concert for 2020 is interesting. It took place in the Samjiyon Orchestra Theatre, a specific concert hall in central Pyongyang on the bank of Pothong River renovated and renamed for the ensemble in October 2018. The concert followed the 5th Plenary Meeting of the 7th Central Committee of the Worker's Party of Korea, where Kim Jong Un had given a lengthy speech criticizing the United States and the sanctions regime created by it. As a policy response this meant ending the period of waiting for more peaceful international relationships and instead concentrate again on self-reliant economic and military development.[68] Samjiyon Orchestra was chosen to present the artistic

interpretation of the new policy, and pointedly the concert was published, being its first published concert since spring 2018.[69] The signal song of the concert was perhaps *Uriye chongchangue phyŏnghwaga itta*, or "Peace is on our bayonets", a 1993 composition by Ri Jongo. This song is usually performed during periods of international tension, as it implies that peace does not lie on diplomatic negotiations or summit meetings, but on North Korean arms. A similar message was delivered by a long poem titled *Yŏngnywŏnan Josŏnye heunggungil*, or "Eternal Korean marching road", recited with exquisite pathos. Its basic message was that the future will be the same as the past. Citizens and foreigners alike, be ready!

This might look like the Samjiyon concept had changed. To some extent it has happened. Because the orchestra has now risen to the pinnacle of North Korean musical politics, it delivers the messages of the leadership, and this now includes also military songs. This fact notwithstanding, much of the concept is still the same. The orchestra is still predominantly female, performs fine art, and wears civilian attire. A remarkable fact was that its choir was formed by the State Merited Chorus, but instead of military uniforms, the male singers wore tuxedos, which is very rare. Conceivably we can read from this that in spite of the rather confrontational tone of the supreme leader's speech, the new policy was not about direct military conflict, but rather about a protracted contest of wills with the United States and other foreign powers. This is a diplomatic message, and the Samjiyon orchestra is thus still fulfilling the role it was given in 2018. The Samjiyon concept is even now intact enough for the ensemble to deliver also friendlier messages if the international political climate was to become warmer again.

Notes

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48. The naming history of the highest institution for North Korean musical education is extremely complicated. It has been restructured many times during its existence, and each major overhaul has apparently demanded a name change. There is only conflicting information available about these changes in English; the following is our attempt to trace them, based on a wide reading of North Korean materials. The highest North Korean institution specialized in musical education was established in 1 September 1946 as the Pyongyang Music School (평양음악학교), but soon the school was reorganized into Pyongyang Music College (평양음악전문학교), implying lower university level education. In 1 March 1949 this institution was elevated into the National Music School (국립 음악 학교), which meant that it became the nationally highest educational institution in music. In 1952, during the Korean War, the name was changed to Pyongyang University of Music (평양 음악 대학). In August 1956 the Pyongyang Dance School (평양무용학교) was established by amalgamating the Department of Dance of the General Art School (종합예술학교) with the National Dance Research Institute (국립무용연구소), and this combination was later reorganized into the Pyongyang University of Arts (평양예술대학). In February 1972 these two art universities were combined, the result becoming the Pyongyang University of Music and Dance (평양음악무용대학). In 2003 the Department of Dance was separated from the university and named Dance Institute (무용학원), while the university reverted back to the name

Pyongyang University of Music (평양음악대학). In June 2006, in memory of the composer of the national anthem and other classical compositions the name was changed into Kim Won Gyun Pyongyang University of Music (김원균명칭평양음악대학). In 2015 a number of middle and high schools specialized in music education were attached to the university, and the name was changed into Kim Won Gyun General University of Music (김원균명칭음악종합대학). It appears that between September and October 2019 a new reorganization of the university took place. It is not clear what exactly was done, but both North Korean media and the Ministry of Culture of the DPRK reverted back to calling the institution as Kim Won Gyun Pyongyang University of Music (김원균 명칭 평양 음악 대학). Strictly taken, on the new website of the Ministry opened in November 2019 (http://www.korart.sca.kp/index.php), the English name is "Kim Won Gyun Pyongyang Conservatory," but we have here continued with the appellation "university", because it is a direct translation, and is useful for consistency. No reason for the change has been announced, but we speculate that the 2015 organizational change implicated a bigger role given for the musical arts in state policy tools, and consequently the 2019 change implies a lessening of that role. That would be consistent with the observed lower level of published concerts and new compositions.

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The Changing Patterns of North Korea's International Film Co-Productions Since the 1980s: A Global Value Chain Approach

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Abstract

Although North Korea is one of the most closed countries in the world, it has long been pursuing international cooperation with other countries in order to upgrade the quality of its film industry to international standards. Preceding studies on this topic have mainly focused on the political influences behind filmmaking in general and very few studies have exclusively dealt with North Korea's international co-productions. In this respect, in order to develop a comprehensive understanding of the internalization strategy of North Korea's film productions, this paper uses the global value chain as a framework for analysis. This approach helps understand the internationalization pattern of each value chain activity of film co-productions in terms of the film location and the methods for collaborating with foreign partners. By dividing the evolution of North Korea's international co-productions into three periods since the 1980s, this paper finds that although North Korea has shown mixed results with different aspects of the film value chain, it has generally improved its internationalization over the three periods. This paper further provides strategic directions for North Korea by learning some of the successful Chinese experiences in the film sector regarding collaboration with foreign partners—to foster a win-win situation for all involved parties.

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Keywords: North Korea, film, internationalization, co-production, global value chain, China

Introduction

As one of the most isolated societies in the world, North Korea's media is under the total control of the state. Among the various forms of media in the country, films have been the main propaganda tool for the government to disseminate its political ideology.[3,4] Interestingly, in contrast to its closed economy, North Korea has pursued international cooperation with foreign partners since the establishment of the film sector. In its early days, North Korea's film industry began to emerge with the assistance of the Soviet Union, by sending their people to the Soviet Union to learn film directing skills and related technologies. Hence, North Korea's film production was largely influenced by Soviet techniques.[5] A change came in the 1980s when South Korean director Shin Sang-ok and his wife, South Korean actress Choi Un-hee, were involved in North Korea's film industry. With Kim Jong Il's support, their participation helped promote a large number of international co-productions and significantly elevated North Korea's filmmaking techniques to an international standard.[6] After the escape of Shin and Choi, the North Korean government continued to encourage international co-productions in order to strengthen its film industry as well as to use it as a source of much-needed foreign currency reserves. More recently, *Comrade Kim Goes Flying*, a co-produced film between North Korea, Belgium, and the United Kingdom, has helped enhance the degree of openness of North Korea's film co-productions.

In spite of the importance of international co-productions in developing North Korea's film industry, most of the preceding studies on this topic tend to stress more the role of film as a tool of propaganda as well as the political influences upon the film production process. On the other hand, there have been very few studies on North Korea's international co-productions. This might be because the early studies on North Korea's film industry were mainly conducted by political scientists rather than experts or researchers in the field of film studies. Recently though, there have been a growing number of scholars from various fields. Yet the number of researchers focusing on the internationalization aspect is still very small. Based on our knowledge, so far only Schönherr's research has briefly examined North Korea's collaboration efforts by illustrating the background and motivations of the key co-produced films, with partners such as the Soviet Union, Japan, China, and other Western European countries.[7] However, Schönherr's study did not systematically analyze their evolution or compare their changing

features over the past few decades, nor provided the insights for North Korea's future industrial development.

In order to fill the gap in the literature on North Korea's film productions, this study applies the integrated approach of the global value chain (GVC). This will help analyze the areas and methods of North Korea's international co-productions in a more systematic and comprehensive manner. The GVC framework will particularly help us investigate the geographical distribution of the filmmaking activities and the organizational governance of each activity. By applying the GVC approach, this paper has identified three distinctive periods in the evolution of North Korea's co-productions, and found that in some areas, such as content, distribution and exhibition, North Korea has shown a higher degree of internationalization, but in some other areas it has displayed less globalization, for example, film location and actor and crew management. In general, though, the areas of partnership have expanded over the last three periods. Finally, by comparing this with the co-production experiences of China, we can further evaluate the effectiveness of North Korea's co-productions, and can provide directions for the sustainable development of North Korea's film industry.

The rest of this paper is structured as follows. The paper first reviews the literature on North Korea's film industry development. It then introduces the research methodology of the GVC framework, in order to analyze the changing patterns of North Korea's international film co-productions. Using this analytical framework, this paper undertakes an in-depth analysis and discussions on North Korea's co-productions by analyzing the features and changing patterns of co-productions since 1980s by dividing them into three periods. Lastly, the contributions from this paper and its implications for the future development of North Korea's film industry will be provided.

Literature Review on the Development and Features of North Korea's Film Industry

In North Korea, the film plays a central role in its propaganda efforts.[8] This is mainly because it is a very efficient tool to educate the people while it also helps support the communist regime.[9] It has the further advantage of being able to effectively reach out to far more people than other mediums, particularly within mostly rural and illiterate populations.[10] So far, the majority of preceding studies on North Korea's film industry have mainly focused on its role in the state's propaganda strategies.

Armstrong focused on the early stages of North Korea's film industry, by examining its origins. This study found that technically and aesthetically, the early

North Korean films were built on the legacy of Japanese cinema and the assistance of Soviet cinema specialists.[11] However, the content of North Korean films has over time diverged from those produced in the Soviet Union. Beginning with the title, the content emphasized more nationalist themes rather than internationalist or "socialist" themes commonly found in Soviet films.[12]

In a similar vein, Hong and Cho's study found that North Korean directors learned from the Soviet system, but then introduced a new approach to better adapt to the conditions of North Korean theatre. They pointed out that the history of North Korea's theatre can be categorized into two periods in general—socialist realism theatre influenced by the Soviet Union (1948–1971) and revolutionary theatre (1971–present),[13] which reflects their own ideology, specifically Kim Il Sung's *Juche*[14] idea and Kim Jong Il's *On the Art of the Cinema* (*Yonghwa yesullon*) principle.[15]

Park and Yi focused on North Korean films in the 1980s and identified five main themes: 1) anti-Japanese armed resistance, 2) the Korean War, 3) classic novels, 4) historical tales, and 5) labor scenes. Interestingly, these themes are not much different from those of the films produced in the 1960s and 1970s.[16] They also stressed that North Korea's feature films emphasize the harmonization of artistry and ideology; artistry should be fully responsive to ideological messages.[17]

In contrast to Park and Yi's research, Kim argued that North Korean films in the 1980s underwent changes by becoming more open than before in terms of expressing creativity.[18] This was the result of the state's desire to elevate quality of their films to an international standard, and for this they relied on the assistance of the South Korean director Shin Sang-ok and his wife Choi Un-hee. The visual change and structural transformations of North Korean films sought to appeal to not just the domestic audience but also an international one.[19] Kim then took the example of a co-produced film with Japan, *Snow Melts in Spring*, and showed how the filmmakers tried to reduce the number of references to political ideology while increasing the portion of artistic aspects.

Kwak, on the other hand, criticized that most of the existing literature on North Korean films just covered a simple overview.[20] However, Kwak's paper argued that seeing a film is not a simple visual act, but a social act to interpret the social meaning and messages embedded in the film. As all North Korean films have a social significance, emphasizing more the propaganda function than the artistic one, this paper seeks to emphasize the importance of observing the social function of North Korean films instead of using a superficial approach when investigating North Korean films. In this sense, Kwak suggested that research on films in North Korea could help provide an observation on the inside of the country's society. The similar argument can also be found in the study of Lee.[21]

In contrast to previous studies that examined the development and features of North Korean films during a certain period, Kim's *Illusive Utopia* has covered the history of North Korean films over the past few decades. It is the first thorough account of theater and film in North Korea.[22] This research has pointed out that the ideology in North Korea is all-pervasive; not just embedded in the film and cultural sector, but is also very active in people's everyday lives. However, this book notes that although the ideology in North Korea has not changed, policies related to the arts have actually shifted and evolved toward looser controls over film production.

Schönherr's *North Korean Cinema*, which focused exclusively on North Korean films, is a comprehensive study in terms of its historical review of the industrial development from the early twentieth century to 2010s. This book is thus important as it lays down useful groundwork by assembling information and filling in the gaps in its film history. This book is the first well-known study written in English on North Korean film production from an outsider's perspective. This research covers a wider discussion of international co-productions, such as Shin Sang-ok's influences on the development of film production in North Korea and the rare case of a coproduced film (*Ten Zan*) with Italian partners.

In summary, the preceding studies have approached North Korean film production from different perspectives, whereas the more recent studies commonly acknowledge that North Korea has pursued a more open policy toward film production by encouraging international co-productions. However, this does not mean that North Korea has given up the propaganda role of its films, but rather it has adopted a strategy to enhance its political message by seeking to attract both domestic and international audiences. In fact, the traditional method of filmmaking no longer appeals to the North Korean people as they have become more exposed to international films, particularly from South Korea and Western countries albeit illegally. In this respect, their demand for quality films has grown considerably.

According to Yin, there are four major benefits for countries when they purse international film co-productions: 1) cost reduction and efficiency, 2) market expansion and localization, 3) diversification and synergy-creation, and 4) catch-up and strategic goal-orientation.[23] The main objective for North Korean film co-productions is very much related to the fourth benefit, enhancing the propaganda function of their films. Regarding international co-productions, many preceding studies have explained why North Korea encouraged this approach, but few studies have systematically investigated how it collaborated with foreign countries, in which areas, and whether such co-productions have distinctive features with other countries. In order to analyze North Korea's international co-productions, this study applies the integrated GVC framework,[24] which will be explained more in the following section.

A GVC Approach to the International Film Co-Productions

These days filmmakers from both developed and developing countries have actively pursued international co-productions in order to enhance their overall competitiveness. Morawetz *et al.* defines international film co-productions as the value chain activities of filmmakers that are performed in different countries through joint efforts among partners from those countries.[25] This is consistent with the concept of GVC, which is an extension of Porter's value chain framework. Such an approach helps firms identify the potential areas for generating profit margins. It consists of two types of activities: primary and support activities. Primary activities are further categorized into five types including inbound logistics, operations, outbound logistics, sales and marketing, and services; support activities are subdivided into four activities including infrastructure, human resource management, technology development, and procurement. However, Porter's value chain model mainly focuses on the location of value adding activities within the domestic context, and the way of carrying out these activities within a single firm.

On the other hand, the concept of GVC extends Porter's value chain model in terms of two aspects: 1) the location of value chain activities from domestic to the global scope, and 2) the method of conducting value chain activities from one firm to multi-firm networks (or many firms).[26] In the case of the film industry, the entire process of film production used to be completed in a single country, but due to the development of technology and globalization of the film industry, it has become more fragmented around the world.

Regarding the method of performing the value chain activities, Yin suggested three specific types: trade, foreign direct investment (FDI), and non-equity mode (NEM).[27] Firms can choose either a single or a combination of two to three methods to conduct activities more effectively. Trade emphasizes the transaction of the final or intermediate goods and services. For example, Hollywood exports American movies to other countries, and has obtained a dominant position in the global film market due to their superior advantages. FDI involves equity investment and refers to the transaction of inputs for producing the final or intermediate goods and services, such as knowledge, human resources, technology, and capital. For example, the Chinese company Wanda Group recently purchased the United States-based film studio, Legendary Entertainment, in order to exploit its film technology, expertise, and global distribution networks. On the other hand, unlike FDI that focuses on the transaction within the firm, NEM stresses the inter-organizational cooperative networks along the value chain, in the form of licensing, franchise, and contract management, and so on. For example, a film producer can outsource the post-production related activities, such as sound and special effects, to an external company through forging one-time contracts.

As Porter's value chain has often been criticized for being unable to explain the sources of value creation in the service industry, this paper applies the modified value chain to explain the value chain of film production.[28] Similar to Porter's value chain framework, Lee's value chain for the film industry consists of primary and support activities. Primary activities are further categorized into four activities, including production, distribution, exhibition, and ancillary; the support activities are also subdivided into four activities, which are administration & strategy, casting & crew management, contents & technology management, and network & marketing management.

This paper focuses specifically on the six activities excluding ancillary activities and network & marketing management to analyze North Korea's international co-productions. Ancillary activities refer to the linkage and spillover effects with other industries and products, such as games, merchandise, theme parks, and TV series.[29] Hence, they emphasize the additional channels of making profits using the output of film productions. Network and marketing management is more driven by the commercial objective. As the focus of this paper is the process of film production and given the fact that North Korea's film co-productions are less concerned with the commercialization objective, these two activities are excluded from the analysis of this paper.

Unlike preceding studies that conduct a narrative account of North Korea's international co-productions, this study undertakes an in-depth analysis of the value chain of its film productions by applying the GVC framework. Such an analysis helps us understand *how* they co-produce films with *whom* in *which* areas of value chain activities.

A Brief History of North Korea's International Co-Productions

The North Korean film industry began in the late 1940s with assistance from the Soviet Union. Over the following decades, North Korea committed significant effort and investment to its film industry in order to utilize it as the country's main propaganda tool. International co-productions only began to emerge in the mid-1980s when the South Korean director Shin Sang-ok and his wife Choi Un-hee were involved in the film industry from 1983 until they fled North Korea in 1986. Even after their escape, Kim Jong Il continued to use Shin's approach and encouraged further international co-productions.

As the economic situation in North Korea worsened from the mid-1990s, the total number of domestic films and international co-productions decreased significantly. During the 1980s, North Korea produced 20–30 feature films annually, but

Table 1 Number of feature films produced in North Korea

Year	Number	Year	Number	Year	Number
2004	10	2009	10	2013	1
2005	10	2010	12	2014	2
2006	5	2011	10	2015	1
2007	1	2012	6	2016	2
2008	6				

Source: (1) data for the period between 2004 and 2011: Kim, *North Korea–China cultural exchanges not being exchangeable* 200; (2) the data for the period between 2012 and 2016: Cine 21 News

since the 2000s it has reduced to around 10 films per year. Under the regime of Kim Jong Un, the number declined to only 1–2 films per year as shown in Table 1, because of the economic crisis and the lack of physical and human resources for film production. Although since the mid-2000s North Korea has begun to pay more attention to international co-productions and revitalized its film industry in order to earn foreign currencies through exports, the number of films produced is still very small. In contrast to the decline in the film sector, there has been significant upgrades on TV programs and the pop scene under the regime of Kim Jong Un.[30] Such changes might be driven by both internal and external factors. Internally, the current economic and technological development status of North Korea makes it difficult to produce attractive films that can satisfy the North Korean people. Compared to films, TV programs and pop culture require relatively less initial capital investment, and thus can play a more effective role as propaganda. Externally, it could be a defensive attempt to keep up with South Korea or an indication of Kim's willingness to embrace Western culture.[31]

Schönherr divided North Korea's international co-productions into two periods: (1) from 1984 to 1987, and (2) from 1988 to the present. This is based on the changes in North Korea's policy toward international co-productions, particularly with the film locations.[32] In the first period, North Korea actively went abroad to shoot its films. In the second period, however, North Korea was the only permitted location for filming, even for scenes set in a foreign context. Due to the different features of films co-produced since the mid-2000s, this study has sub-divided the second period into two separate terms: from 1988 to the early 1990s and from 2005 to the present.

Throughout the period of 1988 to the early 1990s, North Korea mainly contacted foreign directors or filmmakers first for co-productions. However, in the third period, all three international co-productions were suggested first by the foreign

partners, and the North Korean government has responded affirmatively to their proposal. According to Schönherr, foreign producers have been mainly driven by making financial profits through the co-productions with North Korea. On the other hand, through these co-produced films, North Korea has sought to release them in the international market, thereby promoting North Korea's positive image. In fact, North Korea has collaborated with a diverse range of countries including China and some Western European countries in the third period. It should be noted that although the co-produced film *Oriental Gladiator* was announced as the first China–North Korea co-production, it was not officially approved by the North Korean government. Thus, *Meet in Pyongyang* is regarded as officially the first co-produced film between China and North Korea, and *Oriental Gladiator* is excluded from the discussion of this paper.

As shown in Table 2, unlike co-productions in the first two periods that are centered on propaganda and mainly targeted at domestic audiences, more recent North Korean co-productions tend to minimize the political message and

Table 2 North Korea's representative international film co-productions (1984–present)

Period	Films	Partner country	Shooting location	Propaganda-function (Yes/No)	Year
Period 1 (1984–1987)	1. An Emissary of No return	Czech	Foreign countries	Yes	1984
	2. Runaway	Japan		Yes	1984
	3. Salt	Japan		Yes	1985
	4. Silver Hairpin	Japan		Yes (on a more sophisticated level)	1985
	5. Bulgasari	Japan		Yes (on a more sophisticated level)	1986
	6. Eternal Comrades in Arms	Soviet		Yes	1985
Period 2 (1988–early 1990s)	7. From Spring to Summer	Soviet	North Korea	Yes	1988
	8. Ten Zan: The Ultimate Mission	Italy		Yes (on a more sophisticated level)	1988
	9. The Shore of Rescue	Soviet		Yes	1990
	10. Bird	Japan		Yes (on a more sophisticated level)	1992
Period 3 (2005–present)	11. Oriental Gladiator	China		No	2005
	12. Meet in Pyongyang	China		No	2012
	13. Comrade Kim Goes Flying	UK & Belgium		No	2012

emphasize the entertainment aspect in order to attract a wider international audience. "Propaganda" has long been a contentious term with many definitions.[33] According to Marlin, there are two broad categories with primarily negative or neutral perspectives.[34] However, propaganda is still largely considered to have a negative connotation in modern usage, as it is often associated with deliberately misleading a group of people by obscuring reality.[35,36] On the other hand, some scholars (e.g., Richard Taylor, Philip Taylor, and Edward Bernays) view propaganda neutrally. For example, according to Taylor, propaganda as can be defined as "the attempt to influence the public opinions of an audience through the transmission of ideas and values."[37] Taylor's definition of propaganda has emphasized two traits.[38] First, the purpose of propaganda is important, but not the result. Therefore, propaganda should have a specific direction, but may fail in achieving its goal. Second, propaganda should be aimed at a particular audience and manipulate that audience for its own purposes. Regarding the role played by propaganda, Richard Taylor said it aims to win and maintain certain political and social goals by achieving a positive mass response. Hence, propaganda helps establish the political legitimacy and public accountability. Other scholars (e.g., Marková; Lasswell) have suggested the role of propaganda in a broader sense as changing people's minds and opinions.

During the first two periods of international co-productions, North Korea mainly collaborated with the Soviet Union and Japan. The co-productions with the Soviet Union were mainly in the 1980s when the two countries were enjoying a friendly relationship. In this respect, the North Korea–Soviet co-productions tended to deliver this key message of friendship between the two countries and inculcating the hostility toward their political rivals such as the United States and Japan. On the other hand, the collaboration with Japan was mainly pursued through its partnership with *Chongryon*, the pro-North Korea General Association of Korean Residents in Japan. These film co-productions highlighted the political message and sought to arouse the emotion of the North Korean people toward national unification. However, co-productions in the third period were not propaganda oriented. Although there were some scenes that portray or glamorize North Korea, these films were initiated by foreign partners thereby less likely to be regarded as North Korean propaganda films. The British filmmaker Nick Bonner, who participated in the film co-productions of *Comrade Kim Goes Flying*, firmly rejected any suggestion that *Comrade Kim* is a propaganda film.[39] Moreover, co-produced films in the third period were about developing the film industry and earning foreign currency by getting a wider release of these co-produced films internationally,[40] and did not intend to manipulate international audiences way of thinking. Although some co-productions (e.g., *Meet in Pyongyang*) have a

diplomatic aspect with an intention to create a favorable atmosphere but with no intention to manipulate foreign countries' (e.g., China) way of thinking.[41] This does not accord with generally accepted definitions and roles of propaganda. Hence, the co-produced films in the first two periods generally have the propaganda functions of educating political ideology, but those in the third period do not have such attempts. Table 2 lists the key co-produced films from each period.

The Changing Patterns of North Korea's International Co-Productions: An Analysis from GVC Approach

This section discusses how the North Korean government's policy has affected the direction of its international co-productions, such as the themes and process of filmmaking. It then compares and contrasts the areas of value chain activities for international collaboration and the transaction modes of implementing these value chain activities.

Period 1 (1984–1987)

In 1978, North Korea abducted two leading figures from South Korean cinema Shin Sang-ok and Choi Un-hee.[42] The purpose was to have them help North Korea to produce internationally competitive films.[43] Shin was a prolific film director in South Korea, who had many international experiences in collaborating with other countries including Hong Kong, Japan, North Korea, and the United States.

Seeking to develop and revitalize North Korea's film sector, Kim Jong Il provided the couple with lavish working conditions and almost unlimited support. After Shin's arrival, Kim helped him establish his own large-scale film studio in Pyongyang similar to what he had in South Korea. Shin was also granted with more freedom by being permitted to film abroad and bring in overseas specialists to work on his film productions. These conditions were unparalleled in the history of North Korean cinema. Kim Jong Il provided Shin with US$2 million every year as his own personal budget for filmmaking, which was a tremendous amount of support by the North Korean standard.[44] Shin's expertise enabled him to make films with better entertainment and production values, and other North Korean films improved under his influence. However, in spite of the improved internationalization in the film sector, the themes of co-produced films during this period are not much different from those produced in the 1960s and the 1970s.

An Emissary No Return directed by Shin was set in the early 1900s and was focused on a Korean diplomat seeking to save Korea's independence. The other two films—*Runaway* and *Salt*—were both set during the Japanese colonial period

Table 3 Analysis of co-productions in Period 1

	Value chain activities	Self-reliance/partnership	Location
Primary activities	Production	Partnership	Eastern bloc countries, China, Japan, Soviet
	Distribution & Exhibition	Self-reliance	North Korea, Eastern bloc countries, Japan, International Festival (e.g., London)
Support activities	Administration & Strategy	Self-reliance	North Korea
	Casting & Crew Management	Actor/actress: Self-reliance Western role, extras, and crew: Partnership	North Korea, Eastern bloc countries, China, Japan
	Contents & Technology Management	Contents: Self-reliance Technology management: partnership	North Korea, Eastern bloc countries, China, Japan

Note: The shaded cells represent the transaction modes of value chain activities through partnership or the location of these activities in foreign countries.

and were focused on the suffering of the poor. *Eternal Comrades in Arms* was a co-produced film with the Soviet Union and emphasized the eternal friendship between the two countries. This was another traditional theme for North Korean propaganda films. *Silver Hairpin* and *Bulgasari* were both produced on a much more sophisticated level when compared to previous films, but they were still regarded as part of the government's propaganda efforts. The following explains the key features of North Korea's international co-productions by applying the GVC framework.

Production. *An Emissary Unreturned*, *Runaway*, *Salt*, and *Bulgasari* were all directed by Shin Sang-ok; two other films *Silver Hairpin* and *Eternal Comrades in Arms* were co-directed by both North Korean and partner directors from Japan and the Soviet Union, respectively. Moreover, since most of the films were set abroad, North Korea chose other countries as the location for filming and closely worked with local studios for the filmmaking process.

Distribution & Exhibition. These co-produced films were aimed mainly at the North Korean audience. *An Emissary Unreturned* and *Silver Hairpin* were also released in Eastern Bloc countries and Japan. Moreover, some quality films such as *An Emissary Unreturned* and *Runaway* were screened at international film festivals and were even awarded the best director prize. However, in general these releases in international markets were very limited.

Administration & Strategy. These co-produced films should conform closely with the *Juche* ideology and the official principles for North Korean films. They should do so through the incorporation of elements of political ideologies such as collective creation based on unity and the important role of Communist and Great Leader in freeing people from suffering. As they were used for propaganda and indoctrination, their release had to be sanctioned by the North Korean authorities. Moreover, the North Korean government was the primary source of funding for the films.

Casting & Crew Management. The actors and actresses were mainly recruited from North Korea, but a large number of foreign actors and extras were also employed for foreign roles, for example, as shown in *An Emissary Unreturned*. Moreover, some international crew members for special effects and other technical crew were employed locally. For example, foreign artists or technical personnel undertook the art direction for many films in this period.

Contents & Technology Management. The screenplays for these films were written by North Koreans, but the technology management was implemented by an international crew in order to adopt advanced film technologies, thereby maintaining the identity of the film. For example, the North Korean co-produced film, *An Emissary Unreturned*, was based on *Bloody Conference*, a play which was said to be written by the country's leader Kim Il-sung. *Bulgasari*, North Korea's first fantasy-action monster film, was based on the legend of Bulgasari written by a North Korean author.

Period 2 (1988–early 1990s)

During this period, North Korea faced both internal and external challenges, which affected the changes in North Korea's policy toward film development and international co-productions. Internally, the South Korean couple—Shin and Choi—escaped North Korea in 1986, which was a serious blow to Kim Jong Il's ambitions for developing North Korea's film industry. At the same time, externally North Korea felt increasingly isolated as the 1988 Summer Olympics were held in Seoul. This highlighted the need for the government to catch-up by adopting the latest filmmaking techniques through international co-productions. During this time, many of North Korea's closest allies in the communist world began to reform and open up their economies. In order to maintain its independence politically and economically, North Korea needed to strictly control the content of the films produced as well as the ways of filmmaking.

Schönherr briefly described the role of North Korea and foreign partners for co-productions. The foreign partner was in charge of the finances and the movie

Table 4 Analysis of co-productions in Period 2

	Value chain activities	Self-reliance/partnership	Location
Primary activities	Production	Partnership	North Korea; partner country
	Distribution & Exhibition	Self-reliance	North Korea, International Film Festival
Support activities	Administration & Strategy	Partnership	North Korea, partner country
	Casting & Crew Management	Self-reliance	North Korea
	Contents & Technology Management	Contents: the key role of North Korea Technology management: partnership	North Korea, partner country

Note: The shaded cells represent transaction modes of value chain activities through partnership or the location of these activities in foreign countries.

making equipment, and North Korea was responsible for locations, local cast and crew and the supply of extras. However, North Korea should determine the proceedings.[45] The themes of co-produced films thus remained politically oriented. However, unlike co-produced films in the first period, North Korea pursued a new approach by offering their country as the location for these co-productions.[46] The following shows the changing patterns of North Korea's co-productions along the key areas of the value chain activities.

Production. All four films in this period were shot entirely in North Korea, including the scenes that take place in foreign countries. This is a critical difference from the locations selected in Period 1. Another difference is that all four films were co-directed between North Korean and partner country directors, and North Korean directors in some films played the role of assistant to the partner directors. Still, the foreign producers have to ensure that every detail of the production is in accordance with the strict principles of North Korean filmmaking. Lastly, post-production was completed abroad by the partners.

Distribution & Exhibition. Films in this period were also mainly distributed and exhibited domestically. Even the internationally well-known film *Ten Zan* was not released in most major markets because of disagreements on the financial terms of distribution between Italian producers and the North Korean side. These quality North Korean co-productions were often shown at international film festivals, which have been the key channel for introducing North Korean

films to the world. In this regard, the Pyongyang International Film Festival, a biennial cultural exhibition, was first launched in 1989 and was considered to be an important channel for North Korean films

Administration & Strategy. As the traditional communist allies of North Korea, such as the Soviet Union, were no longer interested in helping North Korea, it began to approach other potential partners who were interested in co-productions. For example, North Korean film executives contacted an Italian producer for *Ten Zan*. The Japanese producer of *Bird* agreed to this co-production because North Korea first submitted the scripts to the company for potential partnership. Furthermore, given the economic difficulty in North Korea, these partners usually took charge of the budget.

Casting & Crew Management. In principle, the North Korean film production agency made the decision on the actors, the majority of whom were from North Korea. Crew members were also primarily recruited from North Korea.

Contents & Technology Management. The screenplay was written by North Korean writers who decided the general direction. In the case of *Ten Zan*, both producers were involved in the contents of the film and they made many revisions until a final agreement could be made. However, the technology-related activities were performed by the partner producers because of the lack of such capacities in North Korea.

Period 3 (2005–present)

The film sector was at the center of North Korea's cultural industry, but since the emergence of Kim Jong Un in 2011, music has become the primary propaganda tool. This means that the North Korean government is becoming less involved in the film sector. This enabled films like *Comrade Kim Goes Flying*, which is a romantic comedy set in Pyongyang's People's Circus, to be produced. This shows that films during this period were quite different from the previous typical North Korean films—they became less for propaganda. For example, the international directors of *Comrade Kim* firmly rejected any suggestion that this film serves any propaganda purpose. As these films are mainly for entertainment, the themes in this period are noticeably different from those of the previous two periods, although they should still be politically safe. The preceding co-produced films mainly combined North Korean contents and foreign technology, thereby the contents were untouched by the foreign partners. However, the films co-produced in the third stage expanded the areas of partnership on a larger scope, including the contents production. As shown in Table 5, North Korea forged partnerships

Table 5 Analysis of co-productions in Period 3

	Value chain activities	Self-reliance/partnership	Location
Primary activities	Production	Partnership	North Korea, partner country
	Distribution & Exhibition	Partnership	North Korea, partner country, and others (e.g., US)
Support activities	Administration & Strategy	Partnership	North Korea, partner country
	Casting & Crew Management	Self-reliance	North Korea
	Contents & Technology Management	Partnership	North Korea, partner country

Note: The shaded cells represent transaction modes of value chain activities through partnership or the location of these activities in foreign countries.

across most activities of film production. The following describes the key features of co-productions in the third period using the GVC framework.

Production. *Comrade Kim* was co-produced by Belgian, British, and North Korean companies. It was the first co-produced film with Western European partners and was entirely edited abroad. *Meet in Pyongyang* was a co-production between North Korean and China. However, both films were edited in the partner countries.

Distribution & Exhibition. Film co-productions during this period tend to target a broader international market compared to the preceding North Korean co-productions. For example, *Comrade Kim* was released in the United States. *Meet in Pyongyang* was released in both North Korea and China. What should be noted is that the language of *Meet in Pyongyang* appears to be Korean and Chinese, but the subtitles are in Chinese and English. Moreover, these films were all screened at international film festivals. Notably, since the 2000s, people from abroad have also attended the Pyongyang Film Festival, which used to be mainly a gathering of filmmakers from the developing world.

Administration & Strategy. As with the co-produced films of Period 2, foreign partners provided financial support for film production, whereas North Korea provided the human resources and other equipment. However, in this period, it was not North Korea that first approached the potential partners, but rather the foreign producers who first proposed co-productions with North Korea.

Casting & Crew Management. In addition to providing the location for the films, casting and crew is another important area that has long been a strength for North Korea when cooperating with international producers. During this period, North Korea was also in charge of the entire casting and crew management.

Contents & Technology Management. Regarding *Comrade Kim*, North Korean screenwriters wrote and revised the scripts in close collaboration with foreign producers, in order to receive government authorization. Due to cultural differences, the three parties sought to find common ground in order to write a universally recognizable story. Whereas North Korea provided the human resources for film production, Western partners provided the hardware such as cameras, lighting, and sound equipment, as well as other technical aspects for filming.

Discussion

Instead of discussing the internationalization of North Korean films in general, this paper investigates the internationalization strategy of each value chain activity for the film co-productions. Comparing the international co-productions of the three periods, we can summarize the features and changing patterns of North Korean co-productions as follows. In the first period, North Korea pursued a partnership for three activities—production, crew management, and technology management. These activities were usually conducted internationally, although most were done in the communist countries. In the second and third periods, in addition to the two areas of (post) production and technology management, North Korea pursued collaboration in administration and contents development. Co-productions in the third period then further expanded to the activities of distribution and exhibition.

The partnership in distribution and contents was particularly active in the third period. This is because compared to Period 2, co-productions in the third period sought to expand the audience base internationally in order to earn foreign currency.[47] North Korean films used to have twin roles; earning foreign currencies and serving as propaganda. However, since the mid-1990s when North Korea suffered from severe economic difficulties, it has tended to place a bigger weight on the economic role of its films.[48] Although both North Korea and its international partners wanted to find common ground in order to develop a universally recognizable story, the results in fact appear to be disappointing. For example, although the recently released co-productions are different from North Korea's traditional propaganda films by adding more entertaining and humorous elements, international reviewers still criticized the simplistic storylines and outdated contents. This explains why these co-productions failed to satisfy global consumers. While

Schönherr divided the history of North Korea's co-productions into two periods, this paper has found that there are some notable aspects of differences when making a comparison in terms of the value chain activities.

Moreover, in the third period, North Korea showed a higher degree of internationalization in some activities such as expanding the target audience from the domestic to the international market, but it displayed a negative approach to globalization in other activities. For example, North Korea required the entire shooting to be done domestically. To some extent, this strategy can save the money and ensure state control, but it also significantly restricts the degree of internationalization and even negatively affects the quality of films. In North Korea, actors are paid at a very low wage or sometimes work without any payment. In addition, due to the underdeveloped infrastructure and various regulations, it usually takes a long time to complete these co-productions. For example, *Comrade Kim* took more than six years, and *Meet in Pyongyang* took around three years. Therefore, the overall effectiveness of filmmaking in North Korea is quite low compared to other countries.

In addition, the North Korean government recognized the importance of adopting advanced techniques for filmmaking in order to make their films as effective propaganda tools. For this reason, North Korea has frequently encouraged partnerships in the technical side of filmmaking across the three periods. North Korea hybridized Western technologies and North Korean ideology. However, such a combination has not achieved much success, and only a few films of co-productions have been released in the partner countries. Moreover, there have been no recent co-productions that have achieved any significant success in the international market. The communist countries that used to provide financial and technological aid to North Korea's film industry are no longer interested in co-producing films with North Korea. Although North Korea loosened the regulations on the content and the theme of filmmaking, filmmakers are still subject to strong restrictions if they go abroad and pursue collaboration with foreign partners through various methods of internationalization. North Korea's current collaborative model of co-productions makes it difficult to make a film globally attractive. In this respect, the experiences of China's international co-productions can provide some important implications for North Korea.

Like North Korea, the film industry in China has served as the main propaganda tool for the government until the 1970s. However, since the 1980s, China has pursued a series of industrial reforms in its film sector by adopting a commercialization model to satisfy both domestic and international audiences. Due to the lack of capital and technology, the Chinese government pursued international co-productions as an efficient strategy to elevate its film industry. Co-productions

with Hong Kong have particularly helped the development of China's domestic film industry in the 1990s. Moreover, the active participation of the Chinese private sector in international co-productions has also contributed to the development of the country's film industry. Currently, the majority of Chinese film exports are co-productions with foreign partners. It is often difficult to export films to the global market for developing countries with limited film production technology and experiences. This is because of the unique feature of the film industry where consumer tastes are highly unpredictable and vary among different countries. Hence it is important to improve the quality of films through various methods such as investing abroad and adopting foreign filmmaking techniques through international partnership. For example, the Chinese firm Wanda Group recently invested substantially in Hollywood by recruiting local filmmakers to acquire the needed resources. The overseas investment from developing to advanced countries is a critical way for latecomer enterprises to overcome their ownership disadvantages.[49]

These advantages will be difficult for North Korea to achieve unless it opens up its economy. Although there could be negative effects on the country when opening its economy, the positive influences outweigh the negative ones in the long run.[50] However, with only a limited scope and scale of partnership with foreign producers, it will be difficult to upgrade its film industry to the international standard. The commercialization model of the film sector in fact helped with the development of China's cultural industry, and indirectly strengthened its soft power. When North Korea pursued *Juche* thought through its film industry in order to maintain the independence of its ideology and empower the propaganda function of its films, commercial value was not required. However, as past experiences have illustrated, this has not helped North Korea achieve its intended goal. Even the North Korean public is not interested in domestic films, and thus they are unsustainable in the long run. Since the late 1990s, North Korean movies have become no longer popular for local people due to the influx of foreign films, which have further influenced the mindset of North Korean people. They like to watch foreign films, because these films do not focus on political propaganda but show real emotion, the reality of people's lives and the foreign countries' culture.[51] North Korea's millennials[52] in particular have unprecedented access to information about the outside world through foreign films and South Korean dramas.[53] This implies that not political propaganda, but universal intrinsic value is important for making films successful commercially and even politically.

Conclusion

By using the GVC framework, this paper has been able to categorize the evolution of North Korea's film co-productions into three distinct periods. Compared to Schönherr's classification of using a single criterion based on film location, this paper introduces a more comprehensive framework to illustrate the changing feature and patterns of North Korea's film co-productions. Overall, North Korea has shown an improved degree of co-productions, by pursuing partnerships across most of the value chain activities. The only exception is for cast and crew management, due to its superior cost advantages. In particular, the partner countries are more diverse, shifting from the East Bloc countries to Western countries. North Korea has also found common ground with Western countries in terms of content and themes in order to attract more global audiences.

Despite these achievements, there is still a need for more improvement given the film industry's poor performance in terms of both number and quality of co-productions. In spite of its growing internationalization, in some areas there are still strict regulations, such as the choice of location and type of internationalization. Although North Korea has promoted the exports of its films to the global market, there are still restrictions on the screenings of imported films to the public. Both inward and outward investments are very limited not only for the film sector but for the overall economy. So far, out of the three main tools of internationalization (trade, FDI, and NEM), North Korea has mainly relied on short-term contractual partnerships to complement its lack of capital and technology for filmmaking. However, this is not enough to enhance its film industry as a whole. In this sense, this paper explains the experiences of China's international co-productions and the noticeable success it has had in upgrading its film industry. Although both countries have used their film industry for propaganda purposes in the early stages, the development levels of their film sectors have witnessed a significant gap due to different approaches.

Internationalization has been widely accepted as an important source of competitiveness at the firm, industry, and national level. Even the film industry is no exception. In this regard, North Korea should adopt a more comprehensive approach to internationalization based on a larger scale and scope. In highlighting the example of China, this paper also implies that the propaganda function and the commercialization objective of culture industries should not be substitutes, but rather complementary. In order to enhance both domestic and international competitiveness of the film industry, the commercial value should be of real concern.

Notes

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3. Film has also been the main part of the regime's propaganda as part of North Korea's cultural activities abroad. During the period from 2000 to 2013, in the field of mass arts, North Korea's international communication has been mainly promoted through the special show of films held by the pro-North Korea organizations or firms abroad (83 cases), followed by the participation in international film festivals (14 cases). Yet, TV broadcasts abroad only recorded 3 out of a total of 100 cases of North Korea's cultural activities abroad. This could be because there have been no competitive contents generated by TV or radio programs that would satisfy overseas audiences or viewers (Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism 128–129).
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11. Charles Armstrong. “The Origins of North Korean Cinema: Art and Propaganda in the Democratic People’s Republic.” *Acta Koreana*, vol. 5 (1): 2002, p. 15.
12. Ibid., p. 19.
13. The split in the two periods was based on the year 1971 when Kim Jong-Il became Vice Secretary of the Department of Propaganda. Kim Jong-Il established “Revolution Theatre,” which has guided the style and subject of the theatrical performance (Hong and Cho 379).
14. Kim Il-Sung’s *Juche* ideology was first introduced in his official speech on December 28, 1955, which aimed to adapt the Soviet orthodoxy to North Korea’s national conditions. *Juche* though was then codified in the 1972 constitution and became the national ideology (Armstrong 34). *Juche* has often been translated as self-reliance in much of the Western literature. It emphasizes the master attitude and the principle of solving problems mainly by one’s own efforts in all areas such as politics, economy, society, and culture (Myers 166, 168, 174–176).
15. Kim Jong-Il’s *On the Art of Cinema*, which was first published in 1973, established a system of film theories based on the *Juche* ideology and was considered as the authoritarian work in the film sector of North Korea (Park and Yi 100).
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27. Ibid. pp. 39–42.
28. Lee Yeon W. *The Strategy for Sustainable Competitiveness: Theoretical Extension and Application to Global Conglomerates in Cultural Industries*. Doctoral dissertation, Seoul National University, 2018, pp. 104–105.
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31. Ibid.
32. Johannes Schönherr. *North Korea’s International Movie Co-Productions, 1985–2012*, http://filmint.nu/?p=24164.

33. Jonathan Auerbach and Russ Castronovo. *The Oxford Handbook of Propaganda Studies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 67.
34. Randal Marlin. *Propaganda and the Ethics of Persuasion* (Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview Press, 2002), p. 18.
35. For example, Doob defined it as “The attempt to affect the personalities and to control the behavior of individuals towards ends considered unscientific or of doubtful value in a society at a particular time” (390); Lasswell defined it as “The control of opinion by significant symbols, or to speak more concretely and less accurately, by stories, rumors, reports, pictures and other forms of social communication” (9). Leonard Doob. *Public Opinion and Propaganda* (New York City, NY: Henry Holt, 1948).
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More Than Just Simple Fun: North Korean Karaoke in Pyongyang and Beyond

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Abstract

In August 2017, the North Korean Ministry of People's Security released a statement condemning the performance of 'illegal' karaoke in Pyongyang, warning citizens of "severe punishment to those who violate the socialist way of living." Informed by participant observation in Pyongyang in July 2016 and July 2017, and interviews conducted with North Koreans in Pyongyang and Seoul in 2018, this article details the precarious position karaoke has occupied in North Korean society since its introduction in the early 1990s, examining it not only as a popular form of entertainment by which North Koreans 'perform' and 'promote' the nation to domestic and foreign audiences, but also resist it. Karaoke is a tool of diplomacy and identity construction, both within and outside North Korea, and this article will assess the threat that this popular leisure activity is seen to pose to the regime as more North Koreans have access to 'illegal' karaoke equipment.

Keywords: Karaoke, Cultural Diplomacy, Tourism, Identity Construction, Chongryon

Introduction

> North Korean life isn't all about being serious and in fear, it has a fun side too … Come and stretch your vocal cords with North Korean Karaoke!
>
> Tom Fowdy, *Visit North Korea*, May 6, 2018.[2]

> Strict punishment to those who violate the socialist way of life. … Institutions, businesses and organizations, including restaurants, should immediately remove all karaoke operated without the approval of the state. … Those who protest against officials in charge of supervising and managing the enforcement will be arrested and face harsh punishment.
>
> Ministry of People's Security, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, August 21, 2017.[3]

Informed firstly by participant observation in Pyongyang in July 2016 and July 2017, this article examines the precarious position that the practice of karaoke has occupied in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK; hereafter, North Korea) since it was first introduced in 1992. Divided into two parts, I first examine why karaoke has been promoted by North Korea during the Kim Jong-un era, focusing on its use as a tool of nation branding, soft-power, and identity mediation. Soft power, as "the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments … arises from the attractiveness of a country's culture, political ideology and policies."[4] While Nye asserts that popular culture is more likely to attract people and preferred outcomes where cultures are similar rather than widely dissimilar, this article, by approaching tourism in North Korea as a form of national performance (after S. Y. Kim), argues that, in recognizing its "otherness" in the eyes of foreign and particularly Western audiences, North Korea has capitalized on the exoticism of its popular music and karaoke scene in a bid to attract more tourists to its shores, and thereby to help sustain economic development.[5] The article frames karaoke as an attempt to humanize the regime in the eyes of the world, demonstrating the global spread of North Korean karaoke through cross border corporate negotiations, the Pyongyang restaurant chain, and fan-produced karaoke videos on YouTube. Following Hosokawa, Lum and Ong, who have illustrated how karaoke is involved in the construction and reconstruction of ethnic identities among Asian diasporas, the first part concludes with a discussion of how karaoke is used by members of the Chongryon community—long-term Korean residents of Japan with ties to North Korea[6]—to mediate their Japanese and Korean identities and reconnect with their Koreanness while visiting Pyongyang.[7]

Informed, secondly, by in-depth interviews conducted with nine North Korean women in Pyongyang in 2017 and Seoul in 2018, my second part details karaoke

practices in Pyongyang, and assesses why the performance of karaoke by ordinary citizens is perceived as a threat to domestic stability by the North Korean authorities. The women I interviewed were between the ages of 23 and 38, and had lived at some point in Pyongyang. In order to ensure their safety, I do not provide any identifying information, nor detail which of them may still be in North Korea.

In examining the practice of North Korean karaoke, be it in Pyongyang or in one of the many North Korean operated restaurants in China, Russia, and Southeast Asia, be it by citizens of the DPRK or Japanese-born Chongryon sojourning in the North Korean capital, be it by foreign diplomats or tourists keen to establish trust relations with the nation and experience the 'real' North Korea, I treat karaoke as a site of cultural production, one that is constructive rather than reflective of social realities. As such, I examine how different groups of karaoke users in Pyongyang and beyond consume and practice North Korean karaoke, and explicate why karaoke, as a "cultural technology," is more than just simple fun.[8]

Karaoke Diplomacy

For several decades, musicologists and ethnomusicologists have examined the role of music in international relations, focusing on musical change in the context of modernity, conflict, and cultural exchange. It is only in recent years, however, that musicologists, historians, and social scientists have come to examine the dynamics of musical exchange as a type of cultural diplomacy, where it forms a subset of public diplomacy.[9] Bridging musicology, history, and political science to identify continuities and changes in diplomatic practice, Rebekah Ahrendt, Mark Ferraguto and Damien Mahiet's *Music and Diplomacy from the Early Modern Era to the Present* indicates the multi-disciplinary approaches scholars are now adopting to better understand music as diplomacy.[10] Again, works such as Jessica Gienow-Hecht's *Music and International History in the Twentieth Century* examine the role of the state in the formation and implementation of music as diplomacy.[11] To date, however, much of the literature has focused on cultural exchange between the superpowers through the Cold War, with few engaging directly with North Korea's music diplomacy, either then or now. Adam Cathcart and Steve Denney's "North Korea's Cultural Diplomacy in the Early Kim Jong-un Era" (2013) is a notable exception.[12]

Identified as crucial to the strength of the regime because it gives "people a deep understanding of the revolution and contributes positively to the formation in them of a revolutionary world outlook," music has long played a central role in nation building and cultural diplomacy in North Korea as elsewhere.[13] As has been demonstrated, North Koreans were engaged in forms of cultural diplomacy

even before the state was established as separate to its southern competitor, to promote it as enlightened, rational, and modern. During and beyond the late twentieth century, North Korea has continued to utilize music practices to this end, but with one major adaption: karaoke.

Since 1984, the year in which Charles Keil wrote about his encounters with mediated and live musical performances in Japan, karaoke has been the subject of considerable academic attention.[14] Scholars have analyzed it as a set of practices "informed by complex historical and economic processes inter-constitutive with matters of class, nation-building, economic imperialism, and 'modernity'" (Otake and Hosokawa), as a tool of community-building (Drew), as a social ritual that can negotiate and consolidate identities (Lum; Wong; Ong), and as a means to disseminate propaganda (Brenner).[15] What is common to many studies is a recognition of karaoke as inherently performative. Using Goffman's dramaturgical metaphor as an analytical framework, Lum, for example, conceives of the web of karaoke as "a definable social environment wherein people play various roles in an ongoing process of interaction and impression management."[16] This is precisely how it has been appropriated by North Korea as an effective tool of nation branding. Nation branding, as a subset of public diplomacy, functions to convey cultural values and positive images to foreigners, and is a form of 'soft power' that co-opts and attracts people through the promotion of a nation's cultural assets rather than through threats and coercion.[17] It is an economic strategy that nation-states employ to improve their competitive position in the global economy and enhance their soft power, through which national images inspire target audiences to visit, invest in, or cooperate with a country.[18] Not dissimilar to the branding of products or corporations, nation branding is deeply engaged in creating a sense of identity and emotions.[19]

Though now a popular leisure activity in the North Korean capital, when karaoke was first introduced in the early 1990s it was not intended for domestic consumption. Rather, it was embraced by the state as a means by which to foster relationships with foreigners through cultural exchange. North Korea's first karaoke parlor was opened in the *Chung-kuyok* district of central Pyongyang in 1992 by a repatriated Japanese-born Korean with the intention of earning foreign currency from Japanese and Chinese Korean travelers who frequented the Koryo Hotel by providing them with a familiar comfort in a decidedly unfamiliar environment.[20] Pivoting toward Russian clients in 2007 as worsening relations between the DPRK and its immediate neighbors began to impact business, the parlor began offering Russian-language karaoke services, utilizing the Russian media to promote the business to future Russian visitors by promising a sense of the familiar in Pyongyang. As the founder was quoted as saying: "I'd like very

much to make Russian clients know they'll get a very special reception here. Along with tasting unique Korean meals, they can now sing their best-loved songs in their native tongue while staying in Pyongyang, so far away from home."[21] In providing karaoke services to foreign travelers to Pyongyang, it is evident that the intention was to brand North Korea as a welcoming and hospitable country, and to encourage tourism by assuring potential travelers that were they to visit Pyongyang they would not be deprived of any creature comforts—not even karaoke.

Karaoke Tourism

Today, karaoke has assumed a central role in the North Korean tourism experience. "All tourism in North Korea constitutes theatre," states Connell. "Politics, history, place and society are constantly performed and staged, at different scales, for both domestic and tourist consumption, and tourists are firmly directed to multiple stages, effectively to the exclusion of all else."[22] Karaoke is one such stage. As the tourism sector has not yet been sanctioned by United Nations' resolutions, Pyongyang has actively sought to improve its global image in order to attract foreign visitors and sustain economic development. As part of its efforts, in 2014 Kim Jong Un ordered the opening (or reopening) of karaoke venues in Pyongyang, citing a desire to "popularize the cultural entertainment business."[23] The promotion of karaoke was undertaken to humanize the regime in the eyes of the world for, "while not rejecting the probability of North Korea being imbued with negative characteristics," many tourists visited to seek "a 'normality' absent from western and Korean media depictions' of the nation."[24] Tourists expect to find karaoke in the nightclubs of Japan and South Korea, but not in North Korea, for in contrast to the 'alien' spectacles of North Korea's mass games and military parades, karaoke is an intimate, non-threatening practice familiar to many would-be visitors, providing an environment in which meaningful relationships can be established, experiences shared, and perceptions altered. Considered an everyday activity in East Asia, and a fun though *kitschig* activity in much of the West, the availability of karaoke in North Korea indicates a relatability to the North Korean experience that is not depicted in mainstream media, and tourism companies take advantage of this, promoting North Korean karaoke as "an experience you'll never forget!"[25]

As a tourist visiting Pyongyang, one's supposedly unforgettable karaoke experience begins with the space itself. Unlike in most countries, where karaoke is synonymous with dingy, alcohol-soaked bars or tiny *koin noraebang* (private coin-operated karaoke booths that are popular in South Korea), the experience

provided in North Korea usually takes place in a large, modern, and well maintained restaurant, a fact tourism companies highlight to potential clients as they sell the experience as exotic and Other.[26] Lights are dimmed and table service is suspended as several young, attractive, ever-smiling waitresses take to the stage to sing the opening refrain of Ri Jong-oh's 1991 classic "We are Glad/*Pan'gap sumnida*," welcoming foreign guests with enthusiasm and bopping along in a cute, choreographed manner. Tourists are encouraged to video or photograph the performance to later circulate once they return to their home countries. Should they do so, however, they become complicit in North Korea's nation branding efforts since, "any actor, any state official, and any non-state group may be part of nation branding. The concept makes no distinction between 'positive' cultural diplomacy in search of 'mutual understanding' and 'unscrupulous' propaganda on the other."[27] As such, by posting videos and pictures on their social medias, tourists function as intermediaries in North Korea's branding efforts, serving as witnesses who testify to the 'fun,' 'crazy,' 'silly,' and/or benign spectacle that is karaoke performance in Pyongyang.

The karaoke experience is designed to be fun and non-threatening—the complete opposite of the authoritarian public image most have of the state. Tourists are encouraged to become active participates and join the amiable waitresses in singing of their love and gratitude for the Kim dynastic leaders as images of "bucolic scenes and attractive women" interspersed with "monuments, artillery barrages and tank movements" are projected on screens behind them.[28] Selected to portray North Korea as both a nation worth defending and a state capable of protecting itself should the need arise, the images are frequently updated to ensure that the nation is always shown at its best. During my visit to Pyongyang in July 2017, for example, it took only three days before images of Hwasong-14, the intercontinental ballistic missile tested in the East Sea on July 4, began to appear in karaoke montages.

North Korea's use of such imagery in karaoke videos exerts influence and furthers a domestic and diplomatic agenda. This is far from unique, as David Brenner's recent article, 'Performing rebellion: Karaoke as a lens into political violence' demonstrates. Analyzing common themes within karaoke music videos, Brenner's article examines how they have been instrumental in revitalizing the Kachin rebellion after years of organizational decay, interspersing revolutionary symbols with aspirational imagery of handsome, affluent Kachin soldiers and beautiful Kachin women in fashionable clothes.[29] Likewise, Ong has documented how still images from the government-sponsored Philippine tourism campaign "WOW Philippines" featuring "pristine white sand beaches, nature resorts, colonial-era houses, [and] parks with statues of national heroes" are inserted into

karaoke music videos to promote “feelings of ecstatic nationalism” in the London-based Filipino diaspora.[30] The accessibility of North Korean karaoke video clips to audiences outside the country makes them a particularly potent tool of nation branding, and tourism companies often share them with clients to prepare them for what they will experience in Pyongyang.[31] A quick search through YouTube reveals thousands of state and fan-produced karaoke versions of North Korean songs, all designed to promote the nation. While these are often identical to videos used within the country, fan-produced clips usually target specific national groups, providing real-time translations of North Korean materials for their audience. One content creator who goes by the handle ‘teyangri14,’ for example, produces North Korean karaoke clips with Japanese subtitles and has amassed nearly 2,000,000 views since publishing his/her first video of “The Mother’s Statue on Osan Hill/*Osandŏng maruŭi ŏmŏnimdongsang*” in March 2009. His/her most popular video, “Look at Us/*Urirŭl pora*,” published on January 28, 2010, has had nearly 325,000 views at the time of writing and intersperses video of Ri Kyong Suk and the Pochonbo Electric Ensemble with images of parading soldiers. The digital spread of North Korean karaoke materials has led some to express concern about its coercive potential. In 2015, for example, after two karaoke machines containing North Korean content were found in Seoul, lawmaker Hong Moon-pyo likened it to poison: “These karaoke machines have the power to break down our mentality and ideas. They are like a poison mushroom that can infect 50 million South Koreans … Like water soaking through a sponge, singing songs that praise North Korea can slowly penetrate our minds and make us weak.”[32] Today, South Koreans remain barred from visiting Pyongyang and experiencing North Korean karaoke in full but, if they are willing to travel, they can visit the karaoke rooms of the many Pyongyang cafés and restaurants operated by the North Korean state all over Asia. This is a trip that many make every year.

Dinner and a Show: Karaoke in the Pyongyang Café

Owned and operated by the Haedanghwa Group, a government organization, the estimated 130 Pyongyang cafés and restaurants operating in China, Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia, Russia, Mongolia, and Nepal today function both as major sources of foreign currency and as a means to exert soft-power influence.[33] The karaoke experience provided to patrons is practically identical to that in the tourist-focused restaurants of Pyongyang, and the establishments have found particular popularity among South Korean clientele. In a 2012 English-language advertisement for waitresses at the ill-fated Pyongyang Restaurant in Amsterdam, for example, potential employees were advised that,

beyond the tasks normally expected of waiting staff in Europe, waitresses would be expected to "entertain the guests with singing North-Korean traditional songs, [and] sometimes play an instrument and dance traditional North-Korean dances with other waitresses and sometimes with guests."[34] The advert stressed that it was "[v]ery important to realize the cultural function of the restaurant," adding, "[i]n the basement the karaoke room is situated. While singing traditional North-Korean songs you can take a look at the Damrak on the other side of the water."[35] One Chinese patron told DailyNK in 2007 that he enjoyed visiting North Korean restaurants in Dandung City as, "I don't have to seek out karaoke, because I can sing and dance with the ladies of Pyongyang."[36] The waitresses employed at restaurants are sent by the state and are expected to work very long hours for little remuneration while performing their roles as perfect cultural ambassadors. Due to the poor conditions, it is not uncommon for them to attempt to escape, though should they be intercepted by North Korean authorities, they face forced repatriation, investigation by the security agency, and sentencing to education and military service.[37]

In addition to functioning as serious moneymakers for the state, the karaoke rooms of the Pyongyang chain also function as important sites of identity maintenance—spaces in which North Korean migrant workers can experience the familiar while away from home. As Ong observed of karaoke practices among the Filipino population of London, North Koreans traveling and living in Russia and China frequent karaoke rooms to "proactively strive to recreate the homeland through symbols and rituals in food, talk, and song." Ong explains that "[k]araoke, as a more interactive medium than television news, provides the tool, time, and space for the project of reterritorialization. As much as this medium is a 'nucleus of reflexivity', it is simultaneously a nucleus of reterritorialization."[38] Detailing the experiences of North Korean workers in Vladivostok in 2016, an unnamed *NK News* correspondent recalled the almost nightly "booming and wailing" of groups of North Korean businessmen "unwinding by shouting their way through a few Juche-inspired hits" in the karaoke rooms of the city's Pyongyang Café.[39]

Corporate Karaoke

Beyond simply aiding the promotion of the nation, karaoke parlors in North Korean restaurants, both within and outside the country, play a prominent role in the world of business, providing space in which middle-aged businessmen, government officials, and foreign investors can eat, drink, sing, and engage in social interactions that help cement relationships with business partners or patrons in government.[40] Even in a corporate environment, the public performance of

karaoke is heavily gendered, with female employees, regardless of their role within the company, expected to entertain and charm. “Whenever we were visited by businessmen from China,” recalled one female North Korean defector who once worked as a ginseng saleswoman, “our company would provide a big dinner in a special room on the ground floor of our office building on the first night. Because I was young and pretty, I was expected to sing and dance for them. I didn’t think it was bad at the time—it was normal for me—but now when I think about it I am uncomfortable.” The repertoire of songs is usually a mix of North Korean classics and regime-appropriate ballads from the international partner’s country of origin; “Most of our clients were Chinese so we sung Chinese songs to them. Not new songs, though, they were all very old, from the 1970s or 1980s maybe.” As such, for North Korean businesspeople, as is the case in Japan and China, karaoke is a trust-building practice, used to ingratiate oneself to foreign partners and, as in the tourism industry, project a nonthreatening image of normality. It is particularly effective as a relationship-building tool for, as Ogawa stated in 1993, “[k]araoke encloses a ‘karaoke space’ within its musical wall. People there are thought to be friends. And a person singing in the presence of others in spite of shyness is thought to be trusted. Both sharing a ‘karaoke space’ and singing in the presence of the others reinforce group consciousness.”[41]

Karaoke and Chongryon Identity

In addition to being used as a tool by North Korea to promote the nation and build relationships with foreign partners, karaoke is also used by some members of the Chongryon community to mediate between their Japanese and North Korean identities. Historically tied to North Korea, members take their name from the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan (*Jaeilbon joseonin chongnyeon haphoe*), abbreviated to ‘Chongryon’ in Korean and ‘Chōsen Sōren’ in Japanese. This is one of two main organizations for Zainichi (lit. ‘residing in Japan’) Koreans. Chongryon are very active in their local communities because, as Sonia Ryang asserted in 2008, in Japan the “divide between Japanese and non-Japanese is final and definitive.”[42] As such, they have been largely excluded from Japanese society, holding North Korean documents only, if any, despite their often multi-generational Japanese residency. Several scholars, including Ryang, John Lie, Eika Tai, and Sasaki Teru have demonstrated how in recent years Chongryon factions have attempted to distance themselves from the North and foster a distinctly separate identity which embraces their Japanese-ness and “transcends the limitations set forth in Zainichi ideology.”[43] Still, strong ties between the Chongryon and North Korea exist, and every summer hundreds of school children, most of whom

attend Chongryon-run schools in Japan, are sent to the "mother nation" by their families to experience life in Pyongyang.[44] When travelling though Pyongyang in July, it is not uncommon to see such groups in Korean-style school uniforms visiting Pyongyang's most significant sites and engaging in all manner of cultural and educational activities, including karaoke.

I observed the use of karaoke to mediate Korean-ness by Chongryon on several occasions in July 2017, from pre-teen girls making up dances to Moranbong Band songs to teenagers giggling when performing Pochonbo Electronic Ensemble's "Whistle/*Hwip'aram*" to the consternation of their teachers. My most memorable observation, however, took place in a *tankogi* (dog meat) restaurant on Unification Street, when a group of exceptionally inebriated teachers and chaperones enthusiastically serenaded myself and members of my party with North Korean classics for over an hour. When we arrived at the restaurant, the group (eleven men in their late 20s to early 60s), were already finishing their dinner of 'sweet meat' soup and were chatting away in Japanese about the next day's activities. They were clearly already quite drunk. As we sat, one of them, who appeared to be in his late 50s, proclaimed loudly that it was too quiet and he wanted to sing. Beckoning the waitress over, he asked her in heavily accented Korean to turn on the karaoke system and give him a microphone. Initially complaining that he did not know any of the 'new' songs on the system, he eventually settled on Pochonbo's "My Country is the Best/*Nae nara cheillo choa*," the upbeat theme song of the "Nation and Destiny/*Minjokkwa unmyŏng*" film series, performing it with greater confidence than skill. The rest of the group, clearly amused, cheered him on, singing along to the chorus in a good-natured way.

As the evening progressed, most of the men took turns, although a few had to be pressured into doing so. As more songs were sung, and more alcohol enjoyed, the group's language changed from Japanese to Korean. It became clear that for these men, their Korean identity was not understood as 'an essence'—as something innate—but as a performance, an active process, "a relation to something or someone else."[45] Sitting in the restaurant, drinking Pyongyang *soju*, eating dog-meat soup, and loudly bellowing "*Nae nara cheillo choa*," was an experience they could only share in North Korea, and it instilled in them a sense of Korean-ness that they had not begun the night with. One participant, after noticing us watching their collective performance, came over to our table with a bottle of *soju*, and asked us in Korean if we wanted to sing with them. Politely declining, we stated that they appeared to be having a lot of fun. "Yes," he responded, gesturing to himself and his group. "We are Koreans."

Karaoke as a Threat to Domestic Stability

Despite its use as a tool of nation branding and identity construction, karaoke in North Korea is viewed by the authorities as a threat to domestic stability for, while not initially intended for domestic consumption, it has become an incredibly popular, though expensive, recreational activity for the wealthy élite. Of the nine North Koreans I interviewed as part of this study, only three claimed to have sung it for recreational purposes regularly (that is, two or more times a month), with most enjoying the activity in restaurant spaces an average of twice a year. "It was not something we could do often," stated one who now lives in Seoul. "My parents would have been very upset if I spent so much money to sing." Despite the expense, karaoke facilities for ordinary North Koreans are often dated in comparison to those used by tourists. Two interviewees who travelled often to China for business recalled their surprise at the quality of backing-tracks in the North Korean karaoke rooms of Beijing. "It was like real instruments!" remarked one, while the second commented that the restaurant was much nicer than any she had visited in the North. Even in Pyongyang it is acknowledged that karaoke technology is better in restaurants frequented by foreign clientele; one waitress stated that she liked working at the tourist restaurant where she had formerly been employed because the karaoke and speaker system was new and "made me sound pretty."

In addition to visiting restaurants to engage in the practice, however, wealthier North Koreans can buy karaoke systems for their homes, though they are prohibitively expensive for most.[46] One unnamed source told the Washington-based broadcaster Radio Free Asia in 2012 that rich citizens would source pre-programmed karaoke machines from China at between $100 and $200 per unit.[47] In recent years, however, North Korea has begun producing their own systems for domestic consumption. "Singers simply type in a number that corresponds to a song of their choice, and an instrumental version belts out of the speakers."[48] The market leader in such systems is Hana Electronics, a company established in May 2003 as a joint venture between the UK's now defunct Phoenix Commercial Ventures and the trading department of North Korea's Ministry of Culture. Despite access to domestically produced systems however, there remains a trade in 'illegal' karaoke—particularly for songs originating from South Korea—a trade the state has taken steps to eradicate.

In April 2018, posters warning of severe punishment to those found to engage in 'illegal' karaoke appeared all over Pyongyang. First issued by the Ministry of People's Security in August 2017, the posters warned of "severe punishment to those who violate the socialist way of living." They advised those "who have installed

karaoke machines in restaurants without permission from the government," and those with such 'illegal' systems in their households, to immediately destroy them. "Those who protest against officials in charge of supervising and managing the enforcement will be arrested and face harsh punishment."[49] Though coming as a surprise, given the promotion of the practice for national morale and the centrality of it to the North's diplomacy efforts in the Kim Jong-un era, policing did not come as a shock to citizens, for it was not the first time karaoke had been labeled a threat to national morality. In 2011 Kim Jong Un's father, Kim Jong Il, who had sent karaoke machines to troops across the nation in 2008, criticized karaoke bars as 'capitalist bully culture (*chabonjuŭi nallari munhwa*), and ordered all venues providing karaoke services located outside of Pyongyang to forfeit their equipment or close immediately.[50] Likewise, in 2016, Kim Jong Un ordered a crackdown, increasing punishments for those found to be in possession of 'illegal' karaoke materials, and urging "surveillance units to double down on their duty."[51]

Though publicly claiming to be concerned with the spread of capitalist ideas, both father and son, fearing 'anti-government waves' (*panjŏngbu mulgyŏl*), were concerned with stifling the continued spread of South Korean cultural products, for, as the (South Korean) Korean Wave swept across Asia and the world, so too had it invaded the homes and karaoke rooms of North Korea.[52] Many of my interviewees stated that it is not uncommon to find South Korean songs hidden on North Korean karaoke systems, and several defectors spoke of singing South Korean songs in North Korean spaces while still in Pyongyang. There is a healthy but illegal trade in USBs and MP3 players containing South Korean and Western content, and many of my interviewees admitted to having shared such materials within their friendship circles, taking them to the karaoke parlor (as a space partly sealed off from the social pressures and political forces of state control) to sing. Nonetheless, while acknowledging that government crackdowns made visiting karaoke parlors more difficult, all stated that the policing of venues did not deter them from visiting: "It was very difficult to get money from my parents. They were worried that it was too dangerous, that we would be questioned, so we would lie and tell them that we were just going to eat." "After we got our food we would make sure the door was closed and would listen to music on USBs," recalled another. "We could not sing real karaoke because the songs were not in the system, so we would sing along using earphones. We had to be very quiet. It was very dangerous. If anybody found out, we would have been questioned. Someone always had to stand by the door to warn us if anyone was coming." Because everybody in the friendship circle shared the same devices, they all knew the same songs, and would all sing together regardless of who could hear the music: "We knew all the songs from [the South Korean television drama] *Winter*

Sonata/Kyŏul Yŏn'ga (2002). We liked singing them." One interviewee explained that the songs she and her friends sang were mostly dictated by what they had access to, and what was "good for dancing," emphasizing that the group's choice to sing foreign songs was not because they were 'anti-Kim' but because the songs written for the leaders were boring. For this reason, they would often sing-along to Russian songs, not because they understood any Russian, but because the songs were musically more interesting than what they were used to. They liked the sound of the Russian language; "We would pretend. It was fun."

Some of my interviewees clarified that, while they knew that singing forbidden songs was a punishable offense, they did not do it with the intention of being part of an anti-government wave. Rather, it was about seeking what fun they could, and expressing themselves as individuals in ways the state would not permit. Writing about China, Fung has stressed that for young people living under authoritarian regimes karaoke is not only a performative activity but one that "manifests a performative modernity" in which young people actively seek to learn and express identities outside of the structured social environment which seeks to constrain their range of expression.[53] As with Ban and Lum, one of my interviewees and her friends discovered that in the collective environment of the karaoke space they found security and mutual support, and this safely constructed individual identities without jeopardizing their group membership. "While a karaoke event is a collectivistic activity for social interaction," writes Lum, "it is also an opportunity for individuals to express themselves or, put metaphorically, to have a voice of their own."[54] In a country like North Korea, where conformity is paramount, it is therefore no wonder that karaoke is seen to be a threat to the state.

Conclusion

This paper has examined the precarious position that karaoke has occupied in North Korean society since the mid-1990s. Approaching tourism in North Korea as a form of national performance, it has argued that, in recognizing its 'otherness' in the eyes of foreign and particularly Western audiences, North Korea has capitalized on the exoticism of its popular music and karaoke scene in a bid to attract tourists to its shores and restaurants, and to sustain the economic development of the state. Used by corporate entities to build trust, by migrant workers to maintain their North Korean identities while abroad, and by members of the Chongryon community to mediate their Japanese and Korean identities and reconnect with their Korean-ness, it has demonstrated that in the Kim Jong-un era karaoke has become an important aspect of soft power. Undertaken to humanize the regime in the eyes of the world, North Korea—and the tour companies that

organize visits to North Korea—promote karaoke to potential clients as an unforgettable experience, as proof that “North Korean life isn’t all about being serious and in fear, it has a fun side too!”[55] This, however, is far from the reality.

As the second half of the article demonstrates, the domestic consumption of karaoke in North Korea is viewed as a threat to domestic security because of its democratizing nature, and it is therefore heavily policed by the state. Despite this, many young people in Pyongyang continue to utilize the karaoke parlor as a space in which they can practice a form of self-expression otherwise denied to them. More than just simple fun, the performance of karaoke for them becomes a performance of resistance—a method by which to forge a sense of individualism in a system that demands conformity. And, while it may not result in the “anti-government wave” that state leaders are worried about, it could see the emergence of a generation with a more defined sense of self, a greater knowledge of the expectations and living conditions of their contemporaries in other countries, and years of practice in defying the orders of the regime.

Notes

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Korean Muslims: Shaping Islamic Discourse and Identities Online[1]

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Abstract

This ethnographic study explores the ways in which Korean Muslim youth are employing strategies of dialogue to build trust and acceptance through the use of Facebook. Using public posts and facilitating discussions within the private message setting, Korean Muslim youth are engaging mainstream Korean society in the hope of fostering solidarity, acceptance and normalization of their existence as Korean Muslims. Through these efforts, Korean Muslim youth are re-working notions of Korean identity through their personal conversions to Islam.

Keywords: Korean Muslims, Muslim Minorities, Multiculturalism, Korean Identity, Social Media Activism

Introduction

As noted by Peter Morey, successful relationships are based on trust, a useful lens for viewing relations between Muslims and non-Muslims at this challenging moment of history.[2] As Yaqin, Morey and Soliman highlight, Muslims are facing a general climate of mistrust, misunderstanding and Islamophobia; this is particularly true for Muslims living as minorities in multicultural societies.[3] In this global context, I will demonstrate how Korean Muslim youth have taken to social networking sites (henceforth SNS) to challenge stereotypes related to Islam. By uploading images of their daily lives, posts sharing basic Islamic knowledge or

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actively engaging in online chat streams, young Korean Muslims are using the power of the internet to assert their position in wider Korean society, emphasizing that they are not persons who have embraced 'foreign-ness' but are dynamic agents re-working what it means to be Korean through their conversions to Islam.

There are no official census figures for Muslims in Korea although it is estimated Muslims make up approximately 0.4% of the total population. It has been suggested that around 150,000–200,000 Muslims exist in Korea with approximately 30,000–45,000 being indigenous Korean Muslims.[4] These low figures help to delineate the status of Korean Muslims in wider society as tiny minority, and helps to frame the context in which Korean Muslims are toiling for recognition and acceptance.

The relationship between Muslims, the Internet and social media has been probed deeply by scholars focusing on *jihad*, terrorism, online radicalization and security-related narratives.[5] Others have looked at the role of social media in social movements such as the Arab Spring.[6] Furthermore, there is a growing body of literature that documents the ways in which Muslims are using social networking sites to develop themselves as 'influencers' in different Muslim societies.[7] However, few studies examine the ways in which Muslims use Facebook, chiefly Facebook private messages (as this section of the app is usually inaccessible to the public) to challenge and interact with Islamophobic tropes as part of active efforts to carve out a space for themselves in society through social media *dawah* (invitation to Islam/proselytization-related activities) activism.

This study is concerned with the intersections between *dawah*, Facebook and identity construction amongst Korean Muslim youth. Research questions explored in this study include: How are Korean Muslims using Facebook to assert their place in society? Where does the concept of *dawah* fit into Korean Muslim identity construction? To what extent are Korean Muslim online activities impacting society offline? As part of a wider research project on Korean Muslim converts and their processes of identity constructions through conversion to Islam, this study contributes to scholarship on Muslim minority studies by incorporating East Asian, specifically Korean, voices to the field. The inclusion of Islam within Korea's religious landscape further encourages diversity and creativity in the ways that we re-imagine conceptualizations of Korean identities, widening the scope of Korean Studies.

Eva F. Nisa has conducted valuable research on the *dawah* activities of Indonesian Muslim youth through Instagram,[8] and Nasya Bahfen investigates how American and Australian Muslim minorities use social media to negotiate their identities.[9] This article draws from those approaches and shares insights from ethnographic research (participant observation, fieldnotes, interviews and

case study collection) conducted with a group of Korean Muslim youth aged 20–35 years, who have constructed a Korean-language Facebook page to connect with Korean society. Using their unique position as indigenous Korean Muslims, the interviewees and individuals discussed in this paper attempt to build better relationships with society by answering questions about Islam and their own everyday lives. In doing so, I will demonstrate the ways in which Korean Muslim youth express agency, as they attempt to subvert existing negative perceptions about Islam and assert their own place in Korean society.

The offline fieldwork was conducted between 2017 and 2019 in South Korea's capital city, Seoul. More specifically, the research was mostly conducted in the diverse neighbourhood, Itaewon, home to the only major and officially recognised mosque in the city. Interviews were conducted with three different page administrators, two female (24 and 35 years old respectively) and one male (27 years old). To address potential ethical issues arising from the collection of online data, full consent was obtained from all interviewees under the condition of preserving their anonymity. Throughout this study, interviewees are addressed through pseudonyms or the label 'administrator.' Whilst this research is based on data from all three interviewees, the main informant is the male administrator, Ahmad. Furthermore, whilst the names of the administrators have all been anonymised, permission to use the real name of the Facebook page was obtained in advance of publication.

Muslim Minorities and the Media

Social media has become an important and powerful resource for Muslims, particularly Muslim minority youth in different parts of the world. For example, Bunt noted how the internet became an important mechanism for British Muslim youth to express their Islamic identities.[10] Similarly, through her work with Muslim minorities in Australia and the United States, Bahfen highlights how the use of online media has made it possible for religious communities to create a lively public sphere of discussion about faith, practices and the complexities that come with having multiple identities.[11] Islamic discourse online challenges traditional systems of authority that exist within Muslim spaces. The lack of face-to-face contact allows social media users to circumvent objections to sharing Islam-related content based on educational credentials, personal politics or positions such as gender or race. In short, anyone can post anything on their social media accounts as long as they have access to the Internet and an account.

Mass media itself has a contentious and adversarial relationship with Muslims, particularly those in minority settings. The majority of existing research on this

fraught relationship is rooted in western sources where popular media perception 'obsessions' include the perceived oppression of Muslim women, their clothing choices and their so-called need to be saved.[12] Popular representations of Muslim men in the media are often related to terrorism, violence and sexual deviancy.[13] Across the Muslim community as a whole, the media often portrays Muslims as backwards, homogenous outsiders with unstable identities and issues with belonging.[14] Much of this rhetoric has travelled through the airwaves to Korean media and academic discourse. For example, K'im Suwan has found that Koreans were mostly exposed to negative news articles when covering Arab issues, with Arabs and Muslims discussed synonymously. This scholar further highlights that most articles on Arab issues in Korea use terms such as "terror, war, conflict, sexual discrimination" which shaped negative Korean perceptions.[15] Similarly, recent work conducted by K'oo K'i Yŏn (2018) suggests that Islamophobia has become even more prevalent in Korean society since the emergence of ISIS in 2014. She argues that the media plays a key role in shaping hateful perceptions of Muslims. Echoing the findings highlighted by K'im Suwan, K'oo K'i Yŏn suggests that:

> The Korean press also tends to regard Muslims and Islamic culture as a monolithic religious bloc. There is a firmly entrenched image of the Islamic world and Muslims in Korea. The Korean media identifies the Islamic world as a land controlled by Islam and equates Muslims to a group of Islamic religious fanatics. In other words, the dominant framing of all Middle East related news within the Korean press is Islam-based.[16]

These negative perceptions create hostile conditions where Muslims struggle to thrive. For example, as I have noted elsewhere, in 2015, the former Park Administration announced plans to create a halal food complex in within the Korea National Food Cluster in Iksan, Jeollabuk-do province. According to Kim Nam Ill (2016), this plan was criticized by Evangelical Christian groups as a way of Islam infiltrating Korean society through halal food and the plans were abandoned.[17] Similar concerns were expressed when plans for halal slaughter-houses were publicized with animal rights activists branding halal slaughter practices as inhumane.[18]

Korea's internal Islamophobic context gives rise to difficult barriers for Koreans who have converted to Islam to cultivate acceptance in society through the development of 'Korean Islam.' However, despite these multifaceted challenges, Korean Muslim youth continue to employ various strategies to foster acceptance, solidarity and acceptance of their existence in Korean society as Muslims who are simultaneously Korean.

Korean Muslim Youth and Facebook

It is no secret that South Korea is a highly Internet literate, connected society.[19] The range of SNS platforms are vast, including Instagram, Facebook, Naver and Daum Blogs, YouTube, Twitter, Kakao groups/stories and other SNS platforms popular amongst domestic users. Guided by the insights gained from my offline research, I decided to focus this paper on one distinct Facebook page, *ChatOnFaithKor*.

There are several reasons for this specific focus. Firstly, main informants from my fieldwork sites are heavily engaged in the construction, content creation and interactions on this page. Instead of long, heated debates across public Facebook walls, the administrators have open Q&A sessions at set times of the day where questioners can drop by in the Private Message section of the site and have a conversation with a Korean Muslim in real-time. As such, I was in the unusually fortunate position of being able to view conversations taking place in the private messaging space directly, collect online comments under the public posts on the page and conduct face-to-face interviews with the administrators about their page activities. Unlike many other 'Islam in Korea' pages or Korean Muslim social media 'celebrities,' who usually post in English, this one has been constructed by a small team of Korean Muslim youth. Demonstrating how online activities through this Facebook page are related to processes of Korean identity construction, the administrators of the *ChatOnFaithKor* page are only interested in communicating with other Koreans in their own language, doing so with the aim to dispel myths and foster acceptance of their presence as indigenous Muslims in Korea.

Muslim Youth Soft *Dawah* Strategies Online

At its core, the term *dawah* refers to form of proselytization, with the notion that people can be 'invited' to accept or convert to Islam. *Dawah* is a wide-reaching concept with a range of activities falling under its remit which can include uploading Islamic messages to the Internet for public consumption.[20]

Traditionally, *dawah* activities were in the realm of Muslim scholars with traditional training (*ulema*). As Nisa (2012, 2018) and Millie (2012) note, in the pre-digital age these *dawah* activities took place in a wide range of settings and formats: lectures on cassette tapes, print books, sermons and through designated *dawah* organizations. However, as social media platforms have emerged and evolved, Muslim youth were amongst the first to use these platforms for the purpose of *dawah*. This has allowed Muslim youth all over the world to become *dawah* activists, contributing to the de-stabilization of traditional authority in Muslim scholarly spaces.[21] Anderson (2003) has gone as far as to describe social

media-savvy *dawah* activists as 'new interpreters' of Islam despite lacking their the traditional training expected of a Muslim scholar. Nisa's 2018 study focused on Indonesian Muslim youth who specifically used Instagram for the purposes of *dawah*. The target of these *dawah* activities were not non-Muslims, calling them to Islam, but were actually directed at other Muslims, encouraging them to increase their own personal piety. Using Instagram, Nisa's informants displayed the ways in which they constructed creative content to conduct *dawah*; in this article, I note the similarities with the case of Korean Muslim youth. However, unlike the Indonesian case, Korean Muslim employ a social media strategy for two main reasons: to dispel anti-Muslim, Islamophobic sentiments embedded within Korean society, and to support new converts to Islam. Both reasons feed into a wider goal of normalizing Islam in Korea with the hope that Korean Muslim youth will one day be able to safely and publicly express themselves as both Muslim and Korean.

Introducing Korean Muslims Converts

SN, an offline group founded by Korean Muslims has conducted several soft *dawah* projects since their inception in 2012. Initially a social group, it was (and remains) a space where new and established Korean Muslims come together, socialize and informally study Islamic texts that are considered useful for building a new Muslim life in Korea. As it has established itself as a formal NGO over time, the group has developed a second aim which is to try to normalize Islam in Korea. There are no church-style 'missions' or hard sell approaches to fulfil this aim. According to my observations, there are two main reasons for this; having seen the approaches of various cults and churches in Korea and how they are received by ordinary Koreans, SN remains cautious and wary of engaging in any activities that could harm good relations between Korean Muslims and mainstream Korean society. As a modestly-sized group, SN prefer to err on the side of caution when talking about Islam in public spaces.

Instead, SN's approach to *dawah* is tailored to the situational realities on the ground, which include a lack of opportunities for Koreans to mix with Muslims (Korean or otherwise), leaving many to rely on Islamophobic tropes, perceiving Muslims as unwelcome outcasts, alien to Korean society.[22] Secondly, it is important to note that our discussion is about indigenous Korean Muslims, who are deeply connected to the historical, political, linguistic and social realities of everyday life in Korean society. As such, the group remains mindful of the thoughts and feelings of mainstream society as much possible. Afraid of scaring them away, the group does not engage in conversion campaigns, street-stall *dawah*, or hold events designed to convert large groups of people. Instead the SN approach to

dawah is very interesting, using themselves as Korean Muslims as the main tools of connection with wider Korean society. SN's Korean Muslims with particular reference to Korean Muslim youth create links with wider society through their personal interactions with non-Muslims online and offline, and through their own everyday lives.

Working towards these aims, the group organizes informal classes, guest lectures, community conferences, free language classes (Korean for immigrant Muslims, English/Arabic for everyone including non-Muslim Koreans), social gatherings, Ramadan *iftar* parties and many other events designed to bring Muslims and non-Muslims in Korea together under the same roof. It is worthy to note that these events allow people from different backgrounds and levels of engagement with Islam to come together, partake in Islamic cultural and religious events without facing the burden of the 'conversion question.' This results in multiple engagements with the group as students working on 'world religion' school projects, general members of the public wanting free language lessons, interfaith leaders, immigrant Muslims seeking community, and many others gather for food, friendly conversation and knowledge. Furthermore, the more educational-orientated programmes help to build the capacity of new Muslims in Korea to strengthen their knowledge about their new-found faith with classes available in both English and Korean languages.

Until recently, SN has used the Internet and SNS sites as passive mode of communication with the wider public. Posts were irregular and online engagement has been relatively low on the priority list, preferring to focus on offline, personal, one-to-one interactions. However, in Spring 2019, the group was given the opportunity to partner with a Middle East based charity to develop online content about Islam in the Korean language. This opportunity was specifically taken up by Internet-literate, SNS savvy Korean Muslims in their twenties and thirties, wanting to reach out to their peers and educate them about Islam. Ahmad, one of the page administrators is passionate about his online activities, desperately hoping that these efforts will discourage Korean society from propagating Islamophobia and eventually cultivate a sense of trust. As we were talking through his aims for the page, Ahmad said: "We want to tell them what Islam actually is and how we, Korean Muslim people—KOREAN PEOPLE, adapt Islam to our actual lives—our practical, social and personal lives."

Facebook for *Dawah*

Sitting down to interview one of the administrators for the Facebook page, I asked why Korean Muslim youth were putting their time and energy into these types

of online activities, particularly when in an online world buzzing with various trolls and hate speech, there were no guarantees that their efforts would yield the desired results.

Firstly, Ahmad shared that using Facebook for *dawah* is part of a two-pronged strategy to normalize Islam in Korea. Facebook users who register interest in the page through a click will receive an automatic invitation to chat using Facebook's private message function. The automatic message sends a short greeting, thanking the user for clicking on their page and lets them know that the administrators can answer any questions they might have about Islam or Muslims. The user is then free to ignore, engage or leave the conversation as they wish. Throughout our interview, this Administrator stressed that they do not reach out to people first, and once someone responds to the automatic invitation, they allow the engaged user to lead the conversation, never setting the topics of discussion or asking them questions. In this way, page administrators can satisfy visitor requirements with meaningful interactions rather than superfluous conversations that may go over the inquirer's level of Islamic knowledge (therefore causing some feelings of discomfort or embarrassment) or level of interest. This approach also acts as a safety measure, ensuring that administrators only interact with people who have some level of interest in their page as opposed to feeding online trolls or propagators of hate speech.

As shown through the interview excerpt below, instead of using the page to attempt to convert Korean people to Islam, these young Korean Muslim administrators seek opportunities to engage directly with Korean society, particularly with younger generations to foster a sense of solidarity and acceptance of their own chosen religion and the lifestyles that come with it. One interviewee shared a 'success' story where a young Korean man decided to visit the administrators in the 'real' world after interacting with them through the Facebook page:

> We're focusing on those people who are coming to our page and ask real questions about Islam and our goal is to invite them into the offline world, to an actual meeting at the masjid. That's our ultimate goal, not conversion. Learning about Islam through websites or through some texts is very different from meeting someone. At the masjid, there are Korean Muslims whom they can ask questions to in Korean. They can watch us pray. You can't deliver your emotions through texts but when it comes to the offline world, you can see a person's emotional state. For example, a student who was writing to us on the page came to visit the masjid. We had dinner together and some chat. I really mean chitchat. We talked about funny things, silly things and I'm sure that warm situation gave him some kind of good impression—like we're not aliens, that we are human beings who want to laugh, who want to be happy, enjoy funny things etc. I'm sure it showed him that we are human beings just like others.

I found this to be a fascinating use of the concept of '*dawah*.' Instead of actively engaging in missionary-style activities to persuade ordinary Koreans to accept Islam, the page administrators consciously chose to avoid this type of approach. These Korean Muslim youth felt deeply passionate about creating spaces and outlets for Koreans to build direct connections, even friendships with Korean Muslims, believing that this was a more powerful way to dispel stereotypes and prejudices. In the eyes of this group, if, through their private conversations and public posts, a few Korean folk chose to convert to Islam along the way, it was a bonus. Furthermore, if these new converts found themselves in need of community, classes or even new friends, these administrators were willing to support them in the 'real,' offline world.

The actual publicly viewable content uploaded to the page itself shares very basic knowledge of the Islamic faith, touching on topics such as: Who is Allah? What is a Muslim? And What is Halal? The administrator emphasized that whilst uploaded content was there to catch the eye of the reader, the main purpose of the content is to encourage people to engage with the page administrators on an individual basis using the private message function. It is in this private space that two people can have a genuine and meaningful interaction based on what it is that the questioner wants to know. Furthermore, within this space, Korean Muslim administrators are able to assert their own form of Korean-ness through sharing their conversion stories, perspectives on issues in Muslim-majority societies and linking their own perspectives on Islam to their daily lives in Korea.

The interactions which take place in the private message setting cover a range of issues. Some users drop by to ask a burning question about Islamic doctrine or about social issues across Muslim-majority societies. According to the administrators, popular topics include women's rights, ISIS/Muslim-perpetrated violence, Islamic law and curiosities about *halal* food. Others ask the administrators to explain why they chose to convert to Islam despite being Korean. The last question is a pertinent one since the administrators do not reveal personal information about themselves unless they feel comfortable with the person they are interacting with. Heavily focused on creating content and facilitating real-time dialogue, the administrators are in collective agreement that their gender, marital status, age and similar personal information is irrelevant to the average Facebook user dropping by to ask a short question and pass on by once they have a satisfactory answer. Interviewees explained how many Korean Muslim youth were still practicing Islam in absolute secret, afraid of negative reactions from their Islamophobic families and wider social networks. For these young people, the risks associated with being 'outed' as a Muslim have very real-life consequences and as a result, they are protective over one another. At the same time, these

young people are using these struggles to fuel efforts at normalizing Islam in Korea, hoping for a better future for themselves and future generations.

There is also the occasional case of a new Korean Muslim who contacts the page as part of their search for community. For example, one questioner reached out to the page because he had converted to Islam whilst serving compulsory military service and needed a Korean Muslim friend to talk to about his experiences. Administrator Ahmad, a young man who had also served his compulsory military service whilst Muslim felt deeply connected to this questioner. The Administrator went on to share how he could empathize with how lonely the questioner must be at this time as Islam is not a recognized religion within the armed forces. This meant that it was very unlikely that this questioner was able to find time to meet his prayer and fasting obligations or change his diet to *halal* food whilst in service. Having been through a very similar experience, a wave of nostalgia hit our Administrator who felt the page was worthwhile if it meant that he, and other young Korean Muslims were able to help people in this way, offering them not only information to diffuse stereotypes, but also to offer a little support to fellow new Muslims along their long and often lonesome journeys as they grow into their new faith. This also demonstrates the value of Korean language communication and a shared sense of 'Korean-ness' as will be discussed in the next section.

The Importance of Communication in Korean: Asserting Korean Identity

> What Korean non-Muslims can find in their own language is either Islamophobic materials or things that are not Islamophobic but made by foreigners. Islamic stuff made by foreigners contain a lot Arabic terminology that Korean people cannot understand. Or foreign-made materials skip the basics and go straight to intermediate or advanced knowledge. These kinds of materials are not appropriate for Korean non-Muslims. This type of content is actually for Muslims. But these types of content are all you can find in Korean society. Or you have to rely on a foreign language.
>
> (Interviewee, 8th September 2019).

As we can infer from this interview extract, the lack of high-quality Korean language content about Islam and Muslims is a real issue for the mission of normalizing Islam in Korean society. Throughout the course of my fieldwork, I have also noted that the dearth of Korean-language content about Islam has not only been a major source of complaint amongst Korean Muslims but also frustrates the many Korean, non-Muslim teachers, tour guides and fieldtrip workers who often bring

groups or classes to Seoul Central Mosque to introduce them to Islam. Almost every Sunday afternoon sees groups of small children sitting cross-legged in a circle nestled under the mosque pavilion, listening in earnest as their teachers talk about Islam. Older, local folks group together to go sightseeing in a part of the city they may never have seen before, couples take selfies peeping out from behind the tall, white pillars of the mosque and tour guides wanting to reach out to Muslim travel markets abroad come through to learn about their target market. However, aside from a few titles and leaflets, there is little high-quality content available that is suitable and accessible for the casual visitor or schoolchild attending a weekend class on world religions. Tackling this issue head on, one interviewee described how they believed their Facebook activities would help to fulfil this knowledge gap and engage Korean society, suggesting:

> Korean people can learn about Islam from Koreans in Korean. It's important because there isn't much data or many materials for Koreans to know about Islam in their own language. There is no proper book. There are no proper videos, there's nothing! So, if they are interested in Islam, what they can find are books or internet sites usually made by Christians. So, when you go to a bookstore or library, or when you go to some religion section and find some Islamic books, many of those books were written by Christians to attack Islam.

Elaborating further on these so-called 'attacks on Islam' by Christian sources, this interviewee explained further:

> Actually, they (Christian missionaries) don't usually deal with doctrine of Islam. Instead, they deal with social problems in Muslim societies. Things like how women are treated in Muslim societies, especially how badly women in Muslim society are treated, how unjust (Muslim) society is—they are more focusing on that kind of thing. Sometimes they can even go as far as distortion of some Quranic verse and use it for their claims *(brackets added for clarity)*.

As we can see from these interview excerpts, often, Korean Muslims are forced to rely on English versions of Islamic texts that are inaccessible to the average reader. Since Korea is a context where English is not used widely, much less with ease and comfort amongst the majority, the lack of high-quality information becomes a real barrier to the wider aim of normalizing Korean Muslim presence in Korean society. This can contribute to an already precarious situation for young Korean Muslims as their peers are left to consume Islam-related content created by specific, hostile Korean Christian communities or Islamophobic media coverage as described earlier, all of which encourages mainstream society to propagate Islamophobic tropes. Perhaps, most importantly for Korean Muslim youth forging their way to societal acceptance of their unique Korean and Muslim identities, the lack of Korean-language content reinforces existing notions that Islam is a foreign

entity and those converting to the religion will inevitably take on the traits of those perceived as 'foreign' or 'alien' to mainstream Korean society.

Discussion

This paper has introduced one section of the Korean Muslim community in Seoul and their efforts to curate a form of 'Korean Islam' online. By focusing on one particular Facebook page, I have been able to offer a deeper exploration of one group's online efforts to foster acceptance, solidarity and connection with a society that Korean Muslim youth should be able to call 'home.' Having gone through the unexpected process of racialization that comes with conversion to Islam, Korean Muslim youth often find themselves in a difficult position, suddenly locating themselves on the peripheries of their networks, families and wider society. Despite the relatively low number of Muslims in Korea and the even lower number of indigenous Korean Muslims, they share many of the similar struggles faced by Muslim minority communities elsewhere in the world. Despite limited opportunities for real-life interactions with Muslims—Korean Muslim or otherwise—perceptions of Muslims in Korea remain broadly negative.

We can attribute this negative perspective to a number of factors, some of which are quite unique to the Korean context. Korea's historical experiences with colonialism and the imposition of foreign cultures that came with it has severely impacted the notion of Korean-ness over time. The scholars K'yunghee So, Jun'gyun K'im and Sunyoun'g Lee have presented a wide-ranging genealogy of how notions of Korean identity have evolved and morphed over time, starting with a sense that it was something that was unique, homogenous and in need of protection.[23] As noted by Song (2014), this narrative has given rise to a number of nationalist-protectionist discourses that effectively try to close ranks on people and practices deemed alien or threatening to what is perceived as Korean culture. This is important within the context of Islam and Muslims in Korea, it is well-documented that despite having historical interactions with Islam and Muslims, including the presence of a historical Muslim community on the Korean Peninsula[24] Korean society generally still views Islam and Muslims through the lens of hostility, deeming it a 'foreign' entity. As further highlighted by Song (2014), these historical events along with other social narratives that could potentially pose a challenge to this sense of unique unity have been erased over time in favour of strengthening a nationalistic approach to Korean identity. This is in spite of scholars such as K'yunghee So *et al.* charting the various discourses that have accompanied conceptualizations of Korean identities which they posit has been something that has been tied to the social, political and historical context at a given time.[25]

Working within this framework, it slowly becomes clear that through a process of racialization, Korean Muslims, especially Korean Muslim youth face many similar challenges to Korean multicultural families as they are perceived as different, foreign and threatening to the (now heavily contested) notion of a stable Korean identity. However, unlike multicultural families who are usually comprised of Korean and non-Korean ethnicity couples and their mixed ethnicity children, as shown through this study, Korean Muslim youth are racialized through their choices to change their religion or beliefs to Islam.

The specifics of the Korean context ought to be considered alongside factors that affect Muslim minority communities across the globe. The flow of Islamophobic discourse sourced from media that echoes or reproduces orientalist tropes in stories about Muslims has repeatedly emerged as a key theme for this research. This Islamophobia is shaped by a number of internal and external factors. Factors internal to Korea include having a genuine lack of knowledge and sources about Islam available in the Korean language along with very few real-life opportunities to interact with Korean Muslims.[26] This leaves a vacuum which can be filled either by media stories which disproportionately cover acts of Muslim-perpetrated violence, linking Islam with terrorism or specific Korean missionary church movements which propagate anti-Muslim sentiments through their 'clash of civilization' style teachings.[27] Finally, when we consider that Islam is still considered a foreign religion in Korea, we can see how Korean Muslim conversions pose links to growing fears over the current, changing cultural landscape in Korea.

These contextual factors are important points of consideration when we analyse Korean Muslim efforts to curate an Islamic identity online. The realities of Korean Muslim life are often harsh, with many rejected from family and friend circles once they reveal their conversion. This often means that new Korean Muslims must learn about their new-found faith in an environment where reliable Korean-language sources about Islam are scarce, often in hiding from the rest of society for fear of being outcast. Furthermore, by going down the online route, Korean Muslim youth are able to operate outside of traditional systems of authority usually located in Muslim spaces. The lack of Korean language proficiency along with a general lack of awareness that Korean Muslims exist across many Muslim societies places Korean Muslim youth in a unique position, allowing them to express and articulate their conceptions of Islam online with limited scrutiny from outside, perceived authoritative figures.

The examples shared in this paper; the new Korean Muslim soldier and the curious non-Muslim Korean student display the significance of having a sense of shared identity or shared values in the Korean context. In the case of the new

Muslim solider, our Korean Administrator was able to offer advice, emotional support and insights from his own personal experiences of being a Muslim whilst completing compulsory military service through their Facebook exchanges. In the case of the non-Muslim student, interviewees cited in this paper were eventually able to introduce him to their offline world and were given the chance to show that they were 'just human.' Whilst these types of deeper interaction are infrequent, they are not insignificant. Reflecting on the state of activities through the Facebook page to date, all of the administrator interviewees appear satisfied with their progress. They do not aim to reach vast numbers of people in a short space of time or to interact with them in a shallow fashion. Instead, Korean Muslim youth interviewed for this study prefer to try and touch the lives and hearts of average Korean people believing that one-to-one interaction in the online or offline sphere will allow their compatriots the time and space needed to accept their existence in society on their chosen terms. In a society which places high value on shared culture, identities, values and language, it becomes a powerful symbol for Korean Muslims to assert themselves as active agents, reshaping what it means to be both Muslim and a Korean in a society that is slowly taking steps towards globalization and multiculturalism.

Conclusion

This study has offered an exploration of the ways in which Korean Muslim youth are using Facebook, particularly its private messaging function to engage with mainstream Korean society. By uploading public posts with simple, clear information about Islam along with longer, more nuanced discussions within the private messaging space, Korean Muslim youth are curating Islamic narratives and asserting their identities as Muslim Koreans online. The fact that these activities are taking place solely in the Korean language is also important for a number of reasons including: independence stemming from the lack of Korean language and culture proficiency within Muslim scholarly spaces, allowing Korean Muslim youth some degree of flexibility and freedom from scholarly scrutiny that Muslim minority communities in English-speaking spheres may experience in comparison. Considering the ultimate goals for this Facebook '*dawah*' work is to normalize Islam in Korean society, using Korean as the preferred mode of communication allows Korean Muslims to assert their linguistic, ethnic and religious identities that are firmly rooted in the Korean context and whilst very gradual, may represent the next stage of evolution for 'Korean Islam.'

Notes

1. This work was supported by the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Korea and the National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF2018S1A6A3A03043497).
2. Peter Morey, "Introduction: Muslims, Trust and Multiculturalism" in *Muslims, Trust and Multiculturalism: New Directions*, ed. Amina Yaqin, Peter Morey and Asmaa Soliman (Palgrave, 2018) 2–4.
3. Amina Yaqin, Peter Morey and Asmaa Soliman, eds. *Muslims, Trust and Multiculturalism: New Directions* (Palgrave, 2018). Several scholars have probed Muslim use of social media. Studies that tend to focus on conflicts, jihad, terrorism and radicalization narratives include works by Gary R. Bunt, *Islam in the Digital Age: E-Jihad, Online Fatwas and Cyber Islamic Environments* (London: Pluto Press, 2003). Also see Oz Sultan, "Combatting the Rise of ISIS 2.0 and Terrorism 3.0," *The Cyber Defense Review* 2, no. 3 (2017) 42–44. http://www.jstor.org/stable/26267384. And J. West Levi, "#jihad: Understanding Social Media as a Weapon," *Security Challenges* 12, no. 2 (2016). 9–26. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26465604.
4. The Korea Muslim Federation (KMF) estimates that 30,000 Muslims in Korea are indigenous Korean Muslims on their website: http://www.koreaislam.org. K'wŏn Jeeyun suggests that there are 150,000 Muslims in Korea with 45,000 being indigenous Korean Muslims: Jeeyun K'wŏn, "The Rise of Korean Islam: Migration and Da'wa" (Middle East Institute, 2014) https://www.mei.edu/publications/rise-korean-islam-migration-and-dawa#_ftn1. A 2018 media report by Korea Expose approximates Muslims in Korea at around 200,000 with around 30,000 Korean Muslims. See Ben Jackson, "How Influential Is Islam in South Korea?" Korea Expose, January 19 2018 https://www.koreaexpose.com/how-influential-islam-south-korea/.
5. Bunt, *Islam in the Digital Age: E-Jihad, Online Fatwas and Cyber Islamic Environments*. 2003. Sultan, "Combatting the Rise of ISIS 2.0 and Terrorism 3.0." 2017. Levi "#jihad: Understanding Social Media as a Weapon." 2017.
6. See Manuel Castells, *Networks of Outrage and Hope: Social Movements in the Internet Age* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012), Magdalena Karolak, 'Online Aesthetics of Martyrdom: A Study of the Bahraini' eds. Noha Mellor & Khalil Rinnawi, *Political Islam and Global Media: The Boundaries of Religious Identity* (London: Routledge, 2016), 67–85. And Noureddine Miladi, 'Social Media as a New Identity Battleground: The Cultural Comeback in Tunisia after the Revolution of 14 January 2011,' Eds. Noha Mellor & Khalil Rinnawi, *Political Islam and Global Media: The Boundaries of Religious Identity* (London: Routledge, 2016), 34–47.
7. See Emma Baulch and Alila Pramiyanti, "Hijabers on Instagram: Using Visual Social Media to Construct the Ideal Muslim Woman," *Social Media and Society* (Oct–Dec, 2018): 1–5. Also see Nur Leila Khalid, Sheila Yvonne Jayasainan and Nurzihan Hassim, "Social media influencers—shaping consumption culture among Malaysian youth," *SHS Web of Conferences* 53, 02008 (2018): 1–12. And Annisa R. Beta, "Young Muslim Women as Digital Citizens in Indonesia—Advocating Conservative Religious Outlook." *Perspective* 39 (Yusof Ishak Institute, 2019): 1–9.
8. Eva F. Nisa, "Creative and Lucrative Da'wa: The Visual Culture of Instagram amongst Female Muslim Youth in Indonesia *Asiascape: Digital Asia* 5 (2018): 69–75.
9. Nasya Bahfen, "The Individual and the Ummah: The Use of Social Media by Muslim Minority Communities in Australia and the United States," *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs* 38, 1 (2018): 119–131.
10. Bunt, Gary. "Islam@Britain.net:" 'British Muslim Identities in Cyberspace" *Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations*, vol. 10, no. 3 (1999): 353–362 and Bunt, Gary R. *Islam in the Digital Age: E-Jihad, Online Fatwas and Cyber Islamic Environments*. London: Pluto Press, 2003.
11. Bahfen, "The Individual and the Ummah: The Use of Social Media by Muslim Minority Communities in Australia and the United States," 120.

12. For a nuanced discussion and pushback against the notion of white saviours "saving" Muslim women from their allegedly oppressive and backward cultures through imperialist ventures, see Leila Abu-Lughod, *Do Muslim Women Need Saving?* (Harvard University Press, 2013). For a discussion about stereotypes about Muslim women, particularly the politics around the headscarf, see the work of Kathrine Bullock, *Rethinking Muslim Women and the Veil: Challenging Historical and Modern Stereotypes* (London, UK: International Institute of Islamic Thought, 2002).
13. Edward Said, *Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World* (First Vintage Books, 1997). 10, 24–28.
14. Edward Said, *Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World*. 28.
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18. http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/article.aspx?aid=3021829, accessed 02/01/2020.
19. See K'yung Yong Rhee and Wang-Bae K'im, "The Adoption and Use of the Internet in South Korea," Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication, Volume 9, Issue 4, 1 (July 2004), JCMC943, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1083-6101.2004.tb00299.x.
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Border-Crossing and the Shaping of an Imagined Citizenship: The Case of Korean Picture Brides

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Abstract

This article engages with the way in which Korean picture brides imagined themselves emotionally in connection with their affective route toward survival and a spirit of liberation in early twentieth-century Hawaii. Exploring the implication of border-crossing as a framework for understanding the dynamics of the brides' lives, from their decisions to become picture brides to engagement with anti-Japanese activities, this article focuses on how a variety of border-crossings formulate these women's consciousness in that their act of border-crossing prompted the shaping of an imagined citizenship of Korea. In doing so, this article offers a new methodology for understanding the Korean picture brides' lives in relation to a more complex dynamic of their emotional experience, the formulation of alternative citizenship, and the construction of modern subjects, thereby contributing to transpacific histories of women's mobility.

Keywords: Korean picture brides, picture marriage, border-crossing, an imagined citizenship, Hawaii.

Introduction

Picture marriage was a popular form of migration for Asian women in Japan, Korea, Okinawa, the Philippines, and China who sought to find spouses of the same ethnicity in Hawaii at the turn of the twentieth century.[2] As the name suggests, photographs as a modern technology along with the 'sea mail' system were used for this marriage process. This marriage practice represents the fact, as Patterson suggests that, "Koreans were quickly making the transition from sojourner to settler, realizing that their futures lay in Hawaii rather than Korea."[3]

The picture marriage emerged from King Kojong's modernization project for Korea with the help of American imperialist power[4] through the medium of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association which sought "to avoid importing more expensive white labor."[5] Thus Korean men began to arrive in Hawaii. Recruited to work on the sugar plantation farms in 1903, they were regarded as the first record of Korean immigration history in the US.[6] After the 'Gentlemen's Agreement' of 1907 between the US and Japan and Korea's annexation by Japan in 1910, there followed the arrival of the first Korean picture bride in 1910,[7] and approximately a further 1000 Korean women who moved from colonial Korea to Hawaii relying heavily on the photographs of a prospective husband and a letter when envisioning their new lives on new soil.[8] This practice continued until the passing of the Asian Exclusion Act of 1924.

Most of these female immigrants came from urban areas and were Christians aged between fifteen and their early twenties.[9] According to their memories, the main reasons for becoming a picture bride were "to escape the Japanese"[10] or "to escape the stranglehold of the traditional feudal system in any way possible,"[11] or to get a free education in Hawaii.

What makes these picture brides historically significant is that the archival materials show these "women's experience" in relation to multiple forms of hardship.[12] Yet, despite 'the value of' their 'life story' 'as the roots' of Korean Americans,[13] the lives of the Korean picture brides were scattered across Hawaii, and only a few interviews, memoirs,[14] and transcripts based on their recollections are available in contemporary newspapers and the Korean Picture Brides Collection of the University of Hawaii. For this reason, this article focuses on a few Korean picture brides who left records of their lives in the form of interviews and memoirs.

The intent of this article is thus twofold. On one hand, it aims to challenge a somewhat monolithic dimension of the picture brides' lives, represented by their 'predicament' and 'victory.' Although it cannot deny that their lives are viewed as "an American dream-come true,"[15] this article engages with the way in which the picture brides imagined themselves emotionally based on their recollections. More precisely, realizing that "The picture brides are certainly examples

of this spirit [*Han*],"[16] an exploration of understanding an affective dimension of these women's experience is of significance, as it means that the content of their recollection can at times be accompanied by their 'tears and laughters.' Such an aspect reveals that the picture brides' "life story [...] may expand the collective consciousness of Korean Americans."[17] This approach thus goes a step further than the views of both Duk-Hee Lee Murabayashi and Alice Yun Chai, that the study of the picture brides as the object of modern Korean history "build[s] women's history from the bottom up, focusing on women who have experienced multiple oppressions of culture, class, race, and gender."[18]

On the other hand, this article is based on a transnational perspective which refers to "both moving through space or across lines, as well as changing the nature of something" in relation to movement of the Korean picture brides' act of border-crossing moving from colonial Korea to Hawaii.[19] In this view, acknowledging that being "cross-cultural" as the nature of border crossing is "theatrical," border crossing that refers to both a metaphor and an actuality is a framework for understanding the dynamics of their lives, from their decisions to become picture brides to engagement with anti-Japanese activities.[20] This approach presumes that these women are active agents whose cultural identities are flexible as "the points of identification, the unstable points of identification or suture."[21]

Grounded in a trans-pacific perspective that attends to "the movement of people, goods, and ideas across geographical boundaries"[22] between colonial Korea and Hawaii, this article focuses on how a variety of border-crossings formulate Korean picture brides' consciousness associated with their emotional attachment to their homeland. This is linked to the way in which these women's border-crossing prompted the shaping of an imagined citizenship of Korea, rather than that of a new place, Hawaii, thereby transcending *Han* which is defined as "a uniquely Korean collective feeling of unresolved resentment, pain, grief, and anger."[23] In other words, their border-crossing underpins their affective route toward survival and "a spirit of liberation."[24] In doing so, this article will offer a new methodology for understanding the Korean picture brides' lives in relation to a more complex dynamic of their emotional experience, the formulation of alternative citizenship, and the construction of 'modern subjects,'[25] thereby contributing to trans-pacific histories of women's mobility.

Picture Marriage as a 'Scripted' Institution

As the Korean picture brides recalled, it was not an easy decision to become a picture bride, for "in the feudal days of Korea, becoming a picture bride was considered dishonorable, questionable and wicked."[26] Nevertheless, being

a picture bride was just a means to getting out of colonial Korea. One woman recalled that she didn't care about the photograph that her potential husband sent and was "not attracted to his picture nor the idea of marriage."[27]

At that time it is not difficult to find harsh criticism of picture marriage which circulated in the Korean press: in 1914, one editorial stated that "a picture marriage is the thing that deceives people and makes them slaves."[28] Another newspaper account also warned that "once [the brides] crossed [the Pacific Ocean], a lot of hardship" awaited.[29] The quality of this marriage practice of not knowing for certain whether or not the information of a prospective husband was reliable was sufficient to be deemed "uncivilized" and "immoral" as such an act betrayed a sublime sense of marriage.[30] According to the Korean newspaper, *Kook Min Bo*, "a negative result" from picture marriage was that there were 5231 divorcees during "a two year time period."[31] It is thus no wonder that the lives of many of the brides ended in tragedy.[32] The dominant pattern of a Korean picture bride's story is that, for the most part, they found their dreams collapsing and scattered as soon as they met their men after arriving in Hawaii: Their prospective husbands were too old because they sent a photograph that they took a long time ago; the brides also experienced poverty, language barriers and racial discrimination from the owners of the sugar plantation farms. Nonetheless, these women did not decide to return to their homeland because it would be regarded as shameful in their villages and would lose face for their family, where Confucian beliefs that focus more on community's value rather than an individual's freedom were still predominant, in addition to the fact that they also had no money for the return ticket. The degree of the shame or "disgrace to the entire family"[33] is equal in the accounts to the feeling that "I'd rather to die here [than experiencing such shame]."[34] In this respect a news account titled "Is Hawaii a paradise or hell?," summarizes that for women who came to Hawaii through picture marriage with "a glimpse of hope," Hawaii is like "a hell."[35]

However, the general perception of Hawaii among Koreans was positive in the early twentieth century. The Korean historian Yang Ho-min points out that during Japanese rule Korean perceptions of America were that it was "a civilized country, a wealthy country and powerful country, a free country."[36] This abstract, idealized perception of America implies that Hawaii was equal to America, which was also another name for the West, especially because the vast majority of Korean people had no specific knowledge that Hawaii was a protectorate of the United States at that time.

In *Kuk Min Bo* in 1914, Hawaii was viewed as a "Korean's Hawaii" or "a glorious paradise."[37] In *Dong-A* newspaper in 1921, based on his experience of Hawaii, one Korean man wrote in a letter to the editor that "[Hawaii] is a place where it has

a warm climate and freedom. Actually, *Chosun* [Korean] people living in Hawaii are far happier than people living in Korea, so that I am reminded of Hawaii as *Chosun* within the Pacific."[38] This reader's perception of Hawaii as a good place to live is highlighted by the identification with the name of the downtown of Seoul that its "landscape is similar to *Chongro*" because "*Chosun* people living in Hawaii wear our clothes." Indeed, this perception of Hawaii is not far from the picture brides' who "thought Hawaii was America."[39] As many accounts of the Korean picture brides reveal, they received information about Hawaii through word of mouth,—through missionaries, matchmakers, or their friends and relatives—as a place regarded as a "mystic paradise where clothes are hanging on trees and fruits fallen from the trees become rotten as nobody owns them, a place where all the money that one earns can be saved as there is no need to spend it."[40] In other words, they did not know that their migration to Hawaii was taking them from colonial Korea to what at that time was another colonial space.

The concept of Hawaii as a 'paradise' was the driving force for the brides to enact picture marriage practice and move forward with a glimpse of hope for a better financial future. In the brides' recollections, the process of arrangement for marriage was as follows: Korean men who emigrated to Hawaii sent their photographs to Korean women who lived in their hometown, and those women, who wanted to marry the men, also sent their photographs by sea mail. Once they decided to choose their spouse, they exchanged a letter with each other to confirm their marriage, and the male party transferred the ship fare of $200 to her and her family.[41] This means that "Korean picture brides did not have a wedding ceremony, and crossed the ocean to Hawaii as a 'wife' without any marriage registration under the civil law."[42] Hence, letters and photographs are useful mediums for understanding the implication of this picture marriage in detail.

Performance studies scholar Robert Bernstein contends that the photographs are understood as "scriptive things" to "prompt, structure, or choreograph behavior" in that the object is enacted by agency, and its situational context creates its interactive narrative.[43] Of further utility here is that "The scriptive things [are] a tool for analyzing incomplete evidence—and all evidence is incomplete—to make responsible, limited knowledges about the past."[44] Recognizant of the difficulty of finding much evidence about individual photographs, letters, and official documents like passports and marriage certificates in this marriage practice, Bernstein's viewpoint helps to comprehend the brides' bodily behaviors that generated the meaning of the picture marriage.

Although it is somewhat rare to find specific descriptions about an emotional value of the letter in the brides' accounts, waiting for a letter and a photograph from their prospective husband to be was significant. Accordingly, the photographs

that contained the brides' future husbands 'scripted' the process of crossing the Pacific Ocean by the brides. These photographs capture the men's behavior and the way in which the men as future grooms represented themselves by means of decorative elements, self-made appearances and illusions, which gave the brides a sense of satisfaction with the arrangement. Implicated in the potential to actualize the brides' new lives, their potential husbands' photographs were often taken years ago, or fabricated in a western setting to include, for example, a car and mansion creating an illusion between the bride and the groom.[45] By identifying the photographs with their prospective grooms or the potential for a hopeful future, the picture brides were determined to leave for Hawaii, despite never before having seen them in person.

Furthermore, as Kwon Boduerae elaborates on the popular trend of the love letter "that promises the experience of love, albeit an indirect one" during colonial Korea, the letters that women and men exchanged with each other also prompted their decision on the arrangement for marriage.[46] As one of the brides recalled that "His messages were like love letters," the letters functioned as a subjunctive mode of happy marriage based on their spouse's love and respect.[47] Through the exchange of the letters, they feel as if they get "to choose the person whom they love" and the letters were written as if a prospective husband is "sitting next to" them.[48] One picture bride who "had memorized a number of romantic expressions" for a letter writing recalled that [after writing a letter to her potential groom] she "began to feel some affection toward the man in the picture. She kept his picture at the bottom of her cloth basket, and every morning she took it out to look at."[49]

In this context, it can be stated that a picture marriage serves as a 'scripted' institution in which letters and photographs as 'scriptive things' prompt and generate the brides' border-crossing. For these women who wished to become picture brides, the implication of the picture marriage along with the idealized image of Hawaii is littered with freedom, democratic values, love, and fate. And all these subjunctive thoughts and expectations for the marriage are grounded on the brides' determined will. This is true especially when one thinks that the picture marriage is ushered by an individual woman's choice that challenged the convention of the traditional marriage: "No girl with the proper upbringing would even dream of choosing her own husband."[50] The content of the letter thus consisted of these women's determination, saying that "I told him that I felt I must leave Korea to live in another country, and I had already consented to his proposal. After receiving such a letter from me, he felt convinced he must marry me."[51] To put it another way, though leaving home to marry somebody whom she had never met before showed "a naïve attitude" by the bride, it was one of the ways to find

a new reality in contrast to colonial Korea.[52] The picture marriage would have been impossible without such somewhat romanticized, hopeful presumption of the brides' own futures.

Korean Picture Brides' Border-Crossing

Korean picture brides' acts of border-crossing are important for an understanding of actualizing this marriage practice. As Sophie Nield claims, an act of border-crossing is theatrical in terms of "space, appearance and dis-locations."[53] Here, border-crossing is central to moving through different spatial realms or boundaries, movement through which is possible to transform the nature of something. The border not only means geographical locations between Hawaii and Korea, but also an epistemological frame to prompt the shaping of an imagined citizenship in that "they [borders] also construct the nation and the idea of 'belonging.'"[54] In this view, the brides' border-crossing is related to the ways in which they crossed the Pacific Ocean geographically, ideologically, and culturally, which allowed them to be in a constant state of becoming.

Indeed, this period surrounding when these Korean women crossed the Pacific overlapped with times of economic instability, geopolitical conflicts, Korean immigration, and modern technological advances: The 'Gaelic' liner of the Pacific Mail Steamship Company was operated between Japan and the US since 1875,[55] and Post Offices in some areas of Honolulu, such as Kaimuki were established in 1914.[56]

On a geographical level, these brides-to be literally sailed across the Pacific Ocean in order to immigrate to Hawaii. According to their recollections, the brides crossed the border twice. They first needed to go to a Japanese harbor (usually Yokohama or Nagasaki) to transfer ships to Hawaii. Once they passed the entry examination, they could then board the ship to depart for Hawaii. As the brides recalled, in Yokohama they were questioned by officials, as well as examined for trachoma and tuberculosis and tested for hookworm.[57] Upon arrival in Honolulu, they were only able to leave the waiting room in the immigration office when their husbands came to collect them in person. They were also asked to pass a literacy test at the immigration station[58] before they actually meet their prospective grooms.

In the course of the border-crossing there are multiple sites for functioning as "places of in-between-ness"[59] such as ocean liners,[60] hotels, and the immigration station in Hawaii. As John Urry points out, "Places we might then say are like ships that move around and do not fixed within one location" and these "are temporary immobilized."[61] The brides' recollections suggest that their experience of the

in-between places, such as boarding a ship or staying in the hotel after their arrival in Hawaii, contains moments of mixed feelings, such as hope, despair, frustration and the like. Despite the paucity of specific information in their accounts—for example, the name of the ship and the class they sat in the board—the brides' "boat experience" was littered with expressions of seasickness alongside fears and anxiety for the unknown future.[62] In the Korean picture brides' accounts, for the most part, they had to wait for their husbands at the immigration station as some of the grooms were living in islands far away from the city. These immigration procedures that controlled the entry of foreigners are played out these women's fear and anxiety as this moment causes them to be stuck in a liminal state with nowhere to go.

In particular, both the immigration station[63] in Honolulu and a hotel[64] where the picture brides and their grooms stayed after the immigration procedure was complete serve as such places: where these women unleashed feelings of sufferings, disappointment, and frustration about the actual appearance of their grooms, in comparison to the photographs taken of their prospective husbands which were considerably different from the men's actual elderly appearance, which left many brides feeling 'deceived'[65] and 'frustrated.'[66] The brides recalled, "my husband was too old to do anything," or they were quite sick.[67] As a result, the marriage which the brides imagined turned out to be a marriage without love,[68] or a "marriage that is not happy."[69]

In contrast to their perception of Hawaii as "the dreamland," they coped with the harsh reality anyhow by enduring marital difficulties, such as their grooms' heavy drinking and gambling.[70] Accordingly, the reality of the brides' lives in Hawaii was not quite what they wanted it to be, perhaps summarized as 'survival' out of nothing.[71] After their arrival in Hawaii, the brides recounted that their concept of a new reality in Hawaii was transformed into that of "hard living and prejudice."[72] In this context, border-crossing is symbolically enacted through racial and social differentiations and exclusion manifested in the social and cultural discourses of Hawaii, which entail that the legal citizenship status of these Korean migrants was as colonial subjects of Japan as well as a racially marginalized group in Hawaii. The brides existed as "the minority among the minorities,"[73] who "did not have a protective community such as a Chinatown."[74] It is true that the number of Koreans were relatively very small as in 1910 the proportion of Asians living within a total population of 20 million in Hawaii was 42% Japanese, 11% Chinese, and 2.4% Korean.[75] This rate explains why the brides recalled Hawaii as "a white man's world, and the less we bother, the better."[76] To borrow the bride's words, racial discrimination explicitly foregrounds that "At that time, even if you graduated college, there was no job for Orientals."[77] This is

supported by the fact that immigration policies restricted the citizenship rights of Asian Americans and limited their education and workforces until the McCarran-Walter Act which was enacted in 1952 to allow them to become US citizens.

Edna Bonacich pinpoints that “Asian immigrant labor had many similarities to Afro-American slavery” in terms of the value of their labor, being regarded as being ‘cheaper’ in Hawaii.[78] Throughout the turn of the century and the early twentieth century, the overall dynamic of Hawaii was viewed as a discursive space where Hawaiian natives, white plantation owners, and cheap laborers from the East, such as China, Japan and Korea were “mixed under the logic of capitalism.”[79] This is especially true of the poor and terrible working conditions: The Korean immigrants worked for ten hours being whipped by the farm owners in order to pay back the $170 that was loaned as an immigration fee under a three-years contract.[80]

As the brides recalled, the climate of racial prejudice was epitomized by the fact that “we weren’t regarded as human beings in those days.”[81] As Carol C. Fan contends, these women were ‘doubly’ marginalized as Asians and women in sugar plantation farms, given that the labor hierarchy was highly gendered and racialized in Hawaii at that time.[82] To the extent that Korean picture brides became financially active because they were forced to work as wage laborers: They worked in pineapple farms or doing laundry jobs.[83] This situation implies that the transgression of their border crossings moved the brides toward a challenge to the patriarchy especially in terms of their financial independency. Wayne Patterson argues that “For most couples, their new living and working situations led to at least the approximation of equality in marriage.”[84] According to one bride, it was a rewarding and ‘satisfactory’ feeling to earn money “as much as men could do.”[85]

In addition, an extensive level of hardship led them to experience border-crossing on an ideological level through the main shift of ideology from feudal ideology to individual freedom to some extent. As the brides recalled, they were free from their duty to take care of their mothers-in-law in spite of the fact that gender roles between them and their husband followed the patriarchal order.[86]

Most notably, the significance of the brides’ border-crossings is particularly embedded in the conscious shift from a matter of survival to political activism for the urgent project of nation-building. As the manifesto of the Korean Ladies Relief Society shows, the epistemological shift from “one quarter role of human being” at home to “the entire role of human being” in public was encouraged for these women to ‘act’ and support the Korean people participating in anti-Japanese activism under the Japanese occupation.[87] Put succinctly, reminded that for the brides the picture marriage would serve as a scripted institution, we can surmise

that the homeland is replaced by another scripted institution in which they could imagine a better future after their confrontation with the new reality of Hawaii. Under the consistent umbrella of considering themselves Koreans, the brides' border crossings enabled them to transform and mobilize their consciousness into an imagined nation state of Korea as a scripted institution.

Yet, this speculation posits the idea that though such a scripted institution as epistemological conceptions of both marriage and Korea may be understood as the brides' ways of moving through a harsh reality, the former did not equate with the latter: For the case of the picture marriage, the scripted institution serves as the precondition of the brides' act of border crossing; on the other hand, for the shaping of an imagined citizenship that would be possible to cope with and go further to transgress the harsh reality in Hawaii, it functions as the consequence of border crossing.

The Shaping of an Imagined Citizenship

My use of the term 'an imagined citizenship' here is grounded in both works of Benedict Anderson and Suk-Young Kim. For Anderson, the concept of 'an imagined community' is defined by its 'style,' which determined the particularity of one nation.[88] This view is helpful for thinking about the Korean independence movement in Hawaii. In the Korean context, Kim points to citizenship that "reflects the under-problematized notion of oneness embedded in *minjok* [which means nation or people in Korean], but it is firmly grounded on the intuitive sense of belonging to a family unit, be it biological or figuratively imagined."[89] Challenging "any constitutional definition of citizenship," she offers the concept of "emotional citizenship" that serves as "alternative formations of citizenship" in relation to "emotional affiliation."[90] This article follows Kim's view by foregrounding that 'an imagined citizenship' is a product of the act of border-crossing by the brides and is attached to their homeland on an emotional level.

Circumstantial evidence suggests that the idea of imagined citizenship points to the ambivalence of whether or not it refers to colonial Korea or Korea post liberation. In relation to their perception of homeland many picture brides stated that "I never regret leaving Korea [because of the colonial situation regardless of their harsh reality in Hawaii]."[91] This indicates that they may have imagined their homeland as a liberated and independent nation outside of colonial Korea. In light of this, the concept of imagined citizenship that I use in this article is based on the idea that Korea is an imagined nation-state in the brides' mind. As John Lie states, the idea of "modern peoplehood" is grounded on the notion that "home is no longer a concrete place but an imagined space."[92] He goes on to articulate

that "In the age of nationalism and the nation-state, […] Every migrant, under the reign of nationalist ideology, is an alien, an exile. Hence, a constant yearning for a return to homeland—the only place where one can truly belong, truly *be*—is constitutive of modern peoplehood."[93] Against the backdrop of early twentieth-century Hawaii, Korea was illuminated as "rivers and mountains of the rose of Sharon"[94] [*mugunghwagangsan*], or as "people in white clothes who have a long history and tradition."[95] By claiming that "the rights of small nationalities are to be protected by a world League of Nations," colonial Korea should gain "justice and freedom from oppression [by Japan]."[96] The claim that "we Koreans were civilized people"[97] articulates Korea's ethnic identity distinguishable from the Japanese who treated as 'our enemy'[98] in particular. Thus, the concept of citizenship in this article is more about an imaginary formation of an independent Korea that began to be activated during the brides' border-crossings. It is obvious that the brides' accounts show that despite their legal citizenship as Japanese nationals they considered themselves Korean citizens who wanted to "go where there are Koreans" instead of staying on Japanese farms during the Korean independence movement in Hawaii.[99]

More significantly, the idea of an imagined citizenship stems from the picture brides' sense of pride for their homeland. Although their lives in Hawaii were so harsh and miserable under intense working environments, these women regarded their feelings for their homeland as 'proud.'[100] According to them, "We've always been proud of being Korean."[101] Such pride is deeply embedded in the belief that "We have a culture and a language all our own that is more than 5000 years old."[102] This sense of belonging becomes convincing particularly when we realize that for these Koreans there would be no bright future of emigration without recovering a lost sovereignty. The brides' privileged sense of being Korean thus explains why they became actively engaged in the independence movement while living in Hawaii.

There seems to be two distinct elements of Hawaii functioning as the headquarters of the Korean independence movement outside of Korea throughout the early twentieth century. One of the reasons that Koreans in Hawaii were actively engaging in these activities is that "they were the only immigrants to earn a regular salary among other Koreans residing in other countries."[103] This makes them distinguishable from other Korean immigrants living in Mexico, China, and the like at that time. In addition, to some extent, Hawaii was regarded as 'a safe place' littered with personnel and material resources that are necessary for operating independence movements, as well as a secure place where the Japanese government could not hinder the Korean independent movement due to the geographical distance between Hawaii and Korea.[104]

The Korean National Association (KNA, 국민회, *Kungminhoe*) was a representative of the Korean community in Hawaii. According to picture brides, "*Kungminhoe* was the only one recognized by the U.S."[105] One bride recalled that "Our KNA came to our rescue. They issued badges that said, We are Koreans."[106] She continued to say that "We also received posters and signs to hang in our homes and places of business. […] No one else cared about us, prior to the KNA. We had no country, no power, no history."[107] This quotation not only indicates the significance of the KNA as an institution to protect Koreans in the early twentieth century, but also reveals a sense of desperation for the absence of one's own nation. And this sentiment is highlighted by "*Han* of the lost nation" [mangguguі han] which is defined as "the entire Korean people are prisoners; the entire Korea is a prison" by stressing Japan as "our enemy."[108]

Unlike Koreans living in the homeland and participating in the movement in a direct manner, overseas Koreans living in Hawaii, for the most part, focused on raising money for supporting anti-Japanese activists and the provisional government of Korea, which was located in Shanghai. For them, the provisional government in Shanghai was viewed as 'our government.'[109] This elucidates the idea that the independence movement was produced through transnational flows of people, goods, and ideas across the Pacific.

Although it is somewhat difficult to find a specific trajectory of financial flows crossing the Pacific from Hawaii to other countries where Korean immigrants lived, such as China, Mexico, and within colonial Korea, the legacy of overseas Koreans in Hawaii is notably supported by the fact that almost all monetary funds necessary to run the provisional government came from Korean immigrants in Hawaii.[110] These funds sent to the provisional government of Korea totaled "2 billion dollars with a contemporary exchange rate."[111] It is certainly the case that Koreans living in Hawaii paid a population tax to the provisional government for '36 years' during the colonial period.[112] This persistence and fidelity to claim independence were also possible through multiple political organizations that picture brides supported in the Korean independence movement against Japan. Many picture brides belonged to a plethora of organizations in which these women instilled a patriotic sense of their homeland and tried to spread Christian belief.[113] Indeed, the significance of these women's contributions stresses that the picture brides' active participation in political and social movements against Japanese colonial rule was a counterpart to the Korean independence movements run by men.[114]

The first women's association entitled "Sinmyoung Wife Association" based in Hawaii was organized in 1908 prior to the Japan–Korea annexation (1910).[115] This organization created by women, who came to Hawaii with their families

before the first arrival of the picture brides, was later incorporated into a bigger organization named “Dae-Han Wife Association” in 1913. After the March First Movement which was the first reckoning of the Korean resistance which took place in Korea in 1919, the brides organized another association named “the Korean Ladies Relief Society” in Hawaii. This Society’s membership was over 300, and it declared that “it is time to save our people who are dying and undergoing hardship.”[116] As Lili M. Kim points out, the value of the Korean independence movement by these women lies in the fact that it “embraced humanity first and foremost, not politics, without losing sight of the political nature of their work.”[117] To be more specific, they made colored posters and sold them for fundraising and sent the money to help Korea and support the Korean provisional government in Shanghai.[118] They sent $2000 to China and $1500 to people who were injured because of military participation in the movement.[119] The money that they earned through their economic activities was sent to Korean immigrants who lived in China to those who had experienced natural disasters such as famine and flood in Korea.[120]

According to the brides’ accounts, they ‘did everything’[121] to make funds: they sold Korean traditional dishes and rice cakes to the public to make secure funds for the independence movement and went on tour to stage the March First movement.[122] One picture bride recalled what she did in Hawaii for the Korean independence movement:

> All these women joined in for big occasions, and they were mostly picture brides—asserting themselves and their newly found freedom and independence. Honolulu was the headquarters. We endured all kinds of weather while collecting money for the Korean Independence Movement. Even pregnant woman participated. So much enthusiasm! We women put a great deal of energy in collecting relief materials for our compatriots and went out to collect funds to aid the Korean patriots’ efforts. We even went into opium dens.[123]

What is noticeable here in this organization is that they ran the business themselves in daily connection to domestic, gendered labors. One woman recounted that “[in order to ‘raise funds’], each family would save a few ounces of rice every day in a designated bag. Once a month the women got together and made cakes with the rice they had saved.”[124] The brides’ engagement in the organizations and independence movement foregrounds their pivotal role in taking the lead on economic activities in their households.[125] As one Korean lady recounted, they considered themselves to be ‘dead’ if they were in colonial Korea,[126] a feeling which compelled them to join these activities. An affective bond with each other was another indicator that the brides engaged with the independence movement through these informal meetings in their daily lives.[127] These women’s active

participation in the independence movement recaptures that their consciousness of their homeland as an imagined, liberated Korea was futuristic. Such a futuristic vision of their homeland not only imagined an independence to come, but also implied that as “Chosun people living in Hawaii” their sense of conceiving of themselves as Koreans is permanent in the claim that “I’m living as *Chosun* people, and will even die as *Chosun* people.”[128]

Most notably, part of the reason that these women were actively involved in the movement was itself the nature of their experience as picture brides. Considering that most of them came to Hawaii to get an education and study, but had no opportunity to do so, engaging in these associations and organizations was a means to achieve some of their unfulfilled dreams. For them, this was a concrete way of shaping their imagined citizenship in terms of recovering a lost sovereignty as Korean immigrants in early twentieth-century Hawaii. The brides’ effort to become involved in the independence movement was also a way in which these women sutured the gap between their idealized concept of Hawaii and their actual reality of Hawaii.

In particular, through their political and social activities associated with the independence movement, picture brides placed themselves into a more dynamic position in the history of modern Korea in relation to migration and the independence movement outside of colonial Korea. In this respect, the Korean picture brides differed from other ethnic groups, as it is quite likely that it distinguished them from the Japanese, Chinese, and Filipino immigrants who came to Hawaii as picture brides, too.[129]

Conclusion

One picture bride stated that “My philosophy of life is that when circumstances strike, even when you say you can’t, you can and you do. No matter who you are.”[130] This statement might be understood as a way of “just enduring a life.”[131] These women’s blend of fidelity and tenacity enabled them to transform and mobilize limitations and hardships into possibilities of a better future, humiliations and despair into hope and pride, which underlines the point of view that “those who chose to become picture brides were strong enough to fight for their self-determination.”[132] In doing so, they do not confine themselves to ‘examples of *Han*,’ rather demonstrate how to transcend it through diverse implications of their border crossings at the intersections of diasporic identity, mobility, and trans-pacific history.

Notes

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Modern Womanhood, the Ideology of the Housewife, and Young Female Rural–Urban Migrants in the 1960s and 1970s in South Korea

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Abstract

This paper attempts to clarify how young female rural–urban migrant workers were positioned within the ideology of the housewife as a form of modern womanhood, which was regulated by the developmental state as part of the modern nation-state building in the 1960s and 1970s in South Korea, by analyzing media discourses on the mobility, space and labor of single female workers. First, within the ideology of the housewife, in which women were required to settle down in the private sphere away from the main breadwinners after the Korean War, the mobility of young rural girls was depicted as 'unsettled' and 'unstable' and thus was socially deviant relative to the 'settled' and 'cared for' women in the private sphere. Second, the working space as well as the residential space for single female workers was illustrated as a loss of control of their bodies and sexuality under the normative ideology of the housewife, which led to the idealization of the institution of marriage as the final savior for single female workers. Finally, under the patriarchal system and the redefinition of women's labor in the developmental state based upon familism, the labor by single female workers was 'housewifized' either as 'filial piety' or a 'natural duty' to the family as well as to the motherland.

Keywords: Modern womanhood, ideology of the housewife, female rural–urban migrants, Park Chung Hee regime, Korea

Introduction[2]

The ideology of modern womanhood in the 1960s and 1970s in South Korea (hereafter, Korea) has two significant meanings. First, creating a modern woman was a major part of the modern nation-state building by Park Chung-Hee [Pak Chŏnghŭi] (1961–1979).[3] However, this does not necessarily mean that the discourses on modern womanhood by Park's regime were completely newly defined. Park's regime traditionalized modern gender roles. A traditional term for the ideal woman, 'wise mother and good wife' (hyŏnmoyangch'ŏ), was adopted for the creation of modern womanhood. For instance, the historical female figure Shin Saimdang (1503–1551) of the Chosŏn Dynasty (1392–1897) was often revived as a symbol for the 'rehabilitation of the nation.'[4] Furthermore, the construction of modern womanhood by Park's regime was not necessarily consistent and uniform. Modern womanhood was characterized by the coexistence of and conflicts between 'traditional' and 'modern,' 'old-fashioned' and 'new' and 'undesirable' and 'ideal'; therefore, it was filled with multiplicities, contradictions and complexities.[5]

Next, housewives were at the centre of the discussion of modern womanhood of Park's regime.[6] The emergence of housewives has been considered to be a 'natural' social consequence that results from industrialization and modernization. In the 1960s and 1970s, Korean society began to witness a gradual emergence of full-time housewives along with rapid industrialization, the proliferation of the nuclear family, and the birth of the middle class.[7] Although the middle class remained 'imagined' for most of the population, the aspiration to join the middle class and to become a full-time housewife was strong and occurred along with the rise of discourses promoted by newspapers and magazines on economic development and modern nation-state building.[8] In particular, women's magazines played a significant role in regulating modern womanhood by continuously promoting discourses and constituting women's gendered identity and modern womanhood.[9] In these women's magazines, urban middle-class housewives were depicted as a 'desire' that should be achieved by all women.[10] In the media, housewives were situated in the centre as important social entities that make nuclear family-based loving homes, have romantic relationships with their husbands, serve as modern educators and providers of scientific knowledge to children, and serve as disciplined home managers and rational consumers with modern knowledge for family members.[11] In this sense, housewives were romanticized as the ideal in modern womanhood and positioned as the centre of the private sphere.[12] However, when understanding modern womanhood under Park's regime, *all* women were redefined as housewives rather than only full-time housewives.[13] Housewives were situated

as an idealized standard of modern womanhood. Therefore, housewives were positioned as a social group that should be regulated and disciplined by the state. In this vein, the media attempted to formulate an ideal form of housewives by idealizing them in the abovementioned ways while also 'problematizing' their behaviours in relation to consumption, leisure, labor, and family planning.

The question is in what ways the discourses on housewives as the ideal of modern womanhood have influenced the women who *de facto* did not belong to the group of stay-at-home housewives. In particular, in what sense did the ideology of the housewife regulate the lives of young female rural–urban migrants in the 1960s and 1970s in Korea? This article explores these questions by drawing on how the media's discourses on single female rural–urban migrant workers positioned them within the ideology of the housewife, which was regulated by the developmental state as part of the modern nation-state building, by analysing the discourses on their mobility, space and labor.

Literature Review

Significant studies have been performed on young female rural–urban migrant workers in the 1960s and 1970s in Korea. In particular, extensive research has focused on the 'labor' of female factory workers (*yeogong*).[14] The reason that previous research has focused on the 'labor' of female factory workers is that factory labor has been considered to be 'work' in the public sphere[15] while the experience and labor of women in the domestic sphere, in rural areas, and in the sex industry have often been socially recognized as 'nonwork.'[16] In recent years, there have been endeavours to emphasise the interrelations of female workers in the formal and informal sectors and their positions within broader discussions on women under Park's modernization project. The discourses in the women's magazines in the 1960s and 1970s were created to label these working-class women as 'others';[17] women's magazines for urban middle-class housewives depicted working-class women as 'social problems.' For example, housemaids were 'impurities and obstacles' in the formation of an ideal modern family, and factory workers and manual bus fare collectors were 'potential sex workers.' Thus, the sex workers for American soldiers and Japanese tourists were referred to with disdain as *yanggongju* (Western princesses) and *kisaeng*, respectively,[18] and positioned as representatives of deviance from an ideal modern womanhood, although the sex industry was supported by the developmental state with a semi-official form "for national security and economic growth."[19] In short, these women vacillated between the extremely polarized labels of "shame of the motherland" and "patriots for the nation."[20]

The contribution of previous research to female migrant workers can be evaluated in two ways. First, previous studies have attempted to redefine women's labor more broadly by expanding the scope of work from the formal sector to the informal sector. This redefinition has contributed to the embracing of women who have been marginalized from the conventional discussion. Labor in the informal sector was, in fact, predominant in the earlier stage of industrialization in Korea. Furthermore, the borderline between the formal and informal sectors was ambiguous because non- and semi-skilled female rural–urban migrants often transcended the boundaries.[21] Next, the literature attempts to position marginalized women within an extensive discussion of a modern womanhood under Park's regime by shedding light on the interconnectedness between upper-middle-class and working-class women. Meanwhile, the literature has overlooked the mechanism and rationalization of the process of otherizing working-class women. By concentrating on how the media has promoted discourses on the mobility, space and labor of female migrant workers in association with the formulation of modern housewives, this paper examines the positioning of single female migrant workers under the modern nation-state building project of Park Chung Hee in a broader context. First, within the ideology of the housewife, in which women were required to settle down in the private sphere away from the main breadwinners after the Korean War, the mobility of young rural girls was depicted as 'unsettled' and 'unstable' and socially deviant from the 'settled' and 'cared for' women in the private sphere. Second, the working and residential spaces for single female workers were illustrated as a loss of control of their bodies and sexuality under the normative ideology of the housewife, which led to the idealization of the institution of marriage as the final saviour for single female workers. Finally, under the patriarchal system and the redefinition of women's labor in the developmental state based on familism, the labor of single female workers was 'housewifized' either as 'filial piety' or a 'natural duty' to the family and the motherland.

Research Method

This paper analyses the discourses of a monthly magazine for rural women called *Happy Home* (*kajŏng ŭi pŏt*)[22] from 1968 to 1979.[23] A discourse analysis is the study of social life by "examining the way knowledge is produced within different discourses and the performances, linguistic styles and rhetorical devices used in particular accounts."[24] The regime of Park Chung Hee utilized every type of media as a means to proliferate the ideology of modernity to legitimize the dictatorship. In this vein, women's magazines were one of the most important parts of Park's modernization project.[25] Because of the emergence of full-time

housewives and the middle class, there were numerous women's magazines for urban middle-class housewives in the earlier stage of industrialization,[26] which popularized the ideology of the housewife as the 'norm' and articulated the middle-class housewives' lifestyles as 'dreams.'[27] There has been significant research on women's magazines for urban and middle-class women;[28] however, the media discourses on rural women are under-researched. This article attempts to fill this lacuna by analysing a monthly magazine for rural women. *Happy Home* was published by Taehan Kajok Kyehoek Hyŏp'oe (Planned Parenthood Federation of Korea) to enlighten rural women and proliferate the ideology of the modern family, and its particular focus was on family planning in rural areas. It was distributed to the Family Planning Mothers' Clubs, which was a nationwide housewives' organization. However, the readership mainly focused on rural women because family planning was conducted with a particular concentration on rural women.[29] The magazine made it clear that the aim of the publication of the magazine is "for the modernization of rural villages."[30]

The Ideology of the Housewife and Female Rural–Urban Migrants

Rural Girls' Mobility: Deviance from the 'Settled' Woman

The rural population in Korea has continuously declined since the 1960s. The share of the rural population among the entire population was 72% in 1960 but decreased to 42.7% by 1980. Although the increase in the ratio of the entire population between 1966 and 1970 was 1.4%, the increase in the ratio of the urban population was 6.8%.[31] In particular, the increase in the Seoul population was 9.8% during this period.[32] The reason for the rapid urbanization lies in the decrease in rural household income because of industrialization-centred economic policies. A low-price agriculture policy was an important part of the industrialization policy in feeding workers with low wages and in inducing rural populations to leave to go to the factory. As a result, the rural household income in the late 1960s had declined to under 70% of the income of the urban household. A survey in 1969 indicated the extent of the dissatisfaction of the rural population. In a survey conducted for 6 rural villages in Kyŏnggi Province, 63.5% of the respondents replied that "[they] are not satisfied with the current agriculture policy." Forty percent of the respondents answered that "[they were] willing to migrate to cities."[33] Rural villages were full of desperation and a loss of passion under the worsening rural economy and the demise of the community in addition to the accelerated increase in the number of rural–urban migrants.

The discourse on rural–urban migration began to powerfully emerge in the media at the end of the 1960s when the absolute number of individuals in the rural population started to decline.

> Seoul is a place that is very dangerous and is full of criminality. In the background of this reckless migration is a misguided fantasy that if one moves to Seoul, one can become richer by getting a job as a housemaid or factory worker. In particular, during the springtime, when the rural population has difficulty obtaining food, the reckless migration to Seoul increases. There are people who succeeded by working as a factory worker or a housemaid; however, the number of these successful storytellers is extremely limited. Most of the young girls went down the wrong path, in a way that their parents at home might not be able to imagine. Currently, we see countless rural girls who *left their homes* and *wander around* the Seoul central station without a specific destination carrying small bags. After all, most of them lose their virginity with the lure of criminals.[34]

First, although the discourse on rural girls' migration is repetitively depicted in the media, as if the migratory group were overwhelmingly dominated by rural girls, the majority of the rural–urban migration until the mid-1970s was family-based.[35] Most of the single migrants were presumed to be young girls aged 15–19 years,[36] which is twice the number of male migrants in the same age group.[37] However, this ratio is applicable to only single migrants. A survey of the In'gu Munje Yŏn'guso (Korean Institute for Population Problems) in the early 1960s, for instance, clarifies that the share of family-based migration was 78.2% while the share of single migration was 22.8%. Out of the entire population of single migrants, female migrants aged between 15 and 19 years accounted for 35.1%.[38] Nonetheless, the discourses on rural–urban migration problematized 'being a woman' and 'singleness.'[39]

> Rural village girls are enticed with the city life. They *leave home* and *wander around* seeking a job as a factory worker or domestic worker. As a result, the traditional family has been ruined by invisible power to make them leave the rural villages and thus leave behind the family.[40]

> Countless cases of young rural girls have left their hometowns with a small suitcase and come to cities deceived by people who claimed that they could work as housemaids or factory workers, although they eventually either worked in pubs or as prostitutes.[41]

Although *Happy Home* continuously promoted discourses on the rural girls who "leave home," it did not reveal the reasons why rural girls had to leave behind the family and head for the city. On the one hand, this is because the employment structure in urban areas at this time was concentrated on the service,

manufacturing and domestic sectors, for which young female workers were preferred because they were considered to be cheap labor compared to their male counterparts. Furthermore, manufacturing industries were concentrated in several industrial cities.[42] On the other hand, young rural girls were the first subjects who were compelled to leave the home due to poverty.[43] As cited in the abovementioned article, rural–urban migration was especially active during the spring because of hunger during this season. This period was called *poritkogae* (literally, 'barley hills'). Korean small farmers and poor households in rural areas traditionally suffered from food shortages and hunger between the end-of-winter stock of rice and the barley harvest in the late springtime. Therefore, it was not uncommon for rural populations to migrate to cities—permanently or temporarily—to find work during spring. This migration continued until the mid-1970s when a new, high-yield variety of rice seed called *t'ongilbyŏ* ('unification rice') was developed.

According to a survey about the motivation to migrate, most of the rural girls migrated for the following economic reasons: to earn money (40.5%); to obtain education and skills (18%); to fulfil an aspiration for urban life (18.5%); to escape poverty (12.9%); and to leave familial problems (4.5%).[44] During the Korean industrialization process, the family-based strategy of the poor for social mobility was strongly gendered: daughters played a significant role in supporting the entire household by dropping out of the education system, participating in the labor market at an early age, and postponing marriage, while sons were expected to pursue higher education supported by the family income.[45] A survey also showed the high aspiration for social mobility through the education of sons. In this survey, 74.4% of the respondents in rural areas replied that "they are very willing to sell the whole property if it is for [their] sons' education."[46] Accordingly, although the discourses concentrated solely on the massive mobility of rural girls, there were strong pull-and-push factors for migration.

Furthermore, family-based migration was described in a neutral way, with individuals referred to as "migrators," "departers," or "wanderers," although most of them were job-seekers without experience and skills.[47] Meanwhile, the mobility of rural girls was portrayed as an emotional, irrational and impulsive decision. In the abovementioned article, the mobility of rural girls was described via linguistic expressions, such as "reckless migration," "misguided fantasy," and "wandering around the central station without a specific destination carrying small bags." Gendered stereotypes regarding the 'reckless migration to Seoul' were repetitively promoted by the media, such as in the form of single rural girls motivated by unexplainable emotional impulses, such as a 'spring wind' and an 'irrational strong aspiration for urban life.' Moreover, the 'reckless' mobility

of rural women was defined as irrational and impulsive, whereas the 'reckless' mobility of men was associated with challenge and courage.[48]

In this way, the media consistently promoted discourses on the massive and reckless mobility of rural girls despite the inevitable reasons for mobility. These discourses on the mobility of rural girls were closely combined with the creation of the ideology of the housewife, which had begun since the end of the Korean War (1950–1953). Although the ideology of the housewife had begun to spread since the colonial period (1910–1945), it was limited to a small number of middle- and upper-class women and intellectuals, namely, 'new women' (*sinyŏsŏng*). It was not until the 1950s when the ideology of the housewife had begun to broaden its scope to the general public as part of the modern nation-state building after the war.[49] In particular, in the early 1950s, women were called housewives; however, the majority of women were involved in productive labor because of the absence of male breadwinners during the Korean War. Therefore, since the late 1950s, women who played a significant role in the public sphere as the main breadwinner have been expected to support the rebuilding of ruined masculinity in Korean society by returning to the private sphere. Furthermore, they were expected to remain a subordinate labor force and a caregiver for the family that was scattered and ruined by the war. "Let's make women outside settle down and let them stay inside" was the main motto of the discourses in women's magazines in the 1950s.[50] That is, summoning women from the public to the private sphere to return to their economic roles as 'traditional women' was the highest priority in the ideology of the modern housewife in the 1950s.[51] The discourses had been accelerated since the 1960s when Korean society witnessed the gradual emergence of full-time housewives. Since the 1960s, women who *left* home (*kach'uryŏsŏng*) have been categorized as "women who need special governmental care."[52] In this context, the female rural–urban migrants who *left* home, where 'patriarchal care exists,' were considered to be a social entity that needs patriarchal care and instruction from the government. Under the ideology of the modern housewife in the 1960s and 1970s, when women were expected to return home and 'settle' in the private sphere, the mobility of female rural–urban migrants was considered to be a deviance from modern womanhood.

Spatial Control—Regulating Nonmarried Women's Bodies and Sexuality

Under Park's regime, value, desire, and women's bodies and sexuality were regulated for the modernization of the motherland. Concerning women's bodies and sexuality, a woman's status based on marriage was considered to be an

idealized standard as indicated by family planning.[53] In this regard, the marital status of the housewife with patriarchal care from the husband became a logic that marginalized other social groups, especially single female migrant workers, because they were considered to be 'unprotected' by either a father at home or a husband.[54] This logic interconnects with the various discourses on 'dangerous women' in the women's magazines during these times.[55]

Regarding the entry of women in the labor market, not only 'work' itself but also 'going out to work' were considered to be threats to men because a woman's entry into public life meant a "life not defined by family and husband."[56] Consistent with this line of reasoning, negative discourses were continuously produced regarding female migrants' bodies and sexuality. For instance, space for working and living, namely, the factory as a workplace and the dormitory as a residence, was combined with a sexual connotation. This type of discourse on female migrants' bodies and sexuality can also be observed from female rural–urban migrants in the industrialization process of Asian developmental states. The vulnerability of female peasant workers is easily combined with the 'sexual myth' of the prevalence of sexual disorders and rape in newly industrializing Asian countries.[57]

The women's magazine *Happy Home* also continuously circulated discourses on the story of rural girls who met through human trafficking, were sold as prostitutes and lost their virginity to urban college students and salarymen. Furthermore, rural girls who migrated were portrayed as if they were sexually active without marital relations. In the literature and media discourses on rural–urban female migrants, rural girls who migrated were depicted as not being allowed to return home. In the 1960s and 1970s, novels and films produced images of rural girls who left home and were unable to return again because they lost their virginity and became prostitutes. In this plot, rural girls were positioned as entities who were out of the control of patriarchal care. For instance, in her novel "Homecoming Women (*kwihyanghanŭn yŏindŭl*)," published in 1979, novelist Song Gisuk depicts the ironic dilemma of young migrant female workers who became sex workers for foreign tourists. They were praised by the developmental government as "patriots earning foreign currency for the nation" and "civil diplomats" on the one hand, but they were not able to return home because of the shame associated with this work on the other hand.[58] "Yŏngja's Heyday (*yŏngjaŭi chŏnsŏngshidae*)," which was originally a serial novel in a magazine for youth (*sedae*) in 1973 and reborn as a film in 1975, depicts the process as the main character Yŏngja becomes an 'unsettled woman.' She migrated to an urban area to earn money and tried to get out of the poverty desperately by working first as a housemaid and then as a manual bus fare collector. However, the final alternative left for her was to

become a prostitute. These works raise a critical question on the number of young female migrants who became the scapegoats in the name of filial daughters taking care of the whole family and acting as supporters of the economic development of the motherland. Moreover, these works undeniably contributed to the creation of the negative connotations of young female migrants as 'unsettled women.'

Vicious rumours spread around factory towns that there were no virgins left inside the industrial complex. Female workers' strategies were to invest capital in fashion and goods to make them look like university students or office workers to avoid the sexual stigmatization.[59] As discussed above, rural girls' mobility was socially controlled as a 'dangerous' behaviour. At the same time, their space as well as the women themselves were redefined as something 'dangerous.' Because the mobility of rural girls was labelled as misbehaviour, their space for working and living in urban areas was also considered to be a poor match for the urban lifestyle and deviant from the ideology of the housewife. The factory was considered to be primarily suited to male workers, and the dormitory for female factory workers was considered to be a place of sexual misconduct.

> We have seen the rapid increase of working youth in the last decade. One significant phenomenon that we could observe along with rising mobility of this working group is a growth of the proportion of the single mothers who reside near the factory complexes. It indicates that the youths' attitudes towards sex have been changed from 'protective' to 'enjoying.' This is a misguided perception that could be found in particular among youths who inhabit areas near factory complexes.[60]

It is noteworthy that the marginalized group of women was positioned as subordinate not only in the discourse but also on the social policy level. The Ministry of Health and Social Affairs categorized women who were housemaids, female factory workers and sex workers as 'vulnerable social groups'[61] and labelled them as 'dangerous women' who needed continuous social control and monitoring by the government.

> In recent years, we have witnessed an increase in teenage single mothers, and it has become a social problem. Although this is a common worldwide social phenomenon that has become typical alongside a free sexual culture, it is mainly observable for teenage female factory workers in Korea. The Ministry of Health and Social Affairs is subject to increasing care facilities for young single mothers.[62]

The ideology of modern housewives was closely aligned with the building of modern youth. A 'sound' youth was depicted as the future that supports the entire nation. 'Sound' girlhood (*yŏhaksaeng*) and female university students

(*yŏdaesaeng*) were illustrated as phases for the preparation of the traditionalized modern "wise mother and good wife"—"future motherhood."[63]

This ideology is also associated with the facts that many articles about 'sexual behaviour of rural youth' had begun to be problematized in the *Happy Home* magazine since the mid-1970s.[64] In particular, it is noteworthy that rural youths who left the hometown and were not able to be under the care of the parents were depicted with a negative connotations. In this context, female factory workers were represented as deviants from an idealized youth, and their consumerism was considered to be an element of a 'non-ideal' girlhood.[65]

> When the spring comes and the weather is getting warmer and warmer, there are many more youths leaving rural areas and coming to cities. These youths have been positioned as one of the social problems since the mobility of the youth has been related to criminals such as sexual misconduct of youths.[66]

> Working youths are lonely. It is especially the case when they left their homes and work alone in an alien region as factory workers. They suffer from the emptiness as well as the loneliness since they left their hometowns and are not under the care from their parents any more. In particular, a lot of dangers lie before young rural girls.[67]

In particular, single female migrants were considered to be an entity that requires special care and monitoring not only from the government but also from enterprises. As part of the "factory *saemaul* movement (*kongjang saemaŭrundong*)" within a modernization project initiated by the developmental state, companies provided an education on contraception to female workers under the name of 'family planning' and 'population education' in 1977[68] because "female workers are the future mothers of our nation."[69] Family planning that focused on rural women broadened the government's sphere to the urban poor.

> In the 1960s, factory workers were associated with images, such as cheap wages, manual work and low literacy rates. In recent years, we can see that they are well educated with the effort of their own will as well as the support from the company. Along with the enhancement of their educational level, they became aware of sexual life with responsibility.[70]

Along with "the mass circulation of women's magazines" based on the analysis of the settlement of housewife as a social norm in Japan, "the status of 'housewife' had become the aspiration for those who engaged in wage labor or household production"[71] In the context of the 1960s and 1970s in Korea, 'becoming a housewife,' or the achievement not only of the social status as middle-class but also the marital status of housewife, was considered to be the 'final saviour' and the 'sanctuary' for most female factory workers.[72] Young female workers had a

strong desire for marriage because marriage was considered to be the unique opportunity to attain freedom from the prevalent discourses on 'dangerous' and 'filthy' women.[73] The manner in which the ideology of the housewife had impacted rural girls was well reflected in the policy of the government: rural girls who migrated to Seoul and had no jobs were sent to job agencies to find positions as domestic workers, which was considered to be the most 'ideal' and 'appropriate' job for rural migrant girls because it was believed that they could learn housework to become a future housewife.[74]

Housewifization of Female Rural–Urban Migrants' Work

'Housewifization' is a term defined by German sociologist Maria Mies.[75] The meaning of 'housewifization' is the devaluation of the productive and reproductive labor provided by women. Under capitalism, women were renamed "as housewives, as carers, as nonproductive entities or labor reservists, not because they are those things, but because they have been constituted as such things."[76] In this context, Mies argues that "housewifization means the externalization, or ex-territorialization of costs that otherwise would have to be covered by the capitalists, which means women's labor is considered a natural resource, freely available like air and water."[77] She maintains that it is the logic of how capitalism functions in which non-waged or underpaid labor in the domestic sector by women supports capital accumulation and the patriarchy. Moreover, the devaluation of the reproductive labor of housewives in the industrialized world also legitimatizes the housewifization of women in the Third World, regardless of whether they are *de facto* housewives.[78] In the research on lacemakers in the city of Narsapur in India, Mies defines housewifization as the "process by which women are socially defined as housewives, dependent for their substance on the income of a husband, irrespective of whether they are *de facto* housewives or not."[79] Women in the Third World who use their spare time to earn some extra money are defined as housewives. Accordingly, the ideology of the housewife from the First World supports the integration of female workers in the Third World into an exploitative global production system. The process of capitalization in the industrialized world and the imposition of Western patriarchal values in the name of 'development' policies in the Third World have been discussed by a number of researchers. Capitalism and Westernization have often resulted in a narrow definition of the 'domestic' sphere that redefines women's place. Moreover, the restriction of women to the limited 'domestic' sphere legitimizes the loss of women's political and bargaining power through atomization and individualization.[80] In this sense, the devaluation of labor by rural girls in the

1960s and 1970s in Korea is well associated with a process of 'housewifization,' as Mies discusses, regarding the women's labor of the Third World under the New International Division of Labor.[81] Furthermore, in the Korean context, this devaluation was further strengthened by the patriarchal system and by the developmental state's new definition of women's work.

Under the industrialization process in the 1960s and 1970s, in most cases, rural migrant girls were the main breadwinners who supported the entire household.[82] This fact is also well reflected in a survey about the motivation of the economic activities of 356 female rural–urban migrant workers. In total, 40.8% out of the respondents answered that they work to provide financial support for the family: to financially support the education fee of male siblings (16.9%), to make a living (15.2%), and to send money to family who were left behind in rural areas (8.7%). Individual motivations, such as the acquisition of the working experience (32.9%) and saving for marriage (11.8%), followed after the share of the financial support for family.[83] The poems written by female factory workers illustrate the collapse of the family economy in rural villages during industrialization. Fathers were commonly absent from the memory of young female workers. Under the rapid urbanization process, rural society began to collapse and rural girls were expected to move to urban areas to financially support the entire family as the breadwinner. In the poems of female workers, 'fathers' are often described as "(financially) incompetent but authoritarian entities with strongly rooted patriarchal gender rules" or "helpless subjects who are not capable of saving her from tough factory labor."[84] Regarding the transformation from domestic to factory production in the early period of industrialization in England, the British historian Catherine Hall describes the shift as follows: "the break-up of the family economy, with the threat this could present to the male head of the household, who was already faced with a loss of control over his own labor, demanded a reassertion of male authority."[85]

In this context, rural girls' migration could have been considered to reflect a significant change in the sense that they became waged workers and entered into the masculine sphere. Citing Hall's work, the British social scientist and geographer Doreen Massey illustrates how threatening it was for their male counterparts to witness the first stage of the entry of women into the public sphere in the earlier industrialization process in England. She notes that the threat came from the males' concern about the shift from taken-for-granted unpaid work by women to waged labor and "a degree of potentially unsetting [the] financial independence" of women.[86] The Korean developmental state regime in the 1960s and 1970s used a gendered metaphor. On the one hand, the economy-related spheres, such as corporations and chaebols, were defined as masculine. On the other hand,

society was considered to be a feminine sphere in which women's duty was to nurture and support the economic development of the nation.[87] Therefore, the economic activity of rural girls could have been interpreted as the entry into the masculine sphere. However, the labor of rural girls was either depicted in women's magazines "as a means to make small money for an entertainment, to look for a friendship and a courtship and to seek a place to be out of the patriarchal control"[88] or as the duty of a daughter "paying back their natal families for giving them life and nurture before they left home" before marriage.[89] The labor value of the "working daughter"[90] and the "factory daughter"[91] was recognized when it was combined with family obligation.

Furthermore, the labor of rural–urban female migrants was further 'housewifized' by the government. Under Park Chung Hee's regime, women's work was redefined as a 'nationalistic duty' and as a 'sacrifice' for the purpose of nation-state building.[92] In fact, the labor force of young rural girls was a significant resource not only for their households but also for the developmental state. Inconsistent with the discourses on the 'stay-at-home-housewives' that were prevalent in the 1960s and 1970s, this is the period in modern Korean history (which was discussed above concerning the mobility of rural girls) when the participation rate of the female labor force increased the most rapidly, i.e., by 26.8% in 1960 to 45.7% in 1975. In particular, the participation rate of the young female labor force aged between 15 and 24 years was very high and accounted for 40–50% during this period.[93] These young female workers were concentrated in underpaid light manufacturing industries with harsh working conditions. Until 1975, 70% of the total amount of exports came from the female-dominant light manufacturing industry.[94] In 1985, 88% of the garment industry, 77% of the textile industry and 68% of the electronics industry were supported by the labor force of female workers.[95] These workers were named 'industrial warriors' in an asexualized form combined with the maximization of productivity.[96] Similar to their mothers, i.e., married women in rural areas who were mobilized for the development of the rural area through the New Community Movement (*saemaŭrundong*) initiated by the Park Chung Hee regime in early 1970s, the working daughters were also encouraged to maximize the productivity for the economic development of the motherland. Female leaders were also selected as role models in the "rural New Community Movement (*nongch'on saemaŭrundong*)" to encourage participations in the rural development project, and female factory workers who performed well in terms of heightening the productivity were named as role example within the framework of "factory New Community Movement (*kongjang saemaŭrundong*)". Although the developmental state named them 'industrial warriors,' Park's regime presented a dilemma between the need to enlighten 'ignorant' rural girls within

the framework of modern womanhood as part of the modern nation-state building and the demand for cheap labor.

As illustrated above, in the media, the rural–urban migration by rural girls was symbolized as 'dangerous' and 'filthy.' In the early 1970s, when migration temporarily declined due to an increase in the hope for betterment via the implementation of a series of pro-agriculture policies and rural development projects, the attitude of the developmental government drastically changed. The increased ratio of the urban population decreased from 6.8% to 5.7% from 1966–1970 to 1970–1975, whereas the decreased ratio of the rural population declined from –1.6% to –0.3%.[97] Thus, *Happy Home* released articles that emphasized the positive perspectives of the contributions of young female workers.

> The diligent, industrious and hard-working female rural labor force has made a great contribution to industrialization. The job opportunities and urban life experiences have provided opportunities for rural people to abolish traditional customs and introduced a new modern lifestyle based upon science and technology.[98]

Regarding the rural–urban mobility of rural girls, it is suggested that mobility should be encouraged *only* when it contributes to the industrialization of the nation.[99] In this regard, rural girls' labor was socially acknowledged only when it was associated with the individualized duty as a 'working daughter' for families and for the nation but not as a laborer. Although female factory workers were often praised as 'industrial warriors' who supported the national economy, such as in other East Asian industrialization processes, female workers were positioned as secondary workers in the labor market while male workers were trained as semi-skilled and skilled workers.[100]

Conclusion

In Korea, the 1960s and 1970s have a special meaning in the discussion of modern womanhood. First, 'being/becoming a modern woman' was specifically regulated as a major part of the modern nation-state building policy promulgated by the state. Second, regardless of whether they were *de facto* housewives or not, all women were redefined as a housewife.[101] In this regard, a housewife became the centre of the discourses on modern womanhood in the 1960s and 1970s. This paper aimed to clarify how female rural–urban migrant workers' mobility, space and labor were redefined within the broader discussion on modern womanhood under Park Chung Hee's regime in the 1960s and 1970s. The analysis contributes to a better understanding of the sociocultural meaning of 'being single female

rural–urban migrants' in the 1960s and 1970s in Korea, a concept that was associated with the ubiquitous housewife ideology. Furthermore, this article provides meaningful implications for the discussion of women's participation in the labor market in Korea in the current age through its discussion of how women's labor and related issues, such as mobility, space, marriage and family, are socially recognized within a specific socio-political context. First, the mobility of young rural girls was portrayed as 'unsettled' and 'unstable' and thus deviated from the ideal form of modern womanhood as 'settled' and 'cared for' housewives. Next, the working and residential spaces for single female workers were pictured as places to lose ownership of their bodies and sexuality under the normative housewife ideology. Finally, under the patriarchal system and the redefinition of women's labor in the developmental state, the labor of single female workers was 'housewifized' either as 'filial piety' or as a 'natural duty' for the family and for the motherland.

Notes

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Sources of Conflict: A Comparative Synthesis of American and Korean Parricides

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Abstract

Despite the nominative classification of parricides based on the victim–offender relationship, parricide bears the offense characteristics of many crimes. In prior works, the killing of parents has been framed as a violent reaction of severely abused children against their tormentors, or as the identity demarcating actions of adult sons suffering from mental illness. Aside from these two primary discourses, the reasons parents and their offspring become mired in conflicts across various life stages of both participants have been neglected from the literature. A more recent theoretical framework examines parricides and their sources of conflict across the life course of the victims and offenders. This paper synthesizes the sources of conflict in parricides in nineteen-century America and twentieth-century South Korea by comparing the similarities and differences in offense characteristics. I argue that parricides in the two countries can be differentiated based on the differences in history and culture.

Keywords: parricide, sources of conflict, Korean parricide, international homicide, comparative homicide

Introduction

Parricide—the killing of a parent, stepparent, or a close relative—is a highly atypical form of homicide. Even within the criminological[1] and historical literature on family violence,[2] violence that is directed at intimate partners and infants receives the most attention.[3] There are good reasons why parricides and the reasons they occur should be examined from a comparative perspective. Although fatal and non-fatal violence against parents extends across cultural and national boundaries,[4] it has been predominantly examined from Western perspectives. Consequently, the various cultural factors that might affect parricides in different countries remain unknown. While there is danger in synthesis that is premature,[5] this paper attempts one in parricide studies, for sufficient knowledge warrants it.[6]

When parricides in non-Western nations such as Korea have been examined, Western sensibilities permeate the analytical categories.[7] However, it is fallacious to presume that what is implicative in one culture is automatically so in another. For example, although the availability of firearms has been proffered as a significant correlate of homicides in the United States, it would be erroneous to presuppose that firearms affect parricides in similar ways in Asia or Europe where access to firearms is strictly regulated. Before such assertions can be made, each country and its own sociocultural factors must be examined in their own right.[8]

Another example illustrates the Western sensibilities that continue to exert analytical influence on the study of parricides. Since child abuse was framed as a social problem in America,[9] its import in parricides has been encapsulated in an enduring adolescent offender typology. The *severely abused child* describes an adolescent who kills a parent after years of prolonged abuse. Although adolescents constitute, at most, 25 percent of parricide offenders, the discourse on parricide continues to be framed as one related to child maltreatment and abuse.[10] The continued framing of the debate as one related to child abuse overlooks the cultural variations in meaning of terms like 'discipline' and 'punishment.'[11] This a priori construction of parricide as a reaction to parental abuse ignores the possibility that the definition and practice of 'abuse' may be an effect of culture and history.[12] For instance, it just may be that Confucianism, patriarchal ideology, and post-marital residential customs influence the categories of victims and perpetrators of 'abuse' in South Korea. When non-Western nations attempt to apply abuse as a childcentric analytical concept in their respective contexts, there is danger of committing the preceding cultural fallacy.

In order to avoid such cultural and historical pitfalls, it is important to compare the potential sources of conflict that operate in parricides. Conflicts have a temporal beginning and a terminal resolution, even if their origins are historical

and situational;[13] conflicts are also rooted in sociality and occur throughout the life cycle of parents and their offspring. Although much is known about the potential conflicts between adolescents and parents, little is known about the type of domestic conflicts that occur between parents and their adult offspring that lead to parricides. It is this potential discord between parents and their adult offspring that may illuminate points of similarity and divergence across cultures.

Although historical change is customarily measured by the variations in the quantitative rates of violence, in the form of nomothetic analyses and trends across time, which facilitate comparisons across history and geography, especially in canonical topics such as military history, diplomacy, and changes in the forms of production,[14] long-term changes in parricide cannot be studied using the conventional historical methods of analysis. One reason that parricide cannot be measured using conventional indicators of change is that calculation of rates is almost impossible to carry out due to their infrequency.[15] Another framework is necessary. An alternative way in which changes in homicide can be analyzed is to examine the shifts in offense styles and offense characteristics, such as victim–offender relationships, weapons used, crime location, intent embedded in the offense, and sources of conflict. If the sources of the conflicts that lead to parricide are examined in qualitative ways, keeping the coding scheme constant, the differences that emerge can be analyzed in thematic ways that is a defining feature of idiographic analysis. I refer to the offense characteristics that can be used as a way of differentiating one class of parricides from another, across national and temporal boundaries, as the 'character of parricide' thesis. My contention is that the offense characteristics—most notably the sources of the conflicts between parents and their offspring—in parricides embody the unique fingerprints of a culture, which are shaped by the invariant and variant aspects of violence against parents.

There may be real similarities and differences in why parents and offspring become involved in conflicts that result in parricides across cultures. In order to make meaningful comparisons, the categories that are compared must be consistently and sufficiently applied. The primary reason that victims and offenders become entangled in homicidal confrontations is given the label 'motive' or 'cause', the coding procedures variant from author to author. As an example, some researchers combine relational categories (e.g., husband–wife) with crime categories (e.g., robbery) in their analyses.[16] This practice, while internally coherent, leads to difficulties in comparison. In order to compare the reasons that parents and offspring become involved in conflicts across national and cultural boundaries, comparisons must be made using similar analytical categories. Hence, this paper draws on two prior studies that have used identical analytical categories and coding procedures.

A comparative analysis of American and South Korean (hereafter "Korean") parricides is important for another reason. America and other Western nations embody the materialistic individualism and secular humanism that define the very essence of Western sensibilities.[17] Exceptionally high American homicide rates continue to be the topic of lively debate about proximal and final causes.[18] Korea, influenced by Confucianism, embodies the hierarchical social structures that repress individual desire over the collective good, and age and status over right.[19] America has one of the highest homicide rates in the industrialized world while Korea has one of the lowest. Despite such differences in quantitative rates of lethal violence, ideology, cultural and social systems, are there points of convergence and divergence in why offspring kill their parents? What are the factors that shape those similarities and differences, and are they related to the usual variables related to parricides? These types of comparative questions have not been asked in the literature.

This paper differentiates parricides into a typological classification based on the sources of conflict related to parricides. It draws on two published studies of parricide—U.S. (1847–99) and Korea (1948–63)—and a methodological study of the validity of the divergent sources of archival data. The three previous studies used an identical coding scheme to classify and categorize the sources of conflict in parricides.[20] It foregrounds the similarities in the sources of conflict related to argument, finance, and defense while highlighting the points of divergence in sources of conflict related to discipline, punishment, and abuse. It argues that the divergence exists because the very meaning and practice of punishment and abuse involve different actors and definitions that are socio-culturally shaped.

Sources of Archival Data and Synthesis

The current paper draws upon three prior studies of parricide in two different countries and three different time periods for synthesis. The first project on nineteenth-century parricides in America used two newspapers as data, the *New York Times* and the *Chicago Tribune*.[21] The archives of both papers were available electronically, hence, a narrow topic search was possible beginning from the mid-nineteenth century. Both completed and attempted parricides were included. For the *New York Times* the search began on January 1, 1851 through December 31, 1899 while for the *Chicago Tribune* the search began on December 1, 1852 through December 31, 1899. The terms *parricide*, *patricide*, and *matricide* were specifically searched in the databases, which resulted in 397 articles for *New York Times* and 325 for *Chicago Tribune*. Articles that were directly related to the killing of a parent were selected and cross referenced against each database, resulting in

a total of 231 incidents of parricide for approximately a fifty-year period. After the cases were selected, a coding instrument containing 42 variables was used to further refine the data for analytical purposes which were then entered into a management software.

The second project on twentieth-century parricides in Korea used *Chosun Ilbo*, a major Korean newspaper that was established in the 1920s, as data. It was used to search for parricide cases, beginning on January 1, 1948 through December 31, 1963. Newspaper copies were available in microfiche that had been digitized and publicly available on a commercial website; registration fee was paid to obtain access. A research assistant identified and located articles related to homicides by sifting through the digitized copies of the newspapers. I then scoured the digitized microfiches looking for the appearance of general terms such as 'homicide' and 'murder' in the initial stages of case selection. A much more refined search was carried out if the term 'sal in' (Korean word for murder/homicide) appeared; cases were selected for inclusion if the term 'jon sok' appeared next to the term 'murder' or its lexical/sentential equivalents. '*Jon sok sal in*' literally translates to 'elderly superordinate murder,' the closest English equivalent of 'parricide'. Newspaper articles that were directly related to the killing of a parent or other superordinate family elders were selected which resulted in a total of 102 newspaper articles on 92 completed or attempted parricide incidents. After the cases were selected, a coding instrument containing 18 variables was used to further refine the data for analytical purposes. The data were then entered into a data management software.

In an attempt to supplement the newspaper sources as data, I visited the National Archives of Korea and obtained a record list of all the documents related to crimes committed against 'superordinate elders' that occurred between 1948 and 1963 through on-site access at the National Archives of Korea (hereafter, NAK). According to Korean law, offenses against superordinate elders receive a special designation ('jon sok') which functions as an aggravating factor. Between 1948 and 1963, there were 473 offenses committed against superordinate elders which were reported, investigated, and adjudicated. This figure constituted the universe of violent offenses against parents/superordinates. There were 19 distinct offenses that received this special designation. The record list facilitated further validity checks in the following way. Out of the 19 aggravating offense categories contained in the list, using the four most serious possible charging offenses for 'jon sok' categories (e.g., completed murder ['sal in']; manslaughter ['chi sah']; attempted/intended ['mi soo']; wounded ['chin sang'/'sang hae']), 124 offenders were identified using the NAK record list. This figure represented the universe of attempted and completed parricides. The *Chosun Ilbo* yielded 92 completed and attempted parricide incidents and 95 offenders.

It was not feasible to cross-reference the names of offenders in the NAK record list as some of the middle names were redacted; similarly, newspapers sometimes left out the middle names of offenders and victims in newspaper articles as a way of preserving the anonymity of the accused. In the end, the primary source of data for the Korean parricide project was the 92 cases that were found in *Chosun Ilbo*. While this figure was by no means an exhaustive list of all parricide cases during the period examined, it comes close to the actual number of cases found in the archives; others have found that when newspapers are matched against official sources using the capture-recapture technique, newspapers contain 75 to 80 percent of homicides that appear in official records.[22]

A third study of parricides attempted to establish the validity of Korean newspapers as data sources as compared to official criminal justice records for homicide research.[23] This study was included in the synthesis to ensure that newspapers were a valid source of data about parricides in Korea. The data for this project were gathered from the regional and appellate court records from the nine provinces of the Republic of Korea (South) from 1995 to 2012.[24] This project used one particular type of court record as data: the sentencing verdict. The sentencing verdict is an official pronouncement made by the regional trial court of original jurisdiction (e.g., Circuit/Superior in U.S.) as well as the Supreme Court. When a defendant appears as a subject in a sentencing verdict, an offender has been arrested by the police, indicted by the prosecutor's office, undergone a trial, and convicted of a crime. The sentencing verdict is an official record of the judgement the court has rendered as well as the punishment that the defendant has received. Sentencing verdicts utilize all case-related materials, such as police reports, witness statements, school records, coroner's reports, and expert testimony to arrive at the decision.

The Korean criminal justice agencies follow a ten-year rule: police, courts, and correctional agencies generally keep their records on site for ten years. During that period, court-related document requests are made directly to a centralized recordkeeping component of the Korean Supreme Court. Once the requests are routed to the appropriate regional-level prosecutorial office, the decision to release the records is entirely up to prosecutors' discretion. After ten years, the records are sent to NAK, which are then inaccessible to researchers for 30 years. For example, all records between 2001–1971 would have been inaccessible during the period that I visited NAK. Once 30 years have elapsed, researchers are able to submit document requests to NAK, if permission is granted by the victims' families. There were insufficient resources to undertake such a task.

In order to acquire sentencing verdicts of parricide offenders, the following procedures were followed. First, a research assistant registered on a commercial

law-related website often used by criminal justice practitioners as well as legal researchers; access fee was paid. The assistant then searched the database using general search term 'jon sok sal in' ('parricide' in Korean) in order to locate incident (court case) numbers; locating and identifying the correct incident number was crucial because document requests could not be made to the Korean Supreme Court without it. Using this procedure resulted in 78 'hits' related to parricide, beginning in 1965 and ending in 2012. Excluding cases that could not be accessed due to the 30 year rule, 20 parricide cases were gathered. Some cases had not been forwarded to NAK and were still available in the regional courts. In the end, 17 regional-level sentencing verdicts and 4 appellate reviews were collected on 20 parricides cases.

The names of victims and their family members related to the parricide case were redacted in the sentencing verdicts. However, the sentencing verdicts were significant in one key way. There were numerous crime-related variables that were consistently present in the verdicts. A coding sheet with eight variables was created in order to collect the relevant data using this narrative-rich source of information. In order to match the court records related to the parricides, a newspaper search was conducted using the following procedures. A popular Korean internet search engine was utilized to search for parricide cases by year, name when available, and region where the crime occurred. Because the sentencing verdicts had been redacted of the full names of victims and offenders, it was nearly impossible to search any database using only surnames; hence, other information, such as the province and year of parricide, was used to locate parricide incidents. Once tentative newspaper articles were found, an attempt was made to match the victim count and parricide type, along with the ages of victims and offenders. Twenty newspaper articles were located to match the sentencing verdicts of the parricide cases.

Newspapers were initially used to code the parricide cases; crime-related details were ultimately verified using the court records. There was one primary reason why this decision was made. As noted, the internal policies of NAK prohibit access to records for 30 years once they are under its custody and control. Furthermore, access to crime records requires victims' or their family's consent, a major impediment to data access. That limitation means that newspapers may be the only accessible archival record available to study parricides in the past. Consequently, I wanted to determine if newspapers could be used as a valid and reliable source of historical data about parricides. And using newspapers as the initial source of information, which were later verified using court records, three conditions were created: (A) variable was unknown in newspaper but known in court record; (B) variable was known in newspaper but unknown in court record;

(C) variable was known in newspaper but recoded as a result of new information revealed in court records (coding error).

To assess the accuracy of newspaper accounts of parricides, three variables were selected for comparative analysis: (1) weapon; (2) intent; and (3) source of conflict. I read through both archival sources, and coded the weapons, intent, and sources of conflict used in the parricides separately, newspapers followed by sentencing verdicts. The preceding three variables are essential pieces of information needed to form a general understanding of parricides.[25] Although the principal criterion needed for understanding homicides is determined by the relationship of the victim to the offender, knowing the intent behind the crime, the weapons used, and what the victims and offenders were fighting about which resulted in death are important variables that shape a reader's understanding of parricide. Those three variables were also consistently reported in the newspapers and sentencing verdicts. Convergence rates between newspapers and court records were then created. Using the three conditions (i.e., A, B, C) as numerators and the total number of cases as denominators, a crude measure of convergence was constructed. The findings indicated that there was convergence in the emic factors related to parricide in the two disparate archival sources. Although sentencing verdicts contained more descriptive and detailed information about variables such as intent and sources of conflict, newspapers contained information about crime details that yielded a high convergence rate (75% or more).

If researchers are not able to gain access to criminal justice records to study homicides, the third study included in the synthesis found that newspapers can be used as sources of data without sacrificing the validity of their findings. Although Shon and Lee (2016) found that discerning intent and weapons used in parricides are potential weaknesses of relying solely on newspapers as data sources, they found that newspapers were accurate reflections of crime-related details that are contained in official records such as sentencing verdicts, for there was a high convergence rate when the parricide variables examined were compared with other official sources.[26] The inclusion of this third study enabled the use of newspapers as archival data without compromising reliability despite their divergence from more official sources. The preceding three studies were used as secondary sources of synthesis for the current paper.

For both American and Korean studies of parricide, the initial data on the sources of conflict were coded into the following categories: (1) argument; (2) long-term finance; (3) short-term finance; (4) disciplinary; (5) defense; (6) mental illness; (7) other; and (8) unknown. The source of conflict was coded as being related to 'argument' if the parricide originated out of an unplanned verbal dispute of trivial

origins that were related to domestic matters. The source of conflict was coded as being related to 'long-term finance' if the parricide occurred during the course of an intricate plan to steal a parent's property, inheritance, or life insurance. The source of conflict was coded as being related to 'short-term finance' if the parricide occurred during the course of a robbery or if the offspring demanded money for other purposes which the parent rejected, which then led to the killing. The source of conflict was coded as being related to 'disciplinary' if the parricide originated out of a parent's administration of discipline or punishment and the offspring killed in response. The source of conflict was coded as being related to 'defense' if the killing occurred in defense of self or another family member. The source of conflict was coded as being related to 'mental illness' if the parricide offender was reported as being mentally ill in the newspaper. The source of conflict was coded as being related to 'other' if the parricide originated out of conflicts that did not fit into the preceding categories. The source of conflict was coded as being related to 'unknown' if it could not be discerned from the newspaper article.

In addition to the sources of conflict, one additional offense characteristic was compared because the contexts in which parricide arose were tied to the way the crime originated. Hence a parricide was coded as being (1) 'premeditated' if the offender planned the crime in advance; (2) 'spontaneous' if the parricide was not planned; (3) 'accidental' if the killing was an unfortunate accident; (4) 'hit' if the offender used a hitman to carry out the attack; and (5) 'unknown' if intent could not be discerned. The amount of detailed information collected was explained by the coverage a particular case received. For instance, parricides that contained bizarre details generated tremendous news coverage. Parricides that involved the mentally ill received a paragraph at best. In the following sections, a synthesis of the notable contexts related to American and Korean parricides and the sources of conflict are examined in greater narrative detail.

The Domestic Character of Parricides

In nineteenth-century America and twentieth-century Korea, parricides were primarily domestic in character. Trivial arguments represented the most common source of conflict between parents and their offspring. The arguments that resulted in the killings are best described as being 'transactional' in character, for the domestic squabbles incrementally and sequentially unfolded from minor incidents and escalated into fatal confrontations in a rapid series of exchanges between victims and offenders, which the victims often precipitated in the first place.[27] Arguments tended to involve adult sons and parents that originated from the tedium of domestic life as parents argued with their sons over household

chores, quality of food, flippant remarks, or refusal to participate in leisurely activities.[28] The domestic arguments usually began when one of the parties uttered a statement that was interpreted as an offense by another. As research on domestic violence has shown, arguments and assaults ensue even when participants ignore or remain silent to offensive statements.[29] Adult-on-adult parricides followed such contours of violence as banal domestic arguments morphed into physical fights that resulted in deaths of parents.

The argument-centered character of American and Korean parricides was inextricably related to the intent that was embodied in the killings as well. Domestic parricides were impulsive events that emerged from the on-going social interaction rather than premeditated attacks. Arguments were compounded with the presence of alcohol. Fathers and sons came home drunk and began arguments with family members; drunken arguments led to physical confrontations that ended when one of the parties successfully deployed violence against the disputant. In this way, adult-on-adult parricides resembled scenarios of masculine violence in that the killing began as domestic arguments and escalated into physical confrontations which were resolved through the killing. This transactional and sequential aspect of parricides bore a striking resemblance to the modal homicide between men.[30]

In Korea, arguments made up a full quarter of the parricides; they made up a third in America. Sons and fathers usually argued and fought with each other and other family members in drunken stupor. The pressures of family and domestic life did not quell the emotions that bubbled underneath the vertical relations that were girded in Confucian ideology, for Korean parents and their offspring became embroiled in ordinary squabbles that led to physical fights. The tensions became aggravated as they lived under one roof, especially when alcohol was involved.[31]

The lethal outcomes were aggravated in nineteenth-century America as Colt revolvers became cheaply available and as the culture of gun-carrying facilitated the violent resolution of domestic arguments, as sons and fathers used handguns that they already carried or fetched from a short distance (i.e., from bedroom to living room).[32] Such structural patterns of gun availability and gun usage easily transformed assaults into homicides during arguments.[33] However, it would be erroneous to attribute the lethality of parent-offspring conflicts solely to the availability of firearms. Gun were not “ultimate causes” of the killings. Using guns to kill parents were typical in nineteenth and twentieth-century America, but they were—and are—anomalies in Korea.[34] The lack of firearms in Korea, however, did not prevent parricides. Korean sons used hands and feet, sticks, sickles, stones, and other objects of convenience to kill their parents during domestic arguments.

Table 1 Sources of conflict in 19th-century US and 20th-century South Korea

	Argument	**Finance**	**Defense**	**Abuse (Discipline)**	**Abuse (Other)**	**Unknown**
American	N=77 (33%)	N=32 (14%)	N=21 (9%)	N=14 (6%)	N=7 (3%)	N=76 (33%)
Korean	N=24 (26%)	N=15 (17%)	N=3 (3%)	N=9 (10%)	N=20 (21%)	N=8 (9%)

The composite picture of adult parricides in America and Korea converge on their domestic character. The argumentative nature of adult parricides attests to their spontaneous character and aim of violence. Sons did not plan their attacks against parents as much as the attacks erupted from the on-going social interactions. Those offense characteristics—source of conflict, intent, weapon—suggest that parricides that emerge from arguments are consistent with other expressive homicides, as offenders deploy violence in response to an affront as a way to regain lost respectability and salvage their sense of self in a rapidly devolving series of social exchanges.[35] Although parricides are homicides classified exclusively by the relationship between the victim and the offender, the offense characteristics suggest that they bear a strong resemblance to other forms of masculine violence.

The domestic character of parricide is reflected again in the killing of mothers. Male-offender-matricides were similar to domestic homicides in that sons shot, stabbed, hacked, and beat their mothers to death when they accused their sons of being drunk, threw them out of the house, or otherwise began arguments with their adult sons. Korean sons used hands and feet and household tools to kill their mothers while American sons used handguns and axes and hatchets. The preceding offenses characteristics of male-offender matricides are noteworthy because they illustrate their similarity to homicides that are domestic in character rather than psychodynamic. First, their impulsive and domestic character highlights their similarity to intimate partner homicides, the killings shaped primarily by disputes about domestic conflicts and gender roles.[36] Second, whether the source of conflict is related to long-standing tension or situationally-aroused anger,[37] male-offender matricides unfold in similar ways, different from premeditated attacks against estranged spouses in the context of threatened separation or divorce.[38] Third, although prior research has framed matricides as being motivated by sexual rivalry or an act of liberation from an excessive attachment to mothers,[39] the historical and cross-cultural synthesis of parricides from two distinct countries militate against an overly psychoanalytic or evolutionary interpretation of the offense.

The Financial Roots of Parricides

Finance represented a significant source of conflict between parents and their offspring across American and Korean contexts. Long-term finances involved estates, inheritances, insurance claims, and property, and required an extended period of time to carry out fraudulent ploys. Parricides that involved large estates and other long-term finances were motivated by greed, but other factors configured in important ways. The prospect of sons' own future and their preparations affected their conflicts with their parents. American and Korean sons needed seed money to marry and establish their own households. Marriage and the establishment of one's own family represented important milestones in the movement toward autonomy, respect, and adulthood.[40] This movement toward autonomy was a point of convergence in the developmental stages of men in early adulthood. This forward movement was impeded when fathers reneged on their promises of support.

Long-term finances also became a notable source of conflict when fathers remarried and other parties entered the household.[41] The appearance of stepmothers became an important source of conflict between sons and fathers as they became competitors in affective and legal ways. As widowers, fathers remarried more frequently, and were not as financially vulnerable as widows.[42] When fathers remarried, they often married younger women, in both countries. But much more importantly, as wives, they had legal rights to their husbands' estate. Consequently, stepmothers who appeared in fathers' households could interfere with a son's share in his father's inheritance; sons who faced this condition exhorted, threatened, and used violence to get what they thought was their fair share of what they were promised. There was proportionality in their demands.

In both American and Korean contexts, the exigencies of social life entwined fathers and sons as the latter attempted to traverse the normative benchmarks of young adulthood. Fathers' priorities shifted as they brought young wives home; sons in particular viewed the introduction of a stepmother as an intrusion that could potentially disrupt their long-term financial well-being. Consequently, sons took measures to take what they thought was rightfully theirs. But if sons were motivated by long-term finances and what it could provide for their family's future, conflict about money in the short term looked different in dynamic and offense characteristics.

Short-term finances involved cash, and the notable feature of short-term financial conflicts between fathers and sons was the immediacy of the demand. This exigency was especially evident in an American context as sons demanded

money from their fathers, for drink and other unknown ends, and targeted fathers as an armed robber attacks a suitable target. Sons killed their fathers in these robbery-like contexts when they resisted or as the sons were fleeing the scene. Thus, short-term financial parricides in America resembled felony homicides.

Korean sons demanded more money than what they were already allotted by custom and practice. Unmarried sons remained in their fathers' households and received allowances. Sons who gambled and drank excessively demanded more than their allotted allowances in order to sustain their profligate lifestyles. Thus, the behavior of Korean sons resembled those of pampered offspring; they demanded more spending money from their parents, and when their parents refused, they attacked and killed them. Parricides that originated from short-term conflicts were similar to long-term ones in terms of outcome, but the internal dynamics and motivation of such short-term financial conflicts, as well as the personalities of the offenders as revealed in their offenses, differed in noticeable ways.

The Significance of Domestic Violence in Parricides

Violence against intimate partners configured in significant ways in the patterns of violence within the family and against parents. In both historical and cultural contexts, sons killed their fathers in defense of their mothers. Sons rarely killed their mothers to defend their fathers from their mothers' attacks.[43] Instead, parricides emerged from the confluence of alcohol and intimate partner violence. Defense-of-mother parricides materialized when fathers came home drunk and began an argument with their spouses; those arguments turned into acute battering incidents that turned homes into scenes of domestic violence. Sons intervened on their mothers' behalf when they heard their mothers' cries for help or witnessed the unfolding violence and inserted themselves into the fray.

Sons' direct intervention into scenes of domestic battery affected the trajectory of violence in notable ways. In America, fathers simply redirected their attacks. Consequently, domestic violence against an intimate partner turned into an assault against a son, which then turned into a fight between two men. When fathers threw a punch, pulled a knife, swung an ax, or pulled a gun during fights, sons used their personal weapons or fetched their firearms to kill their fathers. The lesser-drunk person who fired a more accurate shot usually won the fist-fight that turned into a gun-fight. Defense-of-mother turned into scenes of self-defense. That is why defense-of-mother parricides and self-defense parricides were closely related to one another in their origin and resolution; the trajectory of violence in parricide scenes was primarily shaped by the father's behavior in the context of a domestic assault. In addition to protecting their mothers from abusive husbands,

American sons also came to the defense of their siblings as well, and killed their fathers while defending their siblings from abusive fathers. In an American context, 'defense' encompassed mother, siblings, and self.

A notable difference between American and Korean parricides was the absence of defense. When compared to their American counterparts, there were fewer defensive killings in Korean parricides. Korean sons killed their fathers to defend their mothers, but not to defend themselves or their siblings. In absolute numbers, parricides that were coded as being related to 'defense' were few; however, expressed as a ratio, American defensive parricides were greater by a factor of three to one when compared to Korean ones. The lack of self- and sibling-defense parricides may be related to the Confucian roots of Korean society where respect for patriarchal authority is encoded in every aspect of social and moral life. Consequently, sons may be reluctant to challenge their fathers' authority. Sons may view a father's right to punish and discipline his children as a legitimate exercise of his authority.[44] However, even Korean sons interpreted their fathers' use of violence against their mothers as an unacceptable practice, and killed their fathers when this boundary was crossed. Such an ironic performance of their roles as filial sons is one of the ways in which the paradox of Confucianism manifested in the lives of Korean sons and parents.

That parricides unfolded in this particular condition demonstrates the significance of intimate partner violence in parricides. In America and Korea, abusive husbands who consumed excessive amounts of alcohol and battered their wives implicated other family members into scenes of parricidal violence. Abusive husbands tended to be abusive fathers, at least in an American context, for the patricides emerged out of fathers' violence against members of their family. Such a claim can be made only tentatively in a Korean context, for the offense details do not support such an interpretation. Korean fathers may have been just as harsh with their children as they were with their wives, but that practice was not called 'abuse'. It was considered legitimate authority that fathers exercised in a Confucius-influenced, patriarchal social system which viewed their authority in absolute terms. Yet, despite such cultural injunctions against violence against one's parents, sons crossed ethical boundaries and defended their mothers from their fathers during acute moments of domestic battery.

Cultural Variations in Punishment and Abuse

It is important to understand that punishment, discipline, and abuse are not mutually exclusive categories, that no absolute boundary demarcates one from the other, although medicalized definitions have attempted to quantify what it

means to be a victim of physical abuse.[45] Punishment that is intended to correct and deter untoward behavior which falls within the normative parameters of acceptability in a community is considered discipline;[46] punishment that produces visible injuries, and falls outside of the normative parameters of acceptability is considered abuse.[47] But in addition to standards of normativity, the constitutive elements of discipline and abuse undergo a much more subjective interpretation, for punishment that is culturally normative may be interpreted as intolerable abuse.

The dominant discourse on parricide has been framed in relation to child abuse and maltreatment. Child abuse has been primarily defined along the lines of physical, sexual, and emotional abuse while child maltreatment has been framed along the lines of physical and emotional neglect and emotional incest.[48] The last form of abuse is notable in that parents' excessive dependence on their children to act as surrogate mates stunts their psychological development and creates undue stress, becoming a form of emotional incest.[49] While it is uncertain how much of the adolescent-perpetrated parricides are related to abuse, the notion that parricides are abuse-related has been shaped by factors that are external to the phenomenon, such as sensational cases, seminal publications, and the evolution of criminology as a discipline.[50]

Parricides that were rooted in 'abuse' as a source of conflict in nineteenth-century America represented about 6 percent; in mid-twentieth century Korea, those types of sources of conflict made up about 10 percent. In both countries, 'abuse' made up a small portion of the overall parricides. In America, children who felt that their whipping had exceeded its limits as punishment interpreted the discipline as abuse and acted accordingly. They challenged parents during moments of abuse or waited until they were in positions of tactical advantage and killed their parents in premeditated attacks when their parents were asleep. That is to say American offspring defined excessive punishment along physical dimensions.

The circumstances surrounding discipline and abuse were different in a Korean context. First, the meaning of 'abuse' differed from an American one. 'Abuse' in a Korean context did not carry the impending sense of physical harm that American usage connoted. What may have been 'abuse' very well could have been termed as 'disciplinary' in a Korean context. Second, newspapers used words that suggested that a parent's action was administration of punishment and discipline, not abuse. Newspaper articles related to 'discipline' tended to employ terms such as 'berate' or 'chastise' to describe the behaviors of the parents.

In addition to the cultural differences in the definition and meaning of the word discipline, punishment and abuse, a notable difference emerged in relation to age. The term 'punish' connotes a chronological basis of age that is implicitly

assumed: parents chastise and punish children. American parents disciplined and punished children and adolescents. The discipline-related Korean parricides occurred between parents and adult offspring; moreover, the disciplinary actions that preceded the killings were not physical but verbal and emotional. Sons reacted adversely to parental discipline which denigrated their adult status; adult offspring challenged the authority of their parents and protested against being infantilized. Sons reacted with violence when parents responded with hypocritical assertions of their parental authority and denigrated the autonomy of their adult sons.

Parricides in America and Korea converged and diverged in relation to punishment, discipline, and abuse. First, parents in both countries chastised their offspring. Second, the figures attributable to 'abuse' and 'discipline' were comparable across national and cultural boundaries. Third, offspring in both cultures reacted violently to what they interpreted to be legitimate parental authority that was extended too far. Abuse in an American context was an adolescent reaction to excessive physical punishment; abuse in a Korean context involved adult reaction to a debasement of self-identity and social status.[51] However, those similarities diminished in relation to unmistakable differences. First and foremost, the ages of the offspring involved differed, for American fathers directed physical abuses against children and adolescents while Korean parents heaped on verbal and emotional abuse on their adult offspring. Second, the vocabulary that was used to describe the acts differed as well, for one culture referred to the excessive punishment that parents meted out as abuse while another considered them discipline.

'Abuse' in Korea differed in another important way. The nominal identities of the victims and offenders in Korean parricides differed from American ones. As Korean brides entered the households of their grooms as part of patrilocal marriage customs, they assumed the primary responsibility of managing household chores; they assumed that role side-by-side with their mothers-in-law. Daughters-in-law who left their maternal homes and entered their husband's homes encountered verbal, emotional, and psychological abuse at the hands of their in-laws, most often, mothers-in-law who accused them of being poor homemakers, lousy cooks, thieves, and incompetent managers of households. These verbal diatribes often led to parricides as daughters-in-law picked up convenient weapons (e.g., laundry stick) and struck their mothers-in-law to death. Or, as young, non-kin women amidst her husband's patrilineal kin, the women became targets of unwanted sexual attention from their fathers-in-law;[52] when husbands discovered such inapposite demands, violence erupted that led to parricides. Daughters-in-law also used poison to kill their in-laws in calculated revenge for abuses they endured. In Korea, 'abuse' was almost exclusive to daughters-in-law, for parricides coded

as 'abuse' were 3.5 times greater than the comparable category in America. This aspect of 'abuse' in a Korean context differs from the discourse of abuse noted in Western parricide literature, and introduces a new concept to the discourse on abuse in the family. This type of abuse is likely to occur and persist in patrilocal marriages where women leave their maternal homes and enter the households of their husbands.[53]

Discussion

I have examined the similarities and differences in the sources of conflict—what others have referred to as 'motivation' or 'cause' in prior works—that led to parricides in nineteenth-century America and twentieth-century Korea. Although standardized parricide rates have not been explored for comparative purposes, I have argued that there are sufficient similarities in the offense characteristics in both countries to proffer some provisional conclusions about the link between parricide to other homicides, and to the larger culture despite the differences in language, culture, and technology. I have introduced the term 'character of parricide' as a way of differentiating one class of parricide from another, and as a way of examining the qualitative differences in offense style and character. I have argued that this idiographic analysis is warranted by the difficulty of quantifying parricide rates as a means of standardization for comparative purposes. By comparing the similarities and differences in the sources of conflict between two countries separated by time and distance, I have attempted to show that quantitative variations in rates of violence need not be the sole indicator of cultural difference and historical change. There are other ways to show cultural differences across history and geography.

First, parricide in America and Korea is primarily an adult-on-adult offense. Although child abuse occupies a prominent place in the criminological and psychological literature on parricide, encapsulated in the adolescent offender typology that has been used by clinical and legal practitioners, I have argued that the definition and meaning of 'abuse' is shaped by history and culture. In nineteenth-century America, abuse was primarily used to describe the excessive physical discipline meted out to children and adolescents while in twentieth-century Korea, the term was most applicable to daughters-in-law who endured emotional and verbal invectives from their mothers-in-law. There was almost no mention of abuse of daughters until they left their natal homes and entered the homes of their husbands; the sons endured verbal, physical, and emotional attacks, but the newspapers rarely called it abuse; it was considered normative discipline. Abuse occurred in both national contexts, but it was called different things, directed at

different family members, whose appearance in the first place was shaped by cultural ideologies (e.g., Confucianism).

I have shown that 'abuse' constitutes a small portion of the overall parricides when viewed in the context of the conflicts that occur between parents and their offspring. This cultural difference need not be demonstrated quantitatively; it can also be shown in the offense characteristics of parricide that I have used to contrast one class of parricides in America to those in Korea. Comparing the two different sites and time periods, I have come to the cautious conclusion that parricides occur primarily in adulthood as parents and their offspring negotiate the intricacies of domestic life, or as sons attempt forward movement by forming their own households and attaining financial autonomy, or defend against a domestic batterer in the household. The conflicts that entangle parents and their offspring traverse a path of expectable conflicts throughout the masculine and uxorial cycle.[54] The conflicts that are common to American and Korean parricides suggest that the parricidal subjects become involved in killings when their movement toward adulthood is impeded by situational and cultural forces.[55]

Second, I have intimated that parricides need not be the sole purview of clinical psychologists, psychiatrists, and psychoanalysts. Historians and criminologists have shown that the declination in homicides throughout centuries is correlated primarily to confrontational homicides between unrelated men.[56] Some have attributed this decline to the rationalization and modernization of societies, or to the pacifying effects brought on by the civilizing force of industrialization and technology.[57] One of my main arguments has been that male-offender-patricides mirror this type of masculine violence rather than violence rooted in sexual jealousy a la Freud. I have argued that male offender matricides also resemble domestic homicides rather than the psychodynamic killings, as argued by psychiatrists and psychoanalysts for the past forty plus years. Using 'arguments' as a source of conflict, as well as the intent embedded in the offense and the weapons used, I have tried to show that the character of adult-on-adult parricide mirrors the patterns observed in the larger literature on the history and criminology of homicides.[58] This pattern of masculine violence, I have maintained, is applicable to fathers and sons in Korea and America, that the hierarchical relations and the constraining forces of Confucianism lose their significance as two adult men enact culturally-scripted notions of masculinity.[59] In both countries, fathers and sons become men through the use of violence.

Third, using sources of conflict between parents and their offspring, I have been able to delineate other notable similarities and differences between nineteenth-century America and twentieth-century Korea. For example, sons and fathers became embroiled in conflicts related to long-term finances. This pattern

has been observed by historians and evolutionary theorists alike. Inheritance disputes appear consistently across both countries; yet, there are real differences when the short-term financial conflicts are examined. American sons forcibly took money from parents in the manner of a robbery while Korean sons demanded money in the manner of a spoiled child. There might be a cultural explanation for this difference. Korean society values sons, especially eldest sons, for lineage is traced through the father's line, not the mother's.[60] Historical demographers have shown that this kinship ideology changed as Koryo Dynasty came to an end[61] and as patrilocality replaced matrilocality around the fifteenth century.[62] The history of Korea may then be an embodiment of the transition from a matrilineal rule of descent into a patrilineal one that reflects actual changes in society brought about by the intrusion of a centralized state and private property on gender relations.[63] That sons are given preferential treatment and accorded deference in sibling relations is an effect of culture and history. Korean daughters did not appear as offenders in these types conflicts.

Fourth, there is nothing surprising about the fact that parents discipline their offspring. American parents chastised children and adolescents while Korean parents berated their adult offspring. Again, the similarities and differences are explained by the cross-cultural aspect of parenting and family systems, and demonstrable in the character of the offense. One marker of adulthood in nineteenth-century America was departure from home, marriage, and establishment of one's own household.[64] Korean sons did not start departing their paternal homes until late 1950s and 60s when Korea began to industrialize. Prior to that, Korean sons married and brought their wives to their family residence. Korean parents, therefore, had a much more protracted view of their role as caretakers, for they extended their authority into the adult years of their offspring. This extension of authority led to intrusion into the lives of adult sons. Confucianism also shaped Korean parents to assume a proprietary view of offspring. These ideologies are real differences in parent-offspring relations, and they translate into behaviors that become unique sources of conflict in Korea but not in an American context. These cultural differences were reflected in the class of victims and offenders who appeared as victims and offenders in scenes of parricides. Women as offenders and in-laws as victims were prominently represented in the Korean cases while they were barely present in American cases. The presence and absence of particular classes of victims and offenders thus speaks volumes about the socio-cultural factors related to parricides.

Cultural differences also appeared in other ways. American and Korean sons defended their mothers from their fathers as they battered their wives. That is not surprising. What is surprising is that Korean sons did not kill their fathers to

defend themselves or their siblings during battering incidents while American sons did. That American sons killed their fathers, when viewed solely in terms of outcome, reifies the unflattering stereotypes that exist about America and Americans, that they are trigger-happy and violent by disposition.[65] But it is important to iterate that American sons killed for prosocial—not antisocial—reasons, to uphold universalizable notions of the good, to defend themselves, their mothers and siblings against tyrannical and violent men. Although contemporary literature has conceptualized an offspring's role of surrogacy and defense of one parent from an abusive one as a form of emotional incest,[66] another way to view such protective behaviors is to see parricides as a form of righteous killing.[67]

And it is the precise absence of this offense characteristic in a Korean context that illustrates the power of culture to constrain behavior, for Korean sons did not challenge the patriarchal authority of their fathers. Confucianism necessitates the defense and protection of one's father, even if he has committed a crime and is fleeing from the state.[68] This contradiction that is inherent in Confucianism extended into the lives of fathers and sons in Korea. Korean sons deferred to the patriarchal authority of their fathers by remaining silent when physical violence was directed at their siblings or themselves, but rose up to defend their mothers in those handful of incidents when they were being attacked. They did not defend their own bodies from physical attacks as sons but they defended against the ontological debasement that verbal and emotional humiliation effectuated on their identities as men.[69] In this way, the Korean men's performance of their gender embodied the paradox of Confucianism that played out during moments of violence in Korea.

The comparison between parricides in America and Korea provides one more reason why the study of family violence ought to be broadened to include figures who may have been overlooked. It also illustrates the myopic notion of 'abuse' presupposed in the conventional literature on parricide and family violence. As I have explicitly and implicitly tried to intimate, the definition and meaning of abuse varies across cultures in ways that escape quantification; instead, the nuances of cultural differences in abuse must be explored in qualitative and idiographic forms in the details of the offense characteristics. Daughters-in-law appeared as offenders in Korean parricides. They rarely—if ever—appeared in American parricides. As argued here, their appearance as parricide offenders is largely explained as a function of the marriage customs and patrilateral kinship ideologies of Korean society. Korean daughters-in-law encountered a pervasive conflict with their mothers-in-law which resulted in violence, a finding that has parallels in Europe.[70] If the position of daughters-in-law, as primary domestic servants in their new households, illustrates their precariousness, then we can

begin to understand the dangers of feminine domestic labor and why the term 'abuse' is relevant for women in particular

In Sharpe's 1981 study of domestic homicide in England, he found two patricides and one matricide from a total of 431 cases from 1560 to 1709.[71] He ascribed this low incidence to the fact that children and adolescents were removed from their family households, and sent away to live with their masters as servants and apprentices. Similar practices were observed in Asia.[72] Although apprentices, servants, and maids have been excluded from parricide studies, their inclusion would increase the percentage of family violence by about 10 percent.[73] The conflicts between servants and masters appear in court records, but the servants were disadvantaged ab initio, for the masters' punitive discipline and methods of correction received the law's protection[74] while ascending violence was heavily sanctioned.[75] The position of Korean daughters-in-law mirrors the positions of other domestic servants who left their natal homes and became caretakers in another's household throughout history.

Historical works also provide a glimpse of the nexus between gender and violence within the family, for they have shown that adult women perpetrated violence against other women.[76] As "culpable victims," servant girls became targets of sexual violence in their master's households[77] which led to unwanted pregnancies that were resolved through infanticides.[78] The position of servant girls in Europe and daughters-in-law in early- to mid-twentieth-century Korea is similar again in that both were placed in households surrounded by non-kin men and women; European servant girls appeared in strangers' households to prepare for marriage[79] on a contractual basis[80] while Korean daughters-in-law appeared in strangers' households without remuneration as lifetime servants through marriage customs. Hence, it makes sense to include maids, domestic servants, and daughters-in-law into studies of family violence, in addition to violence against women in general.[81] While historians have demonstrated cultural and social change through variations in rates and political events, I have argued that criminological variables such as offense characteristics and style can also be used as indices of change and variations across culture. Furthermore, although male apprentices may have been overlooked as victims of sexual violence in past research, contemporary studies have shown that they face risks of sexual victimization.[82] Apprentices and servants were certainly affectionately regarded by their masters, enough to be treated like family members rather than just employees, for their masters left them portions of their inheritance.[83] Without a more systematic approach to the inclusion of these precarious figures in the family, their experience of victimization and offending are apt to become lost as dark figures of crime.

Conclusion

This paper has attempted a cautious synthesis of parricide based on studies of two sites. Despite points of convergence and divergence, there are real limitations that require further research. The two studies used for this paper were convenience sample of newspapers; they were not randomized samples nor were they corroborated with official records. The absence of validity checks and standardized rates of violence are shortcomings that should be remedied in future works. While parricides have generally been discussed as percentage figures of general homicides, it may be worthwhile to construct standardized rates to be able to make meaningful comparisons across time and geography.[84]

Throughout most, if not all, published works on parricide, there exists a gross imbalance in the sex ratio in parricides, with victims being about equally distributed between fathers and mothers while the offenders are predominantly men. Researchers have shown that violence in the family is affected by conflicts and changes in gender roles. If this is so, then the patterns of family violence in general and violence against in parents in particular must have been different in matriarchal societies marked by matrilocal marriages. How would violence against parents have been affected by men who had to leave their paternal homes in order to join their brides and their clan? Would violence against wives even be possible or would the patterns be reversed from the ones we have known? The answers to these types of questions cannot be answered by criminologists alone; they require interdisciplinary collaboration. For future works then, collaboration between criminologists, anthropologists, historians, and demographers may open new groundbreaking paths to advancing the literature.

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RESEARCH NOTE

The Japanese Factor in the Making of North Korean Socialism

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Abstract

This article explores a commonly ignored aspect of Japan–North Korean relations: the Japanese factor in the making of Korean socialism. Korea was indirectly influenced by the Japanese Jiyuminken Movement, in the 1910s–1920s serving as a stepping-stone for the creation of a Japanese Communist Party. Wartime mobilization policies under Japanese rule were continued and expanded beyond the colonial era. The Juche ideology built on tendencies first exhibited in the 1942 Overcoming Modernity Conference in Japan, and in the 1970s some Japanese leftists viewed Juche as a humanist Marxism. Trade between Japan and North Korea expanded from 1961 onwards, culminating in North Korea's default in 1976, from which point on relations soured between the two countries. Yet leaders with direct experience of colonial rule governed North Korea through to the late 1990s.

Keywords: DPRK, Socialism, Comintern, Overcoming Modernity, Juche, Japan–DPRK Trade

Introduction

North Korea, the so-called Hermit Kingdom, is often regarded as an anomaly of its own making compared to other 'rational,' capitalist and 'internationalised'

nations. This paper is an attempt to offer an alternative view. There are a variety of approaches that could be used in understanding the pervasive Japanese legacy that exists in the ideology and state policies of socialist Korea. Save for a small number of publications,[2] the Japanese contribution to the making of North Korea is rarely discussed. Indeed, the Korean case, in which a socialist regime absorbed and developed certain tendencies of its colonial and fascist-militaristic predecessors, is not alone even in Asia. In Europe such an observation would resonate with that of the German sociologist Ralf Dahrendorf, who judged that in East Germany the "social revolution of National Socialism […] was continued and, if anything, accelerated and radicalised."[3] Dahrendorf observed, not without controversy, that "certain developments in West Germany might be described as counterrevolutionary in this respect;"[4] similarly, South Korea exhibits remarkable continuity with Japanese and Manchurian experience, a legacy of Japanese colonialism.

The origins of North Korea involved all four parties in northeast Asia: China, Russia, Japan and Korea itself. Much has already been written on Chinese and Soviet bloc influences on North Korea, but this paper explores the less obvious linkages between Japan and North Korea on three major levels: the political, the economic and the ideological. First, on the level of political organization, before there existed a "Left" in Korea, the early progressive movement was inspired by the Taishō Democratic Movement [大正民主運動] and to some extent influenced by the late-Meiji Movement for Liberty and Civil Rights (the *Jiyuminken* Movement) [自由民権運動], via intermediaries such as the Chinese intellectual giant Liang Qichao [梁啟超]. The establishment of the Korean Communist Party was subordinate to an Asian-wide strategy masterminded by the Russians, and in fact Koreans provided a springboard to establishing a Japanese Communist Party. By the 1930s, however, Japanese policies contributed to developments which saw the original Korean Communist leadership decimated and Kim Il Sung [金日成] emerging as the guerrilla leader of Korean communism in Manchuria.

On the second level, the State Socialist legacy in economic development, left behind by Japanese "reformist bureaucrats" [革新官僚] in Korea and Manchuria, shaped the options of subsequent reform and development.[5] North Korea's Juche ideology [主體思想] should be examined within the context of the ideological collusion between the Japanese Left and Right leading up to Pearl Harbour, culminating in the July 1942 Kyoto conference on "Overcoming Modernity" [近代の超克]. North Korean ideologues, especially those educated in Japan, continued to develop the notion that war against the United States could rid Asia of the humiliating modernity that the West had imposed on it. Third, North Korea's trade and ideological exchange with Japan blossomed during the 1960s-1970s, a forgotten chapter that should be re-examined for understanding North Korean

development. Kim Jong Il's [金正日] purge of colonial-era educated communist officials in 1997–2000 places a temporal bracket to the limits of direct Japanese legacy in North Korea.

The object of this paper is neither to expand the extent of Japanese accountability for North Korean developments, nor to negate the centrality of Korean initiative in the resistance movement and the subsequent conduct of the revolutionary state. This paper will have succeeded if it contributes to breaking down nation-centred history that presumes historical processes to be contained within state borders. For in the modern history of East Asia, both the institutions of capitalist imperialism and the resistance against them transcended national frontiers. It would also be important to consider that the composition of North Korea was influenced not only by the Japanese Left but, most importantly, by what existed in a 'twilight zone' of "Neither Left nor Right",[6] where Japanese socialists placed hope in and collaborated with reformist bureaucrats and militaristic ideology. Rather than focus on the usual topics such as abductions, illegal fishing and missile testing, this paper attempts to show how the seemingly different path taken by North Korea also derived from sources common to Japan and South Korea.

Fin-de-siècle Enlightenment: Sino–Japanese Sources of Progressivism

Japanese liberals of the 1880s, including Fukuzawa Yukichi [福澤諭吉], had placed great hopes in the reformist party [開化黨] within the Korean aristocracy, but their hopes were quickly dashed when the reformists' coup of 1884 was met by a Chinese-led crackdown just three days later. In the aftermath of the invasion, in the "Thesis on De-Asianisation" [脫亞論], often attributed to Fukuzawa, the author argued that Japan's only chance of salvation lay not in reform elsewhere in Asia, but in modernizing itself and eventually liberating the hopelessly backward Continent.[7] This document has been identified by some as the founding thesis of Japanese expansionism. Meanwhile, early Korean Communists attributed their origins to the anti-aristocratic Donghak Rebellion [東學黨叛亂] of 1894–95.[8] This triggered the first Sino–Japanese war and, with it, the end of Chinese suzerainty over Korea. Fukuzawa hailed the Chinese defeat as the triumph of civilisation over barbarity. The recurrent theme in Korean ideology was finding the means to handle and overcome Western and Japanese pressure to modernise. The cult-ideology of Donghak, or 'Oriental Knowledge,' fused Confucian, Buddhist and Taoist teachings to create an ideological and social blueprint to challenge 'gunboat Christianity.' Juche ideology would try to achieve the same ends with Marxism. Yet social divisions in Korea meant that it was impossible to speak of

a mobilisation of all classes against Japan until the March 1st Movement of 1919 challenged Japanese colonial rule.[9]

The defeat by Japan in the Sino–Japanese War of 1895 produced an intellectual renaissance in China. In 1898 the reformists held power for one hundred days in Peking before they were suppressed. One of them, Liang Qichao [梁啟超], while in exile in Japan became an avid commentator and translator of Western literature rendered in Japanese, including socialist pamphlets.[10] Liang was influenced by the journalist and Statist movement leader Kuga Katsunan [陸羯南], who instilled in Liang a notion of nationalism whose aim was to seek "real", organic, national "unity"[11] [統一]. This interpretation was indebted to the "Organic Theory of State" by Johann Caspar Bluntschli, a Swiss-German legalist whose works were popular in Japan and highly regarded by the Meiji authorities. Liang's writings, published in Japan, were available in Korea's treaty ports and became widely distributed and read among Korea's Chinese-literate elite[12] They reported sympathetically on Korean developments.[13] Liang's extensive but frequently understated influence reached the nationalist historian Shin Chae-ho [辛采浩] and the Korean-American education reformist Ahn Chang-ho [安昌浩], whom in 1907 named their political party the New Peoples' Society [新民會, or NPS] after Liang's pamphlet "Theses for a New Citizenry [新民說], a compilation of essays arguing that the populace could be rejuvenated and enlightened by means of the modernisation of the self.[14] At this stage the NPS' mission was to aid Emperor Kojong [高宗] reclaim the sovereignty he had surrendered under duress.

Yi Dong-hwi and Yoshino Sakuzō: Beyond Constitutional Monarchism

One figure who emerged from the NPS to become vital to the start of Korean communism was Major Yi Dong-hwi [李東輝] of the Imperial Korean Army, which was disbanded in August 1907 after Korea had become a Japanese protectorate;[15] Korea was formally annexed in August 1910. Shortly thereafter, 105 members of the NPS were arrested over a foiled bomb attack against Governor Terauchi Masatake [寺內正毅]. American diplomatic intervention meant that only six were formally prosecuted; the remainder of the NPS met in Tsingtao, a German colony in China, where the participants split between the Radicals under Yi Dong-hwi, and the Gradualists under Ahn Chang-ho. Yi's Radical platform called for the immediate establishment of a guerrilla base centred at Kando [間島, present-day Yanbian 延邊][16] in eastern Manchuria.[17] Often overlooked, the split at the Tsingtao conference was to have a decisive effect on modern Korean political history, for it meant that a good part of the progressive nationalist and constitutional-monarchist

Yi Dong-hwi

Ahn Chang-ho

Kando (Yanbian) in red

Yo Un-hyung

Yoshino Sakuzō

Hara Takashi

movement went militant. Yi Dong-hwi's failure in armed insurrection forced him into the arms of the Bolshevik movement.[18] Together with his secretary Pak Chin-sun [朴鎮淳], Yi arrived in Khabarovsk in February 1918 to attend a Soviet-sponsored conference of 'Korean revolutionaries,' during which the Korean People's Socialist Party [韓人社會黨, or KPSP] was established. However, their subsequent attempt at armed activities also ended in failure.[19]

A fresh start came in March 1919, when popular protests swept across Korea after rumours circulated that Emperor Kojong, under effective house arrest since 1910, had died of poisoning in the run-up to the Paris Peace Conference.[20] On April 25, 1919, Yi Dong-hwi held a meeting in Vladivostok where it was decided to set up a "coordinating committee for Korean Socialist organisations" and "to form a single command for all Korean partisan units operating in the Russian Far East."[21] Pak Chin-sun and others were sent as representatives to the newly established Comintern in Moscow, where they received 400,000 roubles.[22] Yet Yi was unsuccessful in arousing support for the Bolshevik cause amongst the Versailles-preoccupied Koreans, and he left for Shanghai on August 30.[23] He was named prime minister in the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea and had an uneasy accommodation with its president, the American-educated former

aristocratic-bureaucrat Rhee Syngman [李承晩], who would in 1948 become president of the Republic of Korea. At this stage, representing the KPSP (reorganized as the Koryo Communist Party [高麗共產黨] in May 1921), Yi's contribution was to seek Comintern funds for the Provisional Government.[24]

Yi Dong-hwi had intended for Yo Un-hyung [呂運亨], a member of the Provisional Parliament who had gone to Versailles and openly challenged the lingering monarchist sympathies of the Provisional Government's leadership, to be sent to Moscow along with two others.[25] Only one of them was eventually despatched, and in December 1919, without the consent of the Provisional Government, Yo Un-hyung went instead to Tokyo. There he met Prime Minister Hara Takashi [原敬] and other officials, but none of the talks resulted in practical gains, whilst in Shanghai Yo was disgraced and accused of treachery. The more important of Yo's meetings was with the Tokyo University professor Yoshino Sakuzō [吉野作造], known by then as the "high priest of Taishō democracy"[26] and one of the few intellectuals in Japan gifted with a "genuine sensitivity to Asian nationalism".[27] Yoshino, who wrote that his conscience would not allow him to endorse any contempt for Yo Un-hyung for his perceived political immorality,[28] thought that "the Japanese had not fully cultivated [an] 'internationalist conscience' and therefore lacked 'self-reflection' on why the Koreans were so hostile to the Japanese".[29] Yet he was not convinced that Japan was "inherently aggressive in its attitude towards Asia", because "if the aggressive and militaristic aspect of Japanese modernity had been historically constructed, rooted in particular circumstances, it could also be remade into an open and peace-loving strategy."[30] Japan, said Yoshino, could take advantage of the international reorganisation after Versailles to make its empire more flexible and thus durable.[31]

Having understood that the official line of assimilation was delusional, Yoshino hoped for the existence of Korean collaborators to mitigate tensions with Japan, under which circumstances home rule for Korea, as was being proposed for Ireland, might guarantee the survival of the empire.[32] Yoshino might have intended to have Yo Un-hyung as one such collaborator; in any case, finding himself sidelined in Shanghai, Yo left for Irkutsk in Russia, where some Korean emigres had formed a Communist group distinct from that of Yi Dong-hwi. Armed skirmish with Yi's troops broke out in 1921.[33] Yi was accused of having "made little or no effort to establish a relationship between the Koreans in Japan and the Japanese Socialist leaders,"[34] which explains reports from the Irkutsk group to the Comintern that Yi's party was comprised only of "Nationalists striving to attain Korean independence through Comintern assistance."[35] In any case, the Koreans in Japan had developed their own socialist groupings centred around Kim Yak-su's [金若水] North Star Association.[36]

The Korean Party Twice Dissolved; the Japanese Party Established

Yi Dong-hwi's Moscow representative, Pak Chin-sun, had reported to the Comintern Executive Committee in 1919 that "Korean independence could be attained only with a triumph of the revolution in Japan." Indeed, socialist protest in Japan and Korea had permitted the destruction of a potentially reactionary, nobility- and bourgeois-infiltrated Korean United National Front, from which the Korean Left broke free to seek "collaboration with leftist elements of Japan." Pak described this line as the official position of Yi Dong-hwi's party but admitted that a transnational left-wing liaison had "failed to obtain any substantial results: mutual misunderstanding and mistrust made any collaboration impossible."[37] Still, there was no question that the Korean Communists were committed to "the fact that the interests of the toiling masses of Japan and Korea are interrelated and that the yoke of Japanese imperialism and capital is equally distressing for them," hence the conclusion that "it is essential to have close ties between the revolutionary organisations of both countries."[38]

Unfortunately for the Korean Left, the armed conflict between Yi Dong-hwi's party and the Irkutsk group in July 1921, followed by an unsuccessful forced combination of the two factions in April 1922, resulted in the Comintern's dissolution of both factions.[39] Its replacement in 1923 was a Vladivostok-based, five-man Korean Bureau composed of Soviet representative Grigory Voitinsky, trade unionist Katayama Sen [片山潜], Yi Dong-hwi, one representative from Irkutsk and another from Korea. Voitinsky then left Vladivostok to continue work in China, where Comintern priorities lay. Korean communism remained dormant.[40] However, when it came to organizing a Communist Party in Japan, Japanese activists relied on the Koreans as "natural intermediaries"[41] with the Russian authorities. For a start, Pak Chin-sun "and most of the others" who decided whom to include in discussions "were Koreans who knew Japanese well and were acquainted with the Japanese socialist movement. They also knew Russian and were familiar with the situation in the Soviet Union."[42] In August 1920 a Korean messenger invited Ōsugi Sakae [大杉栄] to Shanghai, where he first met Yi Dong-hwi before being led to a small meeting presided over by Voitinsky.[43]

Although Ōsugi accepted funds from Voitinsky, it proved to be a mistake to rely on him rather than better Japanese tacticians.[44] Once back in Japan, Ōsugi continued his outspoken criticism of Bolshevism and declined to form a party. In May 1921 an ex-member of the Japanese communist cell in New York, Kondō Eizō[45] [近藤栄蔵], upon instigation by Katayama Sen arrived in Shanghai with the help of another Korean messenger. This time Voitinsky presided over the

Grigory Voitinsky

Katayama Sen

Ōsugi Sakae

Kondō Eizō

Kim Chon-hae

meeting together with Pak Chin-sun.[46] A committee of 12 Chinese and Koreans listened to "Kondō's report on the situation in Japan"[47] and offered him a sum of around US $3,000 for propaganda and organisation. Kondō's party, however, was a failure.[48] By mid-1922 a second attempt at forming a Japanese Communist Party had succeeded. One leader was Kim Chon-hae [金天海, also known as Kin Ten-kai], who would be instrumental up to the early 1950s in mobilizing support from the *zainichi* [在日], or Korean community in Japan.

By early 1920, Yoshino Sakuzō was actively engaged in forming a policy of cultural rule for Korea under its new governor, Admiral Saitō Makoto [斎藤実]. The relaxation of repression allowed the gradualist platform of Ahn Chang-ho, who had been expelled from Shanghai by President Rhee, finally to blossom.[49] Under these circumstances the second attempt at creating a Korean Communist Party [朝鮮共産黨] occurred in May 1925.[50] This second party was plagued from the beginning by immature revolutionaries whose indiscretion caused the immediate arrest of most of its leadership.[51] The party extended its activities into China by establishing the Manchurian General Bureau [滿洲總局], which operated mainly in the Kando area and came into frequent conflict with Chinese Communist branches.[52] Sino–Korean partisan conflict in fact created a headache for the Comintern.[53] During the

brief 1929–30 war between Soviet and Chinese troops for control over the Chinese Eastern Railway, ethnic tensions between the Chinese and Korean parties severely hindered transnational Communist mobilization efforts to aid Soviet troops.[54] By 1930 the Comintern had to order a second dissolution of the Korean Communist Party and its general bureaus in Japan and Manchuria; activists were persuaded to join either the Chinese or Japanese parties instead.[55] The policy, rational enough at the time, rendered the Korean communists passive during the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in late 1931. Japanese co-optation of Koreans continued in the Kando region in the form of a Livelihood Corps [民生團 *Minsaengdan*], which posed as a progressive organization and enlisted many Korean ex-communists. This forced the Chinese Communist Party to order a bloody purge of "Minsaengdan infiltration" in 1934. Amongst the few who survived, with bitter memories of Chinese persecution, were guerrilla leaders Kim Il-sung [金日成] and his trusted ally Choe Yong-gon[56] [崔庸健].

The Colonial Legacy

In 1932 Governor Ugaki Kazushige [宇垣一成] started a Rural Revitalisation Campaign which set up and mobilized councils "in every province, county and district to execute campaign programs at the local level, often by integrating already existing official and semi-official village organizations [and] aimed to improve consistency in guidance of rural regeneration".[57] At the same time, financial co-ops made land available to tenant farmers for long-term, low-interest payments.[58] The movement's main objective was to have every county select villages of 30 to 40 households for rehabilitation, each of which was given an individualised five-year economic plan.[59]

Given the colonial-era reforms, "it seems no historical coincidence that similar corporatist state-society relations emerged in both North and South Korea after 1945."[60] On the day of Japan's surrender, Yo Un-hyung set up a preparatory committee [建國委員會] for a People's Republic of Korea [朝鮮人民共和國], which was established on September 6, 1945. The regime was based on a system of People's Committees, which were ordered to disband by US forces in the south but were retained in the north, where they "did not abolish the state purchase of grains which the Japanese had forced on the Korean farmers." Even the name of the program which set production targets for each farmer, the Production Responsibility System [生產責任制],[61] retained the same name under the colonial and communist regimes.[62] The North Korean rationing system under the Department of Food Administration [食糧管理局; *Singnyang Kwalliguk*] was "based on the colonial-era food distribution system".[63] Hwang Kyung Moon has argued that

> continuities between the late colonial and postliberation periods in terms of industrialisation were far stronger for North Korea than South Korea, particularly in the degree of state intervention in market mechanisms. The North Korean state, in short, followed the pattern established by the colonial regime of the 1930s and especially the wartime period much more closely than its southern counterpart.[64]

Kimura Mitsuhiko [木村光彦] agrees, observing that North Korea revived many of the colonial-era agricultural and industrial policies, themselves influenced by Soviet-inspired policies adopted in Manchukuo during the 1930s–1940s: "In introducing Soviet ideas on economic planning, the research division of the South Manchuria Railway [満鉄調査部] played a leading role. This organisation was staffed by many pro-Marxists who were familiar with Soviet literature. [...] A group of bureaucrats based mainly in the planning agency, often called *kakushin kanryo* [革新官僚] or reformist bureaucrats, also studied methods of Soviet planning, as well as those of the Nazis"; in Manchukuo "the Ministry of Military Procurement performed the same role as the Soviet Gosplan."[65] Charles K. Armstrong argues that "because of colonial industrialization, North Korea was uniquely situated among Asian countries to follow the path of Stalinist industrial development."[66] Kimura notes that in North Korea, even before 1945 and certainly afterwards, "the blend of the two ideologies, Stalinism and Japanese imperial fascism, produced the main current of economic policy [...] the primary goal [of which] was heavy industrialization and finally military victory enabling them to conduct territorial expansion, which [...] was demonstrated by its attack on the South in 1950."[67] South Korea under Park Chung-hee later also implemented a series of five-year plans, the first of which was announced in January 1962. Park had in fact drawn inspiration from his memories of "the Manchurian model of military-backed forced-paced industrialization",[68] a point that Bruce Cumings and Nicholas Eberstadt agree on.[69]

In January 1947 the North Korean Government initiated a "Ideological Total Mobilizational Campaign for State-Building" [建國思想總動員運動], the terminology of which appears to be a direct legacy of wartime Japanese mobilizational rhetoric.[70] Meanwhile the legal and administrative machinery of North Korea exhibited clear lineage from colonial institutions. Out of the 20 cabinet members of the North Korean People's Committee elected in April 1947, 17 of them (85%) were educated in universities in Japan or institutions in Manchuria and Korea, ranging from Waseda, Meiji and Nihon Universities in Japan, Keijo Imperial University and Keijo Medical School in Korea, and the South Manchuria Polytechnic [南滿工專].[71] Courthouses built by the Japanese remained in use, and "Japanese colonial law remained in effect until a new law code was promulgated

in the spring of 1946. The result was to a great extent a modified Japanese legal code combined with a Soviet-style judicial system".[72] On the other hand, the initial purge of colonial personnel backfired by producing a vacuum of legal and administrative talent; some colonial-era staff, deemed "progressive", were later readmitted after being put through retraining sessions, to the extent that the Justice Bureau chief, Ch'oe Yong-dal [崔容達], admitted that "he had inadvertently allowed many 'pro-Japanese elements' to sneak into the judiciary."[73] Japanese engineers detained in North Korea also "made such a significant contribution in rebuilding North Korea that some of them were even awarded the 'work hero' medal by the communist government."[74] The hydroelectricity generating station featured on North Korea's state emblem is in fact the Sup'ung Dam [水豐發電所] on the Yalu River, construction of which began in 1937 and operation begun in 1941.[75]

From Overcoming Modernity to Juche Ideology

Juche ideology [主體思想] has been the official ideology of North Korea since Marxism-Leninism was removed from its constitution in 1972. Its main themes revolve around the Korean nation as the subject of its own history, being in control of its future direction, and maintaining self-reliance in foreign relations rather than siding with either China or the Soviet Union, which in the 1960s and 1970s were in conflict with each other, splitting the socialist camp. Although Juche has been phrased in Marxist terminology and there have been repeated attempts to imbue Juche with Marxist categories, these themes obviously have less to do with orthodox Marxism than with nationalistic sentiments typical of a post-colonial country. Yet Juche is more than a curious deviation from Marxism. What has always been overlooked is the context of ultranationalist intellectual thought in 1940s Japan, which, like North Korea a decade later, was locked in a long confrontation with the United States. The main event attempting to conceptualize the era was the July 1942 Kyoto conference on "Overcoming Modernity," organized by a group of left-wing writers and thinkers centred around Kamei Katsuichirō [龜井勝一郎]. They perceived Japan's national crisis as a crisis of the self, that "Japan as it existed had become foreign to itself"[76]—practically having become semi-colonised—and that the country had "lost its properly Japanese character due to the excessive incorporation of Western methods and ideas", including an "extreme degree of specialization forced upon the various branches of culture and knowledge by the demands of modern life, resulting in the widespread sense of alienation among intellectuals and others."[77] The discussion degenerated to the point where Japan's problems were blamed on all foreign influences, old and new. One participant, Hayashi Fusao [林房雄], even identified the roots of such

Takeuchi Yoshimi

Kamei Katsuichirō

Hwang Jang-yop

contamination in the importation of culture from China, and he determined that Japanese literature and society "in fact contained that corruption within itself"[78]

The conference failed to draw any real conclusions charting Japan's future course, and the participants had divergent definitions of 'modernity,' but they agreed that the 'Great East Asian War' against the United States, the European powers and their puppet Chiang Kai-shek regime, would allow Japan and East Asia to purge these contaminants, to rediscover its true self, and to overcome the humiliation and alienation of 'modernity.' Yet the participants of the conference skirted the question of Japan's colonial expansion—which obviously replicated Western actions—confining themselves to viewing it as a means of countering the West. Takeuchi Yoshimi [竹內好], a Sinologist and cultural commentator active throughout the post-war period, noted the irony of this in his 1959 essay on the conference.[79]

Juche ideology, too, contains similar contradictions. Juche seeks to purge Korea of its foreign contamination, to revive the nation from its decline, and to rise above an alienating modernity associated with capitalism. The means to these ends is to be constantly vigilant against the West. In order to defend itself against the United States, its allies and its South Korean puppet, North Korea must thoroughly modernize in ways that distinguish it from colonial modernization. Although there is no clear evidence that the 1942 conference had a direct influence on North Korea, the parallels between it and Juche can be explained by the wartime Japanese education of the early ideologues of North Korea, notably Hwang Jang-yop [黃長燁], said to be the leading theorist of the Juche doctrine. Hwang had studied at the night school of the Law Department at Chūō University in Tokyo between January 1942 and January 1944, when he was conscripted into the Imperial Japanese Army and served until surrender in August 1945.[80] He would no doubt have been exposed to the institutional and ideological norms of Japanese militarism, such as Japanism [日本主義] and Japan's version of what would become North Korea's "military-first politics" [先軍政治]. Hwang went on

to become a speechwriter for Kim Il-sung and Choe Yong-gon.[81] As North Korea plunged into soul-searching in the 1950s, Juche was first formulated in a speech by Kim Il-sung in 1955 and elaborated over the course of the 1960s and 1970s. In a speech from January 1964 on the status and development of the Korean language, Kim criticized the continued Japanese legacy, including the use of Japanese terms in daily conversation.[82]

Exchange with Japan: Technological and Ideological

North Korea proclaimed its successful socialist transformation in 1958 with the completion of agricultural collectivization and launched its first seven-year plan in 1961, together with a Chollima Campaign [千里馬運動] to rapidly boost productivity. Yet the supposedly self-reliant and self-confident North Korean state would soon come to rely on Japanese technology. Imports from Japan increased from 1.6 billion yen (4.44 million USD) to 5.9 billion yen (16.39 million USD) in 1961–65, reaching 8.4 billion yen (23.48 million USD) in 1970.[83] Ikeda Hayato [池田勇人], who in 1960 took over as prime minister from the virulent anti-communist Kishi Nobusuke [岸信介], focused on economic growth and in April 1961 initiated direct trade between Japan and North Korea. In 1962 he also initiated trade with Communist China, known as 'LT Trade,' named after the two signatories of the memorandum, the Japanese-educated CCP leader Liao Chengzhi [廖承志] and former Manchurian Heavy Industries Corporation President Takasaki Tatsunosuke [高碕達之助].

In 1961 North Korea sold 50 million yen (13,889 USD) worth of pig iron (2,500 tons) to Japan. Sabotage by South Korea put paid to many collaborative projects between Japan and North Korea, including permission for North Korean technicians to enter Japan and the export of a 100KW medium-wave transmitter of the same kind used by the NHK Osaka Central Bureau, worth 100 million yen. Despite this, in May 1965 the Japan–Korea Trade Association [日朝貿易会] mounted the Pyongyang Japanese Products Exhibition [平壌日本商品展示会]. A total of 78 Japanese firms and 359 products were represented at the exhibition, which was attended by 79 Japanese delegates and more than 10,000 North Korean administrators.[84] Left-wing scientists in Japan formed a Japan–Korea Scientific Technological Exchange Committee [日朝科学技術交流委員会] which in 1966–67 sent delegations to Pyongyang. In July 1967 the Exhibition of Japanese Scientific Technological Books [日本科学技術図書展示会] displayed more than 6,000 works in 2400 varieties to 2,000 North Korean academics and technicians. In 1969 the committee convened the Pyongyang Exhibition of Japanese Machinery and Silicate Technology[85] [平壌日本機械および硅酸塩技術展覧会] representing seventy firms and attended by 6,000 North Korean spectators.[86]

North Korea imported steel rails, wires and stainless steel, which the country could not at the time produce competitively on its own; in 1968 1.06 billion yen (4.47 million USD) worth of metallurgical equipment was imported from Japan.[87] During the 1960s the North Korean organisation in Japan, "Chongryon" [朝鮮総連] arranged for 150 ethnic Korean scientists specializing in fields ranging from medicine to electronics and architecture to work in North Korea upon obtaining their doctoral degrees in Japan. Many brought with them to North Korea advanced equipment or technical literature.[88]

In 1971 North Korea announced a six-year plan quickening the pace of a Technological Revolution [技術革命] launched in the 1960s, requiring imports of a new kind.[89] Pyongyang's optimism was quickly rewarded when Tanaka Kakuei [田中角栄] became prime minister in July 1972. Tanaka was intent on restoring relations and expanding trade with the socialist continent. Tanaka's ally Kuno Chūji [久野忠治] had been named president of a League of MPs to Promote Friendly Relations between Japan and North Korea [日朝友好促進議員連盟] in November 1971, and in early 1972 he visited Pyongyang over Prime Minister Satō Eisaku's objection and signed a Japan–North Korea Joint Declaration [日朝共同宣言]. With Japanese equipment and technicians, Pyongyang converted to colour television in 1972. In 1972–73 some 500–800 Japanese businessmen and technicians travelled to North Korea, and the number of staff permanently stationed in Pyongyang numbered 50–100.[90] By 1976, trade with North Korea had reached £150–200 million (US$303.63–404.86 million).

But North Korea's Technological Revolution also required renewed ideological support from Japanese socialist theoreticians.[91] A central figure was Kuriki Yasunobu [栗木安延], a professor of economics at Tokyo Senshū University [東京専修大学], where Takeuchi Yoshimi had taught and led anti-Anpo Treaty movements in

Kuno Chūji

Kuriki Yasunobu

N. Korean railway electrification

Photo credits: (Left) Kuno Chūji, *Nihao Peikin, Konnichiwa Pyonyan* (ニイハオ北京・こんにちはピョンヤン), Tokyo: Chūseikai (忠政会), 1982. (Middle) Kuriki Taiko ed. *Henkaku to Jōnetsu*. (Right) Public Domain.

the 1950s–1960s.[92] In September 1973 Kuriki Yasunobu published a paper with strong humanist-Marxist overtones entitled “The Significance of Juche Ideology in World History”; addressed to North Korean social scientists, it was included in a compendium of essays from Japanese contributors[93] translated into Chinese and published in Pyongyang in 1974. The essay opens with the judgment that Juche represents Kim Il-sung’s innovative adaptation of Marxist-Leninist principles to the historical and national conditions of Korea, calling it the right kind of Marxism-Leninism at a time when every nation contributes what it can to “defeat the moribund capitalism-imperialism, and to build a society where the popular masses are truly masters of themselves”. Kuriki argues that subjectivity and the national question were weak points in Marxist theory—that is, until Juche emerged with the answer. Kuriki also stresses that in Juche ideology man is the subject and that Juche “clearly determines that man needs to be respected”; this presents a direct contrast with the self-alienating, exploitative Japanese capitalist system, which regards machines and money as more valuable than people. He cites pollution and piecemeal social welfare as examples of a “disregard” for the populace.[94]

Kuriki points to the humanist underpinnings of the Technological Revolution: Kim Il-sung had written that his goal was to “release people from the heavy burden of labor” and that “economic construction and technological revolution are not ends in themselves, but are means to give people, as masters of their state and society, a luxurious life.”[95] This harks back to themes Karl Marx first raised in his 1844 Manuscripts, where he wrote at length about how a future communist society would relieve people of the burdens and alienation of work. Kuriki also writes about feminism, arguing that until women have been freed from the oppression of housework, gender equality would not be achieved. The people’s political revolution restores to them initiative in making changes for themselves, but freedom cannot be complete until humans have been released from natural limitations and material burdens. Yet material success is predicated upon ideological victory. Kim Il Sung’s greatness, according to Kuriki, lies in the fact that he has furnished the exact blueprint for every step in the revolution towards total liberty, from the anticolonial struggle, to antifeudalism, to the consolidation of democracy, and the materialization of communist society, where humanity will once again fully realize its potential.[96]

In April 1975 Kuriki visited Pyongyang as leader of the Japan Juche Ideology Research Association [日本チュチェ思想研究会] and met with Kim Il-sung.[97] Three years later, on April 9, 1978, Kuriki presided over the Juche Ideology International Research Institute Initiation Conference [チュチェ思想国際研究所創立大会] in Tokyo, attended by 800 delegates from Asia, Africa and Latin America.[98] Unfortunately, as a result of massively expanded imports and a sudden fall in

1974–75 in international prices for zinc and lead, which North Korea exported in large quantities, the country's worsening balance of payments led to default in 1976. South Korea's per capita income had overtaken that of North Korea in 1974.[99] Japanese technical assistance to North Korea became haphazard at this time, although it did not totally cease.[100] Political changes also took place to pave the way for Kim Jong Il's succession; in 1974 Kim Yong-ju [金英柱], Kim Il-sung's brother and second in position to him, was removed from power, after which the country was effectively co-governed by Kim father and son.[101]

By the 1980s Juche's international appeal appeared to lose steam, as the ideology was increasingly modified for home consumption to serve Kim Jong Il's needs of succession, who finally became sole leader of North Korea in 1994. In need of scapegoats amidst economic collapse,[102] Kim Jong Il in 1997–2000 launched a purge of elder officials inherited from his father. Known as the Simhwajo-sageon [深化組事件], the purge basically eliminated the colonial-era-educated generation of officials from the North Korean system. Hwang Jang-yop, architect of Juche, fled to South Korea, where he died under suspicious circumstances in 2010.[103] This signified the end of direct colonial influence on North Korean politics, even though its indirect legacy lives on.

Conclusions

"The East Asian perspective is stranded at the level of the question being posed; it has yet to become systematic content. [...] Asia has not been able to grasp itself either as a regional hierarchy or as a concept of civilization, and to continue extending its discursive efforts systematically in such a direction."[104] So lamented Korean scholar Paek Young-seo [白永瑞] in 2011 in "Thinking East Asia" [思想東亞], a historical critique of Korea's place in the East Asian political community. The present paper has been an attempt to offer some possibilities of systematizing that East Asian perspective. This paper is not just about North Korea, it is about Asia and its internal dynamics, as shown in the exchanges between North Korea and Japan, thought usually to be unlikely. In a sense, a preliminary answer was already proposed by Pak Chin-sun at the Comintern in 1919, when he judged that Korea's independence could not be realized without the emancipation of the Japanese populace by means of an organized liberation movement in Japan, which the Koreans shared a responsibility in bringing about. North Korea's post-1945 relations with Japan were often sabotaged by South Korea and by right-wing political elements in Japan, and indeed Japan's postwar economic boom had much to do with the Korean War, when Japanese industry mobilized against North Korea; moreover, Japan's withdrawal of technical assistance after

1976 contributed to the failure of North Korea's Technological Revolution and the start of the country's decline. When Japan—the "other" in the eyes of the North Koreans—was in the wrong camp or simply failed to cooperate, in other words, it spelled doom for North Korea, which became an increasing threat to Japan's security, ruling out a return to the old, collaborative relationship.

Yoshino Sakuzō, with his advocacy of Korean home rule, was blind to the fact that Korea could not be liberated without social revolution in Japan. Reluctant to touch upon the fundamental issues of class interest at the base of the Meiji state, Yoshino relied on the Japanese leaders' voluntary initiative to foster Korean liberalization, which was counterproductive in the long run. What it did contribute to was the emergence of left-wing figures and organizations which were in a better position—or at least less burdened than Yoshino—to address the basic structural issues of colonialism that held back Korean development. The establishment did attempt to address some of the same issues from another perspective; the work of the Reform Bureaucrats during the 1930s, which attacked the material question of poverty and class disparity at the base, left a rich institutional legacy but stopped short of offering the Korean people the means of political emancipation that were required. Kuriki Yasunobu thus correctly judged that freedom attained in political revolution is prerequisite to further advancement in material liberty. Had Juche remained a strand of humanist Marxism, as it was in the early 1970s, and Japan–North Korean relations not soured as a result of the 1976 default, there is a good chance that the North Koreans could have enjoyed a much greater degree of material and indeed political liberty compared to what they were eventually left with.

In post-war intellectual historiography, where Maruyama Masao's [丸山真男] liberalism looms large over the interpretation of interwar democracy, there has perhaps been an overemphasis on multiparty democracy as the singular useful legacy of pre-war Japan. The influence of Yoshino Sakuzō and the short-lived liberalism begun by leaders such as Hara Takashi and Saitō Makoto have been inflated at the cost of obscuring the legacy shared by the Japanese, Korean, Chinese and even Indochinese socialist movements. This is not to say, of course, that the only East Asian perspective capable of being systematized was the transnational Left, made possible by Comintern agency and carried in new directions in postwar China, Vietnam and North Korea. As this paper has shown, intellectual exchange was a long-established trend between Japan and Korea, dating back to the late 19th century. At times this transnational cross-pollination was accomplished through a Chinese medium like Liang Qichao, thanks to his exposure to progressive ideas in Japan and his popularity in Korea. This example, too, demonstrates that it was by no means inevitable that Korea accept modernization through Japanese coercion. It could be argued that North Korea, via the convolutions of socialist

revolution, had somehow finally achieved the Meiji-era vision of Bluntschli's "organic" national unity, which Liang Qichao and Kuga Katsunan had first alerted the progressive Koreans to a century ago.

The burning question now is how the Cold War divide—which common sense assumes to be the basis of political modernity for contemporary East Asia—can be overcome, not just on the Korean peninsula but also in Japan. Insights into this overcoming can be found in the history of the mutual interaction of Japanese and (North) Korean modernity in the 1960s and 1970s. Until 1998, North Korea was run by people with direct experience of colonial rule, and it could be argued that even after 1998 the country remained more or less under the influence of a Japanese legacy of colonial and militaristic institutions and outlooks. Thus the "other" was in fact made up of elements of "us" as we existed in the past. During the 1950s–1970s, contrasted against the turmoil, corruption and brutality of Rhee Syngman and later Park Chung-hee's military rule in South Korea, North Korea seemed to some Japanese progressives like a beacon of moderation, progress and rationality, and indeed it boasted reasonable living conditions compared to the abject poverty in capitalist South Korea. Most tragically for this rational, progressive North Korea, a country that could have been like "us", its long decline began when it was bankrupted in 1976 by the Technological Revolution. Although the country remained the "other" for Japan, until North Korea's political conduct went awry in the late 1970s and 80s with hostage-taking and acts of terrorism, it was an understandable, if not exactly preferable, "other". Now that North Korea is considering pledging itself to denuclearization, economic reform and trade liberalization, it is once again in the process of joining "us"—the rest of the international community. Rediscovering the legacy of Japanese–Korean interactions and fostering awareness of this history will allow both sides to bridge the perverted modernity of the Cold War divide.

Notes

1. PhD Candidate, Dept of Japanese Studies, the Chinese University of Hong Kong.
2. Notable exceptions include Kimura Mitsuhiko's book *A Hidden Aspect of Relations between Japan and North Korea in the Postwar Era—North Korean Acquisition of Japanese Advanced Technology and Products and its Intelligence for this purpose* [戦後日朝関係の研究 ― 対日工作と物資調達], Tokyo: Chisenshokan [知泉書館], 2008; and his article—"From Fascism to Communism: Continuity and Development of Collectivist Economic Policy in North Korea." In The Economic History Review, New Series, vol. 52, 1999 [1]. 69–86; Charles Armstrong's *North Korean Revolution 1945–1950* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003) makes detailed analysis of the continuities in legality, food mobilization and other administrative institutions; this is whilst various aspects of colonial-era social movements and official policy have been discussed in Gi-wook Shin and Michael Robinson, eds., *Colonial Modernity in Korea* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999).
3. Ralf Dahrendorf, *Society and Democracy in Germany*. New York: Norton, 1967, 412.

4. Ibid, 412.
5. Refer for example to Janis Mimura, *Planning for Empire—Reform Bureaucrats and the Japanese Wartime State*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2011.
6. To borrow a term first used by Ze'ev Sternhell in describing the Fascist movement in France.
7. Koyasu Nobukuni [子安宣邦], *Thesis on East Asia* [东亚论], Trans. Zhao Jinghua [赵京华]. Changchun: Jilin People's Press [吉林人民出版社], 2004, 34–5.
8. As was the case during the Comintern-organised 'First Congress of the Toilers of the Far East' in January 1921. See Suh Dae-sook, *The Korean Communist Movement, 1918–1948*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967, 38. Also see Pak Chin-sun, "The Socialist Movement in Korea", in Suh Dae-sook, *Documents of Korean Communism, 1918–1948*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970, 44–52.
9. The rebellion set the example in Korea during the subsequent five decades for a fraternalistic, egalitarian grassroots revolutionary consciousness. This and subsequent waves of peasant revolt through to the Japanese annexation of Korea in 1910 were first directed against the Korean gentry-aristocracy [兩班 Yangban] before it turned against the growing Japanese presence—at which stage support from the erstwhile gentry-elite grew in strength. This is an official Korean communist interpretation which has existed at least since 1919. See Pak, "The Socialist Movement in Korea", in Suh, *Documents of Korean Communism, 1918–1948*, 46. Soon after the 1919 protests, the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea was established in Shanghai.
10. See Guo Gang [郭刚]. *Zhongguo Zaoqi Makesi Zhuyi de Chuanbo—Liang Qichao yu Xixue Dongjian* (The Early Propagation of Marxism in China—Liang Qichao and the Eastern Propagation of Western Knowledge.) [中国早期马克思主义的传播 — 梁启超与西学东渐] Beijing: Social Sciences Academia Press [社会科学文献出版社], 2010, 213 and 248–250.
11. For discussions on Liang and Kuga's ideological mutual-influence, see Wang, Ke [王柯]. "'Minzu'—Yige Laizi Riben de Wuhui" ("'Nation'—A Misunderstanding Imported from Japan.") ['民族' — 一個來自本的誤會] In *Ershiyi Shiji Shuangyuekan* (Twenty-First Century Bi-monthly Journal) [二十一世紀雙月], 2003 [6], 73–83.
12. Paek, Young-seo [白永瑞]. *Sixiang Dongya—Chaoxian Bandao Shijiao de Lishi yu Shijian* (Thinking East-Asia—History and Practice from the Perspective of the Korean Peninsula.) [思想东亚 — 朝鲜半岛视角的历史与实践] Beijing: Joint Publishing [三联书店], 2011, 230–234.
13. Ibid., 231.
14. Kan, Jye-On [姜在彦]. *Chōsen no Kaika Shiso* (Korean Reformist Thought) [朝鮮の開化思想], Tokyo: Iwanami Books [岩波書店], 1980, 390; See also Guo, *Liang Chi-chao*, 125–152. These essays had originally been published in Tokyo on Liang's constitutional-monarchist journal, the 'New Peoples' Gazette' [新民叢報], which was also widely distributed in Korea.
15. Kan, *Korean Reformist Thought*, 423. While his subordinates joined the 'Volunteer Army' [義兵] guerrilla resistance, Yi, a Christian, founded a modern school on Kanghwa Island where his garrison had been located, and was involved in organizing intellectual societies which promoted modern education. By June 1910, civilian organizations were made illegal. Ibid., 421.
16. Populated largely by Korean peasants who arrived during late-19th century opening up of Manchuria, Kando [Chientao, in some sources] was the subject of a protracted dispute between Chinese and colonial Korean authorities; this area was established as a Korean-ethnic Autonomous Region under the People's Republic of China after 1949.
17. Ahn's 'Gradualist platform' noted the lack of education amongst the agrarian diaspora, and that the prerequisite to a successful revolution would lie in fostering intellectual and financial capabilities of Koreans in Manchuria and overseas. Otherwise, noted Ahn, a premature Korean uprising against Japan would fare no better than an egg being hurled against a rock. Kan, *Korean Reformist Thought*, 422.

18. Yi's activities in Kando, including the establishment of an officer's academy in 1914, came under Japanese persecution, forcing him to escape to Russia's Maritime Province by 1915. Kan, *Korean Reformist Thought*, 423. He organised in Siberia a 'Korean Revolutionary Corps' [高麗革命団] which placed hope in German victory in Europe. Scalapino & Lee, *Communism in Korea Part I*, 6–7. Note 7.
19. Ibid., 6. Although drawing mainly from the ranks of 'wealthy Koreans' and Menshevik sympathizers, and "handicapped by a relative lack of ties with the peasantry" (ibid., 8), the KPSP succeeded in forming a Korean Red Guard Detachment by the end of July 1918. This came in time for the Japanese intervention in Siberia in August 1918, during which they competed for control over Siberia with the Bolsheviks, Social Democrats, Czarists and the Czechs. Defeated, the Korean detachment disbanded later that month, and a number of leading Communists were executed after White forces, with Japanese help, seized Khabarovsk in September 1918 (8–9).
20. In Paris, Korean representatives, including future socialists Yo Un-hyung [呂運亨] and Kim Kyu-sik [金奎植], had been turned away from the negotiations.
21. Scalapino, Robert A. & Chong-sik Lee. *Communism in Korea, Part I: The Movement*. Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 1972, 9.
22. Scalapino & Lee, *Communism in Korea Part I*, 10; Suh, *The Korean Communist Movement*, 11.
23. Suh, *The Korean Communist Movement*, 9.
24. Ibid., 15. Contributing to Yi's later downfall were to be accusations of embezzlement (Ibid., 19).
25. Suh, *The Korean Communist Movement*, 14.
26. Han, Jung-Sun N. *An Imperial Path to Modernity—Yoshino Sakuzō and a New Liberal Order in East Asia, 1905–1937*. Cambridge and London: Harvard University Asia Centre, 2012, 116.
27. Ibid., 108.
28. Yoshino, Sakuzo. "The So-called Yo Un-hyung Incident" [いはゆる呂運亨事件について] *In Chuo Koron* [中央公論], Jan 1920. Quoted on Matsuo, Takayoshi [松尾尊兊], *Taishō Democracy* [大正デモクラシー]. Tokyo: Iwanami Books [岩波書店], 2001, 327.
29. Yoshino, "Taigaiteki ryoshin no hakki", 55–58. Quoted in Han, *Yoshino Sakuzo*. 113. Yoshino had arrived at this conclusion the hard way; during his two visits in Korea he had seen first-hand the nationalist sentiment there, and was surprised at first that Japanese rule was not appreciated; the pervasive discrimination of Koreans, he wrote, had caused the March 1919 protests (Han, *Yoshino Sakuzo*, 107).
30. Ibid., 114–5.
31. Ibid., 115.
32. Ibid., 105–113.
33. On June 27th, 1921 Irkutsk Korean militia and Russian forces attempted to disarm a group of Yi Dong-hwi's troops which had retreated from Kando after a Japanese offensive. Fighting broke out amongst some 7,000 men present, resulting in hundreds of Korean casualties. The Comintern blamed both sides. Scalapino & Lee, *Communism in Korea Part I*, 32–25.
34. Suh, *The Korean Communist Movement*, 45.
35. Ibid., 51.
36. Kim Yak-su was "influenced by the thinking of Saka[i] Toshihiko [堺利彥], receiving tangible support from Kitahara Tatsuo [北原龍雄], Fuse Tatsuji [布施辰治]" and others. Kim had been a member of the Japanese Socialist League, formed in summer 1920 and led by socialists of otherwise divergent platforms, including the trade unionist Sakai Toshihiko and the anarchist and atheist-advocate Ōsugi Sakae [大杉榮]. Wei, Chaoyang [卫朝阳] and Tong Laga [通拉嘎], "Lidazhao he Zhongguo Zaoqi Shehui Zhuyi de Yanjiu Huigu" ("A Review of Studies on Li Dazhao and the Early Chinese Socialist Movement") [李大钊和中国早期社会主义的研究回顾]. In *Heilongjiang Gazette* [黑龙江省志], 2009 [12], 34; Swearingen, Rodger & Paul Langer. *Red Flag in Japan—International Communism in Action, 1919–1951*. Cambridge: Harvard

University Press, 1952, 10. Also a participant was the future Chinese Communist leader Li Dazhao [李大釗]. Li was a friend of Yoshino Sakuzo's and as a student at Waseda University [早稻田大學] had studied under Abe Isoo [安部磯雄], the samurai-turned-Christian trade unionist. Bernstein, Gail Lee. *Japanese Marxist—A Portrait of Kawakami Hajime, 1879–1946*. Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1976, 21.

37. Pak, "The Socialist Movement in Korea", in Suh, *Documents of Korean Communism, 1918–1948*, 48.
38. Ibid., 48.
39. Ibid., 44.
40. It would seem from Pak Chin-sun's statements that he had to reassure the Comintern of the proletarian-internationalist rather than bourgeois-nationalist nature of his movement. It would not require much imagination to judge that the Comintern needed a guarantee that the Koreans would help form a Japanese organization, or at least would not sabotage such efforts by bringing nationalist divisions into the Comintern.
41. Totten, George Oakley. *The Social Democratic Movement in Prewar Japan*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1966, 375.
42. Ibid., 375. Note 44.
43. Also at the meeting was Yo Un-hyung, and the Peking University professor Chen Duxiu [陳獨秀], who had made his name during the May Fourth Movement of 1919 as editor of the radical journal 'La Jeunesse' [新青年] and was to become the first General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party in July 1921. "Neither Chen nor Yi impressed Ōsugi as being diehard Communists." Suh, *The Korean Communist Movement*, 18.
44. Swearingen & Langer, *Red Flag in Japan*, 10.
45. During the 1930s–1940s Kondo would be active in the National Socialist movement, as a member of the Japanese Party of Laborers and Farmers [日本勞農党] which would have ties with the "Reform Bureaucrats" and the left-wing elements of the Cabinet Planning Board [內閣企画院] who attempted in vain to push a policy of industrial nationalization in 1940.
46. Ibid., 10–11.
47. Ibid., 11.
48. Kondo was later arrested in a brothel by the Japanese authorities. He secured his release after promising that the money would not be used for subversive activities, but not before he had founded a 19-member Communist cell known as the Enlightened People's Society [曉民會]. Its representatives arrived in Moscow in January 1922 for the Comintern's First Congress of the Toilers of the Far East but returned to Japan to discover that their organization had perished. Ibid., 11–13.
49. Kan, *Korean Reformist Thought*, 424. Although Ahn's progressive movement was far from Communist, its importance to the later socialist state is manifold—it contributed to the width, depth and sophistication of Korean civil society and built firmly on the gains of the March 1919 mass protests; this allowed for a smooth transition to a mobilizational state, and provided enough intellectuals armed with socialist sympathies to administer it. The movement gave rise to at least two important leaders in early North Korea—Cho Man-sik [曹晩植], a Pyongyang YMCA pastor who led the Korean Industry Encouragement Movement; [朝鮮産業獎勵運動] and Ho Hon [許憲], who led the movement for a civilian-run university [民間大学運動].
50. A handful of intellectual factions participated in its formation, but its direction was dominated by the 'Tuesday Faction', so named because they met at the Seoul YMCA premises on Tuesdays. It was led by Pak Hon-yong [朴憲永], a participant in the 1922 Far East Toilers' Congress who was to emerge as the primary challenger to Kim Il-sung in the early 1950s; and Cho Bong-am [曹奉岩], who was to run as a Progressive candidate for the South Korean presidency against Rhee Syng-man in 1956, and was executed on Rhee's orders in 1958 under espionage charges.

51. Armstrong, *North Korean Revolution*, 25. The party succeeded in forming a number of satellite organizations, for example a national trade union and a women's league. Kim Chon-hae of the Japanese Communist Party represented the Japanese General Bureau [日本総局] of the Korean party.
52. Han, "Colonial Origins of Juche". 35. This was not helped by the fact that the Japanese authorities claimed to represent Korean interests on this otherwise Chinese territory, and offered armed-backing to Korean peasants when disputes arose.
53. in 1929, Korean radicals rose up against Mukden-faction Chinese troops in the Kirin-Dunhua area [吉敦地區], and in 1930 a general uprising occurred in Kando. Armstrong, *North Korean Revolution*, 25.
54. This is despite the fact that the Chinese Communist Party issued a widely-ridiculed decree which, in a spirit of proletarian-internationalism understood by few in China, called for the 'Armed Defense of the Soviet Union' [武裝保衛蘇聯] at the expense of Chinese troops and sovereignty.
55. Armstrong, *North Korean Revolution*, 25.
56. For a detailed account of this event, see Han, Hongkoo. "Colonial Origins of Juche: The Mingsaengdan Incident of the 1930s and the Birth of the North Korea–China Relationship." In Suh, Jae-Jung. *Origins of North Korea's Juche—Colonialism, War and Development*. Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2013.
57. Shin Gi-wook and Han Do Hyun, "Colonial Corporatism,: The Rural Revitalization Campaign, 1932–1940" in *Colonial Modernity in Korea*, 86. This is while financial cooperatives, which had 685 branches covering o million members in 1933, helped matters such as resolving debt, and "extended a total of 52 million won to members as low-interest loans to obviate usury, benefitting almost a half-million peasant households."
58. Ibid., 86. In addition to this was the siksan'gye [殖産会] which "often functioned as peasant co-ops for purchasing and marketing and became the main village-level organization."
59. Ibid., 84. "The survey was comprehensive, including information on demographics (age, education level, etc., of each member of every household); the extent of debt, savings, and food shortages; land productivity; crop production; fertilizer use; cash income; and expenses."
60. Ibid., 96. Shin and Han concludes that the Saemaul (New Village) Movement of 1971, initiated by the military-led "developmental dictatorship" under the former Manchukuo Army Academy and Tokyo Military Academy cadet Park Chung-hee [朴正熙], was similar to Ugaki's campaign.
61. Japanese: *seisan sekininsei*; Korean: *saengsan ch'aegim-je*.
62. Kimura, "From Fascism to Communism", 73, 76.
63. Armstrong, *North Korean Revolution*, 144.
64. Hwang, Kyung Moon. *Rationalizing Korea—The Rise of the Modern State, 1900–1945*. Oakland: University of California Press, 2016, 300, note 6, in reference to Gim Nang-nyeon, "Singminji Joseon gyeongjen ui jedojeok yusan", Working Paper 2010–2, Naksungdae Institute of Economic Research Working Paper Series (2010).
65. Kimura, "From Fascism to Communism", 81.
66. Armstrong, *North Korean Revolution*, 136.
67. Kimura, "From Fascism to Communism", 82.
68. Cumings, Bruce. *Korea's Place in the Sun: A Modern History*. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1997, 311.
69. "Throughout the expansion of the 1930s and the Pacific war, the implementation of war-mobilizational policies was always more moderate in Japan itself than in its possessions and quasi-colonies—a distinction attributable to many factors, not the least of these being that the Japanese military was freer to promote its vision of 'development planning' in settings inhabited by non-Japanese populations. Park Chung-hee was thus

not only exposed in the classroom and the dormitory to economic development. He also witnessed it in practice in Manchuria: first during the years in the academy and then later as a lieutenant in the Japanese Kwangtung Army. For a variety of readily understandable reasons, neither Park nor his South Korean critics chose to dwell on this aspect of his personal history. In retrospect, however, there can be little doubt that it made a lasting impression." Eberstadt, Nicholas. *Policy and Economic Performance in Divided Korea during the Cold War Era: 1945–91*. Washington: AEI Press, 2010, 101–102.

70. *Inmin* [人民] 1947 (1).
71. Kim Chaek [金策]. *Pukchosŏninminwiwŏnhoe shinbalchog e taehayŏ* (On the New Beginnings of the North Korean People's Committee) [北朝鮮人民委員會新發足에對하여] *Inmin* [人民] 1947 (4), 21–22.
72. Armstrong, *North Korean Revolution*, 202, 197.
73. RG 242 SA 2008, 9/100. *Puk Chosŏn Nodongdang che ich'a chŏndang taehoe hoeŭirok* (Minutes of the Second Congress of the North Korean Worker's Party), 144–148. Quoted in Armstrong, *North Korean Revolution*, 200.
74. Kimura, "From Fascism to Communism", 82–83. Japanese engineering staff likewise strongly contributed to post-1949 China, with some 1000 staff from the former South Manchuria Railway and their family members retained by the Communist government to work on designing and building the Tianshui-Lanzhou section of the mainline to Xinjiang, which was completed in October 1952. For a thorough account of their experiences, see Horii, Kōichirō [堀井弘一郎]. *'Manshū' kara Shūdan Renkō sareta Tetsudo Gijutsusha tachi—Tensui 'Ryūyō' Sennichi no Kiroku* (The Railway Technicians Collectively Abducted from 'Manchuria'—A Record of 1000 Days of being 'Retained' at Tianshui' ['満洲'から集団連行された鉄道技術者たち—天水 '留用' 千日の記録], Tokyo: Sōdosha [創土社], 2015.
75. Moore, Aaron Stephen. *Constructing East Asia—Technology, Ideology, and Empire in Japan's Wartime Era, 1931–1945*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013, p. 172–180.
76. Calichman, *Overcoming Modernity*, x, 2.
77. Ibid., 7, 17.
78. Ibid., 4.
79. "The logic in which the non-West (Asia) must essentially become Western in order to resist the West, or [to] become modern in order to resist modernity, was, in Takeuchi's view, never sufficiently problematized either during the war or thereafter". Ibid., xiii.
80. Hwang, Jang-yop. *Hwang Changye Huigulu* (Memoirs of Hwang Jang-yop) [黄长烨回顾录], 20.
81. Ibid., 37–38, 40–41. In 1947 Hwang joined the Korean Communist Party and was sent in 1949 for further studies in Moscow. Coming back to North Korea after the end of hostilities in the Korean War in 1953, he served as lecturer and eventually chancellor at the Kim Il-sung Comprehensive University.
82. "Some people continue to use Japanese terms; they say 'wuwagi' [うわぎ, 上著] for what should be 'yangbok jogori' (jacket), and they say 'zibaong' [ズボン, zubon] for what should be 'yangbok baji' (trousers)." But he then argued that Japanese imports, like varieties of apples such as Asahi and Yiwayi, should be referred to by their original Japanese names "Zubon" came from an Edo-era misunderstanding of the French word "Jupon" meaning "petticoat". Kim, Il-sung [金日成]. "Fazhan Chaoxianyu de Jige Wenti" (Several Questions in the Development of the Korean Language) [发展朝鲜语的几个问题], in *Jin Richeng Zhuzuo Xuanji* (Collected Works of Kim Il-sung) [金日成著作選集] vol. 4. Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Press [外国文出版社], 1976, 8.
83. Kimura, *Hidden Aspect*, 85. Part of the reason for the trade opening to Japan was the unreliability of Soviet aid; power generators to be installed at Pyongyang and Pukchang were slow to arrive, and both projects fell many years behind schedule, forcing North Korean officials to turn to Japan and Western Europe.
84. Ibid., 69–75.

85. Kimura Mitsuhiko noted that Korea's rich reserves of borax [硼砂] and silicates containing aluminium, magnesium and kalium, essential for the manufacturing of military optics, had been exploited by Japanese firms before the war.
86. Kimura, *Hidden Aspect*, 75–77. Japan New Chisso [新日本窒素] also sent representatives to North Korea thirteen times until 1972 to provide information on the latest chemical technological progress and to propose collaboration in the petrochemical sector.
87. This was in addition to some 13,677 pieces of electricity measuring equipment imported between 1961–70, which served a new policy of building large numbers of small power plants across the country. Ibid., 87–90.
88. Ibid., 83.
89. The expansion of the carbide industry required large amounts of electricity which could not be obtained from hydro-electricity power plants during the dry winter season. This required the construction of coal-fired power plants, for which generators, turbines and boilers had to be imported. The electrification of railways to replace steam traction, confirmed as official policy by Kim Il-sung in 1978, also placed huge pressure on electricity supply. Ibid., 97–98.
90. Ibid., 102–103.
91. The late 1960s were a vibrant, if not traumatic period for socialism; Alexander Dubček's "Socialism with a Human Face" was brutally suppressed by Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia, whilst the Cultural Revolution in China, though it widened the gulf with the Soviet Union even further, became a source of inspiration for many young activists in the developed world, including Japan; China's support for Vietnamese and Cambodian communists gave rise to Japanese illusions of a worldwide Maoist revolution against the decadent, imperialist West—a revival of the old dream of Overcoming Modernity. These hopes were dashed when television screens across the world in 1971–72 showed Henry Kissinger and President Richard Nixon shaking hands with Mao. Suddenly, Korean Juche became a readily available ideological alternative for the worldwide Left, and Kim Il-sung was quick to take advantage of this opportunity by organizing international Juche Conferences in Pyongyang, as well as authorizing for such conferences to be held in Japan.
92. Kuriki's father was a military officer, and he had studied in an army-run primary school during the war. By the 1970s he was active on the margins of the Left, against the dominant faction of the Japanese Communist Party (the Yoyogi-ha [代代木派] under General Secretary Miyamoto Kenji [宮本顕治]) and had achieved some fame as an economist specializing on labour issues.
93. These included an essay celebrating Kim Il-sung's 62nd birthday written by the "Gunma Prefecture Research Society on the Korean Question", an essay on the inevitability of Juche victory by the periodical "Workers" under the same society; two essays on Kim Il-sung's revolutionary theory and national theory by Nakagawa Nobuo [中川信夫] who had written extensively on Colonial Korea, the Korean War, and the Democracy Movement against Park Chung-hee. Motohashi Atsushi [本橋渥], professor at the Yokohama National University and an expert on the Chinese economy, contributed an essay on Korea's socialist economy, and Hishinuma Tatsuya [菱沼達也], former professor at the Tokyo Education University and an expert on agricultural policy, wrote on North Korea's village policy.
94. Kuriki's admiration for North Korean social welfare may be explained by the fact that 1973 was known as "Welfare Era Year One" for Japan, before which the welfare state hardly existed. "In 1973 several positive measures were enacted to enhance social security: Free medical treatment for the aged, an increase in pension payments, help with high-cost medical treatments, and an increase in the proportion of medical expenses covered by health insurance." (Shirahase, Sawako. *Social Inequality in Japan*. Oxon and New York: Routledge, 20143) Kuriki's humanist inclinations is shown by how he quotes Kim Il-sung's essay "For the Self-Determination and Peaceful Reunification of the Motherland", where

Kim wrote that "Man is the master of everything, man decides everything. This is the basis of Juche Ideology. The transformation of nature and society is for man, and is done by men. The most precious thing in the world is man, and the most powerful existence is also man." Kuriki, Yasunobu [栗木安延]. "Zhuti Sixiang de Shijie Lishi Yiyi" (The Significance of Juche Ideology in World History) [主体思想的世界历史意义] *In Zhuti Sixiang de Shijie Lishi Yiyi* [主体思想的世界历史意义], Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Press [外国文出版社], 1974, 11.

95. Kuriki, "Zhuti Sixiang", 8–11.
96. Ibid., 12–18.
97. Kuriki also attended the International Juche Conference in Socialist Madagascar in 1976—this highlights Kim Il Sung's intention to capture the attention of African intellectuals, which he did succeed to some extent, with close relations being fostered with Robert Mugabe's Zimbabwe after 1980. North Korea would be training intelligence officers and troops for Mugabe throughout the 1980s.
98. Onoe Kenichi [尾上健一], "Kuriki Yasunobu Sensei no Shichikaiki ni Yosete" [栗木安延先生の七回忌に寄せて], in Kuriki, Taiko [栗木黛子] and Shakai Riron Gakkai [社会理論學会] eds. *Henkaku to Jōnetsu—Mirai e tsunagu—Kuriki Yasunobu omoide shü* (Reform and Passion—Connections to the Future—Remembrances of Kuriki Yasunobu) [変革と情熱—未来へつなぐ—栗木安延思い出集]. Tokyo: Senshobō [千書房], 2008, 95–99. Its nominal president, the pacifist legal scholar and anti-nuclear activist Yasui Kaoru [安井郁] had become too ill to organize the conference.
99. Young, Namkoong. "A Comparative Study on North and South Korean Economic Capability". *The Journal of East Asian Affairs* 1995 (1), 4.
100. The default amount due to Japan reached 80 billion yen, and in August 1979 an agreement was reached whereby debts to Japan would be repaid before those to Western Europe. Kimura, *Hidden Aspect*, 105–107.
101. Ibid., 101.
102. This is due to the cessation of trade and aid from the Soviet bloc, and to the lack of fuel needed by the many power plants, pumping stations and tractors in collective farms across the country. The electrified railways carrying fuel, food and other supplies grounded to a halt, whilst flooding decimated the crops, causing widespread famine.
103. Kim Jong Il's brother-in-law Jang Song-thaek [張成澤] masterminded the purges and emerged as its greatest winner; yet he too would be executed in 2013 on Kim Jong-un's orders.
104. Paek, *Thinking East Asia*. 203.

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Passion—Connections to the Future—Remembrances of Kuriki Yasunobu) [変革と情熱—未来へつなぐ—栗木安延思い出集]. Tokyo: Senshobō [千書房], 2008.
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Book Reviews

Zhihua Shen and Yafeng Xia, *A Misunderstood Friendship: Mao Zedong, Kim Il-sung, and Sino–North Korean Relations, 1949–1976*

2018, Columbia University Press, 357 pages, ISBN: 9780231188265

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It has been widely believed that China and North Korea, having fought side by side against common enemies during the Anti-Japanese War, the Chinese Civil War, and the Korean War, forged a revolutionary friendship as "blood brothers," close as lips and teeth. Such a belief begot a presumption prevailing into the present that should Pyongyang's security be put in jeopardy, Beijing will vigorously and determinedly fight alongside Pyongyang. Nevertheless, *A Misunderstood Friendship: Mao Zedong, Kim Il-sung, and Sino–North Korean Relations, 1949–1976* by Shen and Xia stresses that this belief is a mere "historical myth" whose veil should be torn off not only to enable the accurately comprehension of the contours of Sino–DPRK relations, but also to support other nations to design more functional foreign policy toward North Korea.

Shen and Xia, relying on extensive archival documents from Russia, China, the United States, North Korea, and other Eastern European countries, reveal that although both China and North Korea were members of the Socialist Bloc, their relations were fundamentally in conflict and discord throughout the Mao era. At the crux of the conflict and discord, according to the authors, was an ideological collision between Mao Zedong and Kim Il Sung. This ideological rupture revolved around the fact that whereas Mao inherited a traditional Sinitic sense that China was the "Celestial Empire (*Tianchao*)," Kim held to strong 'anti-flunkeyist' sentiment, which later developed into the *Juche* ideology. Specifically, Mao, as manifested by his quest for a leading role in the international communist revolution in Asia, naturally accepted a traditional Sino-centric hierarchical international order—the *Tianxia* system. China formed a suzerain-vassal relationship with North Korea through this framework. By assuming this self-imposed responsibility, Mao would wholeheartedly extend whatever assistance was available

to the North as long as Pyongyang was willing to accept China's lofty status and priority of leadership. Kim Il Sung, by contrast, based his conceptual strategy towards China on North Korea's national interest, thereby inevitably engendering friction, dispute, and even hostility between the two. A similar observation of Sino–DPRK relations can also be found in the original Chinese edition of this book, *Zuihou de "Tianchao": Mao Zedong, Jin Richeng yu Zhong Chao guanxi* [*The Last "Celestial Empire": Mao Zedong, Kim Il Sung, and Sino–North Korean Relations*] (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 2018).

China's intervention in the Korean War and its assistance during the course of the hostilities has long been considered as a cornerstone of the special relationship between the two countries, and has drawn extensive scholarly attention. Shen and Xia argue that Mao, as the leader of the Asian Revolution, "had long paid attention to the revolutionary movement in China's neighboring countries" and intended, albeit thwarted by Stalin, to create an "Asian Cominform" with its "supreme headquarters within China" (14, 23). Their interpretation of Mao's stance on the Korean War also follows a similar vein; in his eagerness "to assume a leadership role in the Asian Revolution and to expand the Chinese revolutionary experience," Mao Zedong, although the Korean War "would disrupt China's unification plans," not only "did not make any attempt to stop" the war, but also "decided to send Chinese troops to aid" prevailing "over the dissenting views of his colleagues" (8, 33).

This analysis, however, does not hold up under rigorous scrutiny. The Soviet and Chinese archival evidence reveals that Mao relayed a telegram to Stalin on October 21, 1949, expressing his opposition to Kim Il Sung's initiation of the Korean War. Also, when meeting Stalin on December 16, 1949, Mao reaffirmed this position by stressing that China should be committed to economic construction for 3–5 years, which according to Mao was the gravest task at that time. In addition, during his conversation with the Soviet delegation in September 1956, Mao recalled that although he opposed Kim Il Sung's plans for the Korean War due to possible involvement of the U.S. in May 1950, he could not help but reluctantly agree with the plan since both Stalin and Kim Il Ssung had already reached a consensus. At the same time, Mao also made it clear to Kim that "Even if the [U.S.] imperialists do not interfere, we will not care if [U.S. troops] does not cross the 38th parallel." All these documents run counter to the authors' claim that Mao readily concurred with the plans for the Korean War, with the ardent desire to expand his revolutionary experience to the North. Instead, they only attest to the fact that Mao was unsupportive of North Korea's invasion against South Korea and was not positive about a Chinese intervention in the Korean War at least before the outbreak of the war.

In fact, Mao Zedong was by no means resolute when it came to China's entry into the war even after the onset of North Korea's aggression. He did evince his willingness to dispatch troops to the Korean peninsula in July and August when North Korean troops were recording a stunning winning streak against U.S. troops. However, as the tide of the war dramatically turned against the North following the American army's surprise amphibious assault at Inchon in September, Mao reversed this position and informed Stalin on October 2 and 12 that China would not participate in the war. According to recent studies, what was critical in China's final decision on intervention on October 13 was intelligence that U.S. troops might stop their advance at the Pyongyang-Wonsan front. In a telegram sent to Zhou Enlai on October 14, Mao pointed out that if China deployed troops to Tokchon County and established two or three defensive lines north of the county, then both U.S. and South Korean troops would halt their advance, allowing China to extend its national defence line from the Yalu River to the northern part of North Korea even without fighting.[1] Given that Mao's decision to intervene in the Korean War was highly situational and even opportunistic, it appears obvious that the decision was governed by China's raison d'état, rather than Mao's individual ideological sensitivities.

This book also explores the reason why Stalin reversed his original opposition to the Korean War and gave approval to Kim Il Sung's Korean War scheme on January 30, 1950. Shen and Xia enumerated several factors that might have influenced Stalin's strategic calculation, including "the Soviet Union's successful test of an atomic bomb in August; the Communist victory in China in October 1949; the signing of the Sino–Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance in February 1950; the exclusion of the USSR from the postwar Japanese settlement; the rearmament of Germany; and the establishment of the NATO and clear American commitment to defend Western Europe" (31). In addition to these, Shen Zhihua contended in his another book, *Mao, Stalin and the Korean War: Trilateral Communist Relations in the 1950s*, published in 2012 that Stalin, having lost "an outlet on the ocean and an ice-free port" linked with the Pacific Ocean as a result of a new Sino–Soviet alliance treaty, attempted to secure a new ice-free port in the Korean peninsula by unleashing Kim Il Sung.[2] Shen Zhihua continued to follow a similar line of reasoning in the original Chinese edition of *A Misunderstood Friendship*: "As long as tension escalates in the Far East, no matter what the result [of the Korean War] was, Stalin could acquire what he wanted—if the war unfolded favorably, Stalin could use a ice-free port in the Korean peninsula as a substitute for the port in the Liaodong peninsula with; if the war unfolded unfavorably, the Soviet Union could keep its military base in the Liaodong peninsula."[3] Intriguingly, this point has been dropped in the process of translation.

If acquisition of a ice-free port in the Korean peninsula was Stalin's underlying calculus behind his authorization of the Korean War, why didn't he allow China to participate in the war in July and early August, 1950? At that time, North Korean troops occupied virtually all parts of South Korea except for a small southeastern-most corner near Pusan, pushing the U.S. forces to the brink of total defeat. If Stalin had given sanction to Mao's consideration for proactive participation, not only could he have put an end to the war with a sweeping victory for North Korea, but also could have secured several South Korean ice-free ports for Moscow's sphere of influence with ease. Nevertheless, Stalin, in reality, did not green-light China's participation in the Korean War at that time, in spite of Mao's readiness. In this regard, Shen and Xia insist that Stalin, "not yet ready to abandon the Soviet Union's exclusive control over North Korea," wanted to "keep Chinese troops out of Korea unless he had no other choice" (39). However, while in no way disregarding the virtue of the authors' view, some other evidence demonstrates that Stalin's approval of the Korean War, in fact, was conditional on the premise that China would send its troops, thereby invalidating the authors' explanation. For example, Stalin, according to the conversation record in May 1950, informed Kim that "North Korea's move toward actions … should be consulted with China and personally with comrade Mao Zedong." Also, in a telegram sent to the leader of Czechoslovakia Klement Gottwald on August 28, 1950, Stalin pointed out that "America … cannot cope with China, a country with such large armed forces at the ready. … [T]he struggle between America and China would revolutionize the entire Far East."

In fact, it appears that Stalin not only envisaged China participating in the war, but also welcomed it. In the aforementioned telegram, Stalin stated that if China was pulled into the Korean War, the U.S. would be "tied down in the Far East … and overextended itself in this matter." He continued, "America would be incapable of a third world war in the near future. …, which would provide the time necessary to strengthen socialism in Europe." He concluded that such an outcome "gives us an advantage in the global balance of power." In other words, Stalin's strategic goal in the Korean War was to bog the U.S. down on the peninsula and divert its resources from strategically significant Europe to far-flung Asia. It goes without saying that China's intervention was an indispensible part of that plan. Be that as it may, China's entry into the Korean War, from this perspective, was not desirable for Moscow when U.S. forces were on the verge of total defeat, since it could terminate the war to quickly, preventing Moscow from buying sufficient time for strengthening socialism in Europe. Instead, a protracted Korean War best served Stalin's strategy. Moreover, it would not only preclude any possibility of Sino–US rapprochement in the foreseeable future, but also increase China's dependence on

him. Simply put, whichever side won between Washington and Beijing, a pyrrhic victory was always the preferable option for Moscow. On balance, it appears more plausible that Stalin forestalled China's early intervention, not because of his trepidation over the possible loss of Moscow's exclusive control over Pyongyang, but because of his strategic maneuvering.

This book also puts forward an interesting interpretation about the withdrawal of the postwar People's Volunteer Army (PVA) remaining in North Korea in 1958. According to this book, since Soviet power in the socialist camp was weakened after the twentieth congress of the Communist Party of the USSR and the 1956 Polish and Hungarian crises, whereas "status of both Mao and the CCP improved substantially," Mao, felt it "necessary that China exhibit some magnanimity toward the DPRK." Thus, "[t]o alleviate Kim's fears of interference in the future, Mao took the initiative to propose the withdrawal of all Chinese troops from Korea" (111–113). However, Mao informed the Soviet ambassador Yudin on November 30, 1956 that "Kim Il Sung does not like our hundreds of thousands of the PVA stationed in North Korea. He wants us [the PVA] to leave." Mao questioned, "The Soviet forces are stationed in Poland based on the Warsaw Pact. But we don't have [such a treaty]. What they [North Koreans] had invited was a volunteer army. If they said they no longer want to invite, what reason can we have for keeping [the PVA in North Korea]?" Mao remarks imply that it is highly likely that Kim proactively called for the withdrawal of the PVA. At that time, Kim experienced joint Sino–Soviet intervention in North Korea's domestic affairs and had witnessed what transpired in Poland and Hungary in 1956. Under such circumstances, Kim Il Sung might have felt threatened by a postwar PVA that could be utilized as a vehicle for forceful Chinese interference in his domestic politics. "After the Hungarian incident, North Korean comrades may think that our countries are unreliable," said Mao. According to *Chronicle of Zhou Enlai*, Zhou and Khrushchev agreed to withdraw the postwar PVA from the North on January 9, 1957. In a nutshell, it is more likely that postwar Chinese forces were withdrawn not by Mao's magnanimity, but by Kim's demand. If this was the case, Mao might have no other choice but to reluctantly accept the demand, since, as Mao pointed out, there was neither a person who could "replace" Kim Il Sung in the North, nor a treaty to justify the troops' continuous presence.

With the remnant PVA withdrawn, China lost its physical means to control North Korea. Since then, China, according to Shen and Xia, "adopted the more conciliatory policy" toward North Korea, and even "played a crucial role in helping Kim reach the pinnacle of his power in the late 1950s," which was "the beginning of their 'special relationship'" (4, 10). However, one may argue that Kim Il Sung's power had already been sufficiently consolidated long before, especially after Kim

purged Pak Hon-yong and Ho Ka-i. Mao Zedong, as seen above, also mentioned that there was no one who could replace Kim. In the light of these facts, it was not that Mao contributed to Kim's power consolidation, but that Mao, after the withdrawal of Chinese forces, lost a channel to exercise his influence over North Korea's domestic affairs. In other words, the withdrawal of postwar Chinese forces enabled Kim to fully enjoy his dictatorial power without foreign interference.

The book, based upon newly available historical evidence, sheds light on an array of interesting events between China and North Korea in the Mao Zedong and Kim Il Sung era. By piecing together these events, the book draws a provocative conclusion that Sino–North Korea relations have invariably been plagued with tension and strife, and behind the tension and strife was a conflict between Mao's *Tianchao*-ism and Kim's *Juche* ideology. However, as illustrated above, Mao, in his dealing with Sino–North Korea relations, also showed many traits as a rational leader struggling to maximize China's national interest. Admittedly, he repeatedly made statements which seemingly reflecting *Tianchao*-ism. That being said, whenever his *Tianchao*-ism conflicted with China's national interests, Mao, based on strategic consideration, often prioritized the latter. In addition, while this book delves into China's unilateral provision of security and financial assistance toward North Korea, it tends to trivialize North Korea's contribution to China's security. It is axiomatic that China's foreign policy toward North Korea was affected not only the two countries' bilateral relations, but also by the vicissitude of the whole Cold War structure. In this sense, it is highly plausible that North Korea has also served China's strategic interests especially in its relations vis-à-vis the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Of particular note is North Korea's role as a strategic buffer between China and the U.S. and as a power balancer between China and the Soviet Union. To address this lacuna and grasp the full picture, we may need a more holistic approach that unveils entangled interests and complex dynamics of not only Beijing and Pyongyang, but also Washington and Moscow.

Notes

1. Donggil Kim, "China's Intervention in the Korean War Revisited," *Diplomatic History*, Volume 40, Issue 5, November 2016, pp. 1002–1026.
2. Shen Zhihua, *Mao, Stalin and the Korean War: Trilateral Communist Relations in the 1950s* (New York: Routledge, 2012), p. 118.
3. Shen Zhihua, *Zuihou de "Tianchao": Mao Zedong, Jin Richeng yu Zhong Chao guanxi* [*The Last "Celestial Empire": Mao Zedong, Kim Il-sung, and Sino–North Korean Relations*], expanded edition (Hong King: The Chinese University Press, 2018), p. 119.

Kathryn Weathersby, Georgetown University[1]

This latest book by Shen Zhihua and Xia Yafeng is the most substantial and authoritative account yet written of the history of relations between the People's Republic of China and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea during the Mao Zedong era. Shen, a Russia specialist and the director of the Center for Cold War International History Studies at East China Normal University in Shanghai, has for the last twenty years persistently pushed the Chinese government to open its documents on the Korean War and post-Korean War international relations. In 2012 he published an English translation of *Mao, Stalin, and the Korean War* (Routledge) and in 2015 he and Xia Yafeng, an equally prolific historian at Long Island University, Brooklyn, produced *Mao and the Sino–Soviet Partnership, 1945–1959: A New History* (Rowman and Littlefield). In this book, the two scholars bring their considerable knowledge and prodigious research to the important issue of China's relations with its troublesome ally on the Korean peninsula.

The strength of Shen and Xia's examination of Sino–North Korean relations is the breadth of evidence they present and their careful use of these wide-ranging sources. They draw on newly available Chinese records from Beijing and from several provincial governments, declassified documents from Russia, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Albania and the former East Germany, interviews with Chinese officials and high-ranking North Korean officials who defected to China, South Korean documents, and American government analyses. Their aim is to refute the widespread myth that the friendship between China and North Korea from 1949 to Mao's death in 1976 was, in the commonly used phrase, "as close as lips and teeth." They present instead a persuasive picture of a conflicted relationship that continually shifted as Beijing and Pyongyang sought to advance their interests in the midst of changing external and internal circumstances.

Shen and Xia acknowledge that before the Korean War, the DPRK was so thoroughly dominated by the Soviet Union that China had little influence. While Kim Il Sung was closely associated with the Chinese he served with in the 88th Infantry Brigade, Mao Zedong was unhappy that Stalin and Kim Il Sung decided to attack South Korea before the PRC took over Taiwan. Kim Il Sung, in turn, resented Mao's reluctance to support Korean unification after all that Koreans had done to help the CCP win the civil war in China. Mao nonetheless did not reject Kim Il Sung's plan to attack South Korea, mainly because he was eager to assume a leadership role in the Asian Revolution. He did, however, propose that Beijing and Pyongyang postpone signing a Sino–DPRK alliance treaty until after Korean reunification.

On the long-debated question of China's reasons for entering the war, Shen and Xia draw on recently declassified documents to reveal that Mao communicated to Stalin and Kim in August 1950 that China was prepared to send troops to Korea in order to prepare to meet an American advance. Stalin declined to respond to the Chinese offer, however, because, in Shen and Xia's assessment, he did not want to give up exclusive control of North Korea. This explains why, when the Korean People's Army faced defeat in late September, Kim Il Sung directed his first request for help to Stalin rather than to Mao. However, once Beijing decided to intervene in mid-October, Stalin supported the Chinese whenever they disagreed with the North Koreans on how to prosecute the war.

Such disagreements became quite sharp over questions of creating a unified command, the speed of the Chinese/North Korean advance south, the management of railroads, and most significantly, when to end the war. By early 1952 Kim Il Sung was ready to agree to an armistice in order to stop the physical destruction of North Korea by US bombing, but Mao, with Stalin's backing, insisted that they continue to fight in order to strengthen their countries' armies and inspire the worldwide movement for peace. Shen and Xia note that despite these serious disagreements over the war, Mao never interfered with Kim's purges of his domestic enemies and never considered overthrowing Kim—in contrast to the Americans' plans to remove Syngman Rhee.

Mao's restraint toward Kim Il Sung nearly evaporated in 1956. Presenting fascinating new evidence of the crisis that reverberated through the Soviet bloc in the wake of Khrushchev's new policies announced at the Twentieth Party Congress in February, Shen and Xia reveal that Mao considered staging a coup against Kim Il Sung out of fear that the North Korean leader would go the way of Hungary. Mao refrained from taking such a drastic step, but he did join forces with the Soviets in September to force the DPRK to adopt the Soviet line. However, the following year he apologized to Kim Il Sung for this interference and, to relieve Kim's fears of future interference, offered to withdraw Chinese troops from Korea. Shen and Xia conclude that China's public statement that their withdrawal was being done in order to force the Americans to withdraw was in actuality a camouflage to cover their real motivation.

Scholars have long noted that the Sino–Soviet split of 1960 enabled North Korea to play the Chinese and Soviets off one another. Shen and Xia provide such abundant detail about this dynamic that they elevate our understanding to a new level. Thus, for example, with the split imminent, Kim Il Sung went to Beijing in May and sided with the Chinese. Then the following month he traveled to Moscow, whereupon the Soviets showed him minutes of Mao's discussions in 1956 voicing suspicions of Kim's loyalty to the socialist bloc. This tactic worked. After

his return to Pyongyang, Kim declared to a party gathering that he would never again trust China because it wanted to turn the DPRK into a colony. The Soviets also gave North Korean massive new aid and forgave its debts. China reciprocated in kind, despite the severe economic crisis that followed the Great Leap Forward. Pyongyang then sided with China at a party conference in Moscow, whereupon Moscow signed a long-term trade and aid agreement with Pyongyang.

After North Korea signed a Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance with the Soviet Union in July 1961, China followed suit just five days later. Shen and Xia point out, however, that while the Soviet treaty was effective for only 10 years, subject to renewal every five years afterwards, China's treaty was effective indefinitely. Moreover, to compensate for its inability to match Soviet levels of economic aid, Beijing accommodated Kim's request for skilled labor by allowing Koreans living in China's northeast to work in North Korea. China even ceded territory along the Korean border so that the DPRK could acquire part of Mt. Paektu, which it was claiming as a sacred site.

As military tension between China and the Soviet Union intensified in 1962, Mao offered North Korea the whole of China's Northeast as a rear base. In April 1963 he urged the DPRK to "become familiar with Liaoning, Jilin, and Heilongjiang provinces. Send more people there to research and investigate." The following month he declared that "The whole of Northeast China is Korea's rear base … Should a war break out in the future, the great rear base will be turned over to Comrade Kim Il Sung for a 'unified command'." (p. 166) Despite such extravagant offers, by early 1966 North Korea began moving closer to the Soviet Union in order to receive the more advanced military aid Moscow could offer.

Shen and Xia discuss the serious threats North Korea faced during China's Cultural Revolution but argue that relations had begun to sour over the eighteen months before the Cultural Revolution began, as China came to regard the DPRK as a "revisionist" state. They detail how Beijing sharply decreased its aid to North Korea, while Pyongyang nonetheless declined to openly criticize China's excesses.

Sino–North Korean relations shifted yet again in 1969 as military clashes along the Sino–Soviet border aroused Chinese fears that the Soviet Union intended to mount a full-scale war with China. To protect against this eventuality, Mao turned to the United States. Before he could do so, however, he had to lure Pyongyang away from Moscow. Thus, after Kim Il Sung secretly visited China in October 1970, the two states signed the Agreement on Chinese Economic and Technical Aid to North Korea and the Long-Term Trade Agreement. In July 1971, Zhou Enlai successfully lobbied Kim Il Sung to support Beijing's rapprochement with the US by arguing that China was forming a united front with the American people against

US imperialists, which would drive the Americans off the Korean peninsula. In reality, the Chinese leadership made it clear to the Americans that they were in no hurry to facilitate US military withdrawal for Korean unification. By 1974 Pyongyang suspected that China had done just that and therefore began to act independently, without consulting Beijing, on issues such as dissolution of the United Nations Command, a peace agreement with the United States, and the withdrawal of US forces from Korea.

In its breadth of research, care with citations, and balanced analysis, Shen and Xia's book represents the best of post-Cold War international history. It is essential reading for specialists and will be of great benefit to advanced students, policy-makers, and all researchers concerned with Northeast Asia.

Note

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Chung-in Moon and John Delury, *Bridging the Divide: Moon Jae-In's Korean Peace Initiative*

2019, Yonsei University Press, 292 pages, ISBN: 9788968503689

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Amidst President Trump's bellicose 'fire and fury' rhetoric of 2017, very few observers of Korean affairs could have predicted the sudden transition towards the peace summitry that ensued at the outset of the following year. While many had feared the possibility of renewed conflict on the Korean peninsula, what ensued instead was an unprecedented series of (at the time of writing) three inter-Korean summits, two US–North Korean summits, and no less than five China–North Korea summits between the respective leaders of those countries. In explaining this puzzle, the vast majority of commentary in the English language has focused on the dynamics between President Trump and Chairman Kim Jong Un, to the relative neglect of the crucial mediating role of South Korean President Moon Jae-in in the process. This collection of commentaries and analysis seeks to correct this imbalance through shedding light directly on Moon Jae-in's peace initiative towards North Korea.

Emerging out of a conference held at the Yonsei Institute of North Korean Studies in April 2019, the contributors to the volume include a number of notable figures from academia, think tanks and research institutes, and from the policy world and civil society. Their contributions are divided into three sections. The first provides a valuable South Korean perspective on Moon's peace initiative.

These chapters serve to place that initiative into the context of the longer history of inter-Korean engagement while examining the relationship between the goals of peace and economic cooperation along with the tensions within and the challenges faced by Moon both in terms of domestic South Korean politics as well as South Korea's relations with the US. These contributions also provide a conceptual framework for understanding the key principles and aims of Moon's peace initiative. Chung-in Moon, co-editor of the volume and key advisor to the Moon Jae-in government, argues for example that the latter's peace initiative seeks to facilitate a transition from peacekeeping (i.e. suppressing provocations through military force), through peace making (transforming a conflictual situation through confidence building measures), to peacebuilding (removing the structural causes of war). In doing so, it is based on three fundamental principles: resolute opposition to military actions, whether pre-emptive or preventative war; denuclearisation through peaceful means; the principle of no regime change. However, as Kim Joon Hyung argues in his contribution, Moon's peace initiative is beset by a number of fundamental contradictions, most notably between the Washington hardliners and South Korea progressives; between Washington and Beijing on Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD); between progressives and conservatives within South Korea; between Moon Jae-in's campaign promises and Pyongyang's increasing belligerence.

The second section of the book is titled "Theoretical and practical critiques." Despite the title, contributors to this section, as with the rest of the volume, are highly sympathetic to Moon's peace initiative. Tim Kivimaki, for example, reserves his critique for possible alternatives to Moon's diplomacy, arguing that a 'bloody nose' strategy would not only be ineffectual but would potentially undermine the humanitarian norms that might be mobilised to support such a strategy. Similarly, sanctions are seen as likely to cause human suffering but at the same time be ineffectual in achieving their goals. It may be considered a shortcoming then that more critical perspectives were not included in the volume, as they would at the very least have shed light on what some of the forms of resistance to Moon's approach have been. The relationship between Moon's approach towards North Korea and the issue of human rights, for example, has been a constant refrain from human rights activists and from the conservative camp in South Korea. Delury does touch upon this in his concluding chapter, but perhaps a more in-depth analysis of this issue might have been warranted as it forms a barrier to broader domestic consensus and thereby an impediment to the continuity of engagement with North Korea should the pendulum of electoral politics swing back to the conservative camp in the future.

The most overtly critical chapter comes from Cheong Woosik. Although Cheong is on the whole supportive of Moon's efforts, he is also critical of Moon's continued support for sanctions; his decision to install the THAAD missile defence system; the reduction rather than freezing of US–South Korean military drills in spite of the North's freeze on nuclear and missile tests; the significant growth in South Korea's annual defence budget and the introduction of new weapons and equipment such as the F35 fighter jet; limited humanitarian aid to the North. These steps seem largely out of sync with the spirit of the Panmunjom Declaration and its commitment to eliminating military tensions between the two Koreas and indeed have played a role in Pyongyang's increasing frustration with the South.

The final section of the book offers perspectives on the peace process from Chinese, US, Japanese and Russian perspectives. Interestingly, there is a limited focus in these chapters on Moon's peace process itself but rather a focus on the broader peace process and the role of those major powers. The chapters vary, however, in terms of how far they articulate the 'official view' of the authors' respective nations. A strong chapter by Kazianis, for example, is highly critical of US foreign policy and stresses the inconsistencies of the Trump administration's approach in terms of appearing relatively open to a step-by-step approach prior to the Hanoi Summit, followed by a retreat to the more familiar failed hard line strategy of seeking North Korea's complete denuclearisation prior to potential concessions. The chapter on China, on the other hand, can more or less be understood as representing the 'official' view in Beijing towards the Korean peninsula.

Overall, this volume provides numerous valuable insights into Moon's peace initiative and will be of interest to scholars as well of students of contemporary Korean affairs. At the same time, the topicality of the volume is perhaps its greatest weakness as it deals with a considerably fast-moving target. The vicissitudes of the peace process are of course well known to the contributors, as the chapters were written after the failure of the Hanoi Summit. One year after that failure and following a winter of veiled threats from Pyongyang in terms of unspecified 'Christmas gifts,' one might have even more reason to be pessimistic. Nonetheless, as Moon and Delury state in their introduction, the contributions also serve to emphasise the urgency of reinvigorating that process and putting it on a solid and sustainable track.

Jonathan Goldstein and Wayne Patterson (eds.), *Diminishing Conflict, Fostering Reconciliation: Essays in East Asian History in Honor of Hilary Conroy*

2018, MerwinAsia, 192 pages, ISBN: 9781937385576

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The stars came into alignment in March 2010 for the longtime distinguished professor of Asian history at the University of Pennsylvania, Hilary Conroy (1919–2015). This particular year marked the centennial year of Japan's annexation of the Korean peninsula, and the golden year anniversary of the publication of his classic book on this historic event, *The Japanese Seizure of Korea*.[1] As an added bonus, the Association of Asian Studies (AAS) had independently chosen Philadelphia as the host city for its annual conference. To commemorate these anniversaries, one of Conroy's former students, Wayne Patterson, brought four scholars of Japan's colonial history together in a panel to discuss how Conroy's book had influenced their research.[2] Before a healthy crowd, Conroy as discussant focused the majority of his comments on his life where he informed that his being a product of Irish Protestant/Catholic parents had forced him to attend two religious services each Sunday.

I begin this review of *Diminishing Conflict, Fostering Reconciliation* in this rather unconventional way to emphasize two points: First, Conroy's students making efforts to organize panels around his research, raise funds for an AAS prize in his memory, and edit a *Gedenschrift* in his honor underlines the respect that he had gained from them over his long tenure at UPenn, during which time he included many of them in projects that he coordinated (9–10). Secondly, introducing his religious upbringing provides insight into a possible early influence on the flexibility and diversity that he displayed as a scholar, but also as a mentor, colleague, and activist over his distinguished career. The volume appends an extended list of Conroy's many publications (167–84), and introduces readers to the organizations, research centers, and journals that had benefitted from his assistance (9). We see a lighter side to Conroy in the annual autumn "L and R" gatherings that he held at his home, where incoming graduate students, upon arrival, were handed a rake to clear his yard of the leaves that had fallen in his yard prior to the commencement of party festivities.

Conroy's most important and perhaps most challenging writing accomplishment was his inquiry into Japan's annexation—or 'seizure'—of the Korean peninsula. Through this volume we learn that it was Hilary Conroy's distain over the process that led Japan to absorb the peninsula that attracted him to this topic

(4). At the time of its publication, few scholars of Japanese history considered this topic; Conroy's book stood as its seminal work in English for decades; it remains essential reading for both Japanese and Korean scholars of the modern era. Through Patterson's obituary of his professor (included within) we learn that Conroy embarked on his doctoral studies in Japanese history just after completing a master's course at Berkeley in 1942. Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor interrupted Conroy's studies as he was sent to Boulder, Colorado where he studied the Japanese language at one of the Naval Language Schools. In the war's aftermath he was sent to Japan to join the U.S. occupation of the defeated nation. These experiences coincidently placed him in close vicinity to three important influences of Korean Studies: at Berkeley he may have had contact with George M. McCune who, until his untimely death in 1948, staffed this major center of Korean studies; Horace G. Underwood, who taught at Yonsei University for decades, joined Conroy in the Boulder-based Japanese language program; and Harvard University professor of Korean Studies, Edward Wagner, also served in the U.S. occupation in Japan.

At the time that Conroy arrived in Philadelphia (forced into exile from Berkeley after the state of California required from him his signature on a McCarthy-era loyalty oath) and began researching his book on *The Japanese Seizure of Korea*, Korea studies in the United States was rather thin between the decade separating McCune's death and Wagner's appointment to Harvard in 1958. Conroy used a year teaching at International Christian University in Tokyo, Japan (1958–59) to complete the project the following year. Jonathan Goldstein highlights the book's importance to Japan and Korea's colonial history in this volume's Introduction:

> For nearly a century, beginning in the mid-nineteenth century, the common assumption among scholars, and certainly among Koreans, was that the Japanese government had been plotting to take over Korea at least since the Meiji Restoration of 1868, if not before. In 1910, that became a reality, snuffing out the Chosŏn dynasty and installing a brutal colonial regime that ruled until Korea achieved liberation in 1945. Motivated in part by his Quaker background, Hilary Conroy was appalled by the Japanese takeover and decided to look into the decision-making process that led to it.

Conroy concluded that, although people from both the right and left urged it to do so, the Japanese government did not decide on annexation until 1909 "when the 'realists' who made up the government decided that Korea represented a security threat to Japan" (4). More recent research, has benefited from greater access to archives of this period to revise some of the issues that Conroy addressed.[3] However, the quality of his research is mind-boggling, considering the dearth of primary and secondary resources that were available to him at this time, to say nothing of the limits in the technology now available to modern-day scholars.[4]

The chapters within highlight research completed by Conroy's students, all of which reflect their professor's influence. Curiously, the majority of chapters center on a region not reflected in Conroy's extensive list of publications. Of the seven chapters, four deal with China, with one each considering Korea, Japan, and Vietnam/Syria topics. This diversity is explained by one of Conroy's colleagues, the African historian Lee Cassanelli, who in a short essay titled "Hilary Conroy as a Colleague" reflects: "it was very much like Hilary to connect colleagues from different fields and institutions around what proved to be common interests and commitments" (11). All of the authors studied under Conroy, with most completing a doctoral dissertation under his guidance. Each contributor offered short testimonials that explains their relationship with Conroy, the direct influence he had had on their academic studies and research, and the assistance he offered by introducing them to important scholars connected to their studies (185–90).

Conroy's first book, on the Japanese immigration to Hawaii, inspired Patterson to investigate a similar topic on the Korean immigration to these islands.[5] His contribution to this volume extends from this work, and represents the only chapter in *Diminishing Conflict* on a Korean issue. Patterson, extending treatment of this topic through Korean annexation by Japan, demonstrates how their being overseas allowed Hawaii-based Koreans to avoid the increasingly harsh Japanese pressure on them to a Japanese identity. These Koreans, he writes, saw the Japanese Consulate in Honolulu as a "spy headquarters trying to exert control over them." Many Koreans refused to register as ordered by this Japanese office, arguing that as they had come to Hawaii as Koreans with Korean passports, they would remain Korean. Those who did cooperate did so out of necessity rather than choice (125). As a group, however, overcoming inter-divisions proved to be the Korean people's biggest challenge in organizing a united front against their common enemy (135).

The cross-cultural interactions found in Patterson's chapter are characteristic of the remaining six discussions in different ways. Three of the chapters focus on the challenges that individuals faced in China where they bucked the trends of the times to positively trumpet the merits of the Chinese culture and people. Jonathan Goldstein's contribution examines efforts by Nathan Dunn, a nineteenth century merchant who refused to deal in the lucrative opium trade through which many of his Western contemporaries made their fortune. Goldstein celebrates the respect that Dunn held for Chinese culture and the opposition he showed to the opium trade. His positive attitude gained him the appreciation and friendship of the Chinese people and facilitated his procurement of the artifacts he displayed in the Chinese Museum he situated in Philadelphia (36–37). John Schrecker introduces Anson Burlingame's role in organizing a little-known tour of Chinese to the United

States in 1868 where the travelers succeeded in negotiating the 'Burlingame treaty,' the "first equal treaty between China and a Western power since the Opium War" (55). Thomas F. F. Millard is the focus of Mordechai Rozanski's chapter. This journalist resided in China between 1906 and 1931 when he made efforts through his writing to encourage a greater appreciation for, and more active engagement with, China. Like Dunn and Burlingame, Millard's positive approach toward the Chinese fought against the greater attention being directed toward Japan (102–103). Another chapter that highlights the work of an individual is Paul B. Reagan's study of Abe Jirō, and his struggles with a foreign thinking, democratic principles, in an increasingly militarized Japanese society. In the only chapter devoted to Japan, Reagen shows that through the Taisho-Showa-era scholar's 1922 publication "Personalism" "one can gain insight into the complexity, variety, and energy of intellectual life in pre-World War Two Japan" (79).

Two chapters consider intercultural relations at the national level. Tsing Yuan, acting on Conroy's advice to investigate museums, discusses the positive diplomatic results attainable through international trade, here by examining seventeenth-century Chinese ceramic exports with southeast Asian countries. In a more contemporary issue, Edward Drachman congers up memories of the United States involvement in Vietnam to warn of similar issues facing contemporary U.S. involvement in Syria. Drachman warns that the two cases share a 'knowledge gap' that prevented the U.S. from correctly understanding the two situations: Asian experts had been driven out of the State Department by McCarthyism and there presently a dearth of diplomats with Arabic-competency or knowledge of the region. Both deficiencies inhibit a correct understanding and analysis of these situations that has led U.S. leaders reaching false and dangerous conclusions to enact misguided policy decisions (147).

This final chapter joins Patterson's discussion on Koreans in Hawaii in addressing negative consequences to cross-cultural exchange. The Vietnam War topic is most appropriate in that it reflects a major issue that challenged concerned scholars at the prime of their teaching careers. The volume lists ways in which Conroy met the challenge of this travesty. An active advocate of peace movements in general—he had converted to Quakerism—he took to founding academic organs for discussing and publishing work dedicated to this purpose. These included his involvement with the Committee for Concerned Asian Scholars and his founding of the Conference for Peace Research in History that publishes the journal *Peace and Change* (9). *Diminishing Conflict* is perhaps not the most appropriate book to assign students. By celebrating Hilary Conroy's career as a human being dedicated to both performing and guiding students in moral and principle-laden scholarship, the volume serves as a wonderful example of how professor-student relations might develop.

Notes

1. Hilary Conroy, *The Japanese Seizure of Korea: 1868–1910, A Study of Realism and Idealism in International Relations* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1960).
2. In addition to Patterson, the panel included Peter Duus, Alexis Dudden, and Mark Caprio.
3. For example, Edward I-te Chen's research argues that the military urged the Japanese government to annex Korea as early as 1895, after the first Sino–Japanese War. See his "Japan's Decision to Annex Taiwan: A Study of Itō-Mutsu Diplomacy, 1894–95, *Journal of Asian Studies* 37, no. 1 (November 1977): 61–72.
4. Conroy famously dedicated this volume to his wife "without whom this work would have been written in pencil."
5. Patterson writes that his professor influenced not only his dissertation topic but also the title of his book. Hilary Conroy, *The Japanese Frontier in Hawaii, 1868–1898* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1953), reprinted in 1984 by Arno Press. Wayne Patterson, *The Korean Frontier in America: Immigration to Hawaii, 1896–1910* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1977).

Sunglim Kim, *Flowering Plums and Curio Cabinets: The Culture of Objects in Late Chosŏn Korean Art*

2018, University of Washington Press, 292 pages, ISBN: 9780295743417

SungChul Oh, Ohio University[1]

In *Flowering Plums and Curio Cabinets: The Culture of Objects in Late Chosŏn Korean Art*, Korean art-historian Sunglim Kim interprets two types of genre paintings, *ch'aekkŏri* (paintings of 'books and things,' or 'Korean still life') and flowering plum painting, as dominant Korean folk paintings that illustrate the social and cultural changes in the late Chosŏn Korea (1700–1910). Kim brings these artistic objects into the wider realm of visual culture through comprehensive analyses of the late Chosŏn dynasty: first and foremost, the inter-reflective relationship between art and the social totality of late Chosŏn Korea; cultural and political dynamics of conflict and affinity in the relationship between *yangban* and *chungin*; socio-ideological clashes between consumer culture and Neo-Confucianism; and, the social and cultural roles of *chungin* within the context of the social transformation of late Chosŏn.

Chapter 1 sketches the overall history of the Chosŏn dynasty, its social formation of class strata, the fundamental understanding of Confucianism as the central state ideology, and the rise and prosperity of the *chungin* class in late Chosŏn between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. It is notable that Kim begins her first chapter with discussion of Chosŏn's class formation and its dynamics between *yangban* and *chungin*. During the Chosŏn dynasty (1392–1910), the *yangban* class had an unparalleled level of economic, social, and political dominance and were supported by Confucian thoughts that "emphasized loyalty of subject to ruler and

filial piety of child for parents, and adamant social hierarchy and distinction" (11). By the eighteenth century, the *chungin* were the rising class that affected the development of art and culture due to their cultural influence and economic power through their knowledge, skills, and privileges as technical specialists, such as foreign-language interpreters, medical officials, astronomers, geomancers, meteorologists, legal experts, mathematicians, court painters, and scribes (17).

In the late Chosŏn period, accumulation of wealth by the *chungin* had two significant meanings. First, such wealth conflicted with the *yangban* and their ruling class state ideology of Neo-Confucianism which suppressed the idea of "dallying too much with objects" (16) for commercial benefits and instead "esteemed the humble, austere, and modest lifestyle and warned against personal extravagance" (25). Second, such an abundance of wealth gave *chungin* the material power for their cultural and artistic activities. Later, toward the nineteenth century, this accumulated wealth enabled them to construct their own self-image as "men of letters" (31) through their artistic creativity in writing and painting.

Chapter 2 discusses the origin, style, and visual features of *ch'aekkŏri* painting within the eighteenth-century material culture of Chosŏn Korea. The connection between *ch'aekkŏri* and the *chungin*, which is further developed from Kim's previous article, "Chaekgeori: Multi-Dimensional Messages in Late Joseon Korea" (*Archives of Asian Art*, 2014), is more clearly articulated in this chapter. Kim begins the chapter with the explanation of the contemporaneous pan-East Asian consumerism. Like Qing China and Edo Japan, Chosŏn Korea of this period underwent the "growth of population, urbanization, and commercialization" (52) and implemented vigorous international trade with these two adjacent cultures. *Ch'aekkŏri* painting resulted from such commercial prosperity.

Ch'aekkŏri, which means literally 'books and things' and which Kim calls a Korean form of still life painting, emerged during the eighteenth century. *Ch'aekkŏri* painting visually represented books, bookshelves, and other objects such as ceramics, bronzes, jades, fruits, flowers, and scholarly paraphernalia such as brushes, inkstones, handscrolls, and water droppers (54). These visual representations testified to their owners' obsessions with books and other scholarly related objects (55). Through the analyses of *ch'aekkŏri*, on the one hand, Kim contrasts Confucian literati's austerity and sensual materialism. On the other hand, she notes that those contrasting and conflicting social values were simultaneously represented in the diverse *ch'aekkŏri* styles (79).

Chapter 3 investigates growth of the art market and the multiple roles the *chungin* played as artists, patrons, collectors, and consumers in the commodification and mass production of art objects in the late Chosŏn (137). Late Chosŏn higher society craved material objects as well as their visual representations. The

chungin played significant roles in the commercial circulation of art works by building their bases around Kwangt'ong Bridge in Seoul. The eighteenth-century *chungin* who achieved vast wealth and were learned and cultured as *yangban* literati expanded their activities into the art world of the late Chosŏn.

Chapter 4 presents the pinnacle of Kim's arguments. It illustrates the close relationship between *chungin* artists [e.g., Cho Hŭiryong (1789–1866)] and critical historical and cultural moments of the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Korea through more detailed historical records and visual sources. Kim contrasts visual features of the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century flowering plum painting with those of the previous centuries in terms of how different meanings and symbols from the same motifs of flowering plum painting were represented. In the eighteenth century, according to Kim, the stylistic changes in plum painting were affected by consumer culture and public need. In their visual forms, more colorful expressions and large-scales were added with red plum blossoms. The brushstrokes changed from straight, austere, and static into oval and curvilinear. In the nineteenth century, as in Cho's paintings, flowering plum painting was expressed more sensually and luxuriously than in the eighteenth century through reflecting its bold contrast with *yangban* literati painters' "simple and refined aesthetics." (159)

Chapter 5 deals with *chungin*'s involvement with domestic and international diplomatic politics of the nineteenth- and twentieth-century Korea. In the late nineteenth century, Korea underwent social changes that elicited radical shifts of social beliefs and values. The social status system was rapidly abolished for many reasons, like continuous and expanding uprisings against the social system, diplomatic pressures from Japan and China, a weakening of the hereditary aristocracy, and movements to oppose Confucianism. In the first decade of the twentieth century, *chungin* descendants played more important roles in the political and artistic realms. After Japanese annexation of Korea, by resisting Japanese cultural policy that was intended to undermine the Korean tradition, culture, and institutions, *chungin* descendants protected and preserved Korean artistic value and national spirit through art collection and publication of nationalistic history of art during the colonial period.

Kim's *Flowering Plums and Curio Cabinets* boldly presents the academic possibility that the artworks and cultural objects of late Chosŏn Korea can be examined through visual and cultural studies. As Kim mentions in the Epilogue, much research in Korean art has been focused on the early and middle Chosŏn periods. The most popular objects of study in Chosŏn art history are the artworks produced by the *yangban* literati class or aristocracy (223). Kim takes the overlooked *chungin* artists and their art works as critical themes to reveal the social dynamics of

the late Chosŏn Korea and to search for the continuity between premodern and modern Korean paintings. Kim's book adopts multilayered theoretical stances to investigate *ch'aekkŏri* and flowering plum painting. The examinations of *chingin* are executed through substantially implied social perspectives such as consumer culture, materialism, and ideological negotiation with Confucianism. *Ch'aekkŏri* and flowering plum painting can be representative of the "visual culture of the late Chosŏn dynasty" that were "dazzling and daring" (109). Her book is recommended for students and researchers who are interested in not only general description and explanation of late Chosŏn genre painting but also varied methodological approaches to the visual landscapes of late Chosŏn Korea.

Note

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Kinoshita Takao, *A Critical Biography of Yun Ch'iho*

2017, Akashi Shoten, 492 pages, ISBN: 9784750345628

Hatano Setsuko, Yi Kwangsu, *The Father of Modern Korean Literature Branded as Pro-Japanese*

2015, Chuokoron-Shinsha, 234 pages, ISBN: 9784121023247

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On August 14, 2017, the day before South Korea's Independence Day, current President Moon Jae-in invited former independence patriots, their family members, and former comfort women to the Blue House. At this meeting, as Moon pledged to expunge *ch'inilp'a* (pro-Japanese collaborators), he quoted a well-known Korean saying: "If a person fights or works for the independence movement, the person's family will be cursed for the next three generations. However, if a person collaborates with the Japanese, the person's family will become prosperous for the next three generations." This is a popular saying, and it comes from the belief that pro-Japanese collaborators have never been properly punished, and, as a result, they have prospered while the real heroes, *tongnim undongga* (the independence patriots), have suffered. Moon emphasized the importance of overturning such 'reality'; the independence patriots should prosper not the treacherous pro-Japanese collaborators.

Presidents Roh Moo-hyun and Moon Jae-in embraced *ch'inil ch'ŏngsan* (the eradication of or reckoning with pro-Japanese collaboration) as one of his

campaign promises, asserting that, by dealing with *ch'inilp'a ch'ŏngsan*, they would eliminate "the accumulated evils of the mainstream class and their vested rights."[1] Moon Jae-in is certainly not the only politician who has used *ch'inilp'a ch'ŏngsan* to appeal to the public. The term often appears in the political arena to create public support for a certain candidate or policy. This careless, rampant use of the term *ch'inilp'a* illustrates the serious lack of consideration given to the issue of collaboration in South Korea.

In academia, more attention has been dedicated to showcasing collaborators' alleged pro-Japanese acts. The publication of the *Ch'inil inmyŏng sajŏn* (*Pro-Japanese Biographical Dictionary*)[2] in 2009 aptly illustrates this point. Compiled over the span of five years, many prominent researchers and scholars were part of this project. The *Biographical Dictionary* lists 4776 individuals as pro-Japanese collaborators, and it gives detailed accounts of their alleged pro-Japanese acts. In essence, it is a collection of evidence to convict these individuals as pro-Japanese collaborators. Unfortunately, ambiguities are overlooked or hardly mentioned; furthermore, the motivations and reasons behind their acts of collaboration are never fully discussed.

Kinoshita Takao's (木下 隆男) *Hyōden Yun Ch'iho* (評伝 尹致昊, *A Critical Biography of Yun Ch'iho*) and Hatano Setsuko's (波田野 節子) *Yi Kwangsu—Kankoku kindai bungaku no soto shinnichi no rakuin* (李光洙ー 韓国近代文学の祖と「親日」の刻印, *Yi Kwangsu: The Father of Modern Korean Literature Branded as Pro-Japanese*) challenge this tendency by focusing on two individuals who, due to their alleged pasts as pro-Japanese collaborators, have often been disregarded as research subjects. They are both included in *Ch'inil inmyŏng sajŏn*, and their alleged pro-Japanese acts are recorded in detail, while discussions on why they may have collaborated with the Japanese are omitted.[3] Kinoshita and Hatano's work provides us with a novel approach to consider Yun Ch'iho's and Yi Kwangsu's lives as a whole and consider what drove them to become pro-Japanese collaborators. This review will give attention to how the issue of collaboration is dealt with in Kinoshita and Hatano's work of Yun Ch'iho and Yi Kwangsu respectively.

Hyōden Yun Ch'iho (評伝 尹致昊), Kinoshita Takao (木下 隆男)

Yun Ch'iho was born on December 26, 1864 into the *yangban* aristocracy, and his father served as an official in the Chosŏn government. As a *yangban*, Yun received formal education and support from his family. He was cosmopolitan in a true sense and had the opportunity to study in China, the United States, and Japan. Well-educated and multilingual, Yun became a well-known figure among Korean intellectuals and government officials. In his earlier years, he was

involved in the Kapsin coup attempt (*Kapshinjŏngbyŏn*) and the Independence Club, as part of the new wave of progressives attempting to modernize Korea. Although his ambition to modernize Korea to secure its independence unfortunately remained unfulfilled, he continued to remain active in Korea's political and social scenes. Through out his life, he held several important government positions and was constantly involved in various organizations, most notably the Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA). However, as we shall see also with Yi Kwangsu, he has been heavily criticized for his willingness to collaborate with the Japanese Empire.

As *p'yŏngjŏn* (critical biography), Kinoshita's work is different from another work by Pak Chihyang, *Yunch'iho ŭi hyŏmnyŏk ilgi* (*Yun Ch'iho's Collaboration Diaries*),[4] which discusses Yun Ch'iho's beliefs and how they influenced his decision to collaborate with the Japanese. Unlike Kinoshita, however, Pak does not give a comprehensive overview of Yun's life, which makes Kinoshita's work unique and unprecedented; it considers Yun's life as a whole, from birth to death. Consequently, it allows readers to see Yun Ch'iho's collaboration in a wider context, deepening our understanding of the complex nature of collaboration. By examining Yun's life in its entirety, Kinoshita demonstrates how Yun's decision to collaborate with the Japanese fluctuated overtime—he often shifted back and forth in the grey area between collaboration and resistance. His decision to collaborate did not indicate his absolute allegiance to the Japanese authorities, which makes Yun Ch'iho a fascinating subject to study.

Kinoshita argues that Yun Ch'iho's diary entries have often been overlooked as a historical resource as a result of his tainted reputation as a pro-Japanese collaborator. This is, unfortunately, true, and most publications that refer to Yun Ch'iho, especially in Korean, are largely concerned only with *what* pro-Japanese actions he committed, rather than possible reasoning behind them. Furthermore, as Kinoshita notes, the fact that most of Yun's entries are written in English may have hindered scholars from pursuing in-depth research in South Korea due to a language barrier.[5] Kinoshita stresses, "without a deeper understanding of an individual's motivation and inner dilemmas, the issue of pro-Japanese collaboration will never be resolved," (Kinoshita, 13) a sentiment with which this reviewer agrees.

Kinoshita begins with a brief introduction to Yun Ch'iho and proceeds chronologically through his life. He divides the chapters according to significant events and eras. The first six chapters focus on Yun's life before the March 1, 1919 Independence Movement, while the latter six discuss his activities during Japan's occupation of Korea. In Chapter 10, Kinoshita describes Yun Ch'iho's pro-Japanese actions. From Yun's earlier years as an avid learner and thinker to his later years

of struggle, Kinoshita faithfully narrates Yun's life story. Each chapter not only incorporates his diaries but also provides cultural, social, and political context for Yun's account, helping the reader obtain a fuller explanation of Yun's eventual decision to collaborate with the Japanese.

Chapter 10 is appropriately entitled "The Decade of Pro-Japanese collaboration: 1936 to 1943." In this chapter, Kinoshita considers factors that would have influenced Yun Ch'iho's decision to collaborate with the Japanese government. He discusses different ways in which the colonial government pressured Yun to collaborate in their effort to rally Koreans to join the war efforts. For example, Japan tightened its surveillance on colonial subjects, especially the elites, as it prepared for total war. In order to wage this war, Japan needed its colonial subjects to remain entirely loyal to Japan's cause. By arresting prominent members (which included Yun's cousin Yun Ch'iyŏng) from nationalist-leaning groups such as *Suyang tonguhoe* 修養同友會 and *Hŭngŏm kurakpu* 興業俱樂部, the colonial government successfully pressured and threatened many Koreans to collaborate with it. Kinoshita notes, "under the enemy's overwhelming power, in the end, Yun did not confront but rather collaborated with the authority. That was his limitation." (391) I wonder, however, what Yun Ch'iho could have done as an individual to confront the "enemy" while living under that very enemy's authority. By all means, the Japanese did not always succeed turning Koreans into collaborators. For instance, Yŏ Unhyŏng (1886–1947) is well known for his pro-independence activities throughout his life. However, Yun Ch'iho was also not an exception to the norm. Many intellectuals chose to collaborate with the Japanese in different degrees; this is why Kinoshita's work is important because he illuminates through Yun Ch'iho that the act of collaboration cannot be simply divided into treason or pro-resistance. Many acts remained in the grey area between what could be defined as treason or pro-resistance.

In addition, Kinoshita carefully illustrates how the colonial government's coercion tactics were not the only reason Yun Ch'iho collaborated with the Japanese. In one of the discussions held between Minami and Yun Ch'iho (recorded in the *Kungmin shinbo*), Yun Ch'iho urges Minami to consider hiring more Koreans for government positions, ending segregation between Japanese and Korean students, and granting Koreans political rights because they were "imperial citizens." (395–398) Kinoshita observes that Yun Ch'iho agreed with *naisen ittai* 内鮮一体 to the extent that guaranteed "Koreans an equal footing with the Japanese." (405) Kinoshita notes that Yun Ch'iho's decision to collaborate with the Japanese does not mean he agreed with every policy decision they made. In fact, Yun Ch'iho often criticized the colonial government for its unfair treatment of Koreans. Kinoshita observes that Yun did not "forsake his position as a critic

against the ruler." (429) By emphasizing Yun's attempts to negotiate with the Japanese government on behalf of Koreans, Kinoshita successfully highlights how the act of collaboration cannot always be neatly categorized as an act of treason; it is far greyer and more ambiguous than others researching this topic present.

Another noteworthy section of the biography is Kinoshita's attempt to address the blanks in Yun's diaries. By elaborating on Yun Ch'iho's activities during these years, he presents a fuller picture of Yun's struggle as he navigates the boundaries of colonial era. For example, Kinoshita focuses on the years 1936 and 1937, when Yun Ch'iho ceased writing in his diary. According to Kinoshita, Yun lost his mother, with whom he was very close, on February 12, 1936 (369). Furthermore, by 1936, Yun was already 71 years old, which certainly exceeded the average lifespan of Koreans in 1940s (374). Kinoshita notes that these factors may have led Yun to stop writing for two years. It is not difficult to imagine that Yun's deteriorating health, his personal losses (including An Ch'angho, one of his closest confidants), and Japan's increasing persecution of nationalist and religious groups would prompt him to collaborate rather than resist.

This reviewer appreciates Kinoshita's endeavour to present internal and external circumstances that may have influenced Yun's decision to collaborate with the Japanese. By doing so, Kinoshita prompts us to approach the issue of collaboration in a more nuanced way.

Yi Kwangsu—Kankoku kindai bungaku no soto shinnichi no rakuin (李光洙ー韓国近代文学の祖と「親日」の刻印), Hatano Setsuko (波田野 節子)

Yi Kwangsu (1892–?) is often described as the father of modern Korean literature. His novel *Mujŏng* (*Heartless*), written in 1917, is regarded as Korea's first modern novel. *Heartless* is a love story of three youths during the Japanese occupation and their intertwined relationships. He had a robust career as a writer and wrote numerous poems, essays, and novels. He is also known for his lifelong political activities. Most notably, he drafted the Tokyo February 1919 Independence Declaration in his youth and was actively involved in the beginning of Korea's Provisional Government (KPG) in Shanghai. His collaboration with the colonial government was made public through his writings, in which he openly displayed his support for the assimilation of Koreans into the Japanese Empire and for Koreans' role in Japan's war efforts.

Like the biography of Yun Ch'iho, this work is a comprehensive examination of Yi Kwangsu's life. Hatano Setsuko offer a detailed account from Yi's years in Japan as a young, ambitious student, to his career as a writer and his later

years as a collaborator with the Japanese authorities. Unlike Yun, Yi Kwangsu did not apparently leave any personal diaries that we know of. Instead, Hatano focuses on Yi Kwangsu's career as a thinker and a writer, relying on his published writings. This well-researched biography of Yi allows readers to sympathize with Yi's frustrations and struggles as a modern writer subjected to a colonial government's oppressive authority.

Hatano ruminates that the term "pro-Japanese" (J. *shinnichi*) follows Yi Kwangsu like a "customary epithet" (まくらことば) (Hatano, 2). She observes that Yi understood Japan's motivation behind its imperial expansion as a "desire," a desire Koreans also should have so that Koreans could "regenerate" (*saisei*) themselves (6). On the other hand, she observes how he contemplates on the futility of humans' desire in his novels. While illuminating seemingly contrasting elements in Yi Kwangsu's life, Hatano argues that the observation of Yi's life actually reveals "Japan's race towards modernization" and how this must have affected its colonial citizen (6).

Similar to Kinoshita, Hatano also devotes the last section of the book to Yi Kwangsu's decision to collaborate with the Japanese authorities. Rather than simply listing evidence to convict Yi as a traitor to the Korean people, Hatano more closely examines the reasons for such a "traitorous" act. Thus, Hatano argues that Yi Kwangsu's understanding of *naisen ittai* differs from modern readers' understanding. For Yi, *naisen ittai* did not require Koreans to completely assimilate as Japanese; rather, it was a way "Koreans could maintain their uniqueness while becoming Japanese citizen[s]." (171) Similar to Yun Ch'iho, Hatano stipulates that Yun believed "Japan would continue to rule over Korea," and the only way to improve the situation for Koreans was by collaborating with the Japanese to "eliminate discrimination against Koreans." (172)

Furthermore, Hatano presents a more comprehensive understanding of Yi's *ch'inil munhak* (pro-Japanese collaboration literature). First, she notes that Yi did not write in Japanese until 1943. In fact, more of his writings in Korean have been discovered. Yi mostly wrote his works in Japanese between 1943 and 1944. Hatano argues that Yi's motivations with these writings are rather clear. For instance, in *Kagawa kōchō* (加川校長), Yi depicts a school principle who goes out of his way to help a student (the main character) transfer to a better school. Hatano explains that this most likely reflected Yi Kwangsu's personal experience, as his son struggled to continue with his education due to his poor health. Hatano speculates that the character of the school principle is an homage to a Japanese school principle who apparently helped his son advance to junior high school (198–199).

A more controversial piece is *Heini nareru* (兵になれる), published in 1943. It starts with a man who congratulates an acquaintance whose son finally becomes a

soldier. The man explains that his son always wanted do so but could not because he died of an illness. On his way home, the father shouts, "[Our sons] will become soldiers!" (200–201) Hatano observes that Yi believed "the Korean race could not become independent without military power." Therefore, "if they [Korean men] could not avoid conscription, they should take the opportunity to have military training." (201) In other words, Yi saw joining the war efforts as an opportunity for Koreans to elevate and strengthen themselves. Through these two writings and others, Hatano explores the complex web of motivation behind Yi's willingness to collaborate with the Japanese colonial authorities. Hatano does not simply seek pro-Japanese elements in Yi Kwangsu's writings. Instead, Similar to Kinoshita, Hatano discusses not only the external circumstances Yi confronted, but also personal circumstances, allowing us to have a fuller picture of the complex nature of Yi Kwangsu's decision to collaborate with the 'enemy.' Considering that Yi's later writings have been repeatedly dissected and criticized mostly for its pro-Japanese elements, Hatano's work is a breath of fresh air.

Although both Kinoshita and Hatano help us see the wider context of pro-Japanese collaboration, they both fail to discuss how to define the concept, despite the fact that this definition is often vague and ambiguous. For instance, how do we determine what makes a particular act pro-Japanese? Does one's motivation matter? Should the term "pro-Japanese collaboration" be used interchangeably with the term "treason"? As long as these individuals are labelled pro-Japanese collaborators without clarifying this definition, Kinoshita's and Hatano's work may be seen simply as an excuse to justify Yun Ch'iho and Yi Kwangsu's collaboration with the Japanese. This reviewer believes that a discussion of how to best define collaboration is a foundational both texts lack, and it could challenge South Korea's tendency to over-simplify and politicize the issue of collaboration.

Although Kinoshita's and Hatano's efforts to discuss Yun Ch'iho's and Yi Kwangsu's lives in a wider context are commendable, the lack of discussion regarding how to define collaboration dampens their valiant efforts. Furthermore, it risks the notion that as Japanese, they are simply revisionist historians—attempting to justify Japan's colonization of Korea. However, I would argue that they may be better positioned to discuss the grey areas of collaboration as outsiders (non-Koreans), since the issue often is crippled by nationalist sentiments in South Korea. Therefore, their research should be considered a valuable resource to advance our understanding of Korea's past, especially because such research has often been shunned by academia. This reviewer hopes that this work will further enliven and deepen the ongoing discussion of how to interpret the issue of collaboration during the colonial period.

Notes

1. Kim, Ajin, 'Ilje tongniphan chi 72nyŏn … Nugul kyŏnyanghae ch'inil ch'ŏngsan kkŏnaenna' (日帝서 독립한 지 72년… 누굴 겨냥해 親日청산 꺼냈나), *Chosun Ilbo*, January 18, 2017, http://news.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2017/01/18/2017011800296.html.
2. Yun Kyŏngro et al., *Ch'inil inmyŏng sajŏn* (친일인명사전). Seoul: Minjok munje yŏn'guso, 2009.
3. There are a few articles written in English, which explores Yun Ch'iho and Yi Kwangsu's motivations behind their alleged pro-Japanese acts. For Yun Ch'iho, see Mark E. Caprio, "Loyal Patriot? Traitorous Collaborator? The Yun Chiho Diaries and the Question of National Loyalty," *Journal of Colonialism and Colonial History* 7:3 (2006) and Andrew Urban, "Yun Ch'i-ho's Alienation by Way of Inclusion: A Korean International Student and Christian Reform in the "New" South, 1888–1893," *Journal of Asian American Studies* 17, no. 3 (October 2014). For Yi Kwangsu, see Park Changseung, "Yi Kwang-su and the Endorsement of State Power," *Seoul Journal of Korean Studies* 19, no. 1 (December 2006) and Kwak Junhyeok, "Domination through Subordination: Yi Kwangsu's Collaboration in Colonial Korea," *Korea Observer*, no. 3 (Autumn 2008).
4. Pak Jihyang, *Yunch'iho ŭi Hyŏmnyŏk ilgi: ŏnŭ Ch'inil Chisigin* ŭi Tokpaek (윤치호의 협력일기: 어느 친일 지식인의 독백). Seoul: Esoope, 2008.
5. The English entries of the diaries were translated into Korean and published between 2014 to 2016. The fact that it took several decades to translate his diaries into Korean is telling. Most likely, his reputation as a collaborator dampened people's interest in his diaries as a historical source.

Kyoim Yun, *The Shaman's Wages: Trading in Ritual on Cheju Island*

2019, University of Washington Press, 240 pages, ISBN: 9780295745954

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In 2017 this reviewer was on Kagŏdo [Gageodo] island, South Korea's most south-westerly landmass doing fieldwork as part of his own book project. The island now a tourist destination from Mokpo and a haven in the deep sea for sport fishermen was once a developmental and institutional backwater hamstrung by complicated relations with *kaekchu* middlemen and apparently home to a rich and complicated architecture of shrines, sacred islets, spirit filled places just off the coast where its fishing people placated the unruly and unfriendly sea and its watery deities. In 2019 there was virtually none of this left both physically and in the cultural memory, no matter how hard I strove to find it. The extant residue of this was the small unmarked shrine on the hillside which contained an intimidating image of the Sea Dragon King and a few bits and pieces, but which appeared to be rarely visited. I was completely shocked when I asked what happened to everything else around the island, to be told by the Village Head, that the main

village shrine and ritual center had been down by the harbor, near what was now the ferry ticket booth … but that this had been torn down in the late 1990s and replaced with a toilet and shower block for the burgeoning tourist trade. Was this how a community dispensed with its spiritual and cultural framework and meta-narrative after so many centuries?

Similarly shocking moments abound in Kyoim Yun's fine new book *The Shaman's Wages: Trading in Ritual on Cheju Island* but for different reasons and according to Yun with much deeper historical roots. Cultural authenticity and the honor and dignity of ritual culture and performance are long established cores of general academic and popular consensus around cosmically imbued characters such as Shaman and other spiritual figures. Because these people essentially cross time, dimensions and space through what they physically and mentally do, we bestow or allot considerable worth to their actions and energies. But we also thoroughly other them and put them beyond our own time and space with its rather more prosaic, base concerns. Such people surely cannot be concerned with the banal everyday world of putting food on the table, rental payments in the gaping maws of the rentier class, Won notes in their pockets, or nowadays in their virtual wallets. But in fact on far away, distant, semi-mystical Cheju island that is in fact what Shaman have been doing for centuries.

Though the Korean Peninsula and the distances across the sea to its powerful and uncomfortable neighbor Japan are not actually hugely substantial in difference Cheju Island in particular is separated far enough from the mainland by the sea and regional historical confrontations to produce a radically different cultural framework. Yun describes how instead of *mudang* and *mansin*, on Cheju, it is *simbang* who manage *tang* (shrines) and who undertake the large and famous ritual performances that Korea is famous for known as *kut*. Except that on Cheju *simbang* focus on the oral retelling of mythology and ritual practice through elaborate repertoire known as *ponp'uri*. What *simbang* have historically done is not only cosmologically and ritually complicated; connecting to the physical topographies of the island, the cycle of the seasons and practical economy as well as providing a placative or protective shield or influence against the whole panoply of potential misfortunes which befall its citizenry, it is also highly valued and valuable to those who seek to utilize their power and capabilities. It is hard to critique notions of value and stores of value in relation to things as esoteric or unusual as *ponp'uri* recantation or the largest event on the island the *Ch'ilmŏri Shrine Yŏngdŭng Kut*, but these ritual moments do not fit easily into the economic frameworks and logistics of the island more generally and the household economies of particular families who seek to engage them. Yun's introduction and very first moment of fieldwork recounted in this book reads:

"After an exchange of greetings, the household head, Mr. Cho, passed an envelope containing the ritual fee to Simbang Yang. Upon counting the bank checks (*sup'yo*) in the envelope, the Simbang asked cautiously, 'Wasn't it six?' (meaning 'Hadn't we agreed on 6 million won [US$6000]?) Mr. Cho replied, 'It was five.'" (3)

It would not be surprising if there had been over time a huge number of similar uncomfortable conversations between heads of households and *simbang* on Cheju island, but such household moments of discomfort cannot possible explain the hatred and horror these traditions inspired amongst modernizing bureaucrats sent to Cheju such as Governor Yi Hyŏngsang. Yi who become Governor in March 1702 and served for only a year saw Cheju it seems as peripheral anachronism, outside of the influence of the more rigorous structures of Confucian principle which governed Chosŏn during the era of factional politics. He determined that in particular its *simbang* and the various local traditions of *pon'puri* represented the absolute worst of this peripherality and attendant anachronistic behaviors. Yi declared that "So-called male and female shamans (*namgyŏk yŏmu*) shamelessly manipulate the people. These hooligans call themselves tanghin and organize *kye* (financial associations); they [shamans] number more than one thousand." (37) Yi sought to suppress such behaviors, the ritual architectures and the social and economic networks that enabled them thoroughly. This suppression took the form of the burning down of 129 shrines on the island, exile for practitioners of these traditions and a reform of the organizational, religious and bureaucratic structures on Cheju to diminish and forbid such ritual practices in the present and in the future.

It probably doesn't need to be said and readers might not even need to read Yun's fine book, though they of course should, to have a sense that regardless of Governor Yi's efforts *simbang* and *ponp'uri* were never really banished from Cheju and are present in residue even in our present, and certainly in the moments when Kyoim Yun did the field work for this book. This does not mean that they were any less problematic or at times uncomfortable. It is part of the power of such ritual practices that they do not really fit into any earthly time, but project and entwine with cosmological temporalities and dimensions in the beyond … but that very sense of being out of time can mean that they exist askew to the bonds and logics that make everything else for conventional citizens, function. In the recollections of the field work behind this book Yun recounts richly extraordinary moments such as the encounters between the family of Mr Cho and Simbang Kim in which they try to arrange at a realistic and appropriate price for an extensive series of rituals. What *simbang* as I have suggested do and have has real worth, too much worth for our times, and residents of Cheju as Koreans everywhere are both happy to press for a bargain and are in general not extensively wealthy, so

these rituals are burdensome on their communities. The two sisters of Mr Cho in particular are also not beyond deploying some of the tricks and techniques of neo-liberal consumerism so ingrained in the cultures of our globe: "Although I know that you [the *simbang*] could ask for extra money because you have the bother of traveling quite a long distance, think of it as if you were going there [the village] for a relaxing business trip …" (111)

This is in short an extraordinary book, a corrective for anyone who Orientalizes shamanic ritual, specifically Korean *kut* or ritual practices and imagines them as somehow other from the networks and frameworks of local and regional economy, even in a place as 'mystical' as Cheju island. Kyoim Yun sensitively and carefully recounts very personal and intimate moments of ritual connection and power between *simbang*, the family and the voices of their dead ancestors, at the same time as commenting on the techniques used and the feedback loops between practitioner and host. The elements of the book in which Yun dissects and describes the complicated negotiations over cost and expense are uncomfortable as they are enlightening. This discomfort is one of the really valuable elements of the entire process, as in the expense essentially really has to hurt to remind everyone of the real power and worth of the ritual, even though to all involved that expense is not entirely welcome. Spending so much wealth and intangible elements of cultural production seems unhelpful and not useful in the frames of local economy. But it has kept Cheju *simbang* and *ponp'uri* alive as cultural practices when much has tried to kill it off over the centuries. What really does appear to be killing Cheju's unique vision of Shamanism and which appears towards the end of Yun's book is the neo-liberal South Korean state's efforts to coopt, commodify local worship practices at great expense and in the name of global intangible heritage. *Simbang* and *Ch'ilmoŏri Shrine Yŏngdŭng Kut* now are performed forlornly and detached from local energies, out of context on the stages of elaborate new constructions built especially for them in Seoul in order to demonstrate the vitality of traditional Korean culture. In doing so however, as Yun appears to suggest they have removed the discomfort and required complicated negotiation between cosmic and human time and economic framing, as if removing the grit from an oyster. This is a phenomenal book and I recommend it to any scholar interested and engaged with Korean shamanic or ritual practice, the social and economic frameworks such practices sit within and the cultural traditions and legacies of Cheju.

Note

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Ra Jong-yil, *Inside North Korea's Theocracy: The rise and sudden fall of Jang Song-thaek*

2019, State University of New York Press, 200 pages, ISBN: 9781438473727

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In *Inside North Korea's Theocracy: The rise and sudden fall of Jang Song-thaek*, Ra Jong-yil (Na Chong-il) provides a biography of Jang Sung-taek (Chang Sŏng-t'aek or Jang Song-thaek), a member of the North Korean elite who held numerous key positions in the DPRK regime, but was perhaps best known for his status as the brother-in-law of Kim Jong Il through his marriage to Kim Kyong-hui. Jang, who served both the leaders Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il until their respective deaths, in 1994 and in 2011, eventually met the fate of a public execution ordered by his own nephew, Kim Jong Un, in 2013.

The central theme running through the work is the precarious position of Jang as the 'number two' in a monolithic system of rule under the ultimate authority of the leader. This position was further complicated by the challenge of carrying out a leadership succession in a system which lacked clear rules concerning the transfer of power from one leader to the next. Ra refers to the state as a theocracy, in which both the state myth, the revolutionary tradition narrowly anchored on the Mt. Paektu lineage, and actual power were monopolized by Kim Il Sung and other members of the Kim family. Jang, albeit coming from the 'core class', and a graduate of both the Mangyŏngdae Revolutionary School and the highly esteemed Political Science and Economics Department of the Kim Il Sung University, was on his father's side from a family of colonial intellectuals with experience of participating in the farmers' anti-Japanese struggle, and was also related through his sister's husband to a family of landowners. The status of this lineage, however, became complicated and was soft pedaled as the regime achieved a monolithic system of rule after the Kapsan Faction Purge in 1967, in which the Mt. Paektu lineage came to hold a unique legitimacy. This situation was further complicated by his encounter with Kim Jong Il's sister, Kim Kyong-hui, at Kim Il Sung University. Despite Jang's success as a political figure, one who was seen by others as possessing leadership ability together with a genuine concern for those around him and for ordinary people, Ra is attentive to how his success was predicated on an uneasy tension concerning his status as a 'mortal' among the deified 'living gods' of the theocracy. Two years before the death of Jang in 2013, Ra predicted his eventual execution, and his work is preoccupied with the tension arising from Jang's uneasy status as a *kyŏngyein,* a man of the boundary (and this is where the original Korean title of the book, *Chang Sŏng-t'aek ŭi kil:*

sinjŏng ŭi puronhan kyŏngyein (The path of Chang Sŏng-t'aek: the uneasy man of the boundary in a theocracy, 2016) comes from.)

Primarily aimed at a general audience, Ra does not situate his work in the context of any broader scholarly discussion, nor does he draw from previously unknown textual sources. The book gives readers fragments of Jang's life, especially those reflecting his interactions with the regime and the higher echelons of society, from his previously little known family background, his education in North Korea and in the Soviet Union, his travels in Europe and in China, especially his ties with higher level officials in the latter, underscoring his admiration for the reforms carried out by China and Vietnam, his relationship with Kim Jong Il, both during his reign and posthumously, as he handled the gradual debilitation of the once supreme leader to his funeral process, and as a mentor to Kim Jong Un. These accounts are largely based on historical memory in the form of oral testimonies, as well as on textual materials published primarily in the South but also in the North. Naturally, it is no surprise that a fair portion of the book is devoted to depicting the social and the historical background of the Kim families, in particular, that of Kim Jong Il. From the distinctive use of oral testimonies, often in the form of private conversations or observations made by informants, the author's subsequent cross-checking and deliberations concerning such forms of historical memory, and the discussions of the North–South relations, particularly in the Kim Dae Jung (Kim Tae-jung) era, and so on, readers become acutely conscious of the distinctive vantage point that the author is writing from, and of his career trajectory as an eminent political scientist, diplomat and a former deputy head of the South Korean intelligence service, where much of the hard-to-obtain information and testimony of informants concerning the North Korean elite comes from. Proper citation of the majority of the oral testimonies has been avoided so as to protect the anonymity of his informants, and so readers are forced to leave the burden of the corroboration of the sources solely to the author himself.

Ra situates his work somewhere in between biography and fiction, as he sees the act of writing a biography, an attempt to reconstruct the inner self of a person based on limited data, as inevitably involving a blurring of the lines between biography and fiction. The attempt to reconstruct the life of an 'erased' and silenced historical figure in a secretive state is bold and intriguing, but Ra's methodological justification for doing so, and his motivation for such an approach, are not adequately addressed in the book. The task of establishing the author's motivation for adopting such an approach may be particularly baffling to English-language readers, but Ra's discussion of this mode of writing a biography should be seen as an extension of his earlier work, published in Korean, on the North Korean agent Kang Min-ch'ŏl and his involvement in a bombing in Burma in 1983,

which was published in 2013. In this work, Ra echoes an autobiographical work on the Korean War, *Kŭ kyŏul kŭrigo kaŭl: na ŭi 1951-yŏn* (That winter, and then autumn, 2009). This was written by the eminent South Korean literary critic, Yu Chong-ho, who hoped to contribute to the resistance by keeping alive the historical memory against what he saw as a wave of historical amnesia.

While the translation from the original Korean version is professionally done, the proofreading falls short of the high standard maintained in the Korean version. While the omission of a proper reference to the oral testimonies employed is understandable, more thorough referencing of both the North and the South Korean textual materials mentioned would have made the book more useful to scholars in the field.

Joseph Songhyun Jeon, *Vicious Circuits: Korea's IMF Cinema and the End of the American Century*

2019, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 229 pages, ISBN: 9781503608450

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Vicious Circuits is a book about crises. Its context is the 1998 Asian Financial Crisis and how its aftermath, engendered by the neoliberal market policies requested by the IMF and agreed by then the government, shaped the current film industry in the country through lower production costs, quick turnaround times, and distribution advantages (3). The AFC made contemporary cinema and Korea's cinema, as understood by Jeon, is fundamentally shaped by and about crisis itself. Jeon calls this industry "Korea's IMF Cinema" (3) as both "a way to periodize the nation's arrival as a global economic actor" (3), but also to highlight its "compelled political and economic restructuring following the 1997–1998 crisis" (3). As such, therefore, the monograph is not merely a review of the "economy of the moment of transition" (3), but also "this economy's material embodiment" (3).

The book is divided in six substantive chapters, preceded by an introduction and followed by a concluding note. The chapters use a select set of films to discuss specific themes that accompany post-IMF social re-organizations, including social anxiety and nostalgia, salarymen, unemployment and gendered labour, gangsters (a fairly typical trope in East Asian cinema), globalization (*segyehwa*) punk, finance, and in the last two chapters wrapped around an analysis of late US hegemony, notions and practices of computer-generated imagery and the wire shot.

What emerges is a poignant analysis of two inter-twined themes that run through the book: the financial crisis as a context and a source of inspiration for Korea's post-1998 cinema, and the broader systemic environment of US hegemony.

In this monograph Jeon unpacks and critically examines how the daily struggles of individual people are intertwined with and shaped by the more structural challenges of Korean society and economy, revealing—through an analysis of several films from Bong Joon-ho's *Memories of Murder* to *Oldboy* and *Take care of my cat* is an indictment of flexible labour work environment and mass lay-offs in the context of wealth accumulation and growing disparities that define Korean society and the economy. That Korea, or that aspect of Korean society, is still here today, which makes the text relevant and still topical. Although the angle is often of individual struggles in the face of hardship, the author's main focus is systemic: where he focuses on 'revenge', the analysis is not personal, but structural (5), as Jeon crucially argues that such social problems structurally emerged at a time of decline in US hegemony, globally and in East Asia specifically.

As it well known thanks to a large scholarship on state-led development and the international political economy of East Asia, the IMF re-structuring programme indeed favoured multinational corporations' favourite business environment at the cost of ordinary people's flexible labour with no job security, and thus vicious competition between workers and the anger against the cooperate owners and anyone above unfolds in vicious circuits with zero-sum game (7). Drawing on Arrighi's work on signal and terminal crises, the author sees the Asian Financial Crisis as located between the "signal and terminal crisis" of US hegemony (8). The state-led economy in Korea was established together with a few highly performing large corporations such as Chaebol companies and the globalisation policies during the civilian Kim Young-sam government which led those multinational corporations to expand their business through loans and short term foreign investment. When finally one of the four dragons (East Asia's fast developing economies) were confronted with the Asian financial crisis the author borrows the Korean term such Asian financial crisis as 'IMF crisis'—which is obviously not the IMF's crisis but the crisis further imposed on Korea in the aftermath of the IMF re-structuring programmes—which allowed large multinational corporations to survive financial crisis favouring Western liberal market and multinational financial speculators. Critically, as is shown throughout the text, such 'remedy' to the financial crisis brought further polarization of Korea's society divided between the haves and have-nots with massive lay off.

The book insightfully contributes to the interdisciplinary scholarship connecting film and media studies with perspectives on the global political economy. Thus, it potentially attracts a wide readership from fields such as literature, film studies and also political economy, international relations, and politics. This is a timely book, both because of the current acclaim and prizes that *Parasite* has received and, more broadly, because of the huge popularity of

Korea's cultural products, from films to dramas and music. Jeon looks at the so called IMF cinema made after the financial crisis in Korea with a critical focus on the impact of the demise of US hegemony and its client state while Korea suffers in political economic transition between authoritarianism-cum-economic miracle to the imposed globalisation and the world financial speculation that hampered Korean companies' reckless investment fuelled by short term loans.

The potential audience is interdisciplinary and the book would be of interest to postgraduate students or a more advanced readership, particularly with some prior knowledge of film studies. In fact, because of the considerable prior knowledge of both the substantive issues and the content of the films themselves, the reviewer is left wondering whether readers should read film reviews first before watching the film themselves. Inevitably, there will be different views on this. Whilst this is certainly an erudite book which makes a contribution to the understanding of the Korean cinema and the film industry, it is not immediately straightforward for a reader not well versed in both literature, political theory and film studies to follow this book without having at the very least watched most of the films covered in the monograph. The challenge here is that many such films are not actually available unless we visit Korean Film archives. Some are available in VCR or DVD formats only, thus it is not quite possible to access such films unless visiting archives or libraries.

Overall, while this is certainly a very interesting and theoretically sophisticated book, the prose does not follow well because the author decided to pepper the text with constant foreign language borrowings, from Latin to French, which hinder the book's overall readability. Jargon tends to be a recurrent flaw of contemporary academic writing and this text is not an exception. While perhaps the author might have had a particular and specialised audience in mind, the themes' topicality and contemporary relevance to society (not only Korean) would have appealed to a much broader public.

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The *European Journal of Korean Studies* is a fully peer-reviewed, on-line journal that has been published since 1991 (formerly the *Papers of the British Association of Korean Studies*). Volumes 1–18 are available free for BAKS members from www.ejks.org.uk or by emailing Robert Winstanley-Chesters (treasurer@baks.org.uk).

The journal accepts manuscripts for articles within any area of the arts, humanities and social sciences that examine Korea in either contemporary or historical times. Submissions that include a comparative discussion of issues in other East Asian nations are welcome.

Persons submitting articles for consideration should note the following requirements:

1. Articles should be submitted only in English, using American spelling conventions.
2. The body of the manuscript should normally be around 5,000 words in length. Endnotes, bibliography, and other additional material are excluded from this word count.
3. The manuscript should use endnotes and follow the 'Chicago style' for references.
4. Romanization of East Asian names, place names and terms should follow the McCune-Reischauer system for Korean, Hepburn for Japanese, and pinyin for Chinese.
5. Where appropriate, the use of Chinese characters and indigenous scripts following the initial occurrence of a term is encouraged. Use Batang font whenever possible.
6. The manuscript should be submitted as a Microsoft Word file attachment and should be written in double-spaced Times Roman 12 point font. This rule applies to both the text of the article and its section headings. All endnotes should be in Times Roman 10 point font. All inserted East Asian characters should be in 11 point font in the text and all East Asian characters in the notes should be in 9 point font.
7. The page format should be set for A4 size with **left-hand justification only**.
8. The manuscript should have a separate cover page that gives the full name of the author, academic affiliation, and full postal and email contact details. The cover page should also have a one-paragraph summary of the contents of the article, and five (5) key words.

9. The first page of the text of the manuscript should have only the title of the article at top. The name of the author(s) should NOT be included.
10. All materials should be submitted to the Managing Editor, Dr, Robert Winstanley-Chesters at r.winstanley-chesters@leeds.ac.uk
11. The Editorial Board intends that an author should know within two months of the submission of an article about the success of his or her submission.

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